ST v MT

Supreme Court, Richmond County

Decided on May 4, 2026

Index No. REDACTED

Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion No. 007) numbered 159, 186-192, 208-18 were read on this motion. Upon the foregoing documents, and on consideration of the oral argument conducted on April 21, 2026, Motion Sequence No. 007 is resolved and therefore, it is hereby,

ORDERED, that Defendant's request for additional sanctions against the Plaintiff for frivolous conduct within the meaning of 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant's request for Plaintiff to pay counsel fees in the amount of $5,000.00 [FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS] for legal fees incurred thus far in preparation of this motion and opposition to Motion Sequence No. 006 is DENIED; and it is [*2]further

ORDERED, that Defendant's request for the Plaintiff to pay a trial retainer to the Defendant is GRANTED in the amount of $10,000.00 [TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS], pendente lite, subject to reallocation at trial, without prejudice to renew; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Plaintiff is directed to pay to Defendant the sum of $10,000.00 [TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS], pendente lite, subject to reallocation at trial, as a trial retainer for forthcoming proceedings, to be paid within 7 (seven) days of service of this order with notice of entry; and it is further

ORDERED, that all other relief not expressly granted herein is DENIED without prejudice to renewal upon further factual development or upon conclusion of trial; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

The foregoing shall constitute the Decision and Order of this Court.

Memorandum Decision

I. Procedural History

The Plaintiff and Defendant were married in a civil ceremony on XX XX, 2011, in Richmond County, city of Staten Island, State of New York. The marriage was not performed by a clergyman, minister or by a leader of the Society for Ethical Culture. There are two children of the marriage, to wit: ST (DOB XX/XX/2011) and VT (DOB XX/XX/2015). This matter was commenced by the filing of a Summons with Notice on October 30, 2023.

On October 3, 2025, Defendant filed Motion Sequence No. 007 by Notice of Motion seeking (1) Plaintiff to pay to Defendant a trial retainer in the amount of $15,000, without prejudice to future applications for additional fees and costs, as maybe necessary; (2) any and all monies received by Plaintiff for retroactive pay, bonuses, or raises in connection with his pension-including but not limited to the sum of $86,377.04 deposited by Plaintiff on or about February 29, 2024-shall be sequestered and held in escrow to preserve such funds, pending a future determination of equitable distribution and the marital amount of such funds; (3) Plaintiff to pay to the Defendant for an additional award of counsel fees in the amount of $5,000.00 [Five Thousand Dollars and No Cents] for legal fees incurred thus far in preparation of the within motion and opposition to Plaintiff's frivolous motion, without prejudice to a further sum; (4) sanctions against Plaintiff in the amount of $5,000.00 [Five Thousand Dollars and No Cents] for the filing of a motion constituting frivolous conduct within the meaning of 22 NYCRR130-1.1; and (5) such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Plaintiff filed Opposition on April 14, 2026. Defendant file Reply on April 20, 2026. On the record parties resolved prong two of this motion regarding any and all monies received by Plaintiff for retroactive pay, bonuses, or raises in connection with his pension. Oral argument was completed on April 21, 2026 regarding the issues of a trial retainer, counsel fees for this motion, and sanctions.

II. Statement of Facts

Parties resolved the issue of custody of the children in a custody and parenting time stipulation that was "So Ordered" by the Court on March 20, 2025. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 88). Parties having joint legal custody of the children with the Plaintiff having residential custody of the children. (see id).

On September 29, 2025, Plaintiff submitted a proposed Order to Show Cause (Motion Sequence No. 006) seeking various relief which included leave to file an Amended Summons and Verified Complaint pursuant to CPLR § 3025 [b] to amend his Summons and Verified Complaint to change the cause of action from divorce under DRL § 170.7 to action for judgment declaring the marriage null and void under DRL § 140 and sanctions against Defendant for allegedly asserting material factual statements that are false to this Court within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 130-1.1. Plaintiff contended that information was provided to him that Defendant had been previously married and was still married to an individual he identified as RGS. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 132 at ¶4). Plaintiff submitted Exhibit D, which purported to be a Certificate of Marriage, dated March 20, 1999, issued by the Republic of the Philippines Office of the Civil Registrar General recording the marriage of RGS and MKJSS. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 137). The certificate bears a seal identifying the Philippines Statistics Authority.

Plaintiff maintains that in February 2025, he hired the Respicio & Co Law Firm located in the Philippines to obtain a legal certified copy of their marriage certificate. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 132 at ¶6).

Defendant contends that she has never been legally married in the Philippines. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 161 at ¶11). Defendant submits the affidavit of Louise Marie C. Leuterio, an attorney in the Philippines, who is counsel to the Defendant in a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage against RGG, cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, Family Court, Bulacan. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 164 at ¶1).

Counselor Leuterio contends:

No marriage license was obtained by [Defendant]. She did not apply for, sign, or authorize any application for a marriage license. She did not execute any affidavit to fall within Article 34. The absence of a valid license is a fatal defect under Articles 3 and 4 [of the Family Code]. It is not subject to ratification, curative compliance, or estoppel. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 164 at ¶4).

Counselor Leuterio further contends that that Certificate of Marriage submitted by the Plaintiff is a Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) Marriage Certificate that covers the purported marriage of MKJSS and RGS and bears Marriage License No. XXXX, including the date and place of the supposed celebration in the Philippines. This PSA document is identified and submitted solely to pinpoint the specific license number printed on its face, which is the number thereafter verified with the issuing office. The mere appearance of a license number on a PSA printout is not conclusive of lawful issuance. Lawful issuance requires an actual entry in the issuing Local Civil Registrar (LCR) and compliance with all requisites at the time of celebration. (see id at ¶5).

Upon securing [the Defendant's purported Marriage Certificate], our office sought official verification from the Local Civil Registrar of Balagtas, Bulacan, which . . . would have issued the license. Attaching herewith as Annex "B" is the Certification of No Record or No Such License issued by said LCR, confirming that Marriage License No. [*3]XXXX does not exist in its registry for the relevant period, or that no license was ever issued to the parties. The LCR is the original custodian of license applications and issuances. Its certification constitutes competent official proof of non-issuance, the legal consequence of which is that the marriage is null and void ab initio. (see id at ¶6).

Annex "B" purports to be an official correspondence from John Paulo M. Suatengco, Municipal Civil Registrar for the Province of Bulacan, Municipality of Balagtas, Republic of the Philippines regarding the Request for Certification of a Marriage License on Record for MKJSS. The correspondence provides that "Based on the Book of Record under Book No. 2 Pages 48 - 49 on the item under Marriage License that no marriage license exists in our book of record." (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 164 at page 8).

Plaintiff maintains that Defendant's "first husband, RGS, contacted Defendant's brother, RS, via text message. RGS provided a copy of his marriage certificate to Defendant's brother via text message." (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 208 at ¶3; NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 209). Plaintiff further submits what purports to be an Official Receipt from the Supreme Court of the Philippines Region III — Regional Trial Court purporting to be a copy of Defendant's Petition for a Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage filed in or around December 2025. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 208 at ¶7; NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 210).

Plaintiff further contended that the Family Code of the Philippines provides exceptions to the formal requisites of a formal marriage. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 208 at ¶6). Notwithstanding the foregoing, Motion Sequence No. 006 was withdrawn by the Plaintiff on March 12, 2026.

III. Conclusions of Law

A. Sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1

For the purposes of 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1, conduct is frivolous if:

(1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law;

(2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or

(3) it asserts material factual statements that are false. (see 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1).

Defendant contends that Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause, dated September 29, 2025, was in defiance of the prior rulings of the Court and used the judicial process as a means by which to intimidate, provoke, and further threaten Defendant. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 162 at ¶31). Defendant maintains that Plaintiff's Motion Sequence No. 006 was frivolous as defined by 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 and as a result Defendant not only incurred legal fees for motion practice in this in defending against the allegedly false claim but also incurred legal fees for counsel in the Philippines to procure necessary documentation and evidence to defend against this claim. (see id at ¶36).

Defendant contends that she has never been legally married. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 161 at ¶11). Defendant provides an Affidavit from her attorney in the Philippines, Louise Marie C. Leuterio, confirming that there was never a legal or valid marriage between Defendant and RGS. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 164 at pages 2-5). [*4]Defendant further submitted a "Certification of No Record or No Such License" issued by the Local Civil Registrar, confirming that the marriage license number does not exist in its registry or that a license was never issued. (see id at page 8).

Defendant further maintains that

Defendant never had a valid or legal marriage, because there was never a valid marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requisite to a valid, legal marriage. Here, even if the existence of the marriage certificate were true, no marriage license was ever obtained. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 143 at ¶24).

Defendant further provides

that a license number printed on a marriage certificate is not conclusive of a lawful issuance or lawful marriage, which requires an actual entry with the issuing Local Civil Registrar (LCR). Ms. Leuterio obtained a "Certification of No Record or No Such License" issued by the LCR, confirming that the marriage license number does not exist in its registry or that a license was never issued. This is competent, official proof that a valid or legal marriage was never effectuated. (see id).

The Family Code of the Philippines (FCP), as enacted by Executive Order No. 209 on July 6, 1987 provides under Chapter 1 Article 3 that:

The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (Supreme Court E-Library, https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/5/95173 [last accessed April 30, 2026]).

FCP Article 4 provides that "[t]he absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 [2]." (see id). This exception provides for marriages solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so" (see id).

FCP Article 9 requires "A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the city or municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title." (see id).

FCP Chapter 2 details the marriages that are exempted from the license requirement as follows:

Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives. (see id).

Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license. (see id).

Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person [*5]legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage. (see id).

Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with the legible copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the municipality where it was performed within the period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage. (see id).

Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call. (see id).

Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians. (see id).

Art. 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed validly without the necessity of marriage license, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. (see id).

Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage. (see id).

There is no allegation that the purported marriage between the Defendant and RGS was articulo mortis or pursuant to the Muslim faith. On the purported Certificate of Marriage, dated March 29, 1999, the religion of both parties is listed as Roman Catholic. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 164). The place of the purported marriage is allegedly the Office of the Mayor. (see id).

Defendant affirms that she left the Philippines on March 22, 1999, and arrived in New York on March 29, 1999. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 142 at ¶15). Defendant submits what purports to be her reentry permit as well as her Visa dated March 23, 1999. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 146). The document provide however does not provide any identification as to the owner of the documents. (see id).

The evidence at this juncture, indicates there was no valid marriage between the Defendant and RGS within the exceptions to the requirements of FCP Article 9, including the Article 34 exception providing "No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other." (Supreme Court E-Library, https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/5/95173).

While it would clearly be in the Plaintiff's interest to unveil the Defendant as being in a valid previous marriage, in this case, it is not automatically frivolous conduct.

Conduct is frivolous if (1) it is completely without merit in law or fact and cannot be [*6]supported by a reasonable argument; (2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or (3) it asserts material factual statements that are false (see Cassagnol v Village of Hempstead, 214 AD3d 766 [2d Dept 2023] quoting Matter of Congregation Ahavas Moische, Inc. v Katzoff, 134 AD3d 934 [2d Dept 2015]; 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1).

"The party seeking sanctions has the burden to demonstrate that its opponent's conduct was frivolous within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c]" (see Contreras v Jimmy's Auto Top, 242 AD3d 698 [2d Dept 2025] quoting Stone Mtn. Holdings, LLC v Spitzer, 119 AD3d 548 [2d Dept 2014]; citing West Hempstead Water Dist. v Buckeye Pipeline Co., L.P., 152 AD3d 558 [2d Dept 2017]).

Plaintiff states in his sworn affidavit that

In or around January 2025, Defendant's brother informed me that he spoke with Defendant's first husband, RGS, I had no idea Defendant was previously married, let alone still married. According to the marriage certificate, Defendant was married in the Philippines to her first husband on March 20, 1999. The marriage certificate was not legible. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 132 at ¶4-5).

Plaintiff submitted what is purported to be the text message between Plaintiff and Defendant's brother chain which includes an unreadable screen shot of a Certificate of Marriage. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 209). The only words that are legible in the submission to the Court are the words Certificate of Marriage. (see id).

Plaintiff contends that following this revelation, he took the next step and engaged the Respicio & Co Law Firm located in the Philippines to obtain a legal certified copy of the Defendant's purported marriage certificate. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 132 at ¶6). Plaintiff provides a copy of the Engagement Contract between him and the Respicio & Co Law Firm, dated February 16, 2025. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 136). The purpose of the contract is for the firm to obtain a copy of, presumably, the Defendant's purported Marriage Certificate. (see id).

In February 2025, Plaintiff obtained a document purporting to be a Certificate of Marriage, dated March 20, 1999, issued by the Republic of the Philippines Office of the Civil Registrar General recording the marriage of RGS and MKJSS (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 137). The certificate bears a seal identifying the Philippines Statistics Authority. (see id).

At this juncture, having viewed the totality of the evidence provided by both Parties, and having assessed its credibility, and furthermore compounded by Plaintiff's withdrawal of Motion Sequence No. 006 on March 12, 2026, the issue of the Defendant's alleged prior marriage is a non sequitur. However, based on the evidence available to the Plaintiff, particularly the Certificate of Marriage, dated March 20, 1999 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 209), and statements made by the Defendant involving a beach front ceremony in the Philippines, it is not unreasonable that the Plaintiff would bring a motion such as Motion Sequence No. 006.

The hostility between the Parties combined with a clouding of the waters as to whether or not the Defendant had been previously married and whether she was married at the time the Parties were married, clearly required the engagement of motion practice to resolve the issue. Accordingly, the Defendant's request for additional sanctions against the Plaintiff for frivolous conduct within the meaning of 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant's request for Plaintiff to pay counsel fees in the amount of $5,000.00 [FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS] for legal fees incurred thus far in [*7]preparation of this motion and opposition to Motion Sequence No. 006 is DENIED.

B. Trial Retainer

Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a] governs interim awards of counsel fees in matrimonial litigation. It vests the trial court with discretion to direct one spouse to pay counsel fees on behalf of the other, "to enable the other party to carry on or defend the action." The statute was amended in 2010 to create a rebuttable presumption that counsel fees should be awarded to the less monied spouse, to ensure meaningful access to representation and parity of litigation power.

In exercising this discretion, the Court is obligated to consider the financial circumstances of the parties, the relative merits of their respective claims, the complexity of the litigation, and whether either party has unnecessarily delayed or protracted the proceedings. See O'Shea v O'Shea, 93 NY2d 187 [1999]; Prichep v Prichep, 52 AD3d 61 [2d Dept 2008].

The policy underlying § 237 is remedial: to correct economic imbalance and to ensure that one party's superior access to funds does not leverage unjust advantage in litigation. The remedy is designed to be prophylactic and not punitive, recognizing that unchecked financial disparity can undermine the fairness of judicial proceedings.

Upon a detailed examination of the record, this Court concludes that Defendant has met her burden to establish that she is, in fact, the less monied spouse for purposes of this application. The evidence before the Court reveals a significant disparity between the parties' financial positions. While Defendant's gross W-2 income is not insubstantial, Plaintiff's earnings more than double those of the Defendant.

The record further supports the conclusion that Plaintiff has previously engaged in a pattern of conduct that has unnecessarily increased litigation costs for which the Plaintiff was sanctioned by the Court in the Decision and Order, dated September 8, 2026.

The Court, having considered the full procedural history, the evidentiary record, the undisputed financial disparity between the parties, and the governing legal standards under Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a], concludes that in anticipation of trial an additional interim award of counsel fees is not only warranted but essential to safeguard the integrity of the proceedings. To deny Defendant the means to secure continued representation in the face of such a stark economic imbalance would subvert both the purpose of the statute and the equitable responsibilities of the Court.

The Court declines, however, to grant the full amount requested by Defendant. While the Court recognizes the exigency of the circumstances, a fee award must remain reasonable in scope and calibrated to the legitimate needs of the litigation. Accordingly, Defendant's request for the Plaintiff to pay a trial retainer to the Defendant is GRANTED in the amount of $10,000.00 [TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS], pendente lite, subject to reallocation at trial, without prejudice to renew; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Plaintiff is directed to pay to Defendant the sum of $10,000.00 [TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS], pendente lite, subject to reallocation at trial, as a trial retainer for forthcoming proceedings, to be paid within 7 (seven) days of service of this order with notice of entry.

IV. Decretal Paragraphs

It is hereby ORDERED, that Defendant's request for additional sanctions against the Plaintiff for frivolous conduct within the meaning of 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant's request for Plaintiff to pay counsel fees in the amount of $5,000.00 [FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS] for legal fees incurred thus far in preparation of this motion and opposition to Motion Sequence No. 006 is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant's request for the Plaintiff to pay a trial retainer to the Defendant is GRANTED in the amount of $10,000.00 [TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS] , pendente lite, subject to reallocation at trial, without prejudice to renew; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Plaintiff is directed to pay to Defendant the sum of $10,000.00 [TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS], pendente lite, subject to reallocation at trial, as a trial retainer for forthcoming proceedings, to be paid within 7 (seven) days of service of this order with notice of entry; and it is further

ORDERED, that all other relief not expressly granted herein is DENIED without prejudice to renewal upon further factual development or upon conclusion of trial; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

The foregoing shall constitute the Decision and Order of this Court.

Dated: May 4, 2026

Staten Island, New York

E N T E R,

HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR.

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT