Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County

Decided on May 4, 2026

Docket No. CR-024062-25BX

David L. Goodwin, J.

[*1]

The People assumed they had shared all relevant body-worn camera footage with the defense before declaring ready for trial. But they were mistaken. The footage provided to the People by the NYPD, which was transmitted to the defense without an independent review, turned out to be unrelated to this case. And while the People eventually were able to obtain and disclose the correct video after defense counsel flagged the mistake, an additional two-and-a-half months elapsed before they did so.

Defendant R. Dixon^FN1 now moves to invalidate the People's certificate of compliance (COC) and dismiss the accusatory instrument on C.P.L. § 30.30 statutory speedy trial grounds, contending that the People did not exercise due diligence in connection with their statutory discovery obligations. Dixon's argument has merit; because of the materiality of the undisclosed evidence, the protracted delay before the error was fixed, and a record reflecting insufficient post-readiness outreach in light of the seriousness of the omission, the People have not met their burden of showing due diligence. Therefore, Dixon's motion to dismiss will be GRANTED and the accusatory instrument will be DISMISSED.

I. Background

The Charges and Arraignment

On September 5, 2025, Dixon was charged with and arraigned on counts of third-degree assault (P.L. § 120.00(1)) and second-degree harassment (P.L. § 240.26(1)). According to the accusatory instrument, which was told from the perspective of the arresting officer, Officer Diaz, Dixon had allegedly punched the complaining witness and pushed her to the ground at around 1:05 a.m. that morning, leading her to seek medical treatment. Accusatory Instrument at 1.

[*2]Pre-Readiness Discovery Efforts by the People

The People's discovery outreach began twenty-five days later. On September 30 and October 1, the People (through a trial preparation assistant) requested all 911 recordings related to the incident, emailed the NYPD discovery liaison regarding certain outstanding discovery materials—a list that included activity logs, an arrest report worksheet, and arrest photos, but did not specifically mention body-worn camera footage—and sought Giglio impeachment materials for the relevant officers. People's Resp. Aff. ¶¶ 4-6; People's Resp. at 26-27 (pdf pag.).

The next batch of discovery outreach took place in early December 2025, shortly before the People declared ready. On December 1, the People followed up on an earlier email requesting discovery. As before, this email (sent by the same trial preparation assistant) did not specifically mention body-worn camera footage, instead listing three outstanding documents and requesting any material that might be on the officers' phones. In a separate email, however, the assigned Assistant District Attorney also separately sought the body-worn camera footage of Officer Diaz and his partner, Officer Rodriguez, to supplement the footage of two other officers, Officer Bailey and Officer McConnell, who had already uploaded their videos. People's Resp. Aff. ¶¶ 8-9; People's Resp. at 28, 32-33.

Prior to filing their COC and declaring ready, the People accessed evidence.com to ensure that the body-worn camera footage associated with this case's arrest number matched the list of officers who had submitted activity logs. The People did not view each individual video. Instead, the People relied on correspondence among the officers involved in the arrest and those who had uploaded videos to determine that the correct footage had been obtained. People's Supp. at 1-2 (pdf pag.).

Certificate of Compliance and Readiness

The People filed their discovery-compliance materials and declared ready on December 2, 88 days after the case had commenced. According to their COC, the People's disclosures included a 911 recording, twenty-one photographs, and activity logs for six officers. See COC at 7-9. The People also purportedly had disclosed body-worn camera footage from four of those six officers; of the missing two, Officer Diaz did not have his camera activated, and Officer Rodriguez had not yet provided his footage despite multiple attempts by the People to obtain it. COC at 3, 7. A few other items—the complaining witness's medical records, a medical treatment of prisoner form, a Miranda form, screenshots of text messages, and the WINQ—were also outstanding. COC at 3-4.

Post-Readiness Conferral over Incorrect Body-Worn Camera Footage

Although defense counsel originally confirmed that he could view the body-worn camera footage shared by the People, People's Resp. Aff. ¶ 11, by December 8, counsel had realized that the body-worn camera footage was from a different incident entirely. Counsel relayed his concerns to the People via phone and, the next day, memorialized the conversation in an email, emphasizing (among other concerns not relevant here) that the defense lacked any body-worn camera footage relating to the case. Defense's Aff. ¶ 8; Defense's Mot., Ex. A.

The People promptly agreed that the disclosed footage did not relate to this case, outlining the steps they had taken so far in response. Right after speaking with defense counsel the day before, the People had reviewed the footage and contacted the body-worn camera unit direct at the District Attorney's Office. The People also reached out to two of the responding officers and scheduled them to come to the District Attorney's office over the next few days. See Defense's Mot., Ex. B; People's Resp. Aff. ¶¶ 14-15; People's Resp. at 39 (pdf pag.).

Later, on December 14, the People spoke to the District Attorney's Office Video Unit's Bureau Coordinator about the issue. The assigned Assistant District Attorney was advised that the unrelated footage for Officers Bailey and McConnell was the only footage found. People's Resp. Aff. ¶ 16.

Defense counsel followed up on his original email on December 30, as counsel understood that the officers were supposed to have come to the District Attorney's office earlier that month. Observing that nothing had been heard from the People since, defense counsel requested an update. Defense's Aff. ¶ 13; Defense's Mot., Ex. C.

The People responded the next day. Despite having attempted various methods to obtain the correct footage, the People had not been successful—and the officers had not appeared despite the People's requests. Defense's Mot., Ex. D. The People pledged to provide more information as soon as they were able. Id.; see Defense's Aff. ¶ 14.

II. The Motion to Dismiss and Additional Discovery

The Defense's Dismissal Arguments and Post-Motion Court Appearance

Dixon filed this off-calendar counseled motion to dismiss—dated December 31, but submitted January 2—raising a single issue: the missing body-worn camera footage requires invalidation of the People's COC and dismissal of the accusatory instrument. Defense's Mot. at 3-4. Dixon observes that despite defense counsel's attempts to confer on this issue, no accommodation had been reached, as the footage was still missing nearly a month after the People's declaration of readiness. Defense's Aff. ¶¶ 15-16.

The People's Pre-Response Efforts to Find the Footage, Which They Obtained on February 20

One day before the next court appearance, at which the remainder of the motion schedule was set, the People had requested that several officers come to the District Attorney's Office. However, the officers again did not appear or otherwise respond. People's Resp. Aff. ¶ 17; People's Resp. at 40 (pdf pag.).

The record does not reflect any additional outreach until February 20, the day the People's motion response was due, when the People contacted the 47th Precinct's discovery liaison and finally were able to obtain the correct body-worn camera footage. The People shared the footage with the defense and filed a supplemental COC and statement of readiness that day.

The People's Response to the Defense's Motion

In their response to Dixon's motion, the People argue that they demonstrated due diligence and good faith overall in discharging their statutory discovery obligations.

As a threshold issue, the People contend that Dixon's motion is procedurally defective because he cannot accurately affirm, as he must under C.P.L. § 245.50(4)(c), that his "efforts to obtain the missing discovery . . . were unsuccessful" and that "no accommodation could be reached." Relying on People v. Whitney, — Misc 3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op. 25248 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2025) (David, J.), the People argue that conferral yielded acquisition of the missing material, resolving the dispute without any court intervention. People's Resp. at 16-17. As a result, Dixon's motion is procedurally barred. People's Resp. at 17.

On the merits, and among other factors weighing in favor of diligence, the People point to the robust discovery package they provided to the defense within the 90-day speedy trial deadline, the narrowness of the current dispute over the body-worn camera footage, their outreach efforts recounted above when apprised of the missing footage, and the ostensible lack of prejudice to the defense because the missing footage was eventually provided. See People's [*3]Resp. at 11-13. The People emphasize that they responded appropriately when apprised of the error and provided the missing footage "the moment it was shared with the People on February 20" without the need for "any court order or prompting," satisfying the holistic statutory factors in § 245.50(5)(a). People's Resp. at 13, 16.

The People also argue that Dixon did not make a showing of prejudice that justifies invalidating the COC, and in fact made no prejudice argument at all, which (in the People's view) was required of him under the revised Article 245. People's Resp. at 14-15. In any event, the belated materials were "substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied" because the People "immediately shared" the body-worn camera footage with the defense when it was obtained. People's Resp. at 16 (partially quoting C.P.L. § 245.50(5)(a)).

Finally, the People argue that striking the COC is an inappropriate remedy for a discovery violation under the August 2025 revisions to Articles 30 and 245. Relying on the Governor's signing statement/press release on those amendments, pre-2020 New York case law, and criminal discovery sanction decisions from other jurisdictions, the People contend that dismissal for a discovery violation should be a sanction of last resort. Moreover, "in amending Article 245, the Legislature gave courts an alternative to invalidation of a COC" in the form of discovery sanctions under C.P.L. §§ 245.50(5)(c) and 245.80, and that those options—not the remedy of dismissal—are appropriate for any discovery shortcoming here. People's Resp. at 6-11.

Dixon did not originally reply in further support of his motion.

Supplemental Filings and the Defense's Reply

Upon reviewing the original papers, the Court determined that additional information and a reply from the defense were needed. The People were directed to:

(1) make available to the Court the corrected body-worn camera footage that was disclosed to the defense on February 20, 2026, and (2) submit a supplemental response sletter brief and affirmation. In the supplemental affirmation, the People should (a) indicate whether they reviewed the initial body-worn camera footage before disclosing it to the defense and declaring ready, and (b) indicate how they determined that the body-worn camera footage disclosed to the defense did not relate to the case upon being apprised by defense counsel. In the supplemental letter brief, the People should address whether, in their view, the corrected body-worn camera footage was "substantively duplicative" or "insignificant," and why the "delayed disclosure" was not "prejudicial to the defense." C.P.L. § 245.50(5)(a).

Supplemental Briefing Order at 1. Dixon was also directed to reply to the People's original and supplemental response papers. Id.

In their supplemental filing, the People concede (as recited above) that they did not review each individual video before declaring ready, relying instead on correspondence among officers to form a good-faith belief that the footage was correct. The People realized that the footage was unrelated only after being alerted by defense counsel. See People's Supp. Aff. at 1-2 (pdf pag.); People's Supp. at 4 (pdf pag.).

The People argue, however, that the delayed disclosure was not prejudicial to the defense, because no hearing and trial dates had been set as of the February 20 disclosure, leaving ample time for Dixon and defense counsel to review the footage and incorporate it into case strategy. People's Supp. at 6 (pdf pag.). And while the People do not directly argue that the body-worn camera footage here was of "minimal significance," they rely on People v. Lawrence, 231 [*4]AD3d 1497 (4th Dept. 2024), leave denied, 43 NY3d 945 (2025), to argue that this should not lead to dismissal when, as here, the People are able to correct the error. People's Supp. at 5 (pdf pag.). Finally, the People reiterate their argument that dismissal is unwarranted because alternative sanctions are available under C.P.L. § 245.80. People's Supp. at 6 (pdf pag.).

In reply, Dixon addresses the People's lack of diligence, emphasizing that the body-worn camera footage contains statements by both the complaining witness and other witnesses to the incident, rendering its absence prejudicial. Defense's Reply Aff. ¶ 9. In Dixon's view, the People otherwise made minimal outreach before declaring ready despite the relative simplicity of the case, did not review the footage before it was disclosed on the day the People initially declared ready, and took over two months to secure the correct video after the error was brought to their attention. Defense's Reply Aff. ¶¶ 9-11, 15, 17-18.^FN2

The Court's Review of the Footage

The People provided the body-worn camera footage to the Court as requested. Among the events depicted are Dixon's arrest and contemporaneous statements, including at the precinct. See, e.g., Axon_Body_4_Video_2025-09-05_0116_B25645477-2 at 13:40-14:37; Axon_Body_4_Video_2025-09-05_0127_B25645477 beginning at 14:25. Also depicted are statements by the complaining witness and others about the circumstances of the alleged assault—including that the complaining witness "hit [Dixon] back" after he hit her first, and "had him on the ground" before he pulled her hair and "sucker-punched [her] in the face," Axon_Body_4_Video_2025-09-05_0122_B25645477-2 at 15:20-15:44—in addition to a survey of the scene and ample discussion of additional, uncharged conduct. The complaining witness also made several statements while in the ambulance. See, e.g., Axon_Body_4_Video_2025-09-05_0149_B25645477 at 1:00; Axon_Body_4_Video_2025-09-05_0122_B25645477-2 at 7:49.

III. Legal Standard

In a case like this one, where the top count is a misdemeanor punishable by a custodial sentence of more than three months, the People must be ready for trial within 90 days. C.P.L. § 30.30(1)(b). If they are not ready within that 90-day window, the accusatory instrument must be dismissed on motion by the defense. C.P.L. §§ 30.30(1)(b), 170.30(e); People v. Labate, 42 NY3d 184, 190 (2024).

The People must comply with their discovery obligations before declaring ready for trial and stopping the speedy trial clock. See C.P.L. § 30.30(5)(a). The People do so by, among other things, filing a COC.

A COC is valid, and can stop the § 30.30 speedy trial clock, if the People have exercised due diligence and good faith in fulfilling their discovery obligations. C.P.L. §§ 30.30(5)(a)-(b), 245.50(6). This requires the People to make "reasonable" efforts and inquiries to comply with [*5]their statutory responsibilities. People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 211 (2023). Factors relevant to diligence include:

the efforts made by the prosecutor to comply with the requirements of this article; the volume of discovery provided and the volume of discovery outstanding; the complexity of the case; whether the prosecutor knew that the belatedly disclosed or allegedly missing material existed; the explanation for any alleged discovery lapse; the prosecutor's response when apprised of any allegedly missing discovery; whether the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied; whether the omission was corrected; whether the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention; and whether the prosecution's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial.

C.P.L. § 245.50(5)(a). Diligence must be assessed holistically, rather than line-by-line, with no one factor or shortcoming being determinative. Id. § 245.50(5)(b); People v. McMahon, 237 AD3d 746, 751 (2d Dept. 2025). The People bear the burden of establishing their diligence. Bay, 41 NY3d at 213.

IV. Discussion

a) Dixon's motion is not procedurally deficient under C.P.L. § 245.50(4)(c); assuming that an inaccurate affirmation of conferral is a procedural defect, his affirmation was accurate, as the missing discovery was still outstanding when he filed his motion.

As a threshold procedural issue, the People invoke the requirement that a challenge to a COC be accompanied by an affirmation by the moving party that, among other things, the parties conferred, "that efforts to obtain the missing discovery from the opposing party or otherwise resolve the issues raised were unsuccessful, and that no accommodation could be reached." C.P.L. § 245.50(4)(c). Relying on Whitney, the People contend that Dixon cannot meet the "statutory prerequisite" for his COC challenge because the defense received the requested materials and a "resolution was reached" without the need for "any court intervention." People's Resp. at 17.

However, even assuming without deciding that an inaccurate § 245.50(4)(c) affirmation is a procedural defect (as opposed to a merits issue), defense counsel's affirmation was accurate, as it was made when the body-worn camera footage was still outstanding and no accommodation had yet been reached. Nothing about the text of § 245.50(4)(c) suggests that a subsequent, post-affirmation accommodation or acquisition of discovery undermines an affirmation to the contrary that was true when made, or creates a procedural bar to consideration of the merits of the motion.

The People's reliance to the contrary on Whitney is misplaced because the missing discovery was not provided within the 35-day conferral window or before the motion was filed. Under the August 2025 amendments to Article 245, COC-challenge motions must now be filed within 35 days of service of the COC, see C.P.L. § 245.50(4)(c), and courts have generally concluded that the new statutory framework provides for a 35-day window where whatever conferral may be required should take place. See, e.g., People v. Benali, 88 Misc 3d 1228(A), 2026 NY Slip Op. 50265(U), at *2 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Kings Co. 2026) (Zelmanovitz, J.); People v. Taylor, 88 Misc 3d 1211(A), 2026 NY Slip Op. 50079(U), at *2 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 2026) (Miret, J.).

Whitney addressed the effect of belated discovery disclosure within this conferral [*6]window, concluding that "where conferral has resulted in the defense obtaining the purportedly missing material, a COC validity challenge does not typically lie" because the defense cannot then "make the appropriate threshold attestation" and, in any event, "most likely received the material within just a few weeks of communicating the issue to the prosecution," which would "satisfy[y]" several of the "due diligence factors . . . in the first instance." Whitney, 2025 NY Slip Op 25248, at *5-6. In other words, if conferral yields acquisition of the missing material before any motion is filed, a defendant might not be able to affirm that "efforts to obtain the missing discovery" were "unsuccessful," as the § 245.50(4)(c) affirmation provision appears to require.

Conferral here, however, did not yield acquisition of the missing material, which was instead disclosed nearly two-and-a-half months after conferral began and well after Dixon filed his motion. The situation contemplated by Whitney simply does not apply.

In sum, because Dixon's affirmation was accurate as of the time it was submitted, the subsequent acquisition of the missing material did not retroactively undermine it. There is no barrier to reaching the merits of his motion.

b) The missing body-worn camera footage outweighs the other § 245.50(5)(a) factors on this particular record, where the footage was neither duplicative nor insignificant, the People's record of their pre-readiness efforts is only adequate, and the People's post-readiness efforts did not produce the missing material for 80 days after their initial declaration of readiness.

As to the merits, the People have not met their burden of showing that they exercised due diligence^FN3 in discharging their statutory discovery obligations. While their proffer suffered from one key lapse, the relevant omission—the missing body-worn camera footage depicting Dixon's arrest and processing, multiple statements by the complaining witnesses and other witnesses to the alleged assault, an examination of the scene, and so on—was particularly crucial, implicating the People's core readiness for trial. The mistake was not corrected, meanwhile, for nearly 80 days after the initial declaration of readiness, or 74 days as measured from when defense counsel brought the omission to their attention—a delay nearly the length of the misdemeanor § 30.30 period itself. The People have not otherwise provided an extensive record of their pre- or post-readiness outreach; in particular, the post-readiness outreach did not match the urgency of the omission. As a result, the People have not shown the due diligence required to validate their COC.

Several of the § 245.50(5)(a) factors either favor the People or are neutral. The original discovery proffer appears reasonable and comprehensive for a case of this level of complexity and, in sheer volume, the discovery provided appears to overwhelm the missing body-worn camera footage. And while the Appellate Division has occasionally treated lack of complexity as a negative factor for the People—see, e.g., McMahon, 237 AD3d at 747-48, 751 (concluding that a case's lack of complexity "cut[] against a finding of due diligence"); People v. Pierre, 244 AD3d 1139, 1140 (2d Dept. 2025)—those factors, considered in tandem, weigh in favor of the People here.

The "explanation for any alleged discovery lapse" factor, C.P.L. § 245.50(5)(a), favors the defense. With admirable candor, the People admit that they did not individually review each video file provided by the NYPD, and instead relied on officer correspondence in forming a belief that the footage provided was correct. But while the record does not establish what the incorrect footage depicted, defense counsel was able to swiftly determine that none of it showed the underlying incident or anything else relevant to this case.^FN4 To the extent that due diligence may not require the People to individually review every discovery document they intend to provide to the defense, and instead rely on the representations of others—officers, discovery liaisons, and so on—the error here was far broader: none of the footage was from the underlying incident or its aftermath. A spot-check of this core discovery material would hopefully have alerted the People to this problem, but the record reflects that one was not done.

The record of pre-readiness outreach, meanwhile, is just adequate. The People requested 911 recordings and sent a general discovery request on September 30, sought Giglio materials on October 1, and made two final attempts at outreach on December 1. Only the last of these, however, reflected a specific request for body-worn camera footage, People's Resp. Aff. ¶¶ 5-9—and a record of only a few generalized, pre-readiness inquiries can be a problem when, as here, the correct body-worn camera footage is not obtained. While the record also implies that other, specific requests for the footage may have been made, those requests are not documented, and the People do not otherwise assert that there was outreach beyond what is depicted in the four corners of their affirmation.

This leads to the biggest problem for the People so far: whether the outstanding discovery was "substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied"—in other words, whether the missing material mattered, and whether its absence would have affected the case and prejudiced the defense. C.P.L. § 245.50(5)(a). As explained below, it mattered very much indeed.

Here, when they declared ready, the People had neither obtained nor disclosed any of the body-worn camera footage that was relevant to this case, albeit inadvertently. This is a major shortcoming generally, as body-worn camera footage is basic and essential to a case like this one. See People v. Gonzalez, 86 Misc 3d 1230(A), 2025 NY Slip Op. 51064(U), at *6 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2025) (Moore, J.) (explaining that body-worn camera footage "often depicts essential events, particularly when a complaining witness is involved"); People v. Morgan, 83 Misc 3d 1221(A), 2024 NY Slip Op. 50771(U), at *3 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Queens Co. 2024) (Licitra, J.) ("[B]ody-worn camera footage is a basic part of any case.").

This lapse also strikes right at the core of the People's overall readiness for trial. As reviewed by the undersigned, the missing footage encompassed Dixon's arrest (and comments made to the police while the arrest was ongoing), statements by the complaining witness and others at the scene, and an examination of the scene itself. The footage was thus relevant to [*7]hearing and trial preparation and the defense's strategy more broadly, and could also have informed potential plea negotiations. See People v. Loja, 86 Misc 3d 318, 330-31 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2025) (Bowen, J.) (collecting authorities about the importance of discovery reform to plea negotiations and the expeditious resolution of cases); cf. C.P.L. § 245.25(2) (addressing performance of initial discovery obligations and the expiration of plea offers). Thus, while "belated disclosures" might not undermine the People's COC if they are "minimal" and "not related to testifying witnesses," People v. McCutchen, — AD3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op. 01990, at *2 (2d Dept. 2026), the body-worn camera footage here was material to the case.

Despite being invited to make the relevant argument, the People do not contend that that the footage was in any way duplicative or insignificant. Because they bear the relevant burden, it is reasonable to assume from that silence that the footage is just as important as it appears to be, with none of its impact diminished by the officers' activity logs, the arrest paperwork, or other related documents.

Regarding the People's response to the discovery lapse and whether the omission was corrected,^FN5 there is no need to delineate the precise relationship between the magnitude of an error and the People's post-readiness efforts, or to mark out the timespan within which an error may be corrected. Instead, it is enough here to observe that the People's efforts fell short.

Despite being advised of the error on December 8, a mere six days after they declared ready, the People were unable to fix the mistake until February 20, 74 days later and 80 days after they had first declared ready. This is nearly another full class A misdemeanor speedy trial period, and compares unfavorably to cases where a swift response weighed heavily in the People's favor. See, e.g., People v. Gerhard, 244 AD3d 1313, 1317 (3d Dept. 2025) ("[T]he People indicated that missing body camera footage was due to a technical error in uploading it to the discovery software and was quickly remedied when defendant pointed out that it was missing."), leave denied, 45 NY3d 936 (2026); People v. Sombillo, 244 AD3d 873, 874 (2d Dept. 2025) (COC valid when, among other efforts, "the People immediately disclosed the vouchers once they ascertained that they had not been initially turned over").

Nor did the People's efforts during that period match the urgency of the situation. The People detail inquiries on December 9, January 14, and February 20, with the last of these proving successful (a fourth inquiry, on December 15, was internal to the District Attorney's office). People's Resp. Aff. ¶¶ 15-18. But the first three appear to have consisted primarily of [*8]directing the officers to appear, with no apparent follow up when they did not. As a single contact with the precinct discovery liaison on February 20 yielded acquisition of the missing footage, it is far from apparent why the People did not try that sooner.

Again, there is no need to determine precisely what reasonable efforts would look like here. It is enough to say that more would be expected when no body-worn camera footage has been provided in a case where that footage would likely be relevant.

The People's reliance to the contrary on Lawrence is thus inapt. In Lawrence, "some" of the requested body-worn camera footage was missing—an omission that would "not have been particularly obvious to the People" given the "voluminous discovery actually produced." Lawrence, 231 AD3d at 1500. Here, by contrast, no body-worn camera footage was actually provided. Moreover, the prosecution in Lawrence was able to "immediately disclose[] the remaining . . . footage once [the People] learned that it had not been turned over in the initial release." Id. Here, neither the acquisition nor the provision of the missing material was anywhere close to immediate.

Finally, Dixon does not directly contend that his defense was prejudiced by the delay itself, and the People argue that the late disclosure was harmless because, among other things, Dixon now has access to the relevant material. See People's Resp. at 16; People's Supp. at 5-6 (pdf pag.). In the constitutional speedy trial context, however, courts have long recognized that "'impairment of one's defense is the most difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to prove because time's erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony can rarely be shown.'" People v. Wiggins, 31 NY3d 1, 18 (2018) (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972), by way of Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655 (1992)) (second layer of internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (recognizing that prejudice "caused by delay in bringing [a defendant] to trial is not confined to the possible prejudice to his defense in those proceedings"). Thus, the absence of a record about specific impairment of the defense weighs only slightly in favor of the People.

To sum up, while some of the relevant statutory factors do weigh in favor of the People, the sheer centrality and materiality of the missing body-worn camera footage, and the lack of urgency in resolving the issue, tip the scales back in the defense's favor. On this record, the People have not met their burden of demonstrating that they exercised reasonable efforts in discharging their statutory discovery obligations. As a consequence, their COC is not valid.

c) Dismissal remains the only remedy when the invalidity of a COC means the People's statutory speedy trial time has elapsed.

The People nevertheless argue that the August 2025 revisions to Articles 30 and 245 authorize alternative remedies to dismissal when a COC is invalidated, and otherwise require a defendant to show sufficient prejudice as a prerequisite to dismissal. As explained below, however, dismissal remains the only appropriate remedy when a COC's invalidation means that the People's speedy trial time has expired.

The People's argument against dismissal as a remedy relies largely on statements from the Governor's May 7, 2025 press release^FN6 as revealing "the intent and purpose of the [August 2025] amendments." People's Resp. at 8. This argument is rejected for substantially the same [*9]reasons already stated in People v. Guevarez, 88 Misc 3d 1207(A), 2026 NY Slip Op. 50045(U), at *12 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2026). In short, the Governor is not the Legislature, and the language of the press release, which has only limited probative value, cannot override the actual statutory text, which "both before and after August 2025" required dismissal of the accusatory instrument upon a finding that a COC was not valid. Id. (citing, among others, Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. Sch. Dist., 91 NY2d 577, 586-87 (1998)).

Most of the People's other arguments against dismissal are also unconvincing, again for the reasons already stated in Guevarez. Section 245.50(5)(c) provides for discovery sanctions upon a finding of a valid COC, not an invalid one. See Guevarez, 2026 NY Slip Op. 50045(U), at *12. And decisions from other jurisdictions about dismissal as a discovery sanction are of limited use, because those jurisdictions do not "tether discovery compliance to statutory speedy trial rights." Id.

The People also contend that under the August 2025 statutory revisions, invalidation of a COC and the remedy of dismissal must be predicated on a sufficient showing of prejudice—a change that was explicitly intended to overrule the contrary holding in Bay that "a defendant need not demonstrate prejudice to obtain speedy trial dismissal based on a failure to timely comply with discovery obligations." Bay, 41 NY3d at 213. This probably is not correct; the statutory revisions clarified that prejudice should be considered in assessing the validity of a COC, but did not alter Bay's observation that prejudice is not required for the remedy of dismissal if a COC is invalid and the speedy trial time has run. Regardless, as the People themselves concede, "prejudice" encompasses both the importance of the belated discovery and whether the People "took prompt remedial action" to address any discovery omissions. People's Resp. at 15. Assuming without deciding that prejudice is required, prejudice is amply demonstrated on this record as set forth above.

In sum, dismissal of the accusatory instrument remains the appropriate remedy when, due to the invalidity of a COC, the People's statutory speedy trial time has expired.

* * *

Much as the phrase "abuse of discretion" is intended to be "a nonpejorative term of art" that "implies no misconduct," Kaplan v. Bank Saderat PLC, 77 F.4th 110, 117 n.9 (2d Cir. 2023), due diligence is a "familiar and flexible standard" that simply means "reasonable efforts," Bay, 41 NY2d at 211. It has no inherent moral valence and does not require (or imply) individualized fault or misconduct.

But as set forth above, fault is largely irrelevant. The discovery lapse here was too significant, and went uncorrected for too long, to yield a valid COC. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Dixon's motion to invalidate the COC and dismiss the accusatory instrument is GRANTED, and the accusatory instrument is DISMISSED. Unless the People make an application to stay sealing, the matter is also SEALED as of the day this decision is issued and the matter is called on the record. Defense counsel is directed to serve the People with a copy of this order along with a notice of entry.

Dated: May 4, 2026

Bronx, NY

David L. Goodwin

Judge of the Criminal Court