People v Valentin

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th And 13th Judicial Districts

Decided on April 17, 2026

2024-925 K CR

Present: : Wavny Toussaint, P.J., ChereÉ A. Buggs, Joanne D. QuiÑOnes, JJ

Kings County District Attorney (Leonard Joblove and Michael Bierce of counsel), for appellant.

New York City Legal Aid Society (Claire Glass of counsel), for respondent.

Appeals from orders of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Linda Wilson, J.), dated July 23, 2024 and August 21, 2024, respectively. The order dated July 23, 2024 (appeal No. 2024-925 K CR) granted defendant's motion to invalidate the certificate of completion and dismiss the accusatory instrument on statutory speedy trial grounds, to the extent of dismissing the charges pursuant to CPL 245.80 (2). The order dated August 21, 2024 (appeal No. 2024-1240 K CR) denied the People's motion for leave to reargue their opposition to defendant's motion.

ORDERED that the appeal from the order dated August 21, 2024 is dismissed on the ground that no appeal by the People lies from an order denying their motion for leave to reargue their opposition to defendant's motion; and it is further,

ORDERED that the order dated July 23, 2024 is reversed, on the law, and the matter is remitted to the Criminal Court for a new determination of defendant's motion to invalidate the certificate of completion and dismiss the accusatory instrument on statutory speedy trial grounds.

Defendant was charged in an accusatory instrument, filed on January 25, 2024, with driving while ability impaired (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [1]), common-law driving while intoxicated [*2](Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]), unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509 [1]), and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [1] [a]). The matter was adjourned to March 12, 2024 and then again to April 29, 2024. On April 11, 2024, the People served discovery upon defendant, and a combined certificate of completion (COC) and statement of readiness (SOR), which included a CPL 30.30 (5-a) statement, was simultaneously served on defendant and filed off-calendar.

By notice of motion dated June 3, 2024, defendant moved for an order "[f]inding" that the COC "was not proper under [former] CPL 245.50 (1) because certain materials discoverable under [former] CPL 245.20 (1) were not disclosed and made available to" him, and dismissing the accusatory instrument pursuant to CPL 170.30 (1) (e) and CPL 30.30.^FN1 The People opposed the motion and, by order dated July 23, 2024, the Criminal Court (Linda Wilson, J.) dismissed the charges, pursuant to CPL 245.80 (2), finding that the People had failed to meet their initial statutory obligation of disclosure within the 35-day automatic discovery period in violation of former CPL 245.10 (1) (a) (ii).

By notice of motion dated August 15, 2024, the People moved for leave to reargue their opposition to defendant's motion to invalidate the certificate of completion and dismiss the accusatory instrument on statutory speedy trial grounds, and, upon reargument, to deny defendant's motion and reinstate the accusatory instrument, contending that the court had misapprehended and misapplied the law as it did not have the legal authority to dismiss the action, pursuant to CPL 245.80, for belated disclosure without defendant having established that he was prejudiced thereby, and that, in any event, defendant had not requested relief under CPL 245.80. Defendant did not oppose the motion and, by order dated August 21, 2024, the Criminal Court (Linda Wilson, J.) denied it. As the order dated August 21, 2024 denied the People's motion for leave to reargue their opposition to defendant's motion, it granted no relief from which the People are entitled to appeal (see generally CPL 450.20).

When a defendant seeks to obtain statutory speedy trial dismissal based on a failure to timely comply with discovery obligations and a COC has been served and filed prior to the expiration of the speedy trial time period, the motion court must decide whether the COC was proper (see People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 213-215 [2023]). If the court determines that the People did not file a proper COC and that the speedy trial period has thus subsequently run, it must dismiss the case pursuant to CPL 30.30, which does not require a determination of prejudice (see Bay, 41 NY3d at 213; People v Ulloa-Flores, 85 Misc 3d 136[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50494[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2025]; People v Wharton, 84 Misc 3d 26, 28-29 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2024]). However, if the court deems the COC proper, CPL 245.80 sets forth the available remedies for a belated disclosure, which does require a determination of prejudice (see Bay, 41 NY3d at 214; People v Brown, 240 AD3d 1293 [2025]; People v Sheard, 236 AD3d 826, 827 [*3][2025]; People v Persaud, 235 AD3d 1006 [2025]; People v Krasnyanskiy, 86 Misc 3d 135[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 51168[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2025]).

Here, as demonstrated by his June 3, 2024 notice of motion, defendant did not request a CPL 245.80 remedy or sanction. Rather, defendant sought to have the Criminal Court find the COC improper, thereby rendering the SOR illusory, and then to dismiss the accusatory instrument on statutory speedy trial grounds. Thus, the Criminal Court failed to make a determination, as explicitly requested by defendant, pertaining to whether the People's COC was proper

^FN2 or whether the People had even exceeded their speedy trial time, when dismissing the charges. In any event, any invocation of relief pursuant to CPL 245.80 requires the court to first consider all remedies and determine that defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the late disclosure (see CPL 245.80 [1], [2]), which the Criminal Court failed to do.

Accordingly, the order dated July 23, 2024 is reversed and the matter is remitted to the Criminal Court for a new determination of defendant's motion to invalidate the COC and dismiss the accusatory instrument on statutory speedy trial grounds.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., BUGGS and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Jennifer Chan

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: April 17, 2026