People v Campbell

Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County

Decided on May 6, 2026

Docket No. CR-013306-25BX

Scott M. Krompinger, J.

The defendant Clarence Campbell ("Defendant") stands charged with assault in the third degree (Penal Law [PL] § 120.00 [1]) and harassment in the second degree (PL § 240.26 [1]). A combined Wade/Huntley/Dunaway hearing was held before the undersigned on March 16, 2026.

At the hearing, the People called one witness: P.O. Diego Vegaacebo, shield #4834, 42nd Precinct. Defendant did not call any witnesses. The court accepted into evidence, without objection: People's Exhibit 1 (P.O. Vegaacebo's body-worn camera [BWC] footage).

Based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, the arguments set forth in the parties written post-hearing submissions, the court file, and relevant legal authority, the court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I. Findings of Fact

The court finds P.O. Vegaacebo credible and credits his hearing testimony on all material points. The court also finds as fact all events depicted in the video footage and makes the following specific findings of fact.

P.O. Vegaacebo has been employed by the NYPD for almost four years. 3 ½ of those [*2]years have been at the 42nd Precinct. There he responds to 911 calls, 311 calls, investigates crimes, and files reports. On May 8, 2025, at approximately 7:58AM, in the vicinity of 1232 Franklin Avenue in the Bronx, he was working as a police officer with his partner, P.O. Aquino. He was also working with other units — PO Pichardo and PO Flores ^FN1. The officers were in uniform, traveling in a marked police car.

The officers received a "10-68" complaint job at the location - meaning they had to see a complainant because an incident happened, so they had to investigate. P.O. Vegaacebo described the subject location as a three-story residential building. Once there, the officers contacted "Ms. D." (hereinafter "Complainant"). PO Vegaacebo made contact with this person inside the first-floor lobby or doorway area of the building.

Complainant reported that she had been assaulted, and she saw the person that did it, standing outside on the street corner. P.O. Vegaacebo could see the street corner from where he was standing. Complainant did not have a view of the street corner from where she was standing when officers first arrived. Complainant described the assailant as a man wearing a black jacket, black backpack, blue jeans, and white sneakers. From their vantage point, the officers could see someone matching the description standing on the street corner. P.O. Vegaacebo identified Defendant at the hearing as person he saw at the street corner. While the officers were speaking to Complainant, she stepped out a little bit, described the person and confirmed that the person she saw standing on the corner was her assailant.

P.O. Vegaacebo and the officers then walked over to the corner and started to arrest the person identified by the complainant. As they were placing him under arrest, Defendant stated in sum and substance, "what happened, what happened, what did I do, what did I do?" The officers took Defendant over to their police vehicle. After placing Defendant under arrest, P.O. Vegaacebo spoke with P.O. Flores, who was speaking to Complainant on the phone. P.O. Flores told P.O. Vegaacebo that Complainant was in the building looking out the window and confirmed that the person arrested was the person she previously identified as the assailant.

P.O. Vegaacebo's BWC footage was played from external timestamp 0:00 to 9:43. The footage shows officers arriving at the address. They walk into a first-floor doorway and encounter Complainant who states that she has been "calling and calling and calling." Complaint states that the guy is "right there" — she refers to him as "Bali," but says she doesn't know him. She asserts that he is on this side of the street at the corner. She describes him as Black, wearing blue jeans, black jacket and backpack, and white sneakers. Complainant confirms that she will be able to point him out if police stop him. Complainant reports he punched her three times with a closed fist. She says her friend was fighting outside, and Complainant was pulling her away. The assailant hit her three times in her face. She provides the name of her friend who was involved in that altercation. She says this person is outside "every single day." She claims she made a report and took pictures of her face. She points out to officers "all the 911 calls" she previously made. Complaint also alleges that the incident occurred "April 20" or some time last month. The officers inquire as to the prior reports, whether she ever went to the precinct to get the report. She then peers around the corner and says "mm-hmm." The officer then asks, "that's the one?" and she says "yeah."

The officers then approach Defendant. They ask him to take his hands out of his pockets [*3]and begin to arrest him. Defendant asks continuously in sum and substance, "what happened" and "why are you locking me up?" The officers bring Defendant over to a police vehicle and place him inside.

II. Conclusions of Law

Wade Hearing

At a Wade hearing, the prosecution has the burden of providing sufficient evidence demonstrating "the constitutional propriety of a police-arranged identification procedure" (People v Roberts, 169 AD2d 284, 289 [1st Dept 1991], citing People v James, 111 AD2d 254 [2d Dept. 1985], aff'd, 67 NY2d 662 1986]; United States v Wade, 388 US 218 [1967]).

In this case, the People served a notice pursuant to CPL 710.30 (1) (b) stating that the complainant identified Defendant to PO Jonathan Floresmamani via "point out" procedure on May 8, 2025, at 7:58 AM in front of 1232 Franklin Avenue. As noted by Defendant in his counseled post-hearing submission, the testimony at the hearing established that two identifications took place. One occurred when the complainant was speaking to police in her doorway, and the other occurred after Defendant was placed under arrest.

Defendant's motion to preclude the un-noticed initial out of court identification is denied. The evidence at the hearing established that the initial identification of Defendant was a "witness-initiated" procedure made by informant who called police to the scene. Complainant provided a description of the Defendant and told the officers he was outside, and she then looked outside and confirmed that he was standing on the corner down the street without any prompting by the officers. The identification, accordingly, did not require notice (People v Bailey, 66 AD3d 491, 492 [1st Dept 2009], citing People v Dixon, 85 NY2d 218, 223 [1995]; see also People v Burgos, 219 AD2d 504, 505 [1st Dept 1995], lv denied, 86 NY2d 872 [1995]; People v Jafer, 13 Misc 3d 137[A] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th and 10th Jud Dists 2006]).

Defendant's motion to suppress the noticed second out-of-court identification is also denied. The notice as to the second identification was sufficient because it provided the time, place, and manner in which the identification was made, so as to permit Defendant the opportunity to challenge before trial the reliability of defendant's identification (People v Lopez, 84 NY2d 425, 428 [1994]). In other words, the notice served "its purpose of enabling defendant to test the identification testimony for taint arising from official suggestion" (People v Reynoso, 262 AD2d 102, 102 [1st Dept 1999], lv denied, 93 NY2d 1025 [1999]).

In addition, the evidence adduced at the hearing established that the second identification was merely confirmatory. This identification took place only minutes after Complainant first identified the Defendant from her doorway while speaking with the officers (People v Duvert, 229 AD3d 638, 639 [2d Dept 2024]; People v Soto, 198 AD2d 38, 39 [1st Dept 1993], lv denied, 83 NY2d 810 [1994]; People v Gilbert 295 AD2d 275, 276 [1st Dept 2002], lv denied, 99 NY2d 558 [2002]). The fact that Defendant was in handcuffs and in police custody did not render the identification procedure unduly suggestive (Duvert, 229 AD3d at 639, citing People v Croom, 171 AD3d 781, 782 [2d Dept 2019], lv denied, 33 NY3d 1103 [2019]).

Contrary to Defendant's contentions, P.O. Vegaacebo's testimony was sufficient to demonstrate the confirmatory nature of Complainant's second identification. Hearsay testimony is admissible at the hearing to establish any material fact (CPL 710.60 [4]). The officer testified that he personally spoke with P.O. Flores after placing Defendant under arrest. He stated that P.O. Flores was speaking with Complainant over the phone. The witness testified that [*4]Complainant, who was in the building looking out of the window, "confirmed yes, that's the guy." This testimony is sufficient to carry the People's burden as it is an "unchallenged account" that was "derived from presumptively reliable information provided by [a] fellow officer[]" (In re Derek G, 25 AD3d 553, 554 [2d Dept 2006], lv denied, 7 NY2d 707 [2006], comparing People v Gonzalez, 80 NY2d 883 [1992] [hearsay information insufficient when disputed by the defendant and obtained fortuitously by the testifying officer who never relied on it in taking police action]; see generally People v Gerard, 197 AD3d 1045, 1046 [1st Dept 2021], lv denied, 37 NY3d 1161 [2022]).

Dunaway Hearing

At a Dunaway hearing, the People bear the burden of going forward to establish the legality of police conduct in the first instance (see People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367 [1971]; see generally Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200 [1979]). Once that burden of production is met, the defendant has the ultimate burden of proving, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that the arrest was not based on probable cause or that the police conduct was otherwise illegal (Berrios, 28 NY2d at 367; People v Harris, 192 AD3d 151, 158 [2d Dept 2020]).

When evaluating the propriety of police encounters when an officer is acting in a law enforcement capacity, "the court must determine whether it was justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances at the time" (People v Walker, 237 AD3d 102, 105 [1st Dept 2025], citing People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 215 [1976]). The Court of Appeals set forth a graduated four-level test when evaluating the propriety of police-initiated street encounters (id.):

"level one permits a police officer to request information from an individual and merely requires that the request be supported by an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality; level two, the common-law right of inquiry, permits a somewhat greater intrusion and requires a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot; level three authorizes an officer to forcibly stop and detain an individual, and requires a reasonable suspicion that the particular individual was involved in a felony or misdemeanor; level four, arrest, requires probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime"

(People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 498-99 [2006], citing De Bour, 40 NY2d at 223). "Any inquiry into the propriety of police conduct must weigh the interference it entails against the precipitating and attending conditions" (De Bour, 40 NY2d at 233). Courts are required to concentrate on whether the police action "was reasonable at the time in view of the totality of the circumstances" (People v Stephens, 47 AD3d 586, 588-89 [1st Dept 2008], lv denied, 10 NY3d 940 [2008]). "To that end, and in recognition of this analysis as one of the totality of the circumstances, '[d]iscrete analysis of each factor is inappropriate as the officers are confronted with only the complete set of circumstances'" (People v Torres, 232 AD3d 146, 152 [1st Dept 2024], quoting People v Carvey, 226 AD2d 193, 193-94 [1st Dept 1996], aff'd, 89 NY2d 707 [1997]).

In this case, the officers formally placed Defendant under arrest after speaking with Complainant. Such police intrusion is authorized where there is probable cause to believe that [*5]the person to be arrested committed a crime. "Probable cause," also referred to as "reasonable cause," (People v Johnson, 66 NY2d 398, 402 n2 [1985]) "exists when an officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances 'sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed'" (People v Maldonado, 86 NY2d 631, 635 [1995], quoting People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423 [1985]). CPL 70.10 (2) provides: " '[r]easonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense' exists when evidence or information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely that such offense was committed and that such person committed it." Generally, where an identified citizen accuses another person of a specific crime, police have probable cause to arrest (see People v Mendoza, 49 AD3d 559, 560 [2d Dept 2008], lv denied, 10 NY3d 937 [2008]), as an identified informant is presumptively reliable (People v Reid, 27 AD3d 297, 297 [1st Dept 2006], lv to appeal denied, 6 NY3d 852 [2006]).

Here, the officers responded to the scene after a 911 call from an informant reporting an incident. Once at the reported address, the officers spoke with the identified complainant and obtained detailed statements that Defendant assaulted her in the past few weeks. She reported that the individual punched in the face with a closed fist three times when she trying to break up a fight with her friend, and the assailant was standing on the street corner outside. The informant stated that she had repeatedly called the police to report it earlier, she reported injuries and provided firsthand knowledge of the incident. The Complainant-victim's account of the crime and description of the assailant who she contended was just outside the building provided the police with probable cause to effectuate the arrest (see People v Adams, 224 AD2d 703, 703-04 [2d Dept 1996], appeal denied, 88 NY2d 844 [1996]). The officers' seeming inability to confirm the Complainant's statements that she made reports earlier was not materially impeaching circumstances that rebutted the presumption of the informant's reliability (see generally Medina v City of New York, 102 AD3d 101, 104 [1st Dept 2012]).

Huntley Hearing

"At a Huntley hearing, the People have the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that statements made by a defendant to law enforcement authorities were made voluntarily" (People v Cruz, 86 Misc 3d 1136, 1150 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2025], citing People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]).

Defendant argues that the statement was obtained through the use of physical force. Defendant was physically restrained without explanation under the control of multiple police officers. Defendant contends it was a reflexive response to sudden and aggressive police force, restraint, and custody (CPL 60.45). The evidence adduced at the hearing, however - notably the body worn camera footage - established that the noticed statements were made spontaneously while the officers were arresting Defendant. The statements were not made in response to any questioning. While Defendant may have been under the stress of the event there is no indication the arresting officers induced, provoked, or encouraged Defendant to speak (see People v Rivers, 56 NY2d 476 [1982]; People v Lynes, 49 NY2d 286 [1980]; People v. Maerling, 46 NY2d 289, 302-303 [1978]).

***

The motions pursuant to Wade/Huntley/Dunaway are denied.

The three-day delay in submitting a post-hearing memorandum will not be charged to the [*6]People. Even if the delay was inadequately explained, the Court "would find the delay was not so unreasonable as to require that any of the time be included" (People v Holden, 260 AD2d 233, 234-35 [1st Dept 1999], citing People v. Davila, 257 AD2d 48, 4865 [1st Dept 1999][the People's response to defendant's speedy trial motion was not "so dilatory or unsatisfactory that any further time should have been charged"]; CPL 30.30 [4] [a]).

The above constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.

Dated: May 6, 2026

HON. SCOTT M. KROMPINGER, J.C.C.