Matter of K.C. v M.J.P.

Family Court, New York County

Decided on April 24, 2026

File No. 270187

Jaimee L. Nelsen, J.

On February 20, 2026, Support Magistrate Marsha M. Wright ("Support Magistrate") issued an Order on Motion ("Order") and Findings of Fact. The Order vacated the registration of foreign orders dated October 3, 2022 and October 5, 2023 and an Income Execution Order ("IEO") issued on March 22, 2024 and filed by the respondent, M.J.P ("Respondent").

On or about March 21, 2026, Respondent filed a timely objection to the Support Magistrate's Order. The objection was timely served on the petitioner, K.C. ("Petitioner") and on Petitioner's counsel on or about March 23, 2026.

First, Respondent argues that the Support Magistrate erred by treating the New Hampshire registration ruling as dispositive and that she failed to independently apply the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("UISFA"). According to the Respondent, New York is [*2]under no obligation to follow a New Hampshire decision as New York must follow the UIFSA statutory procedure under F.C.A. § 580-601 or 607(a) when deciding whether or not to register the foreign orders and the IEO. Respondent contends that by treating the New Hampshire decision as dispositive, the Support Magistrate expanded the statutory defenses enumerated in F.C.A. § 580-601 or 607(a) beyond those expressly enumerated. Respondent argues that UIFSA's "uniformity" principle does not apply because the principle is intended to maintain a single controlling support order as opposed to requiring responding states to adopt each other's enforcement determinations.

Next, Respondent argues that the Support Magistrate erred in treating the New Hampshire decision as invalidating the Mexican support orders. According to Respondent, the Support Magistrate's findings misstate the scope of the New Hampshire proceedings and the requirements of UIFSA. Respondent asserts that the New Hampshire court proceeding did not have the authority to determine that the Mexican support order is overarchingly invalid. The New Hampshire decision addressed only whether the orders would be enforced in New Hampshire, and not whether the orders from Mexico were invalid. Thus, the Support Magistrate mischaracterized the New Hampshire proceeding and treats that ruling as a determination of invalidity despite the absence of such adjudication.

Further, Respondent states that the Support Magistrate erred in according dispositive effect to the New Hampshire personal jurisdiction ruling under principles of Full Faith and Credit. Respondent argues that New York must make its own determination as to whether the orders should be registered and any challenge to the Mexican court's jurisdiction was required to be raised in the issuing tribunal, Mexico.

Finally, Respondent argues that the Support Magistrate erred in declining to assess whether the Respondent had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in New Hampshire. Respondent's position is that under the collateral estoppel analysis, the Support Magistrate would have found that the Respondent was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate in New Hampshire.

As such, Respondent seeks to vacate the Support Magistrate's Order and to reinstate the registration of the foreign orders and associated income execution order petitions for further proceedings under F.C.A. § 580-607.

Petitioner filed a timely rebuttal to Respondent's objection on April 6, 2026. In his rebuttal, Petitioner argues that the New Hampshire Supreme Court decision is dispositive and entitled to Full Faith and Credit because New York's statutory framework is not independent but uniform and dictated by UIFSA and the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act ("FFCCSOA"). Petitioner asserts that the New Hampshire Supreme Court vacated the Mexican orders based on lack of personal jurisdiction, the first defense under UIFSA. Petitioner argues that UIFSA cannot override the U.S. Constitution's demand that decisions of sister states be afforded full faith and credit as full faith and credit extends to determinations regarding personal jurisdiction.

Next, Petitioner argues that Mexico does not have continuing exclusive jurisdiction and there is no risk of a competing order because Mexico's underlying order is invalid in all fifty states. Petitioner argues that the plain language of FFCCSOA states that a child support order issued without personal jurisdiction over one of the parties does not have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Petitioner further asserts that Mexico does not have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under UIFSA because the Mexico order is a temporary order which was issued ex [*3]parte (See F.C.A. § 205[e]).

Finally, Petitioner argues that Respondent had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in New Hampshire in that Respondent raised the same issue in her unsuccessful New Hampshire appeal.

Therefore, Petitioner asks that this court affirm the Support Magistrate's Order vacating the registration of the Mexican orders and the IEO.

Relevant Background

On or about October 3, 2022, Respondent obtained a child support order in Mexico against Petitioner for their child in common, K.C.J.P (dob XX/XX/XXXX). On or about October 5, 2023, Respondent obtained a second order from Mexico, holding the Petitioner in contempt for violating the 2022 Mexican order.

On or about January 27, 2023, the Respondent filed to register the 2022 Mexican order in New Hampshire, where the Petitioner resides. Petitioner contested the registration of the out of state order in New Hampshire. On or about August 13, 2023, the New Hampshire Circuit Court granted Petitioner's motion to deny registration, deciding that Mexico did not have personal jurisdiction over Petitioner. Respondent appealed, and ultimately the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision on February 7, 2025.

On or about December 12, 2023, while Respondent's New Hampshire appeal was pending, Respondent filed a petition to register the Mexican out of state order in New York.

Both parties were represented by counsel in both the New Hampshire and New York proceedings. Petitioner filed a petition in New York on January 31, 2024, seeking to Vacate a Registration of an Out of State Order. On or about April 12, 2024, Petitioner filed a second petition in New York seeking to Vacate an Income Execution Order.

On or about August 5, 2024, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss both petitions before the Support Magistrate asserting that neither petition was filed timely. On or about November 7, 2024, Petitioner filed a notice of Cross Motion seeking an outright grant of relief requested in the Petition to Vacate the Registration of the Out of State Support Order and Petition to Vacate Income Execution Order, or in the alternative, a stay of all proceedings pending the New Hampshire Supreme Court's ruling. On or about April 28, 2025, the Support Magistrate issued a decision on the cross motions denying the portion of Respondent's Motion to Dismiss seeking dismissal of Petitioner's Petition to Vacate a Registration of an Out of State Order and scheduling the matter for a hearing on September 4, 2025, while staying any income execution order served in relation to the registered foreign order pending conclusion of the hearing to Vacate a Registration of an Out of State Order; granting the portion of Respondent's Motion to Dismiss seeking dismissal of the Petitioner's Petition to Vacate an Income Execution Order; and denying Petitioner's Cross Motion requesting an order granting his petitions or a stay of the instant proceedings.

Petitioner filed an objection to the Support Magistrate's decision on the cross motions requesting that the Family Court Judge reverse the Support Magistrate's Decision on Motion #2 and grant summary judgement in favor of the Petitioner on his Petition to Vacate a Registration of an Out of State Order and reinstate the Petition to Vacate the Income Execution Order.

On or about September 2, 2025, this court issued a decision on Petitioner's objection 1) denying Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Petitioner's Petition to Vacate a Registration of an Out of State Order, 2) granting the portion of the objection to the Support Magistrate's order [*4]dismissing the Petition to Vacate an Income Execution Order, 3) reinstating the Petition to Vacate the Income Execution Order and, 4) remanding the matters for further proceedings.

On or about October 24, 2026, the Support Magistrate held an attorney only conference at the request of Petitioner's attorney. During the conference, Petitioner's attorney requested that the Support Magistrate decide the threshold issue of whether there was claim and issue preclusion with respect to registering the Mexican order in New York given the New Hampshire decision. At the conclusion of the conference, the Support Magistrate set a motion schedule and calendared the matter for oral arguments on the threshold issue. The parties appeared before the Support Magistrate on February 4, 2026, and were given an opportunity to present oral arguments after having fully briefed the issue. The matter was further scheduled for a hearing on the merits, if deemed necessary, on March 24, 2026.

Legal Analysis

Upon review of the record, including the digital recordings therein, this court finds that Respondent's objection is denied.

F.C.A § 439(a) empowers support magistrates "to hear, determine, and grant any relief within the powers of the court" in proceedings properly before them. The support magistrate is granted broad discretion in evaluating the evidence and, therefore, the support magistrate's findings are entitled to great deference (see Minerva R. v. Jorge L.A., 59 AD3d 243 [1st Dept. 2009]). The determination of the support magistrate should not be disturbed upon objection unless no fair interpretation of the evidence can support the findings (see Bragdon v. Bragdon, 23 AD3d 203 [1st Dept. 2005]; Saperstein v. Lewenberg, 11 AD3d 289 [1st Dept. 2004]).

Here, the Support Magistrate determined that New York must afford full faith and credit to the New Hampshire decision that the Mexico Order is invalid because Mexico lacked personal jurisdiction under UIFSA.

Congress mandated that each state enact UIFSA in an effort to create nationally uniform child support standards. The requirement to adopt UIFSA supported the congressional goal to achieve uniformity in interstate cases (see Spencer v. Spencer, 10 NY3d 60, [2008]). New York State adopted the 1996 version of UIFSA on December 31, 1997, and codified it in F.C.A § 580-101. Id. In 2015, New York State adopted, as F.C.A. article 5-B, a new version of UIFSA which became effective in January of 2016. F.C.A. § 580-607 enumerates the defenses against registering or enforcing a foreign order in New York State and states in relevant part that "(a) A party contesting the validity or enforcement of a registered support order or seeking to vacate the registration has the burden of proving one or more of the following defenses: (1) the issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the contesting party."

The court finds Respondent's arguments unpersuasive. Respondent's position that the Support Magistrate expanded the statutory defenses enumerated in F.C.A. § 580-601 or 607(a) beyond those expressly enumerated by giving full faith and credit to the New Hampshire decision conflates the legal issues at hand. The Support Magistrate correctly applied the doctrine of Full Faith and Credit. New Hampshire's determination was based on a valid defense under UIFSA. Both New York and New Hampshire have adopted identical codifications of the lack of personal jurisdiction defense under UIFSA (see F.C.A § 580-607[a][1]; RSA 546-B:45[I][a]). Here, the New Hampshire Supreme Court conclusively determined that Mexico did not have personal jurisdiction over the Respondent, a defense which is explicitly articulated under UIFSA. As such, the Support Magistrate correctly determined that New York is under an [*5]obligation under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution to recognize New Hampshire's determination was that Mexico lacked personal jurisdiction over the Petitioner under UISFA.

Respondent's argument that New Hampshire decision addressed only whether the orders would be enforced in that state, and not whether the orders were valid is also unpersuasive. The Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act ("FFCCSOA") requires each state to give full faith and credit to another state's validly issued child support order (see 28 USC § 1738B). FFCCSOA plainly states that a child support order issued without personal jurisdiction over one of the parties does not have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Id. Indeed, the New Hampshire ruling renders the Mexican orders unenforceable in all states, including New York.

Respondent argues that the Support Magistrate erred in declining to assess whether the Respondent had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in New Hampshire. The record demonstrates otherwise.

The Support Magistrate correctly decided that this issue is beyond her purview. Respondent in this case was represented by counsel in New Hampshire, presented evidence on her case, made oral arguments, and appealed the New Hampshire decision. "It is clear that respondent was afforded [her] day in court with respect to every issue involved in the litigation, including the jurisdictional issue[s]. Under such circumstances, there is nothing in the concept of due process which demands that a defendant be afforded a second opportunity to litigate the existence of jurisdictional facts" (see Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 [1948]). The "doctrine of res judicata applies to adjudications relating either to jurisdiction of the person or of the subject matter where such adjudications have been made in proceedings in which those questions were in issue and in which the parties were given full opportunity to litigate." Id. Here, the Respondent motioned the New Hampshire Circuit Court to reopen the record which was denied. During those proceedings, the New Hampshire Circuit Court concluded that the additional facts asserted by the Respondent as the basis to reopen the record still did not support a finding that Mexico had personal jurisdiction over the Petitioner (see Petitioner's Rebuttal to Objections, Exhibit 1 ¶ 7). "After a party has his day in court, with opportunity to present his evidence and his view of the law, a collateral attack upon the decision as to jurisdiction there rendered merely retries the issue previously determined. There is no reason to expect that the second decision will be more satisfactory than the first" (see Sherrer v. Sherrer; citing Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 [1938]). Using the Respondent's argument, nothing could stop the Respondent from essentially moving from state to state and repeatedly relitigating the issue. UIFSA promotes uniformity, but it is achieved in conjunction with, not in opposition to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

Thus, Respondent's argument that New York must make its own determination as to whether the orders should be registered and whether Mexico had personal jurisdiction over the Petitioner is without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, Respondent's objection to the Support Magistrate's order Vacating the Registration of a Foreign Order and Income Execution Order is DENIED.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Notify the parties, counsel, Support Collections Unit and Support Magistrate.

Dated: April 24, 2026

New York, New York

JAIMEE L. NELSEN, F.C.J.