N.M. v K.L.M.

Supreme Court, Rensselaer County

Decided on May 13, 2026

Index No. EF2024-278488

Noel Mendez, J.

In this contested matrimonial action pursuant to section 170 (7) of the Domestic Relations Law, Defendant K.L.M. ("Defendant") moves the Court for an order incorporating, but not merging therein, a separation agreement, the validity of which is in dispute. Plaintiff N.M. ("Plaintiff") also seeks a judgment of divorce in this action, but opposes the incorporation of the separation agreement and asks the Court to set it aside. Upon reviewing the motion papers, the opposition papers, the reply papers, and all exhibits attached thereto, the Court grants Defendant's motion.

I. Background and Procedural History

Plaintiff commenced this contested matrimonial action pursuant to DRL § 170 (7) by [*2]way of Summons and Verified Complaint uploaded onto the New York State Court Electronic Filing system ("NYSCEF") on December 5, 2024. On January 3, 2025, Defendant answered, counterclaiming for divorce under the same grounds.

On October 17, 2025, counsel for Defendant uploaded onto NYSCEF a "Separation Agreement," with an execution date of July 1, 2025, purporting to address, inter alia, maintenance, custody, child support, counsel fees, and equitable distribution (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 13). Days later, counsel for Plaintiff filed a letter claiming that neither attorney was involved with the drafting of this document, and that her client had signed it without her prior knowledge or review. The Court held a conference in December of 2025, during which counsel for Plaintiff reiterated those claims. Counsel for Defendant asked for an inquest so that the Court may consider testimony for purposes of determining whether to incorporate the agreement into the judgment of divorce.

Defendant thereafter filed a written motion asking for the inquest, which the Court scheduled for April 15, 2026. On that day and through his papers, Plaintiff alleges that he was misled into signing the above-mentioned Separation Agreement, claiming that it was drafted by "We the People" and that he had signed it thinking it would help Defendant obtain a mortgage. Plaintiff asserted that Defendant lied to him about what he was signing and threatened him in order to force his signature onto the document. Rather than proceed with the inquest and obtain testimony in furtherance of the issues raised, the parties, after conferencing off the record with their respective counsel, elected to rest on their submissions, with Defendant asking that the Separation Agreement be incorporated, but not merged, into the final judgment of divorce, and Plaintiff asking that the agreement be invalidated. The Court now considers whether to incorporate, but not merge, the Separation Agreement, which requires consideration of whether Plaintiff signed said agreement under fraudulent circumstances or under threat of coercion.

II. Analysis

A separation agreement, like any other agreement, is a legally binding and enforceable contract (Weddell v Trichka, 200 AD3d 1464, 1464 [3d Dept 2021], quoting Matter of Dillon v Dillon, 155 AD3d 1271, 1272 [3d Dept 2017]). A separation agreement, however, may be set aside if there is evidence that one of one party overreached, engaged in fraud, or caused duress, such that the bargain becomes so inequitable that no reasonable or competent person would have consented to the agreement (Weddell, 200 AD3d at 1464, quoting Suchow v Suchow, 157 AD3d 1015, 1016 [3d Dept 2018], appeal and lv dismissed 31 NY3d 1075 [2018]).

Despite the foregoing, spouses are encouraged to resolve their own matrimonial issues, and judicial review of separation agreements is to be exercised sparingly (Weddell, 200 AD3d at 1464, quoting Marin—Brown v Brown, 79 AD3d 1302, 1303 [3d Dept 2010]). Courts ought not to redesign the bargain on the ground that judicial wisdom in retrospect would view one or more of the specific provisions as improvident or one-sided (Bishopp v Bishopp, 104 AD3d 1121, 1122 [3d Dept 2013] quoting Empie v Empie, 46 AD3d 1008, 1009 [3d Dept 2007]). A separation agreement is not per se unconscionable simply because marital assets are divided unequally, because one spouse gave away more than legally required, or because the spouse's decision to approve the agreement might be unwise (Lounsbury v Lounsbury, 300 AD2d 812, 814 [3d Dept 2002]). Once a contract has been proposed, the person being offered the contract is responsible for reading and assessing the terms proposed therein, and a person who accepts a written contract without reviewing it bears the risk this that the agreement may contain provisions they [*3]do not like or expect (Wu v Uber Techs., Inc., 43 NY3d 288, 330 [2024]). In the absence of fraud, duress, or other wrongful conduct, a person who signs a contract is conclusively bound by the agreement's terms—whether or not they read the agreement (Security Mut. Ins. Co. v Perkins, 86 AD3d 702 [3d Dept 2011]).

Here, no fraud, duress, or wrongful conduct is apparent. The Separation Agreement contains all indicia of reliability, insofar as the parties signed it in front of a duly authorized notary. All other evidence submitted in this case suggests that Plaintiff knew what he was signing, and there is no "no indication that [Plaintiff] was prevented from seeking the advice of counsel" (Weddell, 200 AD3d at 1465).

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that Defendant's motion is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED, the parties are to appear for conference on Monday, June 1, 2026, at 2:00 PM to resolve any outstanding matters, and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant shall serve Plaintiff with a copy of this Decision and Order, with notice of entry, within twenty (20) days of such entry.

This shall constitute the Decision and Order of this Court. The Court has uploaded this original Decision and Order to the case record in this matter as maintained on NYSCEF, whereupon it is to be filed and entered by the County Clerk's Office. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable provisions contained in CPLR 2220 and Section 202.5-b (h) (2) of the Uniform Rules of Supreme and County Courts, insofar as they relate to service and notice of entry, whether by mail or electronic means.

Dated: May 13, 2026

Troy, New York

Hon. Noel Mendez

Acting Justice of the Supreme Court

Papers Considered:

All motion papers uploaded onto NYSCEF, along with attached exhibits