People v Robinson
2026 NY Slip Op 50660(U)
March 20, 2026
Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County
Ralph L. Wolf, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.
The People of the State of New York
v
Lansville Robinson, Defendant.
Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County
Decided on March 20, 2026
Docket No. CR-013863-25BX
For the People: Darcel D. Clark, Assistant District Attorney, Bronx County (by Claudia Ni Buachalla)
For Lansville Robinson: The Law Office of John Guarneri (by John Guarneri)
Ralph L. Wolf, J.
[*1]Summary
Defense motion seeking dismissal of the information is GRANTED.
[*2]Procedural History
Lansville Robinson was arrested on May 13, 2025 and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs under Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL) §§ 1192(1), (2) and (3). He was arraigned on May 15, 2025 and the case was adjourned to May 19, 2025 for the prosecution to file a Certificate of Compliance and a hardship hearing. On May 19, 2025 the defense withdrew their request for the hardship hearing and the case was adjourned to July 2 and August 18, 2025 for Mr. Robinson to be screened and assessed and the prosecution to file their COC. On August 8, 2025 (84 days after arraignment) the prosecution filed their COC, Automatic Disclosure Form (ADF) and Statement of Readiness (SOR). On August 18, 2025 the defense requested time to review the discovery, and the case was adjourned to September 24, 2025. On September 24, 2025 the defense requested and received a good cause extension to file objections to October 23, 2025 and the case was adjourned to November 12, 2025. On October 23, 2025, the defense filed their motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL § 30.30 and on November 12, 2025 the court set the instant motion schedule for the filing of the opposition and reply. The defense requested additional time to submit their filings, so the court extended the deadlines and administratively adjourned the decision date.
The parties come before the court on a defense motion to dismiss under CPL § 30.30. The defense argues that the prosecution failed to provide discovery within the 35 days mandated by CPL § 245.10, and when the prosecution did comply, their compliance was deficient because they failed to disclose records related to the Intoxilyzer breath testing machine used in this case and potential impeachment material for the officers involved. The prosecution argues that they satisfied their discovery obligations, that they have no other discovery to disclose relevant to the Intoxilyzer, and need not disclose any further evidence related to the officers.
Relevant Facts
The prosecution's initial COC did not note that they were aware of any missing discovery as required under CPL § 245.50(1). On May 14, 2025, prior to Mr. Robinson's arraignment, the prosecution requested discovery from the New York Police Department (NYPD), on May 16, 2025 the prosecution requested video from the Intoxicated Driver Testing Unit (IDTU), and on May 19, 2025 the prosecution spoke to an IDTU supervisor and learned that footage existed to which the prosecution was granted access. On May 28, 2025 the prosecution requested 911 calls and radio runs from the NYPD. On June 9, 2025 the prosecution requested additional discovery from the NYPD. Although the prosecution stated that on June 16, 2025 they received the outstanding discovery, on August 5, 2025 (81 days after arraignment) the prosecution requested Giglio information for Officers Montano Arias, Ventura and Montoya. (Opposition at unnumbered page 5.) On August 8, 2025 (84 days after arraignment) the prosecution shared discovery with the defense. On November 10, 2025 (178 days after arraignment) the prosecution filed a supplemental COC (SCOC) stating that they disclosed two items. One item consisted of two photos of an IDTU printout indicating that the Intoxilyzer used in this case failed on July 16, 2025. The prosecution states in the SCOC that they learned about these photos on October 14, 2025. The other item was a copy of the IDTU Field Unit Inspection (FUI) Report prepared on July 17, 2025 indicating that the Intoxilyzer used in this case was taken out of service due to diagnostic failure. The prosecution stated in their SCOC that they believed this document had [*3]been included in their previous disclosure. In their opposition, the prosecution listed Officers Montoya, Montano Arias, and Ventura as the testifying officers. (Opposition at unnumbered page 16.)
The defense argues that the prosecution never disclosed important information related to the Intoxilyzer. The prosecution did not to disclose three of five simulator solution Lots (numbers 24170, 024150, 24330) that were used on February 6, 2025 to calibrate the Intoxilyzer used in this case, and maintenance and repair records for that Intoxilyzer, which experienced a diagnostic failure two months after the test at issue. Additionally, the defense argues the prosecution failed to disclose NYPD Central Personnel IndexFN1 (CPI) records for testifying officers, NYPD Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) log attachments for Officer Montano Arias, and complete, unredacted IAB logs for Officers Montoya and Ventura.
The prosecution's response to the missing simulator solution records is that prosecution is not required to use their subpoena power, create discoverable material or spend thousands of dollars to produce materials for the defense. (Opposition at unnumbered page 21.) The prosecution states that the simulator solution records are not in their possession and cite to two-and-a-half-year-old testimony of the NYPD's Sergeant Schneider from People v Colon, 80 Misc 3d 1219(A) (Crim Ct, NY County 2023), in which Sergeant Schneider testified that the process to obtain simulator solutions records is time-consuming and expensive. Colon at *7.
The prosecution's position as to the maintenance and repair records for the Intoxilyzer used in this case that was taken out of service is that they satisfied their obligation when they disclosed the two photos and the FUI report.
The prosecution argues that they disclosed all of the impeachment materials they are required to disclose. The prosecution states that Officer Ventura does not have any CPI records; CPI records for Officer Montoya exist, but are not discoverable; and they have disclosed all portions of Officer Montano Aria's CPI records.FN2 The prosecution argues that IAB log attachments for Officer Montano Arias are not discoverable because the prosecution has previously disclosed material that tends to impeach the credibility of the witness, the logs may contain sensitive or private information and contain duplicative information, the defense has failed to explain why the logs are necessary, and the information in the logs is inadmissible. Similar to the CPI records above, the prosecution states that IAB logs for Officer Ventura do not exist, and IAB logs for Officer Montoya are not discoverable.
Legal Analysis
Since the top charge in this case is an A misdemeanor, CPL § 30.30(1)(b) requires the People to be ready within 90 days of arraignment (by August 14, 2025 in this case). See People v Brown, 28 NY3d 392, 403 (2016). Under CPL § 245.10(1)(a)(ii), "[w]hen the defendant is not in [*4]custody during the pendency of the criminal case, the prosecution shall perform its initial discovery obligations within thirty-five calendar days after the defendant's arraignment." Therefore, initial discovery obligations in this case were due by June 20, 2025.
A valid COC requires the prosecution to make a diligent, good faith effort to determine what discoverable material exists and to disclose those materials to the defense. CPL § 245.20(2).
Read together, CPL 245.50 and CPL 30.30 require that due diligence must be conducted prior to filing a COC (see CPL 245.50[1] [detailing representations that must be included in a COC]; CPL 245.50[3] [directing that "the prosecution shall not be deemed ready for trial for purposes of (CPL 30.30) ... until it has filed a proper certificate pursuant to (CPL 245.50[1]).
People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 212 (2023). Due diligence is "[t]he diligence reasonably expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a person who seeks to satisfy a legal requirement or to discharge an obligation." Id. at 211, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 573 (11th ed 2019). Recent amendments to CPL § 245 introduce a list of factors courts must consider when determining whether due diligence has been exercised. See CPL § 245.50(5)(a). Courts are instructed to evaluate the factors holistically. "The court's determination shall be based on consideration of all factors listed in paragraph (a) of this subdivision and no one factor shall be determinative." CPL § 245.50(5)(b).
From the analysis of these factors below, this court cannot find that the prosecution exercised diligence before the filing of their COC on August 8, 2025. The prosecution provided little information as to their efforts prior to filing the initial COC. The court will address the factors as they apply to issues raised in this case.
The prosecution does not provide the court with detail as to efforts at compliance with statutory requirements. The prosecution provides some specific dates when discovery was requested, but little else. There is no explanation as to any effort to comply with the mandate to disclose discovery within 35 days after arraignment, nor any indication why the prosecution waited until 81 days after arraignment to request Giglio material, or waited 53 days after they received the majority of the materials to disclose those materials to the defense. The prosecution filed their COC with just six days left under CPL § 30.30, which gave them little time to resolve any issues identified with their COC. The prosecution has disclosed most of the materials in this case, but some of the missing discovery, especially records related to the diagnostic failure of the Intoxilyzer used in this case, could be dispositive of the issues in this case. See People v Diallo, CR-017125-25BX at 5 (Crim Ct, Bronx County January 7, 2026). Also, the defense argues that certain materials remain outstanding. The prosecution has not demonstrated any unusual complexity in this case.
The prosecution states that they do not have access to the simulator solution reports, that they were aware of the FUI report that they belatedly disclosed, but were unaware of any other record related to the diagnostic failure of the Intoxilyzer. The prosecution's explanation for missing discovery is weak. The argument that based on two-and-a-half-year-old testimony, the court should find that the prosecution does not have access to simulator solution reports is [*5]inadequate. See People v Celauzcha CR-014676-24BX at 6 (Crim Ct, Bronx County September 15, 2025). Sergeant Schneider testified that he obtains new solutions every few months and, while it takes some time to receive the reports, he has obtained them in the past. The prosecution has provided no updated information as to simulator solutions. While the prosecution is not required to obtain discovery by subpoena, or create discovery, under the discovery statutes the prosecution is not allowed to do nothing, then claim diligence. The Intoxilyzer is an important source of evidence in most VTL § 1192 cases. Numerous cases depend on this machine, so it would make sense for the prosecution to learn about the issues that affected the machine and whether the evidence they obtained from that specific machine are reliable. A two-page report that offers little information is not sufficient to satisfy the prosecution's discovery obligations.
The prosecution's argument that CPI and IAB records do not exist for one witness is accepted by the court, but the argument that other CPI and IAB are not discoverable with no detail as to why, falls short of the prosecution's burden in opposition to the defense's motion to dismiss. The prosecution has not explained how any of the missing discovery is duplicative or insignificant, and does not appear to have made any effort to remedy the shortcomings. The prosecution has not corrected the omissions and did not self-report any of the missing discovery. The prosecution argues that under amended CPL § 245.50(5), this Court must consider the level of prejudice, if any, that was suffered from the missing or late disclosures. (Opposition at unnumbered page 30.) However, without the missing discovery or better explanations as to what is contained in the missing discovery, the court will not be able to assess prejudice.
After considering each of the CPL § 245.50(5)(a) factors as they relate to the facts of this case, this court finds that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that they exercised due diligence to ascertain the existence of material and information subject to discovery and make that discovery available to the defense prior to filing their initial COC.
Conclusion
Because the prosecution has not demonstrated diligence to this court in identifying, requesting and making available all of the discovery in this case prior to filing their COC, their COC is invalid and SOR illusory. Without a valid COC or SOR, the prosecution is beyond the 90 days allowed under CPL § 30.30, the defense motion is granted and this case is dismissed.
The foregoing constitutes the order and decision of the court.
Dated: March 20, 2026
Bronx, NY
Ralph L. Wolf, J.C.C.
Footnotes
CPI logs contain brief summaries of allegations against officers, without details of the incidents. People v Jackson, 79 Misc 3d 832, 837 (Crim Ct, New York County 2023).
The defense states that they were not provided with CPI records for any of the testifying officers.