Minsky v John Hancock Life Ins. Co. of N.Y.

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County

Decided on April 26, 2026

Docket No. CV-007188-25/KI

Tehilah H. Berman, J.

On December 1, 2004, defendant John Hancock Life Insurance Company of New York ("defendant" or "John Hancock") issued a life insurance policy (the "Policy") to Joseph Lenchevsky. The Policy and associated funds were placed in the Joseph Lenchevsky Life Insurance Trust (the "Trust"). The proceeds from the Trust were to be held in trust for the benefit of unknown designated beneficiaries, with Mordechai Neuhaus ("Neuhaus") as Trustee. The Policy purportedly lapsed some time before June 17, 2008 due to lack of payment of premiums. Defendant issued a check to Neuhaus on June 17, 2008 in the amount of $8,852, but the check was not cashed. Defendant issued replacement checks to Neuhaus on February 28, 2009 and October 21, 2009, which were also not cashed. The refund amount escheated to the Sate of New York on September 5, 2013 pursuant to the Abandoned Property Law after the reissued checks was not negotiated and the dormancy period elapsed.

Plaintiff David Minsky ("plaintiff" or "Minsky") commenced this action on March 20, 2025, seeking to recover funds remaining in the trust after the Policy lapsed, and asserted a claim of $50,000 for breach of contract. Plaintiff claims that on April 25, 2012, Neuhaus had submitted a letter to John Hancock requesting that Minsky replace him as Trustee. The letter which plaintiff filed with the court in furtherance of this claim was not notarized or sworn, and did not list Neuhauss's address. Plaintiff also claims that he paid the premiums every month, but attached no proof of payment. Attached to his submission is a copy of a check dated August 1, 2006 for an illegible amount from the Joseph Lenchevsky Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust to John Hanckock with an unknown signature.

Plaintiff further claims that defendant's settlement offer on February 14, 2025 to reissue the refund check with interest in the amount of $9,852 to the trust demonstrates that he is the proper recipient of the trust proceeds. This court takes judicial notice that the settlement letter predated the commencement of the instant action and was in connection with another case plaintiff previously brought against defendant under docket number cv-011766-24/KI, and is not connected to the instant action. Plaintiff commenced that action on June 18, 2024. The cause of [*2]action was "Dishonored Check for $15,000 with interest from 10/29/2009." The case was dismissed on December 9, 2024 based on the nonappearance of both sides. Plaintiff brought an order to show cause to restore to the calendar. In his supporting affidavit, he stated: "They never gave me a new check for $8800.52." Plaintiff's OSC was denied on February 20, 2025 based on improper service upon the defendant.

Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that:1) plaintiff lacks standing; 2) plaintiff is not permitted to proceed in the absence of the trustee, a necessary party to this litigation; 3) the claim is barred by the statute of limitations and 4) defendant is no longer in possession of the life insurance proceeds as they escheated to the State of News York in September 2013.

EPTL 13-3.3 (a) provides in pertinent part: "(a) The proceeds of thrift, savings, pension, retirement, death benefit, stock bonus and profit-sharing plans, systems or trusts, of life, group life, industrial life or accident and health insurance policies and of annuity, endowment and supplemental insurance contracts (hereinafter referred to as "proceeds") may be made payable to a trustee designated as beneficiary in the manner prescribed by this section and named as: (1) Trustee under a trust agreement or declaration of trust in existence at the date of such designation, and identified in such designation, and such proceeds shall be paid to such trustee and be held and disposed of in accordance with the terms of such trust agreement or declaration of trust." Under this provision, the proceeds could only be paid to Neuhaus, the named trustee of the Joseph Lenchevsky Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust when the Policy lapsed sometime prior to June 17, 2008. Plaintiff's claim that Neuhaus submitted a letter to John Hancock on April 25, 2012, long after the Policy's lapse, requesting that the trusteeship be transferred from Neuhaus to Minsky, does not support his claim to the proceeds, since under EPTL 13-3.3(a), payment could only be made to the trustee of record at the time the Policy lapsed. Furthermore, the authenticity of the letter could be reasonably be questioned since it was not notarized or sworn or affirmed under penalties of perjury. See, Atlasman v. Korol, 238 AD3d 826, 827 (2d Dept. 2025) ("Judicial records, as well as documents reflecting out-of-court transactions such as mortgages, deeds, contracts, and any other papers, the contents of which are essentially undeniable, qualify as documentary evidence in proper cases; however, affidavits and letters are not considered documentary evidence"); Anderson v. Armentano, 139 AD3d 769, 770-771 (2d Dept. 2016) ("To qualify as documentary evidence, the evidence 'must be unambiguous and of undisputed authenticity'"). Accordingly, this court finds that plaintiff lacks standing to sue. See, Orentreich v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 275 AD2d 685, 685 (1st Dept. 2000) ( "since the policies in question are owned by a trust, only the trustee, who was not named as a plaintiff in that capacity, may seek their rescission or damages attributable to their issuance"); Zullin v. Schwartz, 2022 NY Misc. LEXIS 41797, *1 (Sup. Ct. NY Co. 2022) ("Inasmuch as plaintiffs' claim is to recover the assets of the trust, the action must be maintained by the trustee"). Inasmuch as plaintiff lacks standing, his claims are "subject to a jurisdictional dismissal since (1) courts have jurisdiction only over controversies that involve the plaintiff, (2) a plaintiff found to lack "standing is not involved in a controversy, and (3) the courts therefore have no jurisdiction of the case when such plaintiff purports to bring it." Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Abbate, 2009 NY Slip Op [*3]52154(U) 25 Misc 3d 1216(A), 1216A (Sup. Ct. Rich. Co. 2009).

Plaintiff's action is also time-barred. Insurance Law § 3211(d) provides: "No action shall be maintained to recover on any life insurance policy ..., which has lapsed because of default in making such payment ...unless the action is instituted within two years from the date of such default." Insurance Law § 3211(a)(1) further requires that, absent proper 30-day notice, a policy may not lapse until at least one year after default. Accordingly, even where no notice is given, the latest time for commencing such an action is effectively three years from the date of default. Here, defendant has submitted evidence that the policy lapsed prior to June 17, 2008, following nonpayment of premiums. In reviewing the motion to dismiss "we must give the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the allegations as true and accord the plaintiff[ ] every possible favorable inference." Sassi v. Mobile Life Support Servs., Inc., 37 NY3d 236, 239 (2021). Even affording plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference on this motion to dismiss, and assuming arguendo that the limitations period did not begin to run until the latest possible date permitted under Insurance Law § 3211, any claim would have expired no later than June 17, 2011. Plaintiff did not commence this action until March 20, 2025—nearly fourteen years after the expiration of the maximum limitations period. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff's claim is time-barred under Insurance Law § 3211(d),

Dismissal is also warranted under the provisions of the Abandoned Property Law ("APL"). Pursuant to APL § 700, proceeds of life insurance policies that have been unclaimed for three years shall be deemed "abandoned property" after which they must be reported and remitted to the State Comptroller. Total Asset Recovery Servs. LLC v Metlife, Inc., 189 AD3d 519, 520 (1st Dept. 2020). The legislative purpose of the Abandoned Property Law was "to utilize unclaimed property for the benefit of the citizenry at large while at the same time protecting the interest of the rightful owner," which is accomplished "by providing that the care and custody of abandoned property be assumed by the State Comptroller for the benefit of those entitled to receive it." Friar v. Vanguard Holding Corp., 125 AD2d 444, 446 (2d Dept. 1986). In this case, the Policy lapsed and the refund checks issued to the trustee remained uncashed, the funds were transferred to the State of New York as abandoned property on September 5, 2013.

APL § 1404(3) provides: "No action shall be maintained against any person, copartnership, unincorporated association or corporation, or any officer thereof, for (a) the recovery of abandoned property paid or delivered to the state comptroller pursuant to this chapter or for interest thereon subsequent to the date of the report of such abandoned property to the state comptroller pursuant to this chapter; (b) the recovery of abandoned property heretofore paid or delivered to the state or for interest thereon subsequent to the date of such payment or delivery; or (c) damages alleged to have resulted from any such payment or delivery." Under this provision, plaintiff is barred from maintaining an action against John Hancock.

In light of the above determinations, the motion to dismiss is granted. This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: April 26, 2026

Hon. Tehilah H. Berman

Judge of the Civil Court, Kings County