Romagnolo v Lighting Design Assoc., Inc.

Supreme Court, Richmond County

Decided on April 24, 2026

Index No. 150716/2023

Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion No. 006) numbered 103-112 were read on this motion. The following papers were considered on plaintiffs' motion pursuant to CPLR §§ 3101, 3126, 5104 and 5015 [1]: the Notice of Motion and supporting affirmation of Joseph A. Romagnolo, Esq., dated March 23, 2026, with annexed Exhibits A through E; the affirmation in opposition of Christopher R. Travis, Esq., dated April 9, 2026; defendants' memorandum of law, dated April 9, 2026; and plaintiffs' reply affirmation, dated [*2]April 13, 2026.

II. Findings of Fact

This action arises from claims sounding in breach of contract, negligence, and related damages concerning the design and installation of a lighting system at plaintiffs' residence located at XX Redacted Lane, Staten Island, New York.

The procedural context is not merely background, it is dispositive. Following the filing of a Note of Issue on October 24, 2024 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 29), defendants sought extraordinary relief: post-Note of Issue access to plaintiffs' private residence. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 30). That relief was not granted in general terms. Rather, defendants narrowly framed their request around a single, specifically identified expert, Lenny Rampulla, R.A., and represented to this Court that his inspection was necessary for the formulation of his expert opinions concerning the lighting system. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 105). The narrow framing particularized that the evaluation and opinion would be one that was conducted and produced, respectively, by Mr. Rampulla. (see id).

After motion practice and oral argument, this Court issued its Decision and Order dated September 10, 2025. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 107). The Order did not grant open-ended access. (see id). It did not authorize an inspection by "defendants," nor by an undefined group of consultants. (see id). It instead provided, in clear and deliberate language:

"Defendant Expert Lenny Rampulla, RA shall be permitted to conduct one inspection of the premises . . . " (see id at page 6).

The Court's directive was therefore both limited and person-specific, reflecting the precise relief requested and the justification offered.

It is undisputed that an inspection was thereafter conducted. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 110 at ¶8). It is further undisputed that Mr. Rampulla was present. (see id at ¶9). However, the record equally establishes, and defendants expressly acknowledge, that Michelle Yang, an architectural lighting consultant, performed the operative technical functions during the inspection. (see id at ¶10). Those functions included the use of a light-measuring device, the recording of illumination levels, and the documentation of lighting conditions throughout the premises. (see id at ¶11-12).

Defendants further concede that Ms. Yang's subsequent expert disclosure is grounded in those very observations and measurements taken during the inspection. (see id).

Following the inspection, defendants served an expert disclosure dated January 22, 2026 identifying Ms. Yang as an expert witness whose testimony would be based upon the data she collected during that inspection. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 108).

Plaintiffs objected, asserting that Ms. Yang was neither disclosed nor authorized at the time of the inspection, and that defendants used a court-authorized inspection for one expert as a vehicle to generate expert proof for another. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 104; 112).

III. Conclusions of Law

A. The September 10, 2025 Order Was Specific, Deliberate, and Limiting

A court order must be enforced according to its terms (CPLR § 5104). Where, as here, a court grants post-Note of Issue access to a private residence, the scope of that access is to be [*3]construed narrowly and in strict conformity with the order issued.

The September 10, 2025 Order was not ambiguous. It did not authorize a general inspection. It did not authorize a "team." It did not contemplate undisclosed specialists. It authorized one inspection by one specifically identified expert, Lenny Rampulla, R.A.

That limitation was not incidental. It was central to the application. Defendants did not seek permission for a technical inspection by any qualified lighting professional. They sought permission for Rampulla's inspection, and represented that his personal inspection was necessary to form his expert opinions.

The Court granted precisely that relief, and no more.

B. Defendants Materially Exceeded the Scope of the Order

The record establishes that the operative inspection work, namely, the technical measurements, data collection, and documentation that form the evidentiary backbone of expert analysis, was performed by Michelle Yang, not by the expert named in the Court's Order. This is not a distinction without consequence. It is dispositive.

The Court rejects the proposition that the mere physical presence of the named expert satisfies the Order where the substantive inspection work is performed by another professional who later becomes an independent expert witness. Such a construction would render the Court's limitation illusory and would permit a party to obtain judicial relief on one basis and execute it on another.

The Court therefore finds that defendants' conduct constituted a material and substantive deviation from the terms of the Court's Order, amounting to an impermissible expansion of court-authorized access.

C. Substantial Compliance Does Not Apply

Defendants' reliance on the doctrine of substantial compliance (see Gibbs v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 16 NY3d 74 [2010]) is misplaced.

This is not a case of minor procedural variance. The identity of the inspecting expert was the central premise of the prior motion. The substitution, functional or otherwise, of another professional to perform the operative inspection work is a structural deviation, not a technical one.

Where the Court's authorization is person-specific, compliance must be person-specific.

D. Preclusion Is Necessary to Preserve the Integrity of the Court's Order

The Court turns to the appropriate remedy. CPLR § 3126 permits the Court to impose remedies where a party fails to comply with a court order. While preclusion is a significant remedy, it is warranted where necessary to preserve the integrity of judicial process and to prevent a party from benefitting from evidence obtained in excess of court-authorized discovery (see Henderson-Jones v City of New York, 87 AD3d 498 [1st Dept 2011]; McGilvery v New York City Tr. Auth., 213 AD2d 322 [1st Dept 1995]).

The Court emphasizes that its determination is not grounded in a finding of subjective bad faith. Rather, it rests upon an objective and structural concern: Judicially compelled access to a private residence, granted for a specific expert, may not be used as a vehicle to generate [*4]expert proof for another, undisclosed expert. To permit such use would undermine the authority of court orders and incentivize circumvention of their limitations.

E. The Prejudice Is Concrete, Procedural, and Not Curable Without Reopening Discovery

The Court further finds that the prejudice to plaintiffs is substantial and not curable by lesser means. The inspection occurred pursuant to a post-Note of Issue order. Defendants thereafter disclosed Ms. Yang as a new expert whose opinions are grounded in measurements taken during that inspection.

Permitting such testimony would, as a practical matter, require plaintiffs to: retain a new, specialized lighting expert, replicate technical measurements, and engage in responsive expert analysis, thereby necessitating the reopening of expert discovery after the filing of the Note of Issue.

This is not routine prejudice. It is procedural disruption of the litigation posture fixed by the Note of Issue. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the prejudice is neither speculative nor curable through ordinary disclosure mechanisms.

F. Preclusion Is the Only Proportionate Remedy

The defect identified is not peripheral, it goes to the foundation of Ms. Yang's proposed testimony. Her opinions are inseparable from the inspection conducted in excess of the Court's authorization.

Accordingly, lesser remedies would not meaningfully address the violation.

Preclusion here is not punitive. It is restorative, ensuring that evidence obtained beyond the scope of court-authorized discovery does not enter the trial.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion is granted to the extent that the Court finds that defendants materially exceeded the scope of this Court's Decision and Order dated September 10, 2025; and it is further

ORDERED that defendants are precluded from offering the testimony of Michelle Yang at trial, or from introducing any evidence derived from her inspection of the subject premises; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of plaintiffs' motion seeking vacatur of the September 10, 2025 Order is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that all other relief requested is DENIED.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: April 24, 2026

Staten Island, New York

HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR.

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT