People v Lucas

Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County

Decided on April 27, 2026

Docket No. CR-028150-25BX

Craig J. Ortner, J.

Defendant Anthony Lucas is charged by information in connection with an incident in which he is alleged to have struck his wife with a door, causing her physical injury.

By motion dated February 3, 2026, Defendant moves to dismiss the charge of Assault in the Third Degree for facial insufficiency pursuant to CPL § 170.35(1)(a) and for an order invalidating the People's Certificate of Compliance ("COC") based on the People's alleged failure to comply with their discovery obligations under CPL § 245.20. Defendant also moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument pursuant to CPL §§ 170.30(1)(e) and 30.30(1)(b) based on an illusory statement of readiness. In the alternative, Defendant moves for Sandoval/Molineux hearings. For the reasons explained herein, Defendant's motion to invalidate the People's COC and statement of readiness and to dismiss the accusatory instrument under CPL § 30.30 is DENIED. The People are charged a total of 90 days of speedy trial time.

INTRODUCTION

This case raises an issue concerning the interplay of facial sufficiency and a defendant's right to a speedy trial. Here, the People filed a statement of readiness in good faith on an accusatory instrument in which all of the counts turned out to be facially insufficient. The deficiency went unnoticed, however, until the Court sua sponte alerted the parties to it during motion practice, more than two months after the People filed their statement of readiness. At that point, the People filed a superseding information that corrected the deficiency, rendering all counts facially sufficient. The Court must determine whether the insufficiency of all counts in the original accusatory instrument retroactively invalidates the People's statement of readiness and thus prevents the statement of readiness from stopping the speedy trial clock.

CPL § 30.30(5-a) provides that a statement of readiness shall not be valid unless the prosecutor certifies that all counts charged in the accusatory instrument meet the statutory requirements for facial sufficiency. Id.; CPL §§ 100.15, 100.40. The Court of Appeals recently held in People v. Williams, —N.E.3d—, 2025 NY Slip Op. 06535 (2025), that retroactive [*2]invalidation of the People's statement of readiness was not required where the People had certified that all counts were facially sufficient but that certification later turned out to be inaccurate. In Williams, the inaccuracy related to a single insufficient count in a four-count information. The question presented here is: does Williams apply to a case in which the People's § 30.30(5-a) certification turns out to be inaccurate as to all counts of the accusatory instrument? For the reasons explained herein, this Court answers this question in the affirmative. Williams applies and the People's statement of readiness is not retroactively invalidated.

As to Defendant's challenge to the People's COC, for the reasons explained herein the Court finds that the People validly certified compliance with discovery, having exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in discharging their discovery obligations. See CPL § 245.50(1). Therefore, the Court declines to invalidate the People's statement of readiness on this basis. See CPL § 30.30(5)(a).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant was arrested on October 16, 2025, and arraigned that same day on a criminal court complaint in Bronx County. The accusatory instrument charged the defendant with three counts: Assault in the Third Degree, PL § 120.00(1); Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree, PL § 265.01(2); and Harassment in the Second Degree, PL § 240.26(1), arising out of an incident alleged to have occurred on October 12, 2025 at approximately 4:53 p.m. in Bronx County. In support of the charges, the information alleged in pertinent part:

Deponent is informed by RYAN LUCAS that at the above time and place, informant was in the bathroom when defendant pushed open the door, causing said door to strike her body.

Deponent is further informed by informant that as a result of defendant's aforementioned actions, informant suffered substantial pain to the back and shoulder blades, including numbness, tingling, and soreness.

Deponent is further informed by informant that as a result of the defendant's aforementioned conduct, she experienced annoyance, alarm, and fear for her physical safety.

The matter was adjourned for a Crawford hearing, for a supporting deposition to cure the complaint of hearsay allegations, and for the People to file their COC. On October 23, 2025, the parties appeared in court for the Crawford hearing.^FN1 That same day, the People filed and served a supporting deposition. The accusatory instrument was deemed an information and Defendant was arraigned on it. The matter was adjourned for the People to file their COC.

On January 9, 2026, the People filed their COC and a statement of readiness off [*3]calendar.^FN2 The statement of readiness certified that "all counts charged in the accusatory instrument meet the requirements of section 100.15 and 100.40 of the Criminal Procedure Law and, if applicable, those counts not meeting the requirements of section 100.15 and 100.40 of this chapter have been dismissed." See CPL § 30.30(5-a).

The parties next appeared in court on Thursday, January 29, 2026. The People "maintained readiness" for trial. Defense counsel indicated that he would not be challenging the COC and was also ready to proceed to trial. Based on the parties' representations, the Court indicated it would send the matter out for trial that day. The People asserted that despite "maintaining" readiness they could not in fact begin trial that day as they needed time to gather their witnesses. Although the Court reminded the People that witness testimony would likely not start that day, the People still requested the following Tuesday, February 3, 2026, to begin trial. Due to defense counsel's schedule, the case was instead adjourned to Wednesday, February 4, 2026.

On February 3, 2026, Defendant filed the instant motion. The gravamen of Defendant's original motion to dismiss was that the information failed to establish that the complainant suffered physical injury, which is an element of Assault in the Third Degree. Therefore, Defendant argued (contrary to Williams) that the People's statement of readiness was illusory due to an inaccurate CPL § 30.30(5-a) certification. On February 20, 2026, People filed their opposition, arguing that physical injury was adequately made out by the factual allegations and, even if one count were deficient, Williams counseled against invalidation of the statement of readiness. Defendant filed his reply on March 1, 2026, reiterating his same arguments regarding physical injury.

On March 13, 2026, the Court contacted the parties via email regarding a facial sufficiency issue raised sua sponte. Specifically, the Court inquired into whether the element of intent was adequately pled as to all charges. The Court invited the parties to submit supplemental written submissions to address this issue. Defendant then filed a supplemental brief on March 16, 2026, arguing that intent was not made out as to any of the charged offenses, and therefore the entire information was facially insufficient.

The People, in lieu of a response, filed a superseding information on March 17, 2026. The superseding information contains the same three charges as the original information, as well as one count of Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree, PL § 240.30(4).^FN3 It lists the same [*4]time and place of occurrence. But in apparent response to the Court's query about intent, the superseding information includes significantly more factual allegations supporting the inference that defendant intended to commit each of the charged offenses, i.e., that he intentionally used the bathroom door to cause injury to his wife. The superseding information states:

Deponent [the complainant] and defendant engaged in a verbal dispute, during which, defendant shouted at her in sum and substance ["]I KNOWYOU STILL THINK ABOUT HIM. DID YOU WISH HIM A HAPPY BIRTHDAY?["] Deponent further states that she attempted to get away from defendant by going to the bathroom. Deponent further states that defendant followed her to said bathroom.

Deponent further states that immediately after she shut the bathroom door she stood by the door in an attempt to hold it closed. Deponent further states defendant forcefully opened said door and it struck deponent about the body causing deponent to suffer substantial pain to the back and shoulder blades, including numbness, tingling and soreness.

Deponent further states that defendant then backed deponent against a wall and pointed a finger at her face while stating in sum and substance, ["]LET ME TELL YOU SOMETHING.["]

Deponent further states that as a result of defendant's aforementioned actions, she experienced annoyance, alarm, and fear for her physical safety.

Deponent further states that defendant is her HUSBAND with whom she has one (1) child in common.

On March 22, 2026, Defendant filed a second supplemental memorandum of law, arguing that the People's filing a superseding information amounted to a concession that the original information was facially insufficient and, for that reason, the People's statement of readiness filed on January 9, 2026 was illusory. On March 27, 2026, the People filed an opposition to Defendant's supplemental memorandum. The People denied having tacitly conceded that the original information was insufficient. Regardless, they argued, under Williams their statement of readiness should be deemed valid.

DISCUSSION

Facial Sufficiency and Readiness

As a threshold issue, the Court must decide whether the People's original accusatory instrument was facially insufficient. To be facially sufficient an accusatory instrument must "substantially conform to the requirements prescribed in section 100.15"; it must provide reasonable cause that the defendant committed the offenses charged, and contain non-hearsay allegations that, "if true, establish every element of the offense charged." CPL § 100.40(1). The sufficiency of the accusatory instrument is a "nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite." People v. Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 135 (1987); see People v. Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100, 103 (2010). Courts [*5]are cautioned against overly technical readings when analyzing facial sufficiency. People v. Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569, 575 (2004); People v. Casey, 95 NY2d 354 (2000). However, the court must determine whether the allegations give rise to a prima facie case, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People. People v. Henderson, 92 NY2d 677 (1999); CPL § 100.40(1)(c).

If all counts in the original instrument were sufficient, then even under Defendant's reading of CPL § 30.30(5-a) there would be no basis to retroactively invalidate the statement of readiness. See Williams, Slip Op. 06535 at *2. Defendant originally moved to dismiss only the first count of the information, charging Assault in the Third Degree in violation of PL § 120.00(1). As noted above, his principal argument was that the information lacked allegations sufficient to establish the element of physical injury. Defendant also argued that the single facially insufficient count rendered the People's CPL § 30.30 (5-a) certification inaccurate and the statement of readiness illusory (an argument which, this Court again notes, was rejected by Williams). The People opposed the motion, arguing that the allegations were sufficient to establish physical injury.

The Court agrees with the People that the original information adequately made out the element of physical injury. The term "physical injury" is defined in PL § 10.00(9) as "impairment of physical condition or substantial pain." Substantial pain is "more than slight or trivial pain . . . [It] need not, however, be severe or intense." People v. Chiddick, 8 NY3d 445, 447 (2007). Here, the information alleges that the complainant experienced substantial pain, numbness, tingling, and soreness after the defendant struck her back with a door. These allegations not only describe the complainant's subjective experience of substantial pain, but provide sufficient additional bases, at the pleadings stage, from which the court can infer physical injury. See Matter of Philip A., 49 NY2d 198 (1980); People v. Lang, 81 AD3d 538 (1st Dept. 2011) (substantial pain could be inferred from allegations in the information that the defendant punched the victim in the face and the victim stated that she experienced substantial pain). As such, the Court finds no deficiency as to this element.

However, in considering facial sufficiency, the Court sua sponte raised the issue of whether the original information adequately established the defendant's intent, a necessary element for each of the three counts.^FN4 Taking this cue from the Court, Defendant expanded his theory for dismissal, now arguing that the entire information was facially insufficient due to the failure to make out that Defendant intended to commit the crimes charged, as opposed to unwittingly striking the complainant when he opened the bathroom door. Despite being given an opportunity to address this argument in writing, the People did not, instead electing to supersede. The Court need not decide whether the People in so doing tacitly conceded that the original information was defective, because the Court in any event finds that it was.

All three of the charges in the original accusatory instrument contain an intent element. PL §§ 120.00(1); 265.01(2); 240.26(1). Intent can be inferred from a defendant's conduct or the surrounding circumstances. See People v. Rodriguez, 17 NY3d 486 (2011). Here, however, such an inference could not be made based on the facts originally alleged. See People v. Bailey, 13 [*6]NY3d 67 (2009) (evidence of intent insufficient where the defendant's intent could not be inferred from the surrounding circumstances). The original accusatory instrument simply alleged that the defendant opened a door which struck the complainant. From these facts alone, the court could not infer that the defendant intended to injure the complainant with the door, as there were no facts establishing that he even knew she was behind the door. See People v. Kramer, 50 Misc 3d 27, 31 (App Term, 2d Dept. 2015) ("[I]t cannot be said that striking someone in the face with a door while closing it is the 'natural consequence' of such an act unless the facts support an inference that defendant was aware that, by closing the door in [such a] fashion. . . he would strike him."); People v. Cherry, 104 AD3d 468 (1st Dept. 2013).

The People remedied this defect, however, in their March 17, 2026 superseding information. From that superseding information, the Court can infer that the defendant intended to use the door as a weapon and injure the complainant, due to the additional facts alleged that he followed the complainant to the bathroom after a "verbal dispute," forcefully opened the door while she was trying to hold it closed, and thereafter backed her against a wall. See People v. Casey, 65 Misc 3d 145(A) (App Term, 2d Dept. 2019). Still, this superseding information was filed more than two months after the People stated ready for trial on January 9, 2026. As such, had the speedy trial clock been running up until the filing of the superseding information, the People would be well past their allotted time for bringing this case to trial. Thus, having determined that the entire original accusatory instrument was facially insufficient, the Court must next decide whether this renders the January 9, 2026 statement of readiness illusory. If it does, the People's statement of readiness did not stop the CPL § 30.30 clock and the superseding information, though facially sufficient, was untimely.

"In order to declare readiness for trial upon a local criminal court accusatory instrument, CPL § 30.30(5)(a) requires the People to certify that all counts in the accusatory instrument meet the statutory requirements of facial sufficiency and that any noncompliant counts have been dismissed, thereby tying trial readiness to the filing of the required certification." Williams, 2025 NY Slip Op. 06535 at *1. In Williams, the Court of Appeals addressed the question of what remedy is available when the People file their certification in good faith, but that certification in retrospect turns out to be erroneous because at least one count of the accusatory instrument was facially insufficient. The Court held: "[U]nder such circumstances the statute does not require invalidation of the People's statement of readiness. Instead, dismissal of the defective count is the appropriate remedy." Id.

In Williams, the People filed a criminal court complaint consisting of four counts alleging various violations of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Id. The accompanying factual allegations supported three of the counts, but not the fourth.^FN5 Id. The People later filed a superseding information, along with a statement of readiness and CPL § 30.30(5-a) certification. Id. Once again, the accusatory instrument lacked any facts supporting the fourth count. Id. As such, and as [*7]the People in Williams later acknowledged on appeal, their certification that the accusatory instrument met the requirements for facial insufficiency was inaccurate. Id. Several months later, Williams moved to dismiss the entire accusatory instrument on speedy trial grounds, arguing that, due to the inaccurate certification, the People's statement of readiness was illusory. Id. Criminal Court denied the motion and the Appellate Term affirmed, holding that the People met their statutory obligations by the mere act of including the certification in their statement of readiness, even though the certification turned out to be inaccurate. Id.

Examining both the clear language of the statute and its legislative history ^FN6, a majority of the Court concluded that CPL § 30.30(5-a) does not provide for any readiness-related consequence for a mistaken or incorrect certification.^FN7 Id. at *2. The Court observed that "[s]uch a requirement would make little sense because facial sufficiency is a legal question—sometimes a close legal question—and the People cannot reasonably be expected to attest accurately to the outcome of a defendant's challenge to the facial sufficiency of the instrument." Id. Thus, under Williams, while a defective count is subject to dismissal under CPL § 170.40, a determination that a count is facially insufficient does not necessarily vitiate earlier good-faith statements of readiness.

Although Williams dealt with a single insufficient count in a multi-count information, this Court sees no reason why its rationale should not apply to the instant case, where all of the counts in the original information turned out to be insufficient. Williams emphasized that facial insufficiency is not always immediately apparent, characterizing the issue as both "sometimes a close legal question" and "not always clear-cut." Id. at *2, *3. Thus, to retroactively invalidate a statement of readiness based on a good faith but ultimately erroneous CPL § 30.30(5-a) certification "would serve no beneficial purpose." Id. at *4. The same can be said here, where there is no indication the People made their certification in bad faith, they were able to cure the deficiency once it was brought to their attention by filing a superseding information, and they were otherwise ready to proceed to trial.

Indeed, even prior to Williams, at least one trial court declined to retroactively invalidate a statement of readiness despite the People's later concession that the accusatory instrument was facially insufficient. See People v. Odoms, 143 Misc 2d 503 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cty 1989) ("The fact that a superseding instrument is filed does not automatically render the entire period prior to thereto as includable."). But see People v. N.S., 58 Misc 3d 613 (Crim. Ct. Queens Cty 2018) (disagreeing with Odoms and holding, in a decision that predated Williams, that a statement of readiness based upon a good-faith, but erroneous view of an accusatory instrument's sufficiency, is illusory).

Williams implicates concerns that criminal cases might be dismissed on speedy trial grounds based on unforeseen future challenges rooted in facial sufficiency. Those concerns are even more apropos in the instant case than they were in Williams. In Williams, the People included no factual allegations in support of the deficient count, such that the deficiency should have been obvious. Still, the Court of Appeals declined to retroactively invalidate the People's statement of readiness, which included the requisite CPL § 30.30(5-a) certification. Here, by contrast, the deficiency was less glaring. Indeed, Defendant himself overlooked it, having originally advanced a separate (and erroneous) legal argument in support of his motion to dismiss. It was the Court, not the defense, that first questioned whether the intent element was adequately pled. Only then did Defendant file a supplemental memorandum urging the Court to dismiss the information on that basis.

While Defendant correctly asserts that a facially sufficient instrument is a jurisdictional prerequisite to trial readiness, at the time the People filed their statement of readiness in this case there had been no argument—much less a judicial determination—that the accusatory instrument was insufficient or that the Court otherwise lacked jurisdiction over the case. To the contrary, the People had attested to the facial sufficiency of the information. For purposes of CPL § 30.30(5-a) and based on the information known to them at the time, the People had done all that was required of them to bring the case to a point where it could be tried. Cf. People v. England, 84 NY2d 1 (1994) (holding the People could not validly state ready for trial when, due to delay knowingly caused by the People, the defendant had yet to be arraigned on the indictment). Under these circumstances, this Court finds Williams to be fully controlling.

For these reasons, the Court concludes that the People's January 9, 2026 statement of readiness is not rendered illusory by today's determination that the original accusatory instrument--since superseded--was facially insufficient. Therefore, the motion to invalidate the People's statement of readiness under CPL § 30.30(5-a) must be denied.

Defendant's COC Challenge

Next, the Court addresses Defendant's motion to deem the People's January 9, 2026 COC invalid. In the alternative, Defendant requests sanctions under CPL § 245.80.

As a prerequisite to stating ready for trial, the People are required to exercise good faith and due diligence in fulfilling their discovery obligations and to file a COC affirming as such. The materials and information subject to automatic discovery are outlined in CPL § 245.20. The People are not precluded from filing a COC when materials remain outstanding despite the exercise of due diligence to obtain them. However, when filing a COC with known outstanding materials, the prosecution must identify such outstanding materials in their COC. CPL § 245.50(1).

When assessing whether the People have exercised due diligence prior to filing their COC, courts must "look at the totality of the party's efforts, rather than assess the party's efforts item by item." CPL § 245.50(5). The legislature also provided courts with a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider. These include: (1) the efforts made by the prosecutor to comply with their discovery obligations; (2) the volume of discovery provided and the volume of discovery outstanding; (3) the complexity of the case; (4) whether the prosector knew that the belatedly disclosed or allegedly missing material existed; (5) the explanation for any alleged discovery lapse; (6) the prosecutor's response when apprised of any allegedly missing discovery; (7) whether the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied; [*8](8) whether the omission was corrected; (9) whether the prosecutor self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention; and (10) whether the prosecution's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial. CPL § 245.50(5)(a).

Article 245 also outlines procedures for challenging a COC. Pursuant to CPL § 245.50(4)(c), a defendant must address any challenges to the People's COC by motion, within 35 days of service of the COC. However, upon request, the court may extend the 35-day time period for good cause shown, provided that the extension request is made before the expiration of the 35 days. CPL § 245.50(4)(c)(i). A motion challenging the validity of a COC must be accompanied by an affirmation stating that the moving party timely conferred, or attempted to confer, in good faith with the opposing party regarding any COC objections and further affirm that "no accommodation could be reached." CPL § 245.50(4)(c).

Although defense counsel initially stated that he did not have any objections to the COC during the court appearance on January 29, 2026, he subsequently emailed the assigned assistant district attorney ("ADA") on February 1, 2026, noting that he was missing photographs taken of the complainant by the NYPD as seen on body-worn camera footage. Defense counsel stated that the photographs "constitute Brady material, in that they are potentially exculpatory because they show lack of injury." Def Mot, February 3, 2026, Exhibit D. The assigned ADA responded the next day, acknowledging the missing photographs. The assigned ADA stated that he had been informed by NYPD that there were no photographs taken in this case, but that upon re-watching the body-worn camera footage, he too could see that photographs had been taken. The ADA promised to contact the officer who took the photographs. However, as to defense counsel's Brady claim, the assigned ADA stated that these photographs would not constitute Brady material even if they showed lack of injury because the People have never alleged that the complainant suffered visible injury in this case.

Defendant filed the instant motion one day after receiving the assigned ADA's email, and 25 days after the People filed their COC, on February 3, 2026. The People aver that the instant motion is untimely as the COC had already been deemed valid without objection on January 29, 2026. The Court disagrees. When the Court deemed the COC valid on January 29, 2026, it was not a decision on the merits but rather based on defense counsel's position at the time that 20 days after the People filed their COC, he had no discovery objections. However, defense counsel conferred with the People three days later regarding this missing discovery at issue and filed his COC challenge well within the allotted 35 days. As such, the Court finds that Defendant's challenge satisfies the procedural requirements outlined in CPL § 245.50(4)(c).

As to the merits of Defendant's COC challenge, the People's January 9, 2025 COC reflects the disclosure of multiple items, including body-worn camera footage from three officers, activity logs from two officers, arrest paperwork, an aided report, a radio run, domestic incident reports, the DA case summary, and witness contact information.

Defendant's sole objection to the People's COC is the outstanding photograph of the complainant taken by the NYPD, which Defendant contends is Brady or impeachment material.

The photograph taken of the complainant is subject to automatic discovery. The Court is not persuaded that the photograph—which Defense predicts will show lack of visible injury—constitutes Brady or impeachment material under CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv) as the People have never asserted that the complainant suffered visible injury. However, the Court finds that the photograph is subject to automatic discovery under CPL § 245.20(1)(h), which mandates the [*9]disclosure of photographs taken by law enforcement that relate to the subject matter of the charges.

Although a discoverable photograph remains outstanding, the analysis does not end there. Instead, the Court must holistically assess whether the People exercised due diligence by applying the factors outlined in CPL § 245.50(5)(a).

As to the People's efforts to comply with their discovery obligations, the People's COC reflects numerous disclosures across a variety of categories evincing their intent to comply with their discovery obligations. This case, where the top count is a misdemeanor based on one incident between spouses, is not particularly complex. However, the People provided voluminous discovery as discussed supra. The volume of discovery provided prior to the COC significantly outweighs the outstanding photograph.

The People were not aware of the outstanding photograph and therefore did not self-report the error. Although the People perhaps should have realized that the photograph existed as it was evident from body-worn camera footage, their explanation for overlooking it--i.e., that the NYPD told them no photos had been taken--is reasonable. Further, the People were responsive when apprised of the missing photograph, responding to defense counsel within one day and making subsequent efforts to obtain the photograph by calling the officer and notifying the officer to appear in their office. The People made these efforts without waiting for court intervention. Despite the People's efforts, the omission has not been corrected.

The remaining due-diligence factors, i.e., whether the defense was prejudiced by the discovery lapse and whether the material was duplicative, only apply to belated or delayed discovery. CPL § 245.50(5)(a). As such, these factors do not apply here where the missing discovery remains outstanding.

Overall, the statutory factors weigh in favor of finding due diligence. The People's January 9, 2026 COC is therefore deemed valid. However, as the photograph is still outstanding, the People are directed to continue making diligent efforts to obtain and disclose the photograph. The Court defers the issue of sanctions under CPL § 245.80 to the trial court.

Speedy Trial Time Calculation

The People must be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of a criminal action if, as here, the most serious offense charged is a Class "A" misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months. CPL § 30.30(1)(b). Although a criminal action commences with the filing of an accusatory instrument, computation for speedy trial purposes commences on the next day. People v. Stiles, 70 NY2d 765 (1987). In determining whether the People have satisfied their obligation to be ready for trial under CPL § 30.30, the court must calculate the time between the filing of the first accusatory instrument and the People's declaration of readiness, then subtract any statutorily excludable periods of delay, and finally add any periods of post-readiness delay that are attributable to the People for which no statutory exclusions apply. People v. Cortes, 80 NY2d 201 (1992). The People bear the burden of proving the excludability of an adjournment. People v. Santos, 68 NY2d 859 (1986). People v. Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 349 (1980).

Here, the People filed their COC and accompanying statement of readiness on January 9, 2026, the 85th day. For the reasons explained above, the People's COC and statement of readiness were valid and stopped the speedy trial clock.

The clock restarted, however, on January 29, 2026, due to delay caused by the People. On that date, the People stated at the calendar call that they "maintained readiness," but this [*10]proved to be little more than an "empty declaration." England, 84 NY2d at 4. When the Court tried to send the case to a trial part, after Defendant also announced readiness to proceed to trial, the People indicated that they could not actually start trial that day. Instead, they requested a five-day adjournment to February 3, 2026. When pressed by the Court to explain the inconsistency between announcing ready on the record but then refusing to start trial, the People simply averred that they were entitled to a reasonable period of time to produce their witnesses. The People provided no further detail as to the whereabouts of their witnesses or the specific schedules of any individual witness. Even when the Court explained that witness testimony would probably not start that day, as motions in limine and jury selection would need to be completed before any witnesses could be called, the People continued to request February 3, 2026.

Trial readiness requires "more than merely mouthing the words." England, 84 NY2d at 5; People v. Labate, 42 NY3d 184, 191 (2024). To validly state ready for trial, the People must be actually, presently ready. People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 (1985).

The People make no argument in their opposition papers as to the excludability of the January 29th to February 3rd adjournment. At the January 29, 2026 court appearance, however, the People asked the Court not to exclude the time, noting that "case law" allows them a reasonable time to produce their witnesses.

It is indeed well settled that the People do not have to instantaneously produce their witnesses. People v. Dushain, 247 AD2d 234 (1st Dept 1998). Dushain, however, does not stand for the proposition that the People can announce ready in one breath and then in the next breath refuse to start trial due to witness unavailability. Instead, Dushain contemplates a scenario in which the People's witnesses are available at the time the People state ready even if they cannot be produced instantaneously. Here, the Court did not mandate instantaneous production of the People's witnesses. In fact, the Court reminded the People that witness testimony would not start that day. However, the People's witnesses were apparently unavailable for another five days, with no explanation as to why. On this record, the People have not met their burden under CPL § 30.30 for establishing the excludability of this adjournment. See Cortes, 80 NY2d at 213. Thus, the Court must treat the adjournment as if the People had requested five days, which are chargeable to them. Labate, 42 NY3d at 190. The clock stopped on February 3, 2026, due to Defendant's filing of this instant motion. CPL § 30.30(4)(a).

Although the People's in-court statement of readiness on January 29, 2026 was illusory, this does not retroactively invalidate the off-calendar statement of readiness filed on January 9, 2026, which is presumed accurate, and which the Court has already determined is valid for the reasons discussed above. People v. Brown, 28 NY3d 392 (2016). The People are therefore charged with a total of 90 days. Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL § 30.30 is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

Defendant's motion to dismiss the charges for facial insufficiency is DENIED as the People have cured all deficiencies with the filing of their superseding information. The People's January 9, 2026 COC and statement of readiness are deemed VALID. Defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument pursuant to CPL § 30.30 is DENIED. Sandoval/Molineux is referred to the trial court.

The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision, and order of the court.

Dated: April 27, 2026

Bronx, New York

Hon. Craig J. Ortner, J.C.C.