Randall v Town of Irondequoit

Supreme Court, Monroe County

Decided on May 8, 2026

Index No. E2026000258

John P. Bringewatt, J.

Petitioner Freya Randall ("Petitioner") seeks leave to file a late notice of claim regarding a motor vehicle accident that occurred on November 23, 2024 (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 1-7, 9-10). Respondents the Town of Irondequoit and Irondequoit Police Department ("Respondents") oppose the application (NYSCEF Doc. No. 15). Petitioner filed a reply in further support of her Petition (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 19-22). The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026. Petitioner's application is denied for the reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

On November 23, 2024, Petitioner was on duty as a paramedic and was a passenger in an ambulance owned by Penfield Volunteer Ambulance when it was involved in a motor vehicle accident with an Irondequoit Police Department ("IPD") vehicle (NYSCEF Doc. No. 6, ¶ 4). Petitioner alleges that the IPD vehicle was operated in a negligent or reckless manner (id.). Following the accident, Petitioner was taken to Strong Memorial Hospital and discharged the following evening, November 24, 2024 (id., ¶ 6). Subsequently, Petitioner was diagnosed with a traumatic brain injury and has undergone regular medical care (id., ¶ 7). Petitioner was out of work until June 2025 (id.). In support of her Petition, Petitioner submitted a Police Accident Report (the "Report") that was created by IPD contemporaneously to or soon after the accident (NYSCEF Doc. No. 2).

Petitioner brought the instant special proceeding seeking leave to file a late notice of claim on January 6, 2026. Petitioner's proposed notice of claim alleges negligent and reckless use and operation of the IPD vehicle involved in the accident, as well as negligent and reckless [*2]hiring and training on the part of the Town of Irondequoit (NYSCEF Doc. No. 4, ¶¶ 8-9).

DISCUSSION

I. Applicable Law

"Service of a notice of claim is a condition precedent to the commencement of a tort action against a town" (Haunted Forest, LLC v. Town of Wilson, 240 AD3d 1340, 1342 [4th Dept. 2025]; see also General Municipal Law ("GML") § 50-i(1) ["No action or special proceeding shall be prosecuted or maintained against a city, county, town, village, fire district or school district for personal injury, wrongful death or damage to real or personal property" without service of a notice of claim]). A notice of claim must be served within 90 days of the date upon which the claim arose (GML § 50-e).

Courts, however, may "extend the 90-day time limitation in exceptional cases upon consideration of all relevant factors, provided the statute of limitations of one year and 90 days has not already expired" (Jaime v. City of New York, 41 NY3d 531, 540 [2024] [internal quotation marks omitted]). The relevant factors to be considered include "whether the claimant has shown a reasonable excuse for the delay, whether the respondents had actual knowledge of the facts surrounding the claim within 90 days of its accrual or within a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would cause substantial prejudice to the respondents" (Diaz v. Rochester-Genesee Regional Transportation Authority, 175 AD3d 1821, 1821 [4th Dept. 2019] [internal alterations and quotation marks omitted]; see also GML § 50-e(5)).

When there is no action pending, an application to serve a late notice of claim must be brought by special proceeding pursuant to Article 4 of the CPLR (Jaime, 41 NY3d at 541). "The burden of production is on the petitioner in a special proceeding, and the court applies settled summary judgment standards, under which the party seeking relief must establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting admissible evidence" (id. at 541-542). A court has "broad discretion" in deciding an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim (Schunk v. Town of York, 200 AD3d 1669, 1670 [4th Dept. 2021]), so long as its determination is supported by record evidence (Jaime, 41 NY3d at 542).

II. Petitioner Has Failed to Establish that Respondents Had Actual Knowledge of the Facts Constituting Her Claim

"Although no factor is determinative, one factor that should be accorded great weight is whether the respondents received actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim in a timely manner" (Diaz, 175 AD3d at 1821 [internal alterations and quotation marks omitted]; see also Jaime, 41 NY3d at 540 [court must consider "in particular" the actual knowledge factor]). "Timely" means that the requisite knowledge is received within the 90-day period or "within a reasonable time thereafter" (Jaime, 41 NY3d at 540).

To establish actual knowledge, Petitioner must show that Respondents "had knowledge of the facts that underlie the legal theory or theories on which liability is predicated in the notice of claim, and not merely some general knowledge that a wrong has been committed" (Schunk, 200 AD3d at 1670). Additionally, "knowledge of the injuries or damages claimed, rather than mere notice of the underlying occurrence, is necessary to establish actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claim" (Arnold v. Town of Camillus, 222 AD3d 1372, 1377 [4th Dept. 2023] [internal alterations omitted]). Actual knowledge on the part of the municipality must be established "through the submission of nonspeculative evidence" (Jaime, 41 NY3d at 540).

Here, Petitioner argues that the Report provided Respondents with actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim (see NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 1, 6, 19, 22). The Petition asserts that "the [Respondents] are obviously aware of the collision involving their vehicle. Their police department were [sic] on scene, investigated the collision and prepared the police report" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1, ¶ 11). Similarly, Petitioner argues in her affirmation that "[t]he Town and Police are obviously aware of the incident and collision. The police report speaks for itself. Their vehicle and employees were involved." (NYSCEF Doc. No. 6, ¶ 12.) On reply, Petitioner maintains that, "[t]he [Respondents] seem to be clearly and plainly aware of the incident and the essential facts surrounding it given the contents of their own police report. . . . It does not seem that they are lacking in any information concerning the incident whatsoever" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 22, ¶ 12). Petitioner has not submitted any other proof that Respondents had actual knowledge of the facts constituting her claim, and during oral argument Petitioner confirmed that her argument is based solely on the Report.

Contrary to Petitioner's argument, "the fact that respondent's Police Department had knowledge of this incident, without more, cannot be considered actual knowledge of the claim against respondent" (Brown v. City of Buffalo, 100 AD3d 1439, 1441 [4th Dept. 2012] [internal alterations omitted]). "[F]or a police report to provide actual knowledge of the essential facts, one must be able to readily infer from that report that a potentially actionable wrong had been committed by the public corporation" (id. at 1440 [internal alteration omitted]).

Here, the Report does not provide notice of a potentially actionable wrong on the part of Respondents. The Report states that the IPD vehicle's driver was operating in emergency mode with his lights and sirens activated, that he proceeded through the intersection where the accident occurred "slowly" at "about 15-20 mph," and that he did not see the ambulance prior to the accident (NYSCEF Doc. No. 2). The Report goes on to note that camera footage retrieved by the investigating officer confirmed that the IPD vehicle's lights were activated and that both vehicles slowed as they approached the intersection (id.). Finally, the Report observes that the presence of trees and bushes "would limit the view" of both vehicles as they were entering the intersection (id.). The Report thus does not provide notice that Respondents had committed a potentially actionable wrong. To the contrary, there is nothing in the Report that provides notice of Petitioner's claim that the driver of the IPD vehicle was negligent or reckless (see Antoinette C. v. County of Erie, 202 AD3d 1464, 1468 [4th Dept. 2022] [finding petitioner failed to establish actual knowledge when police "accident report made no connection between the accident and any alleged negligence on the part of the [municipality]" [internal quotation marks omitted]). Likewise, nothing in the Report provides Respondents with actual knowledge of the facts underlying Petitioner's claim that Respondents failed to properly hire and train their employees (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 4, ¶ 9) (see Schunk, 200 AD3d at 1671 ["Contrary to claimant's contention, the police report prepared following the motor vehicle accident did not provide actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim because nothing contained therein would have allowed respondents to readily infer that the accident was, as claimants assert, attributable to hazardous road design or construction."]).

The Report also fails to provide actual knowledge of Petitioner's injuries (see Arnold, 222 AD3d at 1377). Petitioner asserts that she suffered a traumatic brain injury as a result of the accident, but the Report states that, while Petitioner was treated at the hospital, "any neurological damage [was] ruled out" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 2). While the Court questions how that information was obtained and whether it is reliable, the fact remains that the information in the Report, which [*3]is the sole basis for Petitioner's argument, does not establish that Respondents had actual knowledge of the facts underlying Petitioner's claims.

III. Petitioner Has Failed to Establish a Reasonable Excuse for Her Delay

"[A]nother key factor to consider in determining whether leave to serve a late notice of claim should be granted" is whether Petitioner has established a reasonable excuse for failing to serve a timely notice of claim (Santana v. Western Regional Off-Track Betting Corp., 2 AD3d 1304, 1304 [4th Dept. 2003]). Petitioner cites two reasons for her delay: (1) the severity of the injuries that she sustained in the accident and (2) that she initially pursued only workers' compensation benefits and was unaware of the requirements to also pursue a personal injury claim. Neither proffered reason constitutes a reasonable excuse.

With respect to Petitioner's claim that her injuries prevented her from serving a timely notice of claim, Petitioner provides no factual detail as to how her condition prevented her from serving a notice of claim. Though she submitted portions of her medical records and workers compensation records (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 3, 20), Petitioner does not point to a specific reason why she could not serve a notice of claim within 90 days of the accident, nor do the records reflect any such reason. She was discharged from the hospital on November 24, 2024, the day after the accident (NYSCEF Doc. No. 6, ¶ 6). Moreover, she returned to work in June 2025 (id. ¶ 7), and provides no explanation for why her injuries prevented her from filing this Petition until January 2026 (see Friend v. Town of W. Seneca, 71 AD3d 1406, 1407 [4th Dept. 2010] ["although claimant was initially unaware of the severity of the injuries, he did not seek leave to serve a late notice of claim until eight months after he underwent surgery, and he failed to offer a reasonable excuse for the postsurgery delay"]).

Petitioner's claim that she was not aware that she needed to pursue a personal injury claim, raised for the first time in her reply (see NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 19, 22), also does not constitute a reasonable excuse. Petitioner explains that she retained the law firm of Connors & Ferris LLP to represent her with respect to her workers' compensation claims but was "unaware that there was a separate area of law that had different timelines and requirements" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 22, ¶ 8). However, "it is well settled that ignorance of the notice of claim requirement does not provide a sufficient excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim" (Antoinette C., 202 AD3d at 1467; see also Schunk, 200 AD3d at 1670 ["law office failure does not constitute a reasonable excuse for [petitioner's] failure to serve a timely notice of claim"]).

IV. Petitioner Failed to Satisfy Her Initial Burden to Establish that Respondent Would Not Be Substantially Prejudiced by the Late Notice of Claim

Under the burden-shifting standard established by the Court of Appeals in Newcomb v. Middle Country Central School District (28 NY3d 455 [2016]), "the burden initially rests on the petitioner to show that the late notice will not substantially prejudice the public corporation" (id. at 466). While this showing "need not be extensive," a petitioner "must present some evidence or plausible argument that supports a finding of no substantial prejudice" (id.). If the petitioner makes this initial showing, "the public corporation must respond with a particularized evidentiary showing that the corporation will be substantially prejudiced if the late notice is allowed" (id. at 467).

Here, Petitioner fails to satisfy her initial burden. She argues that, based on the Report, Respondents have access to the information they need to investigate and defend her claim (NYSCEF Doc. No. 22, ¶¶ 16-19). But, as discussed above, the Report did not provide Respondents with actual knowledge of the facts constituting Petitioner's claim, and that is fatal to her argument that Respondents will not be substantially prejudiced if she is permitted to serve a late notice of claim (Jaime, 41 NY3d at 543-544 ["Insofar as [petitioner] argued that the [municipality] would not be substantially prejudiced by the late filing because it acquired timely actual knowledge, [petitioner's] failure to establish actual knowledge is fatal."].

CONCLUSION

Based on the Court's review of all the papers submitted, oral argument from the parties, and upon due deliberation, it is hereby

ORDERED, that the Petition for leave to file a late notice of claim is DENIED.

Dated: May 8, 2026

Rochester, New York

Hon. John P. Bringewatt, A.J.S.C.