Cesario v Badr

Supreme Court, Kings County

Decided on April 24, 2026

Index No. 998/2025

Aaron D. Maslow, J.

The following papers were used on this motion: notice of motion, affidavit in support, affirmation of service after commencement of litigation, RJI, summons with notice, and sheriff's certificate of service of summons with notice.^FN1

Upon the foregoing papers, having heard oral argument ^FN2 from pro se plaintiff, and due deliberation having been had, the within motion is determined as follows.

Prior to the filing of this motion, plaintiff commenced this action by filing a summons with notice alleging the following:

Legal interference violation of patient rights, medical malpractice & negligence, misdiagnosis, improper treatment (failing to provide proper care such as denying patient food & water, elder abuse & neglect, assault & battery failing to provide food & water, intentional infliction of emotional distress.[^FN3]

On February 13, 2026, plaintiff filed a notice of motion, describing the relief sought as follows:

$100,000,000 & jail time. Dr. Badr banned me from seeing my mother. He ain't give my mother food, water, I.V., no kind of nourishment, he killed my mother. (I was my mothers POA)

In his affidavit of support, Plaintiff stated in support of his motion:

Dr. Badr was abusive, he don't care about the elderly, he abused his power. He was playing God.

"A notice of motion shall specify the time and place of the hearing on the motion, the supporting papers upon which the motion is based, the relief demanded and the grounds therefor. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded." (CPLR 2214.)

It appears that the relief plaintiff seeks in this motion is a judgment in the amount of $100,000,000 and the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment upon "Dr. Badr," whose first name is not identified. The Court is unable to grant this relief. It is clear that plaintiff, proceeding in a pro se capacity, lacks an understanding of how civil litigation operates.

First, a court of civil jurisdiction cannot impose a sentence of imprisonment. Notably, "Where a violation of a right admits of both a civil and criminal prosecution, the one is not merged in the other" (CPLR 106; see Shaul v Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 131 Misc 401 [Sup Ct, Montgomery County], affd 224 AD 773 [3d Dept 1928]).

Second, plaintiff has failed to articulate a legal basis for being awarded a sum of money at this stage. As far as this Court's review of filings with the County Clerk is concerned, the person described as Dr. Badr was not even served with the summons with notice. There is a sheriff's certificate of service upon Woodhull Hospital. Woodhull Hospital has not appeared. Plaintiff does not request a default judgment against Woodhull Hospital in light of its nonappearance.

Even if this motion were construed as one for a default judgment against Woodhull Hospital, it fails because there is no showing of "proof of the facts constituting the claim" (CPLR 3214 [f]). Plaintiff has not presented any details as to how anyone mistreated, misdiagnosed, or did harm to his mother, whose name is not mentioned.

Certainly, plaintiff cannot be awarded summary judgment on liability in the absence of an answer to a complaint, of which there is none (see CPLR 3213 [a] ["Any party may move for summary judgment in any action, after issue has been joined"]).

"In order to establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice, a plaintiff must prove (1) the standard of care in the locality where the treatment occurred, (2) that the defendant[s] breached that standard of care, and (3) that the breach of the standard was the proximate cause of injury" (Pieter v Polin, 148 AD3d 1193, 1194 [2d Dept 2017] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Both the notice of motion and plaintiff's affidavit are woefully deficient of details of the alleged wrongful conduct on the part of Dr. Badr and Woodhull Hospital. Plaintiff has not set forth the applicable standard of care in the locality where the treatment occurred, how the defendants breached said standard of care, and how the breach was a proximate cause of injury or death.

Plaintiff is not the first pro se person commencing an action who is not knowledgeable regarding the process of litigation: The norm is to commence an action and effectuate service of the summons and complaint or summons with notice on the defendants; a defendant must interpose an answer to a complaint after the complaint is served (issue is joined); discovery ensues; motion practice may take place; if the action is neither dismissed nor settled, a note of issue filed by the plaintiff places the action on the trial calendar and a trial is conducted; if a defendant has defaulted and the plaintiff obtains a default order, an inquest will be scheduled after the filing of a note of issue by the plaintiff.

Plaintiff has utilized the services of the Kings County Court Help Center by completing forms he was provided with. It is frustrating for the Court to observe these forms completed by plaintiffs who lack knowledge as to the legal predicates for filing them as well as knowledge of the need for compliance with legal mandates as to specific content. The Court cannot provide legal advice and neither can the Help Center. In Moncion v Moncion (84 Misc 3d 1224[A], 2024 NY Slip Op 51513[U], *2 n 2 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2025]), the Court wrote:

This Court has previously observed, "Apparently, since 'the Kings County Court Help Center is prohibited by law from giving legal advice and can not complete forms on your behalf' (https://ww2.nycourts.gov/courts/2jd/kings/civil/helpcenter.shtml [last accessed Sept. 14, 2024]), pro se plaintiffs are bypassing the CPLR's requirements concerning how to commence actions" (Park v DeJonge, 83 Misc 3d 1293[A], 2024 NY Slip Op 51274, *1 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2024]). The prohibition against giving legal advice is also resulting in pro se litigants filling in blanks on template motion forms without complying with CPLR requirements. It appears that pro se litigants are under the impression that they can seek the totality of the relief requested in a complaint by filing a motion immediately after filing the complaint. (Some do not even file complaints.) This betrays a [*2]misunderstanding of the legal process whereby ultimate determinations might not be made on the underlying merits for several years until after discovery, filing of a note of issue, and a trial taking place. Even if pro se motions are to be construed as ones for summary judgment, the inarticulate nature of many submissions deprives the court of the ability to afford them due consideration. The frustrations of according pro se litigants due consideration of their positions was discussed in Chrysler Credit Corp. v Smith (157 Misc 2d 56 [Civ Ct, Kings County 1993]).

The Court recognizes that pro se litigants might not be familiar with legal procedures (e.g. Brown v Lavine, 45 AD2d 753 [2d Dept 1974] [new administrative hearing afforded pro se individual who erroneously thought pre-hearing off-the-record defense presented to hearing officer was on the record]), and that certain latitude may be afforded (e.g. Haverlin v Gottlieb, 49 Misc 3d 131[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51750[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Dists. 2015] [motion providently construed as one to renew]; Bank Trust Natl. Assn. v Dubrowski, 2024 WL 3312482 [Sup Ct, NY County 2024] [court will examine claim under uncited provision as well as cited one]; Matter of J.E.P. v People, 9 Misc 3d 1104[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51397[U] [Fam Ct, Nassau County 2005] [incorrect caption and minor technical deficiencies in papers excused]).

A benevolent observation concerning pro se parties was recently articulated by the Third Department:

Plaintiff has sought relief in various forms and has been repeatedly rebuffed because of procedural errors made by virtue of his pro se status and lack of familiarity with the CPLR and applicable court rules. "Implicit in the right to self-representation is an obligation on the part of the court to make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights because of their lack of legal training. While the right does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law, it should not be impaired by [a] harsh application of technical rules" (Traguth v Zuck, 710 F2d 90, 95 [2d Cir 1983] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Stephen W. v Christina X., 80 AD3d 1083, 1084 [3d Dept 2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 712 [2011]; Matter of Elliot v Marble, 49 AD3d 923, 925 [3d Dept 2008]; Matter of Mosso v Mosso, 6 AD3d 827, 828 [3d Dept 2004]; see also Duckstein v Rosa, 118 AD2d 951, 952 [3d Dept 1986]; Du-Art Film Labs. v Wharton Intl. Films, 91 AD2d 572, 573-574 [1st Dept 1982]). (Briggs v Fresenius, 247 AD3d 1426, — [3d Dept 2026, 3-2 decision]).

Even so, "A self-represented litigant acquires no greater rights than any other litigant (see Duffen v. State, 245 AD2d 653, 665 N.Y.S.2d 978; Brooks v. Inn at Saratoga Assn., 188 AD2d 921, 591 N.Y.S.2d 625)" (Greenfield v Gluck, 2003 WL 1961333 [App Term 2d & 11th Dists 2003] [untimely summary judgment motion]). A pro se party's lack of understanding of the legal process does not, by itself, does not constitute a reasonable excuse, as was demonstrated in OneWest Bank, N.A. v Jacobs (234 AD3d 983, 985 [2d Dept 2025]):

Here, the defendant failed to proffer a reasonable excuse for the nearly 12-year delay between the plaintiff's rejection of her answer as untimely and her seeking leave to serve [*3]a late answer. Her attorney's explanation that "as a Pro se litigant, [the defendant] was not well-educated in motion practice and did not understand that she needed to cross-move to ask the Court to accept her own late Answer in addition to filing opposition to motions" does not constitute a reasonable excuse for the delay (see Stein v Doukas, 157 AD3d at 744; Chase Home Fin., LLC v Minott, 115 AD3d 634, 634 [2014]).

Therefore, a pro se plaintiff must still be required to articulate a basis in law for granting the relief he seeks.

Affording plaintiff wide latitude, the Court must deny his motion. He failed to serve Dr. Badr. He failed to provide sufficient details as to any wrongdoing on the part of the defendants. The Court cannot order imprisonment of Dr. Badr. The $100,000,000 sought cannot be awarded since no motion for a default (or at least a motion which could be construed as one seeking a default and complying with CPLR 3214 [f]) was made; and, absent an answer from the defendants, there can be no summary judgment.

Since the grounds for Plaintiff's motion are inadequately described (see CPLR 2214) and the relief sought not available as a matter of law based on his assertions, as discussed herein, Plaintiff's motion seeking $100,000,000 and "jail time" for Dr. Badr is DENIED.