Sloan v 216 Bedford Kings Corp.

Supreme Court, Kings County

Decided on May 5, 2026

Index No. 506287/2018

Aaron D. Maslow, J.

The following numbered papers were used with respect to the determination herein: NYSCEF Document Numbers 945-957.

I. Introduction

In advance of the trial in this action, Plaintiffs Hilary Sheryl Sloan ("plaintiff Sloan") and Noah Shulman (collectively "the plaintiffs") move in limine with 11 branches to their motion. Defendant 216 Bedford Kings Corp. ("the defendant") moves in limine with 30 branches to its motion. This decision and order determines Branch No. 8 of the defendant's motion, which branch seeks to preclude the plaintiffs from referring to the size of the defendant's legal team or the defendant's financial status.^FN1

Specifically, the defendant posits as follows:

Plaintiffs should be precluded from referencing the number of attorneys representing 216 Bedford. Absent preclusion, Plaintiffs' counsel may attempt to call the jury's attention to the number of defense counsel in the courtroom, so as to improperly suggest that: (a) 216 Bedford is a large corporation or insured entity with deep pockets; (b) 216 Bedford needs multiple lawyers because it knows it is in the wrong; and/or (c) the disparity in legal resources justifies a large verdict. Each of these inferences is impermissible and incurably prejudicial, in that the jury is urged to draw adverse inferences based on the mere allocation of legal resources. (NYSCEF Doc No. 946 at 6-7.)

II. Background

On January 10, 2018, plaintiff Sloan was allegedly injured when she slipped and fell on a patch of ice while walking on the sidewalk abutting 216 Bedford Avenue in Brooklyn. The defendant 216 Bedford Kings Corp. was the owner of the property at that address. As a result, plaintiff Sloan claims injuries to her left wrist, left shoulder, and left arm. Most notably, plaintiff Sloan claims a comminuted fracture of the distal left humerus that required multiple surgeries and resulted in associated nerve pain, neuropathy, and Complex Regional Pain Syndrome. Plaintiff Sloan treated extensively with various physicians in the years following the accident and, to date, she claims to have undergone ten surgeries as a result of the accident. She claims to be permanently disabled and asserts economic damages (both past and future) totaling $25,956,905.00 and past and future damages for pain and suffering. Plaintiff Noah Shulman, husband of plaintiff Sloan, sues derivatively for loss of consortium and services.

III. The Defendant's Contentions

In support of this branch of its motion in limine, the defendant relies on a federal district court decision concerning counsel references to the size or makeup of the defense's legal team and the amount of money spent defending the case, and a state appellate decision concerning inflammatory terms used by counsel.

IV. The Plaintiffs' Contentions

In opposition, the Plaintiffs argue that "all counsel must refrain from commenting on [*2]opposing counsel as personal attacks are not allowed," but maintain, "Nevertheless, it is fair to comment on who is appearing in Court for whom, what witnesses appear on their behalf, and the effort being expended to defeat the others' claims" (NYSCEF Doc No. 948 at 12).

V. Discussion

"[A]ll litigants, regardless of the merits of their case, are entitled to a fair trial. A trial court has broad authority to control the courtroom, rule on the admission of evidence, elicit and clarify testimony, expedite the proceedings and to admonish counsel and witnesses when necessary." (Mainardi v Imperial Towers, 245 AD3d 701, 702 [2d Dept 2026 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted].)

(A) Comments About Counsel

Concerning the size and nature of a party's legal team, it has been held:

There is no basis for Plaintiff to offer any commentary about Defendant's law firm, as such commentary would only serve to confuse or prejudice the jury. See, e.g., Koufakis v. Carvel, 425 F.2d 892, 904 & n. 16 (2d Cir. 1970) (remanding for new trial in part because of attacks on opposing counsel); Hart v. RCI Hosp. Holdings, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 250, 273 (S.D.NY 2015) ("The jury's attitudes about class actions generally, or employment class actions specifically, or the business model, role, or ethics of class-action counsel, have no bearing on these issues. And commentary on this issue can serve only to confuse, inflame, and introduce unfair prejudice."). . . .

Ultimately, Plaintiff is not permitted to make any statements regarding the size or resources of TC, or the makeup or size of Defendant's legal team or the money spent defending this matter. (Sohnen v Charter Communications, Inc., 761 F Supp 3d 556, 581 [ED NY 2025].)

A reference to "City attorneys" was prohibited in Jean-Laurent v Hennessy (840 F Supp 2d 529, 550 [ED NY 2011]):

Defendants move to exclude evidence that defense counsel are attorneys for the City of New York on grounds that such reference would unfairly prejudice defendants because it may lead the jury to believe that they may be indemnified by the City of New York, "which is commonly viewed as a 'deep pocket' for the purposes of any potential judgment." (Defs.' Mem. at 5.)

Because the City of New York is not a defendant in this action, the court agrees that any reference to defense counsel as "City attorneys" may unfairly prejudice defendants for the reasons cited. The court finds appropriate the approach taken by Judge Bloom in Hernandez. See 2011 WL 2117611, at *6. There, under similar circumstances, plaintiffs were precluded from referring to the City of New York and defense counsel were referred to as "attorneys from the Office of the Corporation Counsel." Id. In addition, the court informed the jury that the Corporation Counsel represents members of the New York City Police Department, an agency of the City of New York. Id. The court will apply the same procedures here. Defendants' motion in limine is granted as to this issue.

"[P]ersonal reference[s] to plaintiffs' attorneys and trial counsel, with its unsubstantiated [*3]implicit charge of subornation of perjury, cannot allow us to rule out the strong possibility that such remarks influenced the verdict," held the Court in Weinberger v City of New York (97 AD2d 819, 820 [2d Dept 1983]), which also wrote:

Finally, defendants' counsel's repeated attacks in his summation upon the integrity of plaintiffs' counsel, which remarks were based upon nothing but rhetoric and the irrelevant fact that plaintiffs' counsel was a member of a large, well-known law firm, were also error. In his initial remarks, he stated:

"Plaintiff[s' lawyer], he has a job to do. He is an assistant partner of a very large law firm [naming it], whose job it is to build up big cases".

Defense counsel then proceeded to stress this idea of "build up" with some 40 variants of the same theme, e.g., "buildup", "building process", "build it up, build it up", "building this big case", and culminating with the following:

"You are not here to build up [plaintiffs' law firm]. Don't be swayed by the enormous law firm * * * that went to the great, great trouble of building up this great thing. Remember that. [Plaintiffs' trial counsel], he's their best lawyer". (Id.)

Among the plaintiff's counsel's improper comments noted by the Court in Nieves v Clove Lakes Health Care & Rehabilitation, Inc. (179 AD3d 938, 940 [2d Dept 2020]), which led to a new trial being ordered were the following: "Here, during summation, the plaintiff's counsel improperly appealed to the passion of the jurors by characterizing the defendant as a 'corporation' that has 'two lawyers,' a 'tech person,' 'general counsel,' and 'video people.' "

Linking a party's expert to counsel was held improper in Walenti v Gadomski (203 AD3d 783, 786 [2d Dept 2022]):

The comments of Oami's counsel also prejudiced the plaintiff. Oami's counsel made multiple improper and inflammatory comments about the relationship between counsel for the plaintiff and the plaintiff's expert pathologist during the cross examination of that expert and during his summation to the jury on behalf of Oami. Contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, these remarks were so inflammatory and unduly prejudicial as to have deprived the plaintiff of a fair trial

(B) Party's Financial Status

A party's wealth is not the proper subject of summation:

Plaintiffs' counsel in his summation stated: "Now, right off the bat let me tell you this -- insofar as justice is concerned a verdict against Mr. Gardner alone would be worthless, because Armco is liable. So the verdict without Armco as far as Mrs. Kenneth is concerned is a worthless verdict, a meaningless verdict." This clearly was a reference to the poverty of Gardner and the wealth of Armco which was designed to appeal to the sympathy or prejudice of the jurors and requires a new trial as to Armco. (Alberti v. New York, Lake Erie & Western R. R. Go., 118 NY 77; Depelteau v. Ford Motor Co., 28 A D 2d 1178.) This introduction of extraneous matter, which may have substantially influenced the outcome, was improper. (Kohlmann v. City of New York, 8 A D 2d 598; [*4]Horton v. Terry, 126 App. Div. 479.) (Kenneth v Gardner, 36 AD2d 575 [3d Dept 1971].)

In Giumara v O'Donnell (96 AD2d 1049, 1050 [2d Dept 1983]), among the statements made by defense counsel which contributed to reversal of the judgment concerned the plaintiffs' financial situation: "These are not poor people, either. These are not people scraping along. I have never owned a Lincoln Continental car. In 1972 that was the most expensive American car that I know of."

"[I]t was extremely prejudicial to suggest that the measure of damages was a 'life savings' or should be determined by whatever was 'in the other fellow's pocket'. References to the financial status of parties have been universally condemned by the courts of this State. . . ." (Vassura v Taylor, 117 AD2d 798, 799 [2d Dept 1986].)

"[I]t was improper for plaintiff's counsel in summation to state "They're the corporations, they're the owner, they're the defendant, they've got the money, they've got the assets behind them". Allusion to a defendant's ability to pay damages is improper (Laughing v. Utica Steam Engine & Boiler Works, 16 A D 2d 294-295; Keenan v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 118 App. Div. 56)." (Nicholas v Island Indus. Park of Patchogue, 46 AD2d 804, 804 [2d Dept 1974].)

It is improper for a defense attorney to appeal to the jury's passions by stating that "[e]verything [the defendant has] worked for his entire life is at risk on this trial" and that "[the plaintiff] wants to take my client's property or money" (Windham v Campoverde, 241 AD3d 1408, 1409 [2d Dept 2025] [internal citations and quotation marks omitted]).

(C) Application of Case Law

Based on the foregoing case law, the Court finds meritorious that branch of the defendant's motion in limine seeking to preclude the plaintiffs from referring to the former's having multiple attorneys representing it, the nature of its legal team, or anything else of a similar nature. Remarks about defense counsel are simply irrelevant and will cloud the jury's assessment of the relevant evidence regarding the issue to be determined: the amount of damages to which the plaintiffs are entitled. While the plaintiffs are correct that that they may comment on witnesses (assuming the comments are proper), the Court disagrees with the plaintiffs' position that they are entitled to remark "on who is appearing in Court for whom" and on "the effort being expended to defeat the others' claims" (NYSCEF Doc No. 948 at 12).

Likewise, the Court will not permit comments by the plaintiffs about the Defendant being "a large corporation or insured entity with deep pockets" (NYSCEF Doc No. 946 at 6-7). The financial status of defendant is irrelevant to the issue of the amount of damages to which the plaintiffs are entitled.

VI. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the branch of the defendant's motion in limine seeking to preclude the plaintiffs from referring to the size of the defendant's legal team or the defendant's financial status is GRANTED, and the plaintiffs shall not comment on the defendant's having multiple attorneys representing it, the nature of its legal team, anything else of a similar nature regarding said attorneys, or the defendant's financial status.