Supreme Court, Rockland County

Decided on April 28, 2026

Index No. 032794/2026

David Fried, J.

[*1]

The papers filed electronically via NYSCEF numbered 1 — 7, 9, 11, 12, 22 — 36, 52, 64 — 66, 71, and 72 ("Motion" and or "Litigation Petition") were read and considered herein. The Court has also considered the record of all proceedings heretofore had herein. Upon such reading and consideration, the Litigation Petition^FN1 is disposed as follows:

BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In this election law proceeding, Petitioners ask the Supreme Court to find that the entirety of a political opponent's Designating Petition, filed with the New York State Board of Elections, is permeated with fraud. In doing so, the Petitioners ask this Court to establish and apply a new standard not previously recognized in the jurisprudence of this state. Petitioner's proposed new standard would require application of the lower-level preponderance of evidence standard commonly associated with tort and contract law, setting aside the requirement of clear and convincing evidence — a much higher standard of proof — in connection with allegations of fraud. The record before this Court does not justify such an extreme deviation from well-settled law regarding fraud permeation. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Petitioners have shined an important spotlight on the potential pitfalls and risks associated with engaging paid petition canvassing.

This action was commenced by Petitioner-Objector Ciro Christopher Riccardi ("Mr. Riccardi") and Petitioner-Candidate Aggrieved Michael Lawler ("Candidate Lawler", and collectively with Mr. Riccardi, "Petitioners") as a special proceeding by the filing of Petitioners' [*2]Litigation Petition (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1) on April 16, 2026 via NYSCEF. The Litigation Petition was presented by proposed Order to Show Cause (NYSCEF Doc. No. 2) which the Court signed (NYSCEF Doc. No. 9) that same day — April 16, 2026 — and directed service of process upon Respondents.

Respondent-Candidate Effie Guadalupe Phillips-Staley ("Candidate Phillips-Staley") appeared in this action by counsel on April 19, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 10) and brought two immediate motions — a motion to dismiss alleging improper venue (Motion Sequence No. 2) and another seeking to consolidate this action with a then-related case^FN2 between the same parties (Motion Sequence No. 3). By Decision & Order dated April 21, 2025, this Court denied Candidate Phillips-Staley's Motion Sequence No. 2, holding that the instant action is properly venued in Rockland County (see, NYSCEF Doc. No. 50). Thereafter, on April 21, 2026, Candidate Phillips-Staley filed a Verified Answer to the Litigation Petition.

Respondent New York State Board of Elections ("State Board") appeared in this action on April 20, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 18). The State Board has not formally responded to the Litigation Petition, opting instead to assert no position as to the allegations contained within the Litigation Petition. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the State Board has been present and participated in all proceedings relevant hereto and has thoroughly cooperated with document production in all respects (see, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 22 — 35).

Petitioners filed a Verified Bill of Particulars on April 21, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 36). The Court so ordered and issued six separate Subpoenas Ad Testificandum at the request of counsel for Mr. Riccardi and Candidate Lawler which directed that various paid petition-carriers affiliated with a vendor retained by Candidate Phillips-Staley's campaign appear before this Court (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 44 — 49). This action has been handled in an expedited fashion consistent with New York State Unified Court System practices relevant to all election proceedings, mindful of the critical timeframes necessary to resolve such disputes in advance of timely ballot production and accessibility. The Court authorized flexible virtual testimony options where necessary in an effort to accommodate witness availability so that both Petitioners and Respondents had a meaningful opportunity to be heard in furtherance of their claims and defenses herein (see, for example, NYSCEF Doc. No. 51; Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 127, lns 18 — 19; pg 131, lns 16 — 17). Counsel for Candidate Phillips-Staley propounded a Notice to Admit with exhibits (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 53 — 61).^FN3

A preliminary conference was conducted on April 20, 2026 with counsel for all parties present. The trial of the action spanned three days, to wit: April 22, 24, and 27, 2026. In addition to their respective counsel, representatives of Candidate Lawler's campaign and [*3]Candidate Phillips-Staley's campaign were present for all trial proceedings. Neither Candidate Lawler nor Candidate Phillips-Staley attended any trial proceedings.

Underlying this action is a forthcoming election for a Member of Congress to represent New York State's 17th Congressional District in the United States House of Representatives ("Public Office"). Candidate Lawler and Candidate Phillips-Staley, as applicable here, are two of several candidates for said Public Office.

By their Litigation Petition, Petitioners request that this Court: (a) declare insufficient, defective, invalid, fraudulent, null and void the Democratic Party Designating Petitions filed with the State Board ("Designating Petition"), purporting to designate Candidate Phillips-Staley as a candidate for the Public Office at the June 23, 2026 Primary Election; (b) enjoin, restrain, and prohibit the State Board from placing Candidate Phillips-Staley's name on the official ballots to be used at the June 23, 2026 Primary Election for said Public Office; and, (c) award Petitioners such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

STIPULATIONS OF THE PARTIES

During the various appearances before this Court, the parties, by counsel, entered into several stipulations which bind them herein. Such stipulations are as follows:

(1) That the relevant records of the State Board be received into evidence electronically via NYSCEF filing (see, Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 23 ln 19 — pg 25 ln 16; pg 73, lns 21 — 24).

(2) That the total number of valid signatures required to be on the Democratic Party Primary Election ballot for the Public Office is 1,250. (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 21 lns 21 — 25).

(3) That the Designating Petition filed with the State Board contained 2,887 signatures (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 22, lns 1 — 10).

(4) That in this proceeding, Petitioners are challenging all 2,887 signatures^FN4 on a theory that the Designating Petition is permeated with fraud (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 22, lns 11 — 14).^FN5

(5) That Petitioners allege that 829^FN6 signatures of the total filed 2,887 signatures constitute actual fraud by virtue of conduct on the part of certain subscribing witnesses and upon a nexus to Candidate Phillips-Staley / her campaign (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 22, ln 21 — pg 23, ln 20; Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg [*4]216, ln 3 — pg 220, ln 5).^FN7

(6) That beyond Petitioners' allegations of actual fraud by certain subscribing witnesses and that the entire Designating Petition is permeated with fraud, the parties note that 145 signatures of the total filed 2,887 signatures were already invalidated by the State Board for reasons other than fraud (i.e., the signature of an unregistered voter, the signature of someone who does not reside in New York State's 17th Congressional District, etc.), are not subject to this proceeding, that there is no proceeding seeking to validate said signatures, and that as a result, said 145 signatures are in fact invalid. (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 24, ln 5 — 19; pg 25 lns 10 — 16; Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 216, ln 3 — pg 220, ln 5).

(7) That the State Board is not empowered to rule upon allegations of fraud, which issue can only be determined by the Supreme Court. (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 24, ln 20 — pg 25, ln 6).

(8) That the 145 signatures already determined by the State Board to be invalid as aforesaid are not at issue herein and, as such, should be subtracted from the total 2,887 signatures that the Petitioners initially indicated are the subject of this action on a theory of fraud permeation. That accordingly, the total number of signatures challenged herein on Petitioners' fraud permeation theory is actually 2,742. (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 25, lns 7 — 9; lns 17 - 23).

(9) That the 829 signatures which Petitioners contend reflect actual fraud contain some of the aforesaid 145 signatures already invalidated by the State Board. That to avoid duplication of potentially invalid signatures, the 829 should be adjusted to subtract the portion of which was already invalidated by the State Board. That 45 of said 145 should be subtracted, resulting in Petitioner alleging that a total of 784 signatures constitute actual fraud. (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 28, lns 1 — 4; lns 9 — 25; Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 216, ln 3 — pg 220, ln 5).

(10) That as to the 829 signatures that are herein challenged by the petitioners in this action as constituting actual fraud, there is a stipulation that said 829 signatures are invalid. Said stipulation to invalidity is without prejudice to the Petitioner's opportunity to engage in a fact-finding via appropriate witnesses, such that the Petitioners have their opportunity to test and establish the issue of fraud, if any. That the sole issue before this Court is limited to a determination on the issue of permeation with fraud as to whether or not the stipulated 829 signatures would impact the entirety of the Designating Petition. Candidate Phillips-Staley has not stipulating to fraud, and has instead only stipulated, for purposes of the within action, that said 829 signatures are invalid. That notwithstanding said stipulation as to invalidity, Candidate Phillips-Staley is not objecting to proceeding with an inquiry so that the Petitioners can test their allegation and seek to establish their claim. (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 30, ln 22 — pg 31, ln 1; pg 31, ln 14 — pg 34, ln 17; Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 216, ln 3 — pg 220, ln 5).

(11) That by discounting the 829 signatures stipulated to be invalid, the Designating Petition, originally filed with 2,887 total signatures, contains 2,058 otherwise valid [*5]signatures which reflects 808 valid signatures above the 1,250 signatures required to qualify for the primary election ballot associated with the Public Office. Petitioners have not contested the validity of said 2,058 valid signatures. Instead, Petitioners contend that said 2,058 otherwise valid signatures should nonetheless suffer invalidation based upon a claim that the entire Designating Petition is permeated with fraud. Neither actual fraud, error, or irregularity has been claimed by Petitioners against said 2,058 signatures. Accordingly, Petitioners concede that the Designating Petition has 808 signatures more than required for Candidate Phillips-Staley to qualify as a primary candidate unless the Court deems the entire Designating Petition fraudulent by permeation.

(12) That the following paid canvassers submitted signatures within the Designating Petition in the following total amounts (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 220, ln 6 — pg 221, ln 10):

a. Dion McBean	501
b. Jackson Campoverde	93
c. Joshua Sanchez	66
d. Stephanie Michell	70
e. Trejere Johnson	49
f. Carmen Campoverde	50

Total Collected by Paid Canvassers at Issue: 829^FN8

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

In support of invalidation, Petitioners contend, inter alia, as follows: that the "entire point [of] this proceeding [ ] is that [the Designating] petition is permeated with fraud." (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 10, lns 9 — 11); that the threshold issue is whether certain "subscribing witnesses witnessed or committed enough fraud to invalidate the petition." (emphasis added) (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 10, lns 16 — 18); that "paid canvassers created fraud" to the extent of 829 signatures which is a "ridiculous amount of fraud." (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 15, lns 5 — 7); that through this proceeding, Petitioners want to show "how prevalent that fraud was as it relates to integration with the campaign, the candidate, and what direction they were given so that [they] can assess permeation of fraud by involvement of the campaign and the candidate, and particularly other people involved in the paid canvassing operation [ ]." (emphasis added) (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 15, lns 10 — 16).

As to the presence of fraud in the Designating Petition, Petitioners submit as follows in relevant part: that Petitioners have presented the testimonies of six (6) live witnesses and twenty-four (24) affiants all of whom allege that they did not sign the Designating Petition and that the signatures purporting to be theirs in the Designating Petition were forged; that such forgeries were taken by six (6) subscribing witnesses, who, in total, collected 829 signatures contained within the Designating Petition; that in accordance with Jaffee v. Kelly, 32 AD3d 485 (2d Dept 2006) and Braunfotel v. Feiden, 172 AD3d 1451, 1451 — 1452 (2d Dept 2019) inter alia, the Court may rely upon affidavits for the purpose of assessing the authenticity of signatures in the [*6]Designating Petition; that if the Court does not accept the testimony of the twenty-four (24) affiants, it may — pursuant to Quercia v. Berstein, 87 AD3d 652, 653 (2d Dept 2011) — compare the affiants' signatures as they appear on their voter registration cards with the signatures purporting to be theirs in the Designating Petition for the purpose of invalidating the signatures; and that by virtue of the subscribing witnesses hired by BCS, find that fraud was committed in procuring the signatures in the Designating Petition; that pursuant to Sgmmatto v. Perillo, 131 AD3d 648, 651 — 652 (2d Dept 2015) and Bloom v. Power, 21 Misc 2d 885, 891 — 892 (Sup Ct, Kings County 1959), a finding of fraud as to a signature in the Designating Petition serves to call into question the authenticity of all signatures taken by the common subscribing witness and requires the invalidation of signatures taken by him or her; that Candidate Phillips-Staley had the opportunity to rehabilitate the subscribing witnesses to the forged signatures but has not done so; and that pursuant to Haas v. Costigan, 14 AD2d 809, 810 — 811 (2d Dept 1961), the Court must charge a negative inference against the subscribing witnesses who witnessed the forged signatures and were subpoenaed to appear at the trial herein but chose not appear.

As to Candidate Phillips-Staley's knowledge of or connection to the purported fraud committed by the subscribing witnesses, Petitioners maintain as follows in relevant part: that Candidate Phillips-Staley should be held to a negligence standard for the purpose of assessing whether or not she knew or should have known of the fraud in the Designating Petition (Transcript of Proceeding, April 27, 2026, pg 436, lns 22 — 25); that as a signatory to the contract with BCS, Candidate Phillips-Staley had a duty to review the Designating Petition for issues prior to filing with the State Board; that because paid canvassers have a greater financial incentive to fraudulently procure signatures, candidates who retain paid canvassers should exercise a greater degree of diligence in reviewing designating petitions; that Candidate Phillips-Staley should have conducted periodical check-ins and obtained signature counts from BCS; that Candidate Phillips-Staley should have known about the fraud contained therein by virtue of the number of signatures collected by certain subscribing witnesses, specifically that subscribing witness Dion McBean collected 127 signatures in a single day, in the context of BCS's estimation that canvassers would collect 8+ signatures per eight-hour shift; that had Candidate Phillips-Staley reviewed the Designating Petition sheets witnessed by Dion McBean, she should have observed inconsistencies between the signatures contained therein (Transcript of Proceeding, April 27, 2026, pg 434, lns 18 — 25); that because Candidate Phillips-Staley retained paid canvassers, she should have compared the signatures in the Designating Petition with those that appear on the signatories' buff cards on file with the State Board; that Candidate Phillips-Staley merely performed a cursory review prior to the filing which is insufficient to meet the standard of care incumbent upon her; and that by filing the Designating Petition without conducting a thorough review of same, Candidate Phillips-Staley was negligent (Transcript of Proceeding, April 27, 2026, pgs 437 — 438, lns 20 — 25; 1 — 2); that Candidate Phillips-Staley cannot rely on Attachment A of the Contract, infra, as a safe haven since Candidate Phillips-Staley's lead consultant/campaign manager, Mr. Tomlin, did not verify compliance with said Attachment A; and that if the Court does not invalidate the Designating Petition due to Candidate Phillips-Staley's negligent oversight and negligent review, candidates would be incentivized to "chum up their petition with extra [and presumably fraudulent] signatures" (Transcript of Proceeding, April 27, 2026, pgs 443, lns 1 — 5).

As to the issue of whether fraud contained within the Designating Petition was of such [*7]magnitude that it permeated the entire Designating Petition so as to invalidate it, Petitioners allege as follows in relevant part: that there is no recognized brightline threshold for triggering permeation; that when assessing whether the doctrine of permeation should apply, the Court should consider the number of invalid/fraudulent signatures in the Designating Petition as a share of the total number of signatures in the designating petition; that according to the attorney representing Mr. Riccardi and Candidate Lawler in this proceeding,

a designating petition containing 1% of invalid/fraudulent signatures is insufficient to justify permeation (Transcript of Proceeding, April 27, 2026, pg 446, lns 9 — 13); that a designating petition containing 25% of invalid invalid/fraudulent signatures is sufficient to trigger permeation (id at lns 18 — 23); that "under 25 [percent], [Petitioner's attorney] think[s] you get a less and less compelling argument as you move down the line, and so that's partly for courts to decide. 20 percent, 15 percent, that's still a lot of fraud [ ]. Ten [percent], I mean, maybe that's something where five to ten [percent], maybe that's where you're getting closer to the normal shenanigans of petition gathering, but at 25 percent that's a concentrated effort to permeate fraud." (emphasis added) (Transcript of Proceeding, April 27, 2026, pgs 446 — 447 17, lns 23 — 25; 1 — 5);

and that it is common for designating petitions to contain irregularities such as missing dates and the names of villages in the place of towns.

In opposition to invalidation, Candidate Phillips-Staley contends, inter alia, as follows: that there are at least six (6) cases of fraud in the Designating Petition by virtue of the testimony of six (6) live witnesses who said that the signature purporting to be theirs in the Designating Petition was in fact not theirs; that it was likely that such fraud was an organized effort perpetrated by someone other than Candidate Phillips-Staley because many of the six (6) signatories who testified were registered Republicans (Transcript of Proceeding, April 27, 2026, pgs 460 — 461, lns 24 — 25; 1 — 2) and because one of the testifying witnesses, on behalf of Mr. Lawler, is an intern of Mr. Lawler who presumably has a motive to lie; that assuming for the sake of argument that Petitioners have established, through the testimonies of the live witnesses and affiants, thirty instances of fraud in the Designating Petition, Petitioners still have not proven by clear and convincing evidence that Candidate Phillips-Staley had knowledge of the fraud; that all subscribing witnesses who testified confirmed that they had no contact with Candidate Phillips-Staley or her campaign team; that the only nexus between BCS and Candidate Phillips-Staley was her execution of the contract between them and three or four phone calls from Candidate Phillips-Staley's lead consultant/campaign manager, Mr. Tomlin, to BCS regarding the status of the signatures; that there is no indication of fraud or irregularities from the signatures on the face of the Designating Petition; that Candidate Phillips-Staley exercised due diligence in protecting against fraud by contracting with BCS, a reputable and experienced vendor, for the express purpose of protecting against fraud; that the contract executed between BCS and Candidate Phillips-Staley protected against fraud by placing a financial incentive against BCS for failing to prevent fraud; that the arguments furthered by Petitioners' counsel regarding the applicable standard of care for candidates/campaigns who hire paid canvassers should not be considered, as such arguments constitute expert testimony without any cognizable foundation; that any fraud adjudged in connection with the at-most thirty signatories who offered testimony (or whose testimony was attempted to be offered) does not extend to the nearly 2,000+ valid uncontested signatures in the Designating Petition; that a designating petition must contain more than 50% of fraudulent/irregular signatures for same to permeate and invalidate the entire [*8]petition (Transcript of Proceeding, April 27, 2026, pg 194, lns 9 — 20); and that thirty instances of fraud are insufficient to permeate the entire Designating Petition when considered against the nearly 2,000+ valid signatures contained within said Designating Petition.

WITNESS TESTIMONY & TRIAL EXHIBITS

Each party had an opportunity to present witness testimony and other evidence for the Court's consideration herein. The Court has reviewed, considered, and evaluated the testimony and arguments of the parties and the documentary evidence admitted into the trial record. Additionally, the Court has relied upon its observation of each witness in determining issues of credibility. In reaching its conclusions, the Court has carefully observed and listened to the parties during the trial and has evaluated all evidence in light of its relevance, materiality, credibility, importance, weight, and, where applicable, permissible inferences have been considered.

The following witnesses testified regarding the paid collection of signatures relevant to the Designating Petition:

Barry Caro, the principal of Bartholomew Communications & Strategies ("BCS") testified, inter alia, as follows: that BCS was retained by Candidate Phillips-Staley's campaign to gather signatures in connection with said candidate's Designating Petition (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 43, lns 16 — 19); that although he did not collect any signatures personally, contractors that he engaged at a per-shift rate of pay, on BCS's behalf, collected signatures ("paid canvassers") for said Designating Petition (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 43, ln 20 — pg. 44, ln 8); that paid canvassers affiliated with BCS are supervised by him and other paid canvassers of BCS, and that he and supervisors would speak to the paid canvassers regularly while engaged in signature collection (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 45, lns 10 — 17); that the following paid canvassers collected signature on the Designating Petition: Dion McBean, Jackson Campoverde, Carmen Campoverde, Joshua Sanchez, Stephanie Michell, Trejere Johnson, John Campagna, Lisa Hamner, Alex Cornwell, Fontini Litsik, and Dan Long, possibly among others (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 45, ln 23 — pg 46 ln 23); that paid canvassers McBean, Michell, and Johnson were new to BCS (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 55, lns6 — 8); that BCS trains its paid canvassers relevant to gathering signatures on Designating Petitions including matters relevant to quality control (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 47, ln 7 — pg 50 ln 17); that the BCS training concludes, "by strongly warning people not to commit fraud, citing the example of some folks who worked for [another campaign] who had press showing up to their house, who got called into court; just stressing that they did not want to be that person." (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 69, lns 12 — 16); that he had no contact with Candidate Phillips-Staley during the period in which services were rendered except perhaps an email relevant to the contract with BCS, and noted further that he has not seen said candidate in person since in or about 2021 when he worked on another campaign for her, instead communicating at all relevant times solely with John Tomlin, the campaign's general consultant (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 50, ln 19 — pg 51, ln 12); that BCS undertakes a review of signatures collected by its paid canvassers to identify, among other things, signs of obvious misconduct and fraud (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 52, lns 2 — 15); that "the thing that would most trigger fraud is a full sheet that looks like it's filled out by the same person in its entirety [*9](Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 54, lns 7 — 9); that no fraud was identified during said review (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 52, lns 20 — 23); that if a paid canvasser commits fraud said paid canvasser would be fired by BCS, noting, "If I have to fire you for forgery, you're dead to me." (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 67, lns 20 — 21); that subsequent to said review, the signatures collected by BCS via its paid canvassers are provided to the campaign (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 52, ln 13); and, that the contract between BCS and Candidate Phillips-Staley's campaign ("Contract") — which was entered into evidence without objection — contains a fraud protection provision in said Contract's "Attachment A."

John Tomlin, Lead Consultant / Campaign Manager for Candidate Phillips-Staley, testified, inter alia, as follows: that his work pertaining to the Designating Petition included working with the campaign's election attorney "to ensure that the [Designating Petition] was in proper order, ensure that it was legal" and to ensure that blank copies of the Designating Petition were distributed to Democratic committeepersons, volunteers, and BCS via Mr. Caro (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 91, ln 20 — pg 92, ln 9); that he has prior experience working with BCS (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 92, lns 10 — 14; Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 189, lns 17 — 21); that he has no knowledge of any historic fraud allegations pertaining to BCS's efforts to gather signatures (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 92, lns 15 — 18); that he speaks with Candidate Phillips-Staley on a daily basis and that the campaign does not maintain an office, instead relying upon remote operations (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 94, ln 18 — pg 95, ln 1); that Candidate Phillips-Staley personally gathered signatures, joined volunteers who were collecting signatures, and collected pages of the Designating Petition from some volunteers, but neither collected from nor accompanied paid canvassers affiliated with BCS (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 95, lns 2 — 19; pg 96, lns 20 — 21); that the campaign hosted events organized for the purpose of gathering signatures but neither BCS nor the paid canvassers had any role in such events (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 97, lns 1 — 7); that prior to the instant litigation, he had no contact with any paid canvassers (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 97, lns 8 — 16; pg 104, lns 15 — 20); that he reviewed the Contract and discussed with Candidate Phillips-Staley the costs of the paid canvass operation and how many signatures would likely yield before the contract was executed (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 104, ln 21 — pg 105, ln 4); that the campaign did not train the paid canvassers (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 105, lns 5 — 7); that he believed BCS was upholding the Contract relevant to the terms of quality control and fraud prevention (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 106, lns 6 — 16); that on a daily basis he did not know in what specific geographic areas the paid canvassers were working, only having a broad sense of where they were working (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 107, lns 15 — 18); that BCS did not preapprove signature gathering locations with the campaign (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 108, lns 5 — 9); that irrespective of the Contract, BCS utilized its own access to voter registration data to manage its paid canvassing services (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 109, lns 8 — 10); that he reviewed — both independently and with the campaign's election attorney — the Designating Petition, including the signatures received from BCS (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 109, ln 22 — pg 110, ln 1); that Candidate Phillips-Staley was present during the initial review conducted by Mr. Tomlin at his home, on one occasion, for approximately one hour, but did not herself conduct any review of any sheets (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 112, lns 12 — 23; pg 114 [*10]lns 9 — 11; Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 244, lns 3 — 6); that while present at said review at Mr. Tomlin's home, Candidate Phillips-Staley asked general questions such as "How's it going?" (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 114, lns 3 — 8); Candidate Phillips-Staley was not present at the campaign's election attorney's office for the final review and binding of the Designating Petition in preparation for its filing, but knew that such final review with counsel was being conducted (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 114, lns 15 — 18; 19 — 20); and, that although the campaign did not provide direct training to the paid canvassers — relying instead on BCS to do so — that the campaign did provide training guides to volunteer canvassers that were prepared by the campaign's election attorney (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 186, lns 15 — 22).

Joshua Sanchez, a supervisory paid canvasser, testified, inter alia, as follows: that his pay was received from BCS — not Candidate Phillips-Staley's campaign (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 77, lns 21 — 23); that his day-to-day contact relevant to the Designating Petition was BCS (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 77, ln 23 — pg. 78, ln 1); that he received the blank Designating Petition forms from BCS (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 78, lns 2 — 16); that the location where he would gather signatures was in consultation with BCS (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 79, lns 7 — 9); that prior to the within proceeding, he had no contact with the campaign's Lead Consultant, John Tomlin (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 79, lns 10 — 14); that he was in fact trained on gathering signatures by BCS (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 80, lns 7 — 9); that he has experience in campaign work and gathering signatures (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 80, ln 22 — pg 81, ln 7); that BCS would check gathered signatures for minor discrepancies, technical issues, and possible fraud, that he participated in such reviews in light of his supervisory status, and that BCS "was very firm and very strict about [minor discrepancies, technical issues, and possible fraud]." (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 81, lns 8 — 19); that he did not discover any fraud in the Designating Petition during his review of same (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 82, lns 9 — 11); that when reviewing for fraud, he looks for "repeated same styles of handwriting, repeated same styles of ways to write a certain letter, things of that nature. Also, [ ] how many errors there are in a petition." (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 84, lns 1 — 7; see also lns 8 — 16); that in connection with the Designating Petition, he supervised paid canvassers Dion McBean, Stephanie Michell, Jackson Campoverde, and Carmen Campoverde (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 86, lns 3 — 7); that he never met Candidate Phillips-Staley (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 87, lns 12 — 14); and, that of the signatures he personally witnessed, every signer signed their name in his presence (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 87, lns 18 — 20).

Jackson Campoverde, a paid canvasser, testified, inter alia, as follows: that he is a contractor of BCS performing service as a paid canvasser (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 151, lns 8 — 11); that he is compensated by BCS on a per shift basis (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 153, lns 6 — 8); that as a paid canvasser he went exclusively door-to-door to gather signatures on the Designating Petition (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 141, lns 10 — 17; pg 155, lns 23 — 25); that he never met Candidate Phillips-Staley nor did he attend any large events or rallies (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 155, lns 2 — 7; lns 23 — 25); that he did not know who Mr. Tomlin was, nor did he meet Mr. Tomlin, prior to the instant litigation (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 155, lns 8 — 15); that he received his door-knocking list from BCS via Joshua Sanchez (Transcript of Proceeding, April [*11]24, 2026, pg 156, lns 2 — 5); that he turned his signatures in to BCS via Joshua Sanchez for review (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 156, lns 6 — 10); that he would sometimes communicate with Mr. Caro regarding signature gathering (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 156, lns 24 — 25) and that Mr. Caro reviewed petitions (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 157, lns 1 — 3); and, when asked if he personally witnessed every person who signed the Designating Petition for him, he responded, "Yes, a hundred percent." (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 158, lns 13 — 17).

Stephanie Michell, a paid canvasser, testified, inter alia, as follows: that she works for BCS performing service as a paid canvasser (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 259, lns 7 — 9); that Joshua Sanchez is a supervisor at BCW (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 259, lns 14 — 18); that she received instruction from BCS on how to collect signatures (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 259, ln 23 — pg 260, ln 10); that all petition signers sign in her presence (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 260, lns 11 — 13); that she had no contact with Mr. Tomlin prior to the instant litigation (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 260, ln 19 — pg 261, ln 1); and, that she never met Candidate Phillips-Staley nor did she ever attend a rally where Candidate Phillips-Staley was present (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 262, lns 1 — 4).

Paid canvasser Trejere Johnson testified similarly and consistently with the testimony of the other paid canvasser witnesses. Neither party called any other paid canvassers as witnesses herein and as such, there is no mechanism for the Court to assess the remaining paid canvassers identified in Mr. Caro's testimony, nor their credibility. To the extent that Petitioners called Carmen Campoverde, Petitioners failed to serve her properly and thus she had no legal obligation to appear, as discussed in greater detail, infra.

The following witnesses testified regarding the presence of "their" signature within the Designating Petition:

Joanne Stash testified, inter alia, as follows: that she has not signed a petition in about ten years (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 167, lns 20 — 23); that she did not sign a designating petition for anyone running for Congress in the last month (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 167, ln 24 — pg 168, ln 1); that the signature contained within the Designating Petition purporting to be hers, was not signed by her, nor did she give any other person permission to sign on her behalf and that the signature is fraudulent (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 170, lns 7 — 18; see, Petitioner's Exhibit 2-b, pg 176, ln 7); and, that she is registered to vote as a Republican and that she is only able to sign for a Republican candidate and as such, her signature would not have benefited Candidate Phillips-Staley in any event (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 172, lns 12 — 20; see also, NY Election Law § 6-132). The purported signature of Ms. Stash was "witnessed" by paid canvasser Dion McBean.

Frank J. Capuano testified, inter alia, as follows: that he is attending college full time at Cornell in Ithaca, New York (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 199, lns 5 — 6; 11 — 12; pg. 205, ln 12); that he has exclusively lived on campus in Ithaca during the spring semester (which includes March 2026) (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 199, lns 14 — 16); that he is very familiar with the process associated with designating petitions (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 199, lns 20 — 23); that he was an intern at Candidate Lawler's office (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 205, ln 24 — pg 206, ln 2); that he is [*12]"currently" an independent voter and as such, his signature would not have benefited Candidate Phillips-Staley in any event (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 205, lns 15 — 23; see also, NY Election Law § 6-132); that the signature contained within the Designating Petition purporting to be his, was not signed by him, nor did he give any other person permission to sign on his behalf and that the signature is fraudulent (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 201, ln 16 — pg 202, ln 10; see, Petitioner's Exhibit 2-a, pg 173, ln 7); and, that on the date of said purported signature he was in Ithaca and would not have been found at the home address where he is registered as a voter (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 202, lns 11 — 23). The purported signature of Mr. Capuano was "witnessed" by paid canvasser Dion McBean.

Lisa Locatelli testified, inter alia, as follows: that she is not familiar with the designating petition process (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 210, lns 1 — 3); that the signature contained within the Designating Petition purporting to be hers, was not signed by her, nor did she give any other person permission to sign on her behalf, that there is an anomaly in the way her address appears in the Designating Petition, and that the signature is fraudulent (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 210, ln 6 — pg 16 — pg 212, ln 25; see, Petitioner's Exhibit 2-b, pg 169, lns 2 & 3); and, that she is an independent voter and as such, her signature would not have benefited Candidate Phillips-Staley in any event (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 214, lns 13 — 15; see also, NY Election Law § 6-132). The purported signature of Ms. Locatelli was "witnessed" by paid canvasser Carmen Campoverde.

Witnesses Thomas Letizia, Dominick Pisano, and Margulia Laifer testified similarly and consistently with the testimonies of Joanne Stash, Frank J. Capuano, and Lisa Locatelli. Each testified that the signature in the Designating Petition purporting to be their own were forgeries and made without their knowledge nor consent. Each of the foregoing witness's purported signatures are adjudicated to constitute fraud. Mr. Letizia's "signature" and Mr. Pisano's "signature" were each purportedly witnessed by Dion McBean. Ms. Laifer's "signature" was purportedly witnesses by Jackson Campoverde.

DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS

As a threshold matter, the Court is mindful that some may argue that Americans are living in an era wherein institutions of democracy are often seen through a lens of doubt and suspicion by the public they are charged with serving — no branch of government nor any political party is immune. It is essential that courts take all reasonable and appropriate steps to ensure public confidence in the judiciary. Mindful of this imperative judicial duty, the undersigned hereby directs that the public have convenient and speedy access to all records of the hearing underlying this Decision & Order. Accordingly, Petitioner's counsel is directed to upload to NYSCEF, within 24 hours of the entry hereof, all transcripts of all proceedings herein and all trial exhibits so that same may be easily accessible to the public via NYSCEF. In furtherance of the transparency that the Court believes should be associated with proceedings of this nature, the Court invites the public to review all such records so that the public can independently assess the within proceedings and the resulting instant Decision & Order.^FN9

Petitioners' counsel, at the outset of this proceeding, stated to this Court that the threshold issue is whether certain "subscribing witnesses witnessed or committed enough fraud to invalidate the petition." (emphasis added) (Transcript of Proceeding, April 20, 2026, pg 10, lns 16 — 18). Such argument of the Petitioners reflects their position that a certain level of fraud is acceptable in a Designating Petition. More specifically, Attorney Curran, on behalf of Candidate Lawler and Mr. Riccardi, argued before this Court as follows. Attorney Curran stated,

"And so, that's why I think you have to think of it as a percentage of what's required as of the overall scope, if that makes sense, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And you indicated that there isn't a specific number, right, like there's no, there's no bright line, would you agree?

MR. CURRAN: Not that I'm aware, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So if it's -- let me just ask you again, a hypothetical. If it's 1 percent fraud?

MR. CURRAN: Obviously not, unless the candidate as a part of the 1 percent.

THE COURT: That's a different story.

MR. CURRAN: That's clear in case law.

THE COURT: That's a different story. But there's no allegation here that the candidate went out and forged a signature, you haven'' alleged that?

MR. CURRAN: No. My allegation is that she should have known of fraud.

THE COURT: Understood. Right. So let's remove her for a second, right, from this equation. So 1 percent you would say —

MR. CURRAN: That's probably negligible, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And 5 percent?

MR. CURRAN: I think if you're working your way up to 25, I'm going to say yes to 25.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CURRAN: You know, that's a quarter of the petition, or a quarter of what's required. If you're working towards 25, yes, I think 25 is a reasonable standard that if a quarter of your petition is fraud -- it contains fraud or an allegation of fraud that's been substantiated, then that should be permeation. Under 25, I think you get a less and less compelling argument as you move down the line, and so that's partly for courts to decide. 20 percent, 15 percent, that's still a lot of fraud, Your Honor. Ten, I mean, maybe that's something where five to ten, maybe that's where you're getting closer to the normal shenanigans of petition gathering, but at 25 percent that's a concentrated effort to permeate fraud.

THE COURT: "Normal shenanigans," so petitions have mistakes in them. Is that common?

MR. CURRAN: Yeah, people miss dates, people put in their village instead of their town, things like that. I would say it is unique to have a finding or charge of fraud to this level. So, yeah, people get kicked off petitions all the time for forgetting the date, the witnesses' signatures at a mass level, things like that. There are technical defects that don't speak to the overall function of the campaign apparatus and the candidate.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. And considering that -- it seems to me that, you know, there's a different level of percentage of fraud that seems to be -- seems to be a flexible number to you in terms of 1 percent no, it's 25, yes, in the middle, maybe.

MR. CURRAN: I think that's a fair statement, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So it's not uncommon, right, for courts to look at the totality of circumstances. So what other factors should the Court consider when assessing — for example, we do some math and it turns out that X percent is a percentage of fraud, if any, okay. What other factors do you believe the Court should contemplate in assessing what -- where that percentage number should land?

MR. CURRAN: I think -- I think a lot of it revolves around the day-to-day activities of the campaign and how much oversight or if they had no oversight to a negligent level of how the petitions were circulated, reviewed and signed. And so, factors such as not knowing if Mr. Caro did a training, not seeing the training in advance, not checking on a daily, weekly basis how many signatures had been collected, where the petition gatherers were going. There was testimony that at least one Caro employee was on the candidate's block even after being instructed to stay out of the candidate's village. And so inconsistencies like that should have risen to the level of triggering an additional review of the signatures and of the -- of the petition submitted.

THE COURT: Your argument in many ways has, at its nucleus, the contract, agreed?

MR. CURRAN: Yes, Your Honor."

(Transcript of Proceeding, April 27, 2026, pg 445, ln 16 — pg 448, ln 23).

On the other hand, Respondent's counsel argues that the Court should consider a 50% of total-submitted-signature rubric to measure the magnitude of fraud in a permeation assessment.

For the reasons discussed herein below, the Supreme Court finds that Petitioners have established the presence of fraud in the Designating Petition. Thus, the Court must focus its attention on whether Petitioners have met their burden of proof — to the requisite standard of clear and convincing evidence — to warrant a finding of permeation. As part of the Court's analysis here, inter alia, even if the Court were to wholesale apply the aforesaid rubric which Petitioners seek to persuade the Court to follow, the 25% purported standard that their lawyer declared has not been established on this record.

Petitioners Have Established Instances of Fraud in the Phillips-Staley Designating Petition

The parties have stipulated that 829 signatures collected by six paid canvassers are invalid. Petitioners request that this Court go the next step and deem all such 829 signatures fraudulent by virtue of the testimonies of thirty constituents of the 17th Congressional District, only six of whom testified live, as well as the circumstances surrounding the collection of certain subscribing witnesses in relation to Candidate Phillips-Staley/her campaign.

The six live witnesses testified that they did not sign the Designating Petition and that the signatures purporting to be theirs as they appear in the Designating Petition were forged. The Court finds such testimonies credible, as do Petitioners and Respondents, as explicitly admitted on the record. Simply, there is no reason for this Court not to believe those who have stepped forward to tell their story in the undersigned's Court. As such, the signatures of said witnesses as they appear in the Designating Petition are adjudged to be fraudulent. On the other hand, the twenty-four proposed affidavits proffered by Petitioners are wholly inadmissible hearsay, and the Court is not permitted to admit them as same would most certainly violate the well-settled [*13]rules of evidence which apply to civil proceedings in this state, except for the limited purpose of providing the Court with a third example of affiants' signatures for comparison with the signatures contained in the buff card(s) and Designating Petition sheet(s) which are in evidence without objection.

To do otherwise and permit the affidavits for consideration of their substance would be highly prejudicial to Candidate Phillips-Staley, who would be denied an opportunity to cross-examine the affiant(s)' testimony in flagrant disregard for the most basic principles of due process and fundamental fairness. Making matters worse, such prejudice is by design. Petitioners, through counsel, represented to this Court that they chose not to produce the affiants for "political reasons" (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 236, ln 21 — pg 237, ln 2). Petitioner's counsel admitted to this Court that Petitioners affirmatively chose not to produce said affiants (Transcript of Proceeding, April 27, 2026, pg 335, lns 1 — 23).

While the Court can understand why a candidate might not want to subpoena the constituency en masse, this was their strategic decision. By not subpoenaing various signatories residing in the 17th Congressional District deprives the Court of any opportunity to hear or consider what those individuals have to say. There is simply no legal mechanism for skirting the most basic rules of evidence as Petitioners' attorney would have this Court do. If the affiants were brought to Court to testify, the undersigned would have most certainly heard them — just as this Court did as to all other witnesses that were presented herein.

Even if the Court were to ignore the right of cross examination and disregard the rules of evidence as to inadmissible evidence, the case law submitted by the Petitioner is incongruent with the request before the undersigned. Petitioners rely on Jaffee v. Kelly, 32 AD3d 485 (2d Dept 2006), Braunfotel v. Feiden, 172 AD3d 1451, 1451-2 (2d Dept 2019), and Supreme Court, Rockland County Index No. 032793/2026, Bonomolo v. Klein, NYSCEF Docket No. 22, to support their position that the twenty-four affidavits may be admitted to establish the veracity of the affiants' signatures as reflected in the Designating Petition. The aforesaid cases are distinguishable from the matter at bar. Unlike here, in said cases invoked by Petitioners, the affidavits were admitted for the limited purpose of confirming the identities of the voters who had previously printed their signatures within a designating petition, and no claim of fraud or forgery was raised therein or otherwise at issue. In Braunfotel, the Appellate Division, Second Department, explicitly noted the absence of a fraud allegation in allowing affidavit-based evidence for purposes of validation — not invalidation by fraud.

At most, the Court can determine that the signatures are not substantially comparable, which would render them invalid and which the parties have already stipulated to. A fraud determination in a factual vacuum is without precedential support. For the same reasons, the Court cannot utilize the affidavits for purposes of assessing the credibility of subscribing witnesses who testified at trial. Although the Petitioners request that this Court compare the testimony "contained within the affidavits" against the testimony of live witnesses who appeared in the courtroom and were subject to cross examination, same is improper in that the Court has not been presented with any opportunity to assess the very credibility of the affiants themselves — whose only "participation" herein is by virtue of 24 pieces of paper that the Court is not allowed to read due to controlling laws of evidence.

In any event, as noted above, the Court does accept the 24 affidavits into evidence for the narrow issue of signature comparison. The Court did undertake a line-by-line comparison of the [*14]affected signatures relevant to said 24 individual affiants as Petitioners requested and did observe discrepancies. However, on this record and without any live testimony by the affiants, the most the Court can do is deem the unmatching signatures to be invalid. Yet, the parties have already agreed by stipulation that 829 signatures — inclusive of the same 24 at issue here — are invalid. As such, there is no finding for the Court to achieve. It is impossible for the Court to glean a finding of fraud by signature comparison alone. Quercia v. Bernstein, 87 A.D.3.d 652, 653 (2d Dept. 2011). As Mr. Riccardi and Candidate Lawler's own attorney admits, "handwriting evolves over time [ ]." (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 234, ln 10). Testimony from the affected individuals subject to cross examination on the record in open court could have changed the outcome and this Court's analysis relevant to said signatures and their subscribing witnesses, but the Court cannot — and should not — make a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that incomparable signatures rise to the level of fraud without witnesses, testimony, and or credibility assessment.

Further, however, the Court hereby adjudges that all signatures collected by paid canvasser Dion McBean are fraudulent for the reasons that follow. First, four of the six witnesses who came before this Court and testified credibly under oath that their signature was forged, were purportedly witnessed by Dion McBean — in other words, actual fraud at the very least enabled, if not perpetrated, by Dion McBean. Second, Dion McBean ignored a duly served subpoena to appear before this Court to give testimony herein without any explanation, and, according to Respondents, has gone radio silent in response to their attempts to reach him for purposes of having him appear herein (Transcript of Proceeding, April 24, 2026, pg 265, lns 7 — 9). Third, the record of the trial proceedings conducted on April 27th established that Dion McBean did not use his actual current address in the various witness statements he purportedly signed. Additionally, and remarkably, the Candidate Phillips-Staley's own election attorney argued to this Court that subscribing witness Dion McBean's signature, as it appears on the face of his Designation Petition sheets, do not match the signature for Dion McBean on file with the State Board (Transcript of Proceeding, April 27, 2026, pg 311, lns 9 — 14). Finally, numerous of the aforesaid 24 affiants' signatures did match the corresponding buff cards on file with the State Board, but did not match the signatures contained in the Designating Petition, and were in large part collected by Dion McBean.

Time and time again, this Court has delivered instructions to jurors, in a multitude of trials, as to the notion of Falsus in Uno (see, PJI 1:22), which stands for the proposition that if one finds that a witness has willfully testified falsely as to any important matter, the law permits one to disregard completely the entire testimony of that witness upon the principle that one who testifies falsely about one important matter is likely to testify falsely about everything. One is not required, however, to consider such a witness as totally unbelievable. One may accept so much of the witness' testimony as is deemed true and disregard what is deemed false. For all the foregoing reasons, the undersigned opts to reject all sworn statements of Dion McBean, including, and most importantly, each and every subscribing witness statement wherein he stated that he personally observed those whose "signature" appears on his subscribed Designating Petition sheets, actually signed same in his presence. Such statements are a far cry from credible. Accordingly, the Court determines that the entirety of all 501 signatures obtained by Dion McBean are fraudulent.

As to Petition signer Locatelli, her purported signature was "witnessed" by paid canvasser Carmen Campoverde. As the Court deems Ms. Locatelli to have testified credibly and truthfully, and with a complete absence of any contrary proof, the signature purporting to be hers within the Designating Petition is adjudicated to be fraud. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the record before this Court does not justify a determination that all signatures secured by paid canvasser Carmen Campoverde be deemed fraudulent in one fell swoop. Relevant to paid canvasser Carmen Campoverde, Petitioners contend that she was subpoenaed to appear. When she was called to the witness stand to testify, she was not present in apparent violation of the subpoena. As such, Petitioners requested the charging of an adverse inference. If granted, the Court would most certainly have entertained argument declaring all signatures of paid canvasser Carmen Campoverde fraudulent. However, the Court is not in a position to do so, as the Petitioners did not properly serve their subpoena upon her. Without jurisdiction to compel her to appear, Ms. Campoverde is not required to appear in this action to give testimony and no adverse inference can attach.

Of particular importance, Petitioners have told this Court that paid canvasser Carmen Campoverde is a domiciliary of the State of New Jersey who is registered to vote in that state, and in fact produced two witnesses — a representative of the Hudson County, New Jersey Board of Elections and the principal of a process serving company — for the purpose of attempting to prove valid service of a subpoena upon Carmen Campoverde in the State of New Jersey. This Court is without authority to compel Carmen Campoverde of New Jersey to appear as a non-party witness in the trial of this New York State action. "It is beyond [one's] power as a Supreme Court Justice to compel the proposed witnesses, residing [abroad], to attend at trial in this jurisdiction and give evidence (Constitution Art. 6, § 1; Judiciary Law § 2—b[1] )." Carroll v. Gammerman, 193 AD2d 202, 204 (1st Dept 1993). (See also, Sarac v. Bertash, 148 AD2d 436, 437 [2d Dept 1989] holding "[u]nder the circumstances of this case, it was not an improvident exercise of discretion for the court to direct that persons who failed to appear for their depositions would not be permitted to testify at trial. It is clear from the record that the appellant intended to call her husband as a trial witness on her behalf. He is a nonparty nondomiciliary and therefore not subject to the subpoena power of the court [see Judiciary Law § 2—b]."). Had Petitioners simply relied upon the residential New York State address that Carmen Campoverde herself subscribed to within the witness statement of her various Designating Petition sheets, where she in-fact currently maintains a voter registration (as confirmed by the State Board), she may have been estopped from asserting an alternate and or inaccurate residential address and the result may have been quite different.

Notwithstanding, the case law upon which Petitioners rely upon to support their request for extending a determination of fraud to all the signatures of all remaining subscribing witnesses does not stand for same. In the Matter of Sgammato v Perillo, 131 AD3d 648, 15 N.Y.S.3d 440 (2nd Dept. 2015), while every signature taken by the subscribing witness was invalidated for fraud by the trial court, the facts were much more compelling, as against the candidate than in the case at bar. In Sgammato, Id., six witnesses testified that the subscribing witness, the mother of the 17-year-old candidate, was not present with said candidate as claimed, when said six witnesses signed the petition. The Second Department in Sgammato, held that the trial court correctly determined that the candidate participated in, and was chargeable with, [*15]knowledge of the fraud, and properly granted that branch of the petition which was to invalidate the designating petition as to said candidate. The matter at bar is incomparable.

Lack of Nexus Between the Identified Incidents of Fraud and Candidate-Phillips Staley

"It should be the purpose of the law, in a doubtful situation, to grant to the electorate the discretion of determining the bona fides of candidates and that elections should not be determined in the courts unless absolutely necessary" (see, Matter of Acosta v Previte, 51 AD2d 960, 961, 381 N.Y.S.2d 690 [1st Dept. 1976]).

"Generally, a designating petition will only be invalidated on the ground of fraud where there is a showing that the entire designating petition is permeated with fraud" (Matter of Finn v Sherwood, 87 AD3d 1044, 1045 [2011]; see Matter of McArdle v Weis, 142 AD3d at 569). "[W]here a candidate's own knowledge or activities are at issue, candidates are held to a higher standard under the Election Law than noncandidates. Absent permeation with fraud, a designating petition may be invalidated where the candidate has participated in or is chargeable with knowledge of the fraud, even if there is a sufficient number of nonfraudulent signatures on the remainder of the designating petition" (Matter of Felder v Storobin, 100 AD3d 11, 15-16 [2012] [citations omitted]). "However, a single instance of fraud by a candidate does not necessarily require the invalidation of an entire otherwise-sufficient designating petition as a matter of law" (id. at 16)" (see, Matter of Gashi v Branda, 216 AD3d 854, 189 N.Y.S.3d 250 (2nd Dept. 2023]). The foregoing is the law of this state, and binds this Court.

Here, the evidence demonstrates, for the most part, one rogue person — paid canvasser Dion McBean — producing fraudulent signatures, albeit, egregious. In Matter of Klugman v King, 242 AD2d 346, 347 661 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1997), the Appellate Division, Second Department, rejected the petitioner's contention that the fraudulent activities attributable to two people soliciting signatures for the candidates were sufficient to show, as a matter of law, that the entire designating petition is permeated with fraud, especially where the trial court, found, like here, that the candidates neither personally participated in, nor knew about, the fraud. Beyond Dion McBean, the other instances of fraud as established herein by Petitioners, can possibly fall into the category of that which Petitioners' own attorney classified on the record as common "shenanigans", and cumulatively do not achieve the 25% rubric asserted by Petitioners in their summation/oral argument — even if this Court were to completely accept Petitioner's position. The Court cannot assess the impacts, if any, of the absent record nor whether what would have yielded herein, if anything, if Petitioner had produced the 24 affiants for testimony subject to cross examination, offered the opinion of a handwriting expert, presented testimony from any qualified person to opine as to a standard of care in the context of campaign petitioning, or properly subpoenaed Carmen Campoverde, among other things.

Dion McBean's fraudulent conduct is reprehensible. However, he is but one person of a total of 108 people who gathered signatures for the Designating Petition. In other words, he accounts for a mere 0.9% of the total petition carriers who gathered signatures and that is not permeation and there is no evidence in the record of this three (3) day trial that connects Dion McBean to the candidate nor the campaign. Such computation is a great distance from the 25% [*16]measuring stick which Petitioners want this Court to use in this action to conclusively find permeation. Further, Dion McBean's 501 purported signatures, out of the 2,887 total signatures contained within the entirety of the petition equates to roughly 17% -- also south of the 25% mark that Petitioners would have this Court embrace.

Although fraud has been established, the Petitioners have not introduced a single piece of evidence to indicate that Candidate Phillips-Staley, her campaign, or the Democratic Party in whose primary she aspires to participate, personally engaged, knew, or should be chargeable with knowing in any fraudulent activity. "Broadly speaking, fraud is defined as any cunning, deception, or artifice employed by one person to deceive or gain an unfair advantage to the detriment of another [Cowles v. Board of Regents of University of State of NY, 266 A.D. 629, 44 N.Y.S.2d 911 (3d Dep't 1943)], order aff'd, 292 NY 650, 55 N.E.2d 515 (1944). Over the years, fraud has generally been defined by behavior involving intentional, false representations, and other connotations of scienter, such as willfulness, knowledge, design, and bad faith [Gaidon v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 94 NY2d 330, 704 N.Y.S.2d 177, 725 N.E.2d 598 (1999)] (see, 60A NY Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 1).

It has not gone unnoticed that not a single party to this action, nor attorney of record, has even attempted to define what the word "fraud" actually means — a word that is contemporarily resorted to quite loosely. Such hackneyed use of the word distracts from actual real fraud, including that of Dion McBean. Petitioner's allegation, on this record, that Candidate Phillips-Staley personally engaged in fraud is devoid of merit. Equally frivolous on this record is Respondent's counsel's contention that a conspiracy (presumably orchestrated by or for the benefit of Petitioners) must exist because several fraud victims in this case are Republicans. This is the very reason that the Court adopts transparency by making the records of this proceeding conveniently accessible for the public to assess, for themselves, and to form their own opinions of the within action and the resulting Decision & Order, spin-free (see, Footnote 9, supra).

Petitioners have the prima facie burden of demonstrating fraud or permeation of fraud as against the Respondent. The proper evidentiary standard for fraud is that of clear and convincing evidence. See, Matter of Felder v Storobin, 100 AD3d 11, 953 N.Y.S.2d 604 [2nd Dept. 2012]). "Clear and convincing evidence is evidence which satisfies the trier of fact that it is 'highly probable' that what the party with such burden contends happened is what actually occurred (PJI3d, § 1:64). It is a standard which serves to 'impress the factfinder with the importance of the decision' (citations omitted). Such proof cannot be 'loose, equivocal or contradictory (citations omitted)"' (see, Morales v State of New York, 83 Misc 2d 839, 705 N.Y.S.2d 176 [Ct of Claims 2000]).

Here, Petitioners have not met their prima facie burden with respect to a showing of fraud by clear and convincing. Instead, Petitioners take the unprecedented position, without citing to any legal authority, that signing a contract is sufficient to entangle a candidate to such extent that the entire Designating Petition be considered permeated with fraud. In essence, Petitioners are asking this Court to adopt a tort negligence standard in connection with a contract law theory in a proceeding governed by the election law and where the required burden of proof [*17]is that of clear and convincing evidence. However, unlike an action based on fraud, in a negligence action, as a general rule, the plaintiff must prove its contentions by a preponderance of the evidence — a much lesser burden (see, 79 NY Jur. 2d Negligence § 235). The preponderance of the evidence standard, only "requires enough evidence to 'produce a reasonable belief in the truth of the facts asserted' (Jarrett v. Madifari, 67 AD2d 396, 404, 415 N.Y.S.2d 644 [internal quotation marks omitted])" (see, People v Addimando, 197 AD3d 106, 112, 152 N.Y.S.3d 33 [2nd Dept. 2021]).

Paragraph 17, among others, of Petitioner's counsel's affirmation (NYSCEF Doc. No. 71) is noteworthy. Petitioners suggest therein that even a cursory review should have revealed fraudulent signatures collected by certain subscribing witnesses and that any experienced campaign worker would recognize same. While asking this Court to apply an unprecedent negligence standard of care, the only witness presented in the entirety of the trial who has any basis to provide anything resembling expert testimony regarding the applicable standard of care relevant to fraud identification in a designating petition by a campaign prior to its filing is Respondent's lead consultant, Mr. Tomlin, who testified to his credentials, lengthy experience with such work, that he conducted a review of the petition independently and with counsel, that he had long-term experience with the paid canvas vendor that was retained, relied upon BCS's supervision and training of its subcontracting paid-canvassers, and the fraud prevention provision contained within the Contract's Attachment A, among other things as noted, supra.

Not a single other person testified to campaign oversight standards nor best practices. As such, Mr. Tomlin is deemed an unopposed expert, and the statements in, inter alia, paragraph 17 as aforesaid, are without any connection to the record; it is an unsupported contention that rests upon pure speculation. The Court cannot help but ask, if it was the Petitioners' position that they were to allege a negligence-based theory regarding campaign oversight as the nucleus of their entire argument, why they did not offer any testimony as to the level of due diligence that Candidate Phillips-Staley should have purportedly exercised. Irrespective of the foregoing, the record at the very least suggests a lack of suitable oversight by Respondent of the paid canvas operation and accordingly, Respondent is not without blame. Nonetheless, there is no cognizable legal basis to equate possibly deficient oversight of a paid canvas operation with a clear and convincing finding of fraud. The issues relevant to paid canvas operation oversight and or standards, if at all, is a policy matter reserved to the legislature of which, both Petitioner Lawler and Respondent Phillips-Staley, are members.

In light of the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED, that Petitioner's counsel is DIRECTED to upload to NYSCEF, within 24 hours of the entry hereof, all transcripts of all proceedings herein and all trial exhibits so that same may be easily accessible to the public via NYSCEF; and it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, that all 501 signatures within the Designating Petition relevant hereto, secured by paid canvasser Dion McBean, are DECLARED to be fraudulent; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Chief Clerk of the Court is directed to serve upon the District Attorney of each county situated within the 17th Congressional District of the State of New York, a full and accurate copy of the within Decision & Order, by certified mail, for purposes of a REFERRAL for investigation of the instances of fraud identified herein, in the discretion of said [*18]prosecutors; and it is further

ORDERED, that all directives and conclusions of law contained herein shall constitute ORDERS and ADJUDICATIONS of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, that the 829 signatures stipulated herein by the parties to be invalid are DECLARED to be invalid by stipulation, less any signatures otherwise adjudged herein to constitute fraud which are hereby specifically DECLARED to be fraudulent; and it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, that the Designating Petition relevant hereto is DECLARED to contain 2,058 valid signatures, which exceeds the minimum required number of signatures for Candidate Phillips-Staley to qualify as a candidate in the 2026 Democratic Primary Election; and it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, that invalidation of the Designating Petition relevant hereto is DENIED and the Special Proceeding filed in this Court under Index Number 032794/2026 is DISMISSED; and it is further

ORDERED, that any relief not expressly granted herein is specifically DENIED.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that any party intending to appeal the within Decision & Order is advised to contact the Appellate Division, Second Department, at AD2-election@nycourts.gov, immediately upon release of this Order. The Second Department has appointed Wednesday, May 13, 2026, as the day for the hearing of appeals pursuant to the Election Law pertaining to the primary elections to be held on June 23, 2026, and has ordered that any such appeals shall be perfected on or before May 4, 2026, and that any responding briefs be served and filed on or before May 8, 2026. Counsel and parties are directed to the Second Department's website at https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad2/ for further information.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision & Order of this Court.

Dated: April 28, 2026

New City, New York

E N T E R:

HON. DAVID FRIED, A.J.S.C.

STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF ROCKLAND