Francilot v Mays

Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County

Decided on April 22, 2026

Index No. L&T 312959/25

Clinton J. Guthrie, J.

Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of respondent Teatra Mays' motion for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3212 (seq. 2):

Papers Numbered

Notice of Motion & All Documents Annexed 1 (NYSCEF #23-29)

Affirmation in Opposition 2 (NYSCEF #31)

Affirmation in Reply 3 (NYSCEF #33)

Upon the foregoing cited papers, the decision and order on respondent's motion is as follows.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This summary holdover proceeding based upon a 10-Day Notice to Cure and a 10-Day "Notice of Lease Termination" was filed in August 2025. Counsel for respondent Teatra Mays ("respondent") appeared in October 2025 and made a pre-answer motion to dismiss. By Decision/Order dated January 22, 2026, Judge Bryant F. Tovar denied the motion, determining that petitioner had not vitiated the notice of termination by accepting rent in the "window period" between the termination date and the commencement of the proceeding.

Thereafter, respondent interposed an answer. Respondent now moves for summary judgment. After multiple adjournments for briefing, this court heard argument on the motion for summary judgment on April 21, 2026.

DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION

On a motion for summary judgment, "the proponent . . . must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact[.] . . . Once this showing has been made, however, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action." (Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986] [internal citations omitted]).

Respondent first moves for summary judgment on the basis that the parties' lease does not contain a conditional limitation that would have permitted petitioner to terminate respondent's tenancy before the expiration of the lease and bring a summary proceeding. Petitioner opposes the motion in all respects. Respondent annexes a copy of the parties' lease, with a term from July 1, 2024 through June 30, 2026. The "Default" provision of the lease (Paragraph 27 [NYSCEF Doc. 20]) reads in relevant part as follows:

"If the Tenant fails to comply with any of the financial or material provisions of this Agreement, or of any present rules and regulations or any that may be hereafter prescribed by the Landlord, or materially fails to comply with any duties imposed on the Tenant by State law, within the time period after delivery of written notice by the Landlord specifying the non-compliance and indicate the intention of the Landlord to terminate this Agreement by reason thereof, the Landlord may terminate this Agreement."

For a conditional limitation to exist, "[t]he tenancy must have ended automatically by lapse of time and not by election of the landlord to forfeit the lease for breach of a condition." (Perrotta v Western Regional Off-Track Betting Corp., 98 AD2d 1, 2 [4th Dept 1983] [internal citations omitted]; see also Calvi v Knutson, 195 AD2d 828, 830 [3d Dept 1993]; Fourth Hous. Co., Inc. v Bowers, 53 Misc 3d 43, 45 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]). In Perrotta, the Court held that a conditional limitation existed where "the lease, once the five-day notice is served, expire[d] automatically on the happening of a specified contingency, the arrival of the termination date fixed in the notice." (Perrotta, 98 AD2d at 5 [internal citations omitted]). Here, in the Default provision in the parties' lease, by contrast, the termination will only occur upon the landlord's election, as indicated by the plain language ("the landlord may terminate the agreement" [emphasis added]). Accordingly, the lease does not include a conditional limitation. In the absence of a valid conditional limitation, petitioner did not have a basis to seek eviction via a summary holdover proceeding before the expiration of the lease (see Bowers, 53 Misc 3d at 45). Petitioner's remedy prior to the expiration of the lease would be via an ejectment action (Id.).

While dismissal shall eventuate upon the lack of a conditional limitation, the court also finds petitioner's notice to cure and notice of termination to be defective because they are impermissibly vague. The notices simply restate block language from various provisions of the lease and make conclusory statements regarding breaches of those provisions. A valid predicate notice must contain "clear, unambiguous and unequivocal" language (Ellivkroy Realty Corp. v. [*2]HDP 86 Sponsor Corp., 162 AD2d 238, 238 [1st Dept 1990]). The notices here lack salient details, such as dates and circumstances of the alleged breaches (see Hollis Partners, LLC v Artis, 73 Misc 3d 128[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 50888[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2021]; Singh v. Ramirez, 20 Misc 3d 142[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51680[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]). Additionally, the notice of termination did not "include 'new allegations about [respondent's] conduct arising' during the cure period." (415 E. 12th St. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp. v Duran, 246 AD3d 484, 486 [1st Dept 2026] [Quoting Tomfol Owners Corp. v Hernandez, 201 AD3d 453, 454 [1st Dept 2022]). Instead, the notice of termination only perfunctorily stated that "you have failed to cure and correct the above-referenced material breaches of substantial obligations of your tenancy." (See NYSCEF Doc. 28). Taken together, these defects are material and cannot be amended (see Chinatown Apts. v. Chu Cho Lam, 51 NY2d 786, 787 [1980]; Singh, 2008 NY Slip Op 51680[U], *1-2).

For each of these reasons, respondent has established that petitioner lacks a cause of action and is granted summary judgment as a result. The clerk shall issue a judgment dismissing the petition (see CPLR § 411). The court reaches no other issue raised in respondent's motion.

This Decision/Order will be filed to NYSCEF.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Dated: April 22, 2026

Queens, New York

HON. CLINTON J. GUTHRIE, J.H.C.