Graham v 425 E. 96th Co LLC

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County

Decided on May 4, 2026

Docket No. SC-003189-24/KI

Tehilah H. Berman, J.

A trial on this small claims matter was held on March 5, 2026. Plaintiff Shadina Graham ("Graham" or "plaintiff") sued to recover damages in the amount of $10,000 for the alleged theft of her motorcycle, which occurred on September 17, 2024. She brought suit against three parties: 425 East 96th St Co LLC ("425 East 96th"), Prompt Parking Corp. ("Prompt"), and Reggio Garage Door ("Reggio"). Plaintiff kept her motorcycle at a garage, located in the building where she resided (425 East 96th Street in Brooklyn) (hereinafter, referred to as the "garage"). Plaintiff testified that she occupied "space #9." 425 East 96th and Prompt appeared by counsel. However, counsel for Reggio, the party in charge of installing the garage door, was not present at the trial. Prompt counterclaimed for $10,000 because plaintiff parked her motorcycle at the garage for six years and nine months without permission and without paying extra for another vehicle.

The trial evidence showed that plaintiff had a remote control to open and close the garage door, and that she parked her car and motorcycle without assistance while retaining her keys. Plaintiff presented video footage at trial which showed that two individuals jimmied the lock of the garage door and took Graham's motorcycle from the space and out of the garage through the [*2]side exit. At trial, neither Prompt nor 425 East 96th disputed that this theft occurred.

425 East 96th, through Coney Realty^FN1, leased the garage to Prompt. The Lease Agreement between them (Def. 425 E. 96th's Exhibit A) provided that Prompt was responsible for managing the garage; i.e., assigning parking spaces to tenants, monitoring fire zones, towing away unauthorized vehicles, and collecting rent and keeping records of payments by tenants. 425 East 96th was responsible for repairs and maintenance of garage doors and all related mechanisms, bulb and fixture replacement, keeping the garage clean, maintaining the garage's interior, sewer and water drainage repair, and preventing any outside leaks from entering the premises.

The Vehicle Parking License Agreement ("Parking Agreement") (Prompt's Exhibit B) between Prompt and plaintiff, which plaintiff signed on August 30, 2021, expressly stated that it was not a lease. The Parking Agreement referred to Prompt as the "licensor," and Graham as the "licensee." A "licensee" has been defined as "one who enters upon or occupies lands by permission, express or implied, of the owner or under a personal, revocable, nonassignable privilege from the owner, without possessing any interest in the property and who becomes a trespasser thereon upon revocation of the permission or privilege." DeJesus v. Rodriguez, 196 Misc 2d 881, 883 (Civ. Ct. Kings County 2003).

The Parking Agreement contained a number of disclaimers: "a. Licensee understands that the Facility is an unattended Facility. b. The vehicles parked at the facility and access to the parking spaces are at Licensee's own risk. C. Licensor makes no warranty of protection for Licensee's vehicle, its contents, or property." Plaintiff also agreed to and signed underneath the Licensee's Covenants which included the following agreements: "Licensee shall not at or within the Facility or the Parking Space: ... b. Place or store any ... additional vehicle/motorcycle/s or anything in the parking space other than the vehicle listed on my Prompt Parking application/agreement. I understand that failure to abide by this policy will result in any and all items being removed and discarded from my parking space at any time without any notice at my expense." The Parking Agreement also provides: "IF THE LICENSEE (YOU) OTHERWISE IS IN DEFAULT OF THIS AGREEMENT, THIS LICENSE SHALL AUTOMATICALLY BE DEEMED TERMINATED WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE TO LICENSEE... THE LICENSOR SHALL HAVE NO DUTY OR RESPONSIBILITY TO SAFEGUARD ANY SUCH VEHICLE OR PERSONAL PROPERTY." The Terms and Conditions section at the end of the three-page Parking Agrement provides: "By signing below, YOU accept and agree to the terms and conditions of this 3 Page agreement and are entering into a binding agreement with Prompt Parking Corp. The monthly fee is $145.00." The only authorized vehicle that plaintiff listed was a 2005, grey BMW x5. Since plaintiff stored her motorcycle in the garage without authority or permission to do so, Prompt had no duty to safeguard her vehicle according to the terms of the Parking Agreement which she signed.

New York General Obligations Law ("GOL") § 5-325(1) prohibits the operator of a garage that has the capacity to hold four or more motor vehicles from exempting itself from liability for "damages for injury to person or property" which stem from the negligence of itself [*3]or its agents and employees in the storage of the vehicle or maintenance of the garage. Any agreement which exempts the garage operator is deemed void. Since plaintiff testified that she occupied space #9, the garage presumably had the capacity to hold four or more vehicles. However, the legislature intended that this section apply only to garage operators "who actually took possession and control of a car; i.e., "bailees for hire." Rudolph v. Riverdale Management, Inc., 202 Misc. 586, 588-589 (Municipal Court 1952), citing the 1949 Report of NY Law Revision Commission, p. 810. The first issue is whether the relationship between plaintiff and Prompt and 425 East 96th was that of bailor-bailee. If it was not, the prohibition of section 5-325(1) would not apply.

This court finds that no bailment relationship was created between plaintiff and defendants Prompt and 425 East 96th and as to her motorcycle because they never agreed to store her motorcycle. See, Onyishi v Madi, 2018 NY Slip Op 50907(U), 2018 NY Misc. LEXIS 2332, *7-8 (Bronx Civ. Ct. 2018) (where the defendant never agreed to store plaintiff's vehicle and never took possession, there was no bailment). Even if Prompt implicitly consented to plaintiff storing her motorcycle in the garage by virtue of the fact that for almost seven years it raised no objections to the presence of the motorcycle [See, Babbage v. Powers, 130 NY 281, 285 (1891)], no bailment relationship was created because plaintiff parked her motorcycle without assistance and retained her keys, constituting an "impersonal parking arrangement." Ellish v Airport Parking Co. of Am., 42 AD2d 174, 178, 345 N.Y.S.2d 650 [1973], affd 34 NY2d 882, 316 N.E.2d 715, 359 N.Y.S.2d 280 [1974]); Burke v. Riverbay Corp., 2009 NY Slip Op 52386(U), 25 Misc 3d 139(A), 139A (App. Term 1st Dept. 2009). See also, Soroudi v Yorkroad Assoc. LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op. 51283(U) 83 Misc 3d 137(A), (App Term, 1st Dept 2024). Since no bailment relationship was created between plaintiff and defendants, GOL 5-325(1) does not apply.

The provision in the Parking Agreement which states that the license to park in the garage "shall automatically be deemed terminated" and that Prompt has no duty or responsibility to safeguard a vehicle when the licensee defaulted on the agreement, such as where the licensee parked an unauthorized vehicle or motorcycle, is valid and enforceable. It is a "well-established principle of law that when a contract affords a party the unqualified right to limit its life by notice of termination, that right is absolute and will be upheld in accordance with its clear and unambiguous terms." Red Apple Child Dev. Ctr. v. Cmty. Sch. Dists. Two, 303 AD2d 156, 157 (1st Dept. 2003). See also, Watermelons Plus, Inc. v New York City Dept. of Educ., 76 AD3d 973, 974 (2d Dept. 2010) ("New York courts permit a party to use an unconditional termination clause without court inquiry into good faith or motive").

Since plaintiff's privilege to park in the garage was revoked once she stored a motorcycle there, she effectively became a trespasser. DeJesus, supra, 196 Misc 2d at 883. "An owner's only responsibility with respect to trespassers, including infants... is to refrain from inflicting willful, wanton or intentional injuries." Beauchamp v. New York City Housing Authority, 12 NY2d 400, 405 (1963). "Where there is no duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, there can be no breach, and thus, no liability can be imposed upon the defendant." Zuniga v. Smith, 241 AD3d 1502, 1503 (2d Dept. 2025); Donatien v Long Is. Coll. Hosp., 153 AD3d 600, 600 (2d Dept. 2017). None of the defendants owed a duty of care with respect to plaintiff's motorcycle, as she was not authorized to park her motorcycle in the subject garage. Thus, there [*4]can be no breach, and defendants are not liable for the alleged theft of plaintiff's motorcycle. The New York City Civil Court Act § 1804 provides: "The court shall conduct hearings upon small claims in such manner as to do substantial justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law." In accordance with this court's obligation to do substantial justice consistent with substantive law principles, plaintiff's claims are dismissed. Prompt's counterclaim is also dismissed as the contract between Prompt and Graham did not provide for additional charges for the storage of a motorcycle; it only provided for the removal of the vehicle without notice. This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: May 4, 2026

Hon. Tehilah H. Berman

Judge of the Civil Court, Kings County