Manculich v Five Riverside Towers Owners, Inc.

Supreme Court, Broome County

Decided on April 27, 2026

Index No. EFCA2025000880

Eugene D. Faughnan, J.

Carole Manculich (hereinafter "Plaintiff") filed a Summons and Verified complaint on March 20, 2025, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act and New York Human Rights Law and Executive Law Article 15. Specifically, she alleges that Five Riverside Towers Owners, Inc. (hereinafter "Defendant") discriminated against her by denying her application for tenancy in their building, based upon a disability that requires her use of a dog as an emotional support animal. Issue was joined by the filing of a Verified Answer on March 27, 2025.

Defendant is a cooperative corporation formed for the purpose of maintaining a residential building containing individually owned apartments. Defendant denies any discrimination, and claims that their initial denial was due to Plaintiff's failure to fully complete the application, and her history of "not following rules". Additionally, Defendant asserts it was unaware of any need for a support animal at the time of the initial denial, so their decision could not have been based on a disability; and that the second application was likewise denied due to a "history of not following rules" and an incomplete application.

The basic timeline of events is not in dispute. Plaintiff's husband, John "Sonny" Manculich owned several apartments in the building, including Apartment 1102, where he lived and which is the property at the center of this dispute. In January 2025, Plaintiff submitted an [*2]"Additional Resident Application" seeking permission to live in Apartment 1102. The Plaintiff ultimately inherited the apartment in the subject building when her husband died on January 30, 2025. The Plaintiff appeared before the Board of Directors on March 6, 2025 for an interview concerning her application to become a tenant (which was separate from her legal right to ownership following her husband's passing). Immediately following the interview, the Board members held a vote and denied Plaintiff's application. On March 7, 2025 Plaintiff submitted a letter stating that following the meeting, she looked at Defendant's policies and acknowledged that there is a prohibition against pets, so she wanted to inform the Board that she had a support dog. Plaintiff later submitted a letter from Charles E. Kramer, LCSW, dated March 11, 2025 which noted various diagnoses and provided an opinion that Plaintiff required a support dog.

One week after the filing of the Complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking an Order directing Defendant to approve Plaintiff's application, which was essentially the ultimate relief being sought. The motion was returnable at the Court's motion term in April 2025, and the Court denied the motion without prejudice.

Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a Summary Judgment Motion on June 24, 2025, arguing that Plaintiff had shown she required a support dog, and the Defendant's stated reasons for denial were pretextual. In response, Defendant averred that it was unaware of Plaintiff's need for a support animal at the time of the denial and that the denial was due to the application being incomplete as well as Plaintiff's failure to abide by the rules of the cooperative. The motion was returnable on August 15, 2025, and at that time, the Court did not make a decision, but suggested that Plaintiff should submit a new "Additional Resident Application", that would have the support dog information. Plaintiff did submit a second application on or about September 9, 2025. She also submitted a letter from her counsel which, among other things, demanded the payment from Defendant of his attorney fees totaling in excess of $8,000. The application was again denied by the Board due to being incomplete, the history of violating rules and, now, also the threatening letter from Plaintiff's counsel.

Plaintiff filed a Note of Issue on September 17, 2025. Defendant filed its own motion for summary judgment which was made returnable on November 14, 2025. At the return on the motion, the Court advised counsel that there were issues of fact and that the matter should be set for trial. Based upon the Court's statements, both counsel agreed to have the case set down promptly for a trial. By order dated January 7, 2026, both motions for summary judgment were denied, and the case was continued for a trial. A non-jury trial was held on February 25, 2026.

At trial, Plaintiff's therapist, Charles E. Kramer, LCSW testified that he has treated Plaintiff since 1989 for "family issues" and that animals historically brought the Plaintiff comfort and had a calming effect for her. He diagnosed Plaintiff with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Anxiety Disorder and Dysthymia. He opined that the support dog was needed to allow Plaintiff to function and feel safe. Not having the support dog would limit her ability to be in the apartment. Upon cross examination, Mr. Kramer confirmed that the first time he prescribed the support animal was March 11, 2025.

Plaintiff testified that she had her current dog for approximately two years at the time she [*3]applied for residency with Defendant in January of 2025. She conceded that she did not disclose the dog, or her need for a dog, when she submitted her first "Additional Resident Application", but testified that she brought the dog with her when she would see her husband, and alleged that "they knew". She testified that her first application was denied and no reason was given. She got the letter/prescription from Mr. Kramer several days later.

Upon cross examination, Plaintiff acknowledged receiving the handbook which stated that pets were not allowed, and she agreed that she had previously brought her dog to the building in violation of the rules. She also agreed that various portions of her first application were left blank including prior employment, income for prior year and income estimate for the next year. She also agreed that there was no mention of a disability or request for accommodation before, or at the interview with the Board on March 6, 2025. She alleged that a doctor had previously prescribed the support animal, but she did not provide any medical documentation of this prescription.

Defendant offered testimony from David Hanzes, the general manager of the facility. Mr. Hanzes testified that he has been the general manager for over 14 years. He is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the building and its apartments. This includes, among other things, providing and receiving applications for tenancy. He testified that when he provides an application to a potential tenant, he also provides a copy of the handbook containing the rules of the cooperative. He also orders background investigations of prospective tenants and provides the application to the Board. He was aware that plaintiff had brought the dog into the building prior to submitting her application, but was never advised that it was a support animal. He witnessed other rule violations by Plaintiff when on two occasions, there were furniture deliveries without prior notice to him.

Mr. Hanzes was present during the March 6, 2025 Board interview and recorded the minutes. He confirmed that there was no request for a reasonable accommodation, no request for a support animal and no medical documentation presented at the interview. He also testified that the Board denied the application, and he noted such in the minutes. On March 7, 2025 Plaintiff left a note in Mr. Hanzes' box advising that she had noticed the prohibition against pets and for the first time, she expressed the need for a support dog.

Mr. Hanzes received the second Additional Resident Application which was submitted with a letter from Plaintiff's attorney advising that he would be seeking over $8,000 in attorney fees regardless of the Board's decision. Mr. Hanzes noted that there was still no information regarding Plaintiff's past and projected future income. He also testified that accepting a second application was unusual as the Board's denials are typically final. Following the interview of October 1, 2025, Mr. Hanzes issued a letter informing Plaintiff that the application had been rejected based upon the incomplete income information, concerns for not following rules and what the Board deemed as threatening letter from Plaintiff's counsel.

Upon cross-examination, Mr. Hanzes confirmed the Board had previously approved modifications to apartments in light of disabilities. He was unaware of any prior application for a support animal.

Defendant offered the testimony of Melody Brundage, Vice-President of the cooperative Board. Ms. Brundage testified consistently with Mr. Hanzes regarding the application procedure. She testified that in addition to the application, the Board assesses candidates "as a whole" and whether they are a "fit for the towers". She recounted that her own family members have been denied and that she has participated in prior denials for incomplete applications. Prior to the application interview, she had no interaction with the Plaintiff and knew her husband "by sight". Mr. Hanzes had told her of the two large deliveries that Plaintiff arranged without prior notice to him and that he had reminded Plaintiff after the first delivery.

No issue regarding any disability or need for support animal was raised by Plaintiff in her first application. The Board rejected Plaintiff's application because it was incomplete and the Board had concerns regarding Plaintiff not following rules. Ms. Brundage first became aware of the claim of needing a support animal based upon Plaintiff's note submitted the day after the interview and the subsequent letter from Mr. Kramer.

Ms. Brundage testified to the importance of having a complete application. The missing income information was troubling as one significant concern of the Board is an applicant's ability to meet their financial obligations. Additionally, the rules of the cooperative are specific and strict, and concerns about an applicant's willingness to adhere to the rules is a significant factor.

The second application was likewise deficient in that it did not provide information regarding past or projected future income. She and the Board were stunned by Plaintiff attorney's letter demand for fees and approval of the application. The Board denied the second application based upon being incomplete and concern for not following rules. Another reason was "[t]he threatening letter of demand from your legal counsel which was attached to your application" (Exhibit H1). At no time was the claimed need for support animal an issue.

The Fair Housing Act ("FHA") was "enacted as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 [ and] makes it unlawful, with certain exceptions not pertinent here, for any person to refuse to sell or otherwise make unavailable a dwelling to any person because of" [Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1036 (2nd Cir. 1979)] "race, color, religion, sex, familial status or national origin" 42 U.S.C. 3604(a) [2026]. The Fair Housing Amendment Act ("FHAA"), which was passed in 1988, "amended the FHA to add disability as a protected classification" Matter of Oceanview Home for Adults, Inc. v. Zucker, 43 NY32 522, 529 (2025), citing 42 USC § 3604 (f)(1) ("it shall be unlawful [t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter" because of disability). Discrimination against a disabled person includes "a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 42 USC § 3604 (f)(3)(B). The FHA applies to cooperative apartments. Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d at 1036. "The corresponding provision in the HRL uses nearly identical language" Hollendale Apts. & Health Club, LLC v. Bonesteel, 173 AD3d 55, 61 (3rd Dept. 2019); see, Stalker v. Stewart Tenants Corp., 93 AD3d 550 (1st Dept. 2012); Executive Law 296 (18)(2).

Claims of housing discrimination are evaluated under the burden-shifting framework set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). See, Mitchell v. Shane, 350 F.3d 39 (2nd Cir. 2003); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1038.^FN1 On a claim of discrimination, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Mitchell v. Shane, 350 F.3d at 47. Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to assert a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for the challenged decision. Id. If the defendant makes such a showing, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the legitimate reasons offered by defendant were merely a pretext for discrimination. See Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2000).

In the specific context of housing, "[t]o establish that a violation of the [FHA or] Human Rights Law occurred and that a reasonable accommodation should have been made, [Plaintiff] was required to demonstrate that she is disabled, that she is otherwise qualified for the tenancy, that because of her disability it is necessary for her to keep a dog in order for her to use and enjoy the apartment, and that reasonable accommodations could be made to allow her to keep a dog" Matter of 1 Toms Point Lane Corp. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 176 AD3d 930, 931 (2nd Dept. 2019), citing Matter of Kennedy St. Quad, Ltd. v. Nathanson, 62 AD3d 879 (2nd Dept. 2009); Hollendale Apts. & Health Club, LLC v. Bonesteel, 173 AD3d at 61; see, Sayeh v. 66 Madison Ave. Apt. Corp., 73 AD3d 459, 461 (1st Dept. 2010) (a prima facie case requires Plaintiff to demonstrate she was a member of a protected class, she sought to purchase an apartment and was qualified, she was rejected and the denial "occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination").

Even if the Court assumes that Plaintiff has established that she suffers from a disability and falls within a protected class, she must also establish she was a qualified tenant, and that her rejection was discriminatory. Defendant's position is that Plaintiff was not qualified for tenancy and that it had no knowledge of her disability or need for a support dog, so their reason could not have been discriminatory.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff was not a qualified applicant because she was not approved by the Board following the interview (actually both interviews). Deficiencies were noted in both of her applications, as well as failures to follow rules. The first application was denied, in part, based on Plaintiff's failure to abide by the rules and regulations of Defendant. The credible testimony of Defendant's witnesses showed that Plaintiff had been notified that she violated the rules by having furniture deliveries made to the building without providing proper notifications. In addition, Plaintiff's first application was incomplete in that it lacked required financial details. Likewise, even the second application was not complete. These violations and failures supported the Board's conclusion that Plaintiff was not otherwise qualified for the [*4]tenancy.

Plaintiff was aware of the cooperative's prohibition against pets. Despite that knowledge, when she submitted her first application, Plaintiff did not request a reasonable accommodation that would allow for a support animal. The day after the March 6, 2025 interview, Plaintiff submitted a note requesting such accommodation. Both Mr. Hanzes and Ms. Brundage testified that the decision to deny Plaintiff's application was made immediately after the March 6, 2026 interview, prior to any discussion about disability, an emotional support animal and/or reasonable accommodations. The Court finds the testimony of Mr. Hanzes and Ms. Brundage credible and supported by the March 6, 2026 interview minutes (Exhibit C).

Plaintiff submitted the March 11, 2025 letter from Mr. Kramer which was supportive of her need for a support dog. But Mr. Kramer testified that prior to March 11, 2025 he had never prescribed a support animal for the Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff testified that a prior medical professional had prescribed a support animal, no evidence was submitted to support this claim.

Additionally, when given a second chance to apply, Plaintiff's application was still deficient. Plaintiff failed to provide information regarding past and projected income. Moreover, even though she knew the reasons for the first denial, and she was given the opportunity to provide additional information regarding her financial stability, she failed to do so. She also could have provided some assurance of her willingness to adhere to the cooperative rules, but she did not. Instead, she failed to ensure that her application was fully complete, which was another example of not following the rules prescribed by the Defendant.

In this matter, Plaintiff's failure to comply with cooperative rules and procedures was in no way connected to any claimed disability. The application was denied before any issue of disability or accommodation was even raised. Moreover, there is some evidence of the claim for accommodation of a disability was an afterthought.

CONCLUSION

Based upon all the foregoing, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not established that Defendant's denial of her application was in violation of the Fair Housing Act (42 USC § 3601 et seq.) or the New York Human Rights Law, Executive Law Article 15. Defendant showed that the Applications were denied for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons, and Plaintiff did not prove that the proffered reasons were pre-textual.Accordingly, Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THIS COURT.

Dated: April 27, 2026

Binghamton, New York

HON. EUGENE D. FAUGHNAN

Supreme Court Justice