Johnson-El v Cogent Waste Solutions

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County

Decided on April 22, 2026

Docket No. CV-016649-25/KI

Tehilah H. Berman, J.

Pro-se plaintiff Jeremiah Johnson-El ("plaintiff" or "Johnson-EL) filed a summons with endorsed complaint against defendant Cogent Waste Solutions ("defendant" or "Cogent"), a waste management company, on September 10, 2025. The complaint alleged that the "nature and substance of the plaintiff's cause of action is as follows: Breach of contract or Warranty for $50,000.00 with interest from 9/10/2025." In a filing dated 10/24/25, labeled "Affidavit in support of motion(s) for Summary judgment," plaintiff identified himself in the caption as follows: "Jeremiah Johnson-EL Sui Juris, In Propria Persona, Moorish American National, All Rights Reserved/UCC 1-308, 3-402(b)." In that filing, he claimed that he was subject to malicious acts of discrimination, fraud, hate crimes, bias and prejudice crimes, that he was terminated because his "religious status and nationality makes them all uncomfortable and feel unsafe." In another filing dated 10/24/25, entitled "Motion to Vacate Judgement," plaintiff claimed that another employee "stated that my Islamic status and Moorish Nationality was a problem as per office staff, and the staff does not like it or me, my energy doesn't sit well with the office staff." Plaintiff further claimed in his filings that he was subject to retaliation for having asked for his time sheets to prove that he was owed 30 hours of overtime. Defendant moved to dismiss and impose sanctions on plaintiff for frivolous conduct, as he was terminated for cause, namely, sleeping while on duty as a truck driver. Alternatively, defendant moved to compel arbitration.

Plaintiff, as an employee of South East Personnel Leasing, Inc. ("SPLI"), was leased to Cogent as a truck driver. He worked for Cogent from August 4, 2025 to September 11, 2025. Prior to becoming a leased employee of SPLI, plaintiff was required to sign and accept the terms [*2]of the SPLI Employee Leasing Application (the "Agreement"). One of the conditions was that plaintiff agreed to arbitrate all employment-related disputes with SPLI or his "temporary staffing employer," i.e., Cogent, that could not be resolved internally. [Agreement, Section V]. Employment related disputes included claims for breach of contract, negligence, torts, unpaid wages or other compensation-related claims, discrimination, harassment or retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and other federal, state and local laws. Plaintiff also agreed to "waive the right to have covered disputes decided by a judge or jury." Plaintiff further agreed and acknowledged that the Agreement "involves interstate commerce and the interpretation and enforcement of the arbitration provisions will be governed by the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, et seq, [the "FAA"] to the exclusion of any different or inconsistent state or local law, ordinance, or judicial rule." Plaintiff signed the Agreement on August 4, 2026 as "Johnson EL Jeremiah UCC 1-308." Immediately above his signature was the following statement: "I have read or have had read to me, and understand the ...I. APPLICANT ACKNOWLEDGMENT, II. SAFE WORKING PRACTICES ACKNOWLEDGMENT, III. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE POST-ACCIDENT/REASONABLE SUSPICION PROGRAM, IV. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG POLICY, AND V. ARBITRATION AGREEMENT."

It appears that plaintiff used UCC 1-308 as the basis for his "Reservation of Rights." This provision states that "[a] party that with explicit reservation of rights performs or promises performance or assents to performance in a manner demanded or offered by the other party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved." UCC 1-308(a). The Commentary to U.C.C. § 1-308 explains: "This section provides machinery for the continuation of performance along the lines contemplated by the contract despite a pending dispute, by adopting the mercantile device of going ahead with delivery, acceptance, or payment 'without prejudice,' 'under protest,' 'under reserve,' 'with reservation of all our rights,' and the like." See, Yashar'El v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168750, *7 (N.D. Tex, Amarillo Division 8/29/25) (the provision is "intended to enable a party in a commercial transaction to accept the other side's continued performance without waiving the right to sue for breach of contract"). This court finds that this provision does not support or detract from plaintiff's breach of contract claim, as it is one of the arguments sovereign citizens use to demonstrate that "they are their own sovereigns and not United citizens," and "claim as grounds for this belief the Uniform Commercial Code." Yashar'El, supra, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168750 at *7.

The FAA provides that a written arbitration provision in "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 USC § 2; Wu v. Uber Tech., Inc., 43 NY3d 288, 297 (2024); Diamond Waterproofing Sys. v. 55 Liberty Owners Corp., 4 NY3d 247, 252 (2005). The courts have "consistently recognized New York's 'long and strong public policy favoring arbitration.'" Wu, supra, 43 NY3d at 297. In consideration of that policy, "New York courts interfere as little as possible with the freedom of consenting parties to submit disputes to arbitration." Smith Barney Shearson Inc. v. Sacharow, 91 NY2d 39, 49-50 (1997). Arbitration agreements are "simply contracts" and are "strictly a matter of consent." Wu, supra, 43 NY3d at 298. A valid and enforceable arbitration agreement has been found to exist where the party subject to the agreement has signed it and made the written representation that they [*3]reviewed it and consented to its terms. See, Patel v. Macys Inc., 168 AD3d 632, 632 (1st Dept. 2019); Urban v. 35 E. 19th St. Medicine, P.C., 2024 NY Slip Op 34522(U), 2024 NY Misc. LEXIS 25614, *2-3 (Sup. Ct. NY Co. 2024).

CPLR § 7503(a) provides: "Where there is no substantial question whether a valid agreement was made or complied with, and the claim sought to be arbitrated is not barred by limitation under subdivision (b) of section 7502, the court shall direct the parties to arbitrate." The court must consider the following three threshold questions in reviewing a motion to compel arbitration: "(1) whether the parties made a valid agreement to arbitrate; (2) if so, whether the agreement has been complied with; and (3) whether the claim sought to be arbitrated would be time-barred if it were asserted in State court." Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 85 NY2d 193, 201-202 (1995). Plaintiff claims that the Agreement is null and void because it is illegible; thus, he never agreed to the arbitration provision contained within. Defendant claims that the copy Johnson-El references is illegible simply due to it being copied several times and contends that the original document was legible at the time of the Agreement.

To be enforceable, an arbitration agreement "must be clear, explicit and unequivocal[,] and must not depend upon implication or subtlety." Sutphin Retail One, LLC v Sutphin Airtrain Realty, LLC, 143 AD3d 972, 973 (2d Dept. 2016). CPLR § 4544 provides: "The portion of any printed contract or agreement involving a consumer transaction or a lease for space to be occupied for residential purposes where the print is not clear and legible or is less than eight points in depth or five and one-half points in depth for upper case type may not be received in evidence in any trial, hearing or proceeding on behalf of the party who printed or prepared such contract or agreement, or who caused said agreement or contract to be printed or prepared." However, plaintiff did not present evidence pertaining to the size of the font. This court finds that while the copy of the Agreement affixed to plaintiff's opposition to the motion filed on February 10, 2026 is illegible, the version of the Agreement contained in Exhibit A to defendant's motion to compel arbitration (seq. 2) is legible. Furthermore, plaintiff is not excused from the Agreement that he executed and agreed to by reason of his alleged inability or failure to read it. Valelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 464 F. Supp. 3d 634, 643 (S.D.NY 2020); Arnav Indus. v. Brown, Raysman, Millstein, Felder & Steiner, LLP, 96 NY2d 300, 304 (2001) Bishop v. Maurer, 33 AD3d 497, 500 (1st Dept. 2006); Gonzalez v. Seaz, 2026 NY Slip Op 30272(U), 2026 NY Misc. LEXIS 563, *1 (Sup. Ct. NY Co. 2026). See also, Guerra v. Astoria Generating Co., L.P., 8 AD3d 617, 618 (2d Dept. 2005) (A party who signs a document is "conclusively bound by its terms absent a valid excuse for having failed to read it").

This court finds that the Agreement is valid and enforceable since plaintiff signed it and confirmed above the signature line that he reviewed and consented to its terms. The Agreement contained a waiver of plaintiff's right to a trial before a judge and/or jury regarding any disputes and claims. Furthermore, the Agreement sets forth an exhaustive list of claims covered thereunder, which include plaintiff's claims for breach of contract, torts, discrimination, and retaliation. Finally, plaintiff has not shown that the Agreement was unconscionable to the extent that it required arbitration of his claims. See, Newton v. LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton Inc., 192 AD3d 540, 541 (1st Dept. 2021).Accordingly, defendant's motion to compel arbitration (seq. 2) is granted.

Where there is an agreement in place that disputes must be resolved through arbitration, [*4]judicial proceedings must be stayed pending arbitration. FAA § 3; CPLR § 7503(a); Schiffer v Slomin's, Inc., 48 Misc 3d 15, 18 (App. Term 2d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, an order granting a motion to compel "shall operate to stay a pending . . . action." Wilson v PBM, LLC, 193 AD3d 22, 40 (2d Dept. 2021). The word "shall" "creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion." Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472, 475-476 (2024). Accordingly, defendant's motion for sanctions and to dismiss the action (seq. 1) are stayed pending the outcome of arbitration. This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: 4/22/2026

Hon. Tehilah H. Berman

Judge of the Civil Court, Kings County