People v Bojanowski

Justice Court of the Town of Amherst, Erie County

Decided on April 23, 2026

Case No. XXXXX

Jeffrey E. Marion, J.

Defendant, Chad Bojanowski, made a motion to suppress evidence of Driving while Intoxicated as a result of a traffic stop in a parking lot. Defendant claims that the evidence was obtained in violation of the "community caretaker" doctrine outlined in the Court of Appeals decision in People v. Brown, (42 NY3d 270 [2024]). For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion is denied in all respects.

FACTS

On November 17, at approximately 4:37 a.m., Officer Dowse of the Amherst Police Department received a dispatch to check on a vehicle parked at the Home Depot on Niagara Falls Boulevard with the lights on, loud music playing, and a male passed out in the vehicle. Upon arriving, Officer Dowse observed the vehicle parked facing the southeast corner of the building with the lights on, loud music playing, and the driver slumped in the driver seat.

The driver, later identified as Defendant Chad Bojanowski, was initially unresponsive to patrol officers. Defendant allegedly awoke when Officer Dowse shook the vehicle. Defendant appeared disoriented upon waking up. He placed his vehicle into drive and attempted to drive away from the parking lot. Amherst Police then pursued Defendant's vehicle. Defendant stopped once police had activated their overhead lights.

After stopping, Defendant exited his vehicle. As a result of that encounter outside the vehicle, the police obtained evidence that led them to believe Defendant was intoxicated. They then placed Mr. Bojanowski under arrest for Driving While Intoxicated. This Court arraigned the Defendant on January 9, 2025.

On April 21, 2025 Defendant, through his counsel Francis C. Amendola, Esq., made a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop People v. Ingle (36 NY2d 413, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 [1975]). On March 16, 2026, a hearing was held on that motion ^FN1.

The People called one witness, Officer Dowse. Under oath, and on the record, Officer Dowse confirmed he was responding to a welfare check at the Home Depot on Niagara Falls Boulevard in the Town of Amherst. When he arrived, he testified that he could hear the music "blasting" from the inside of his police cruiser. He identified the vehicle as a black Tesla with the lights on. Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Dowse testified that he could hear the speakers "crackling." He found the driver, whom he identified in open court as the Defendant, [*2]unconscious in the driver's seat with his head down and to the side. Officer Dowse testified that he could not wake the Defendant by knocking on the window or shining his flashlight into the vehicle. The officer also testified that the loud music was playing the whole time he was attempting to wake the Defendant.

After shaking the vehicle, the Defendant woke up. Officer Dowse testified that Defendant "appeared disoriented." Defendant then drove away from the police. Officer Dowse testified that he got back into his patrol vehicle, activated his overhead lights, and pursued the Defendant's vehicle for 200 yards before Defendant came to a stop. At that point Defendant exited the vehicle.

Defense counsel did not offer any witnesses at the hearing. After hearing testimony, The Court reserved decision.

ANALYSIS

At a hearing to determine whether there was reasonable or probable cause to arrest a defendant, the prosecution bears the burden of production. They must establish, at the outset, that the police officers' actions were lawful under the constitutional search-and-seizure law. If they do, the burden shifts to the defense to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that any specific act was unlawful (See, e.g., People v. Harris, 192 AD3d 151, 157-58, 138 N.Y.S.3d 593 [2d Dept. 2020]). The Court must therefore take each act, analyze whether the prosecutor met their burden of production, and if so, analyze whether the defense met their burden of proof.

When analyzing the police act, what matters is what the officer knew at the time of the intrusion, and not what the police gathered after the fact ( People v. Sanchez 38 NY2d 72, 76 [1975] [noting that reviewing courts must look to "the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure"]; Farquharson v. United Parcel Service 202 AD3d 923, 926 [2d Dept. 2022] [noting that reviewing courts must look to "the sum of the [objective] information known to the police at the time" of the intrusion]).

The constitutionality of police actions is usually reviewed under the four-tier framework of People v. De Bour, 40 NY2d [1976]. First, police may approach a person and request basic, non-threatening information if they have an objective, credible, and articulable reason to do so (Id.). Such a reason need not be necessarily indicative of criminal activity (Id. at 222-23). Second, police may ask more pointed questions, but may not seize a person where they have founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot (Id.). Third, police may temporarily detain a person when then have probable cause the person has committed a crime (Id.).

In People v. Brown, 42 NY3d 270 [2024], the Court of Appeals laid out the two-step analysis when adjudicating police actions under the "community-caretaking" doctrine. The analysis "weigh[s] dual concerns: first, that police 'are often called upon to provide historically grounded, and usually welcome, aide to those in distress;' and second, 'the risk that the community caretaking doctrine may be used by police to circumvent the federal and state constitutional rights afforded to citizens to protect them from unreasonable and unwarranted police intrusions.'" (Id. at 276).

Because "the community caretaking doctrine is subject to abuse," Brown stresses that "suppression courts" must "carefully scrutinize" an officer's "community-caretaking" actions (Id. at 281). That scrutiny must proceed as follows. First, the "officers must point to specific, objective, and articulable facts that would lead a reasonable officer to conclude that an occupant of the vehicle is in need of assistance." (Id. at 276). There must be an "objective basis" to "support the officer's claimed belief" that assistance was needed. (Id. at 277). An objective [*3]analysis is not dependent on "the subjective belief of the officer." (Id. at 277 n.2). Second, "the police intrusion must be narrowly tailored to address the perceived need for assistance." (Id. at 276). "Once the officer is assured that the citizen is not in peril or is no longer in need of assistance or that the peril has been mitigated, then any actions beyond that constitute a seizure." (Id. at 279).

The Second Department held in People v. Khan (182 Misc 2d 83 [2d Dept. 1997]) that the police officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant when the officer found the defendant asleep at the wheel with the engine running.

In People v. Kaster (James) 131 N.Y.S.3d 781; 2020 NY Misc. LEXIS 7733 [2d Dept. 2020]), the arresting deputy testified at a suppression hearing that, while on patrol, he saw a vehicle parked in a large parking lot. The vehicle's engine was running, and the driver's side door was open. Upon approaching the vehicle to investigate whether anyone was injured, the deputy observed the defendant passed out in the driver's seat, his head resting on the steering wheel. A large pile of vomit was on the ground outside of the open door. The Second Department held that the deputy possessed reasonable cause to arrest the defendant. (Id.).

Kaster's fact patter is nearly identical to the case at bar. Officer Dowse was called to the scene to find a car with the lights on and loud music emanating from it. Upon approaching, Officer Dowse found the Defendant passed out at the wheel of the car. Attempts to rouse the Defendant by shining a flashlight into the vehicle and shaking the car failed to wake the Defendant. When the Defendant did regain consciousness, Officer Dowse testified that he seemed "confused." Based on the Second Department's holding in Kaster, supra, Officer Dowse had reasonable cause to stop the Defendant, make further inquiry, and arrest the Defendant for suspicion of Driving While Intoxicated.

In People v. Delgado, 2023 NY Misc. LEXIS 43999, 2023 NY Slip Op 34724, a police officer in Yorktown Heights received a dispatch reporting a disabled vehicle at the intersection of Route 129 and Croton Avenue. The officer arrived at the scene he found defendant's vehicle parked partially on the roadway and the shoulder. The officer observed the defendant asleep in the driver's seat, with the keys in the ignition and the engine running. The officer knocked on the driver's side window approximately twelve (12) times for a wellness check. The defendant was not responsive. The officer was able to open the unlocked driver's side door. When he opened the door, he detected an odor of alcoholic beverage and observed a bottle of beer and a red Solo cup in the front area of the vehicle.

The Court, citing Kaster, supra, found that the People had met their burden to go forward with sufficient evidence to establish the propriety of the initial encounter, the legality of the detention, and the seizure of the defendant. The Court also held that the defendant was unable to establish unconstitutionality or impropriety warranting suppression, and denied the defendant's motion to suppress (Id. at 8).

Defendant's post-hearing submission, relies heavily on Brown. However, the Defendant's narrow reading of the Brown holding asks This Court to ignore the facts of the case and the objective findings of Officer Dowse when arriving on the scene. Defendant states, correctly, that Officer Dowse did not specifically testify that Mr. Bojanowski "was in need of aid." Defendant also argues that: "the need [for aid] clearly dissipated when Mr. Bojanowski woke up and began to drive away." (Def. Memo of Law at 4). That argument lacks merit.

The People's post-hearing submission, likewise, relies on Brown. The People rightfully argue that: "It is clear Amherst Police met their burden [under Brown] with respect to this stop." [*4](Richer Aff. at ¶12). The People note that the police's initial attempts to determine if the Defendant was conscious were minimally intrusive. The People also argue that, after the Defendant woke up, appeared disoriented, and tried to drive away, Amherst Police had reasonable suspicion to pull the vehicle over for further investigation.

DECISION

Under the De Bour framework, the police lawfully approached the Defendant's car. Where police come upon a car that is already parked, it's engine running, and loud music blasting from the vehicle, their actions are analyzed under De Bour's first level (See People v. Eugenio, 185A.D.3d [2d Dept. 2020] [approaching legally parked car with engine running was level one]).

In the case at bar, Officer Dowse received a call about a parked vehicle at the Home Depot in Amherst, New York. Upon arriving at the scene, he saw the Defendant's vehicle parked, with loud music coming from the vehicle. Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Dowse found the Defendant unconscious and initially unresponsive. After the Defendant regained consciousness, Officer Dowse testified that the Defendant was "confused" and "disoriented." Defendant then started to drive away from the scene.

The People presented objective evidence that Defendant needed assistance. He was passed out at the wheel of his vehicle, despite loud music blaring from the vehicle's sound system. After waking the Defendant, he appeared "confused" and "disoriented." The peril or danger had not, in fact, dissipated. When the Defendant, while confused and disoriented tried to drive away, the danger to himself and others increased exponentially. Therefore, suppression of evidence pursuant to Brown is not warranted.

Once the Defendant sought to drive away, the police had a reasonable suspicion and probable cause to stop the vehicle. At the very least, the police had a sufficient basis to stop the vehicle to prevent a driver who appeared to be incoherent from entering the roadway-especially a roadway as busy as Niagara Falls Boulevard. The Defendant stopped his vehicle, and exited the vehicle to speak with officers. The evidence of intoxication police discovered as a result of that encounter was lawfully obtained.

I therefore find that the People have met their burden pursuant to Ingle, De Bour, and Brown to go forward with sufficient evidence to establish the propriety of the initial encounter, the legality of the detention, and the arrest of the Defendant. I also find that the Defendant was unable to establish unconstitutionality or impropriety warranting suppression.

Defendant's Motion to suppress the evidence of the stop is therefore DENIED in all respects.

Dated: April 23, 2026

The Hon. Jeffrey E. Marion, J. J.C.