Estate of Goldstein v Rayner

Supreme Court, Rockland County

Decided on May 14, 2026

Index No. 031665/2023

John P. Collins, Jr., J.

The following papers numbered 1—3 were read and considered in addition to oral argument on May 14, 2026, in connection with Defendant's Notice of Motion for an Order pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 101 et seq. striking Plaintiff's jury demand on the ground that Plaintiff seeks equitable relief, together with such other relief as is just:

PAPERS NUMBERS

Notice of Motion (Motion Seq. No. 5)/Affirmation of Dennis M. Rothman, Esq./Exhibit A 1

Affirmation of Steven B. Kalina, Esq. 2

Reply Affirmation of Dennis M. Rothman, Esq. 3

BACKGROUND

Defendants Kim Rayner, Rayner Law Group PLLC, and The Law Offices of Goldstein & Rayner move pursuant to CPLR 4101 to strike the jury demand contained in plaintiff's note of [*2]issue dated January 21, 2026. Plaintiff Estate of David Goldstein, by Bryan Goldstein as Executor, opposes.

This action arises from the dissolution, following David Goldstein's sudden death in June 2022, of the two-partner law firm Goldstein & Rayner (G&R), which Goldstein and defendant Kim Rayner operated together in Rockland County for approximately twenty-six years. Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that Rayner improperly withdrew $50,000 from G&R's operating account shortly after Goldstein's death and thereafter took other actions that depleted partnership assets. Defendants counter that Goldstein, who solely managed the partnership's financial affairs, had himself disbursed substantial retainer funds to himself without performing commensurate legal work, leaving G&R without sufficient funds to meet its obligations.

The complaint pleads, in relevant part: a first cause of action for an accounting of G&R; a second cause of action for an accounting of Rayner personally and of Rayner Law Group PLLC; a third cause of action for breach of contract; a fourth cause of action for conversion; a fifth cause of action for specific performance of ten obligations alleged to arise under the partnership agreement; and a sixth cause of action seeking, among other relief, a complete inventory of office contents, possession of the decedent's personal effects, and a listing of all client matters formerly handled by G&R.

LEGAL STANDARD

Civil Practice Law and Rules § 4101(1) provides for a jury trial in an action in which a party "demands and sets forth facts which would permit a judgment for a sum of money only." The constitutional right to trial by jury in New York is not absolute in actions that are equitable in character. See Hebranko v Bioline Lab'ys, Inc., 149 AD2d 567 (2d Dept 1989). The prevailing rule is that "the deliberate joinder of claims for legal and equitable relief arising out of the same transaction amounts to a waiver of the right to demand a jury trial." Id. at 567. Accordingly, "[w]hen, as here, the complaint either joins legal and equitable causes of action arising out of the same alleged wrong or seeks both legal and equitable relief, there is no right to a jury trial." Zimmer-Masiello, Inc. v Zimmer, Inc., 164 AD2d 845, 846 (1st Dept 1990). Once waived by the joinder of equitable and legal claims, the right to a jury trial is not revived by subsequent dismissal, settlement, or withdrawal of the equitable claims. See id. at 846—47; See also Mirasola v Gilman, 104 AD2d 932 (2d Dept 1984).

A recognized exception to this general waiver rule — the "incidental equitable relief doctrine" — provides that the right to a jury trial is not waived where the equitable relief sought is "incidental" to a demand for money damages, and where monetary damages alone will afford complete relief. Blackman v Metro. Transit Auth., 225 AD3d 736, 737 (2d Dept 2024); See Hebranko v Bioline Lab'ys, Inc., 149 AD2d at 568. The test is not merely whether the plaintiff characterizes its claims as monetary in nature, but whether the facts pleaded "imperatively require" equitable relief. Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 136 AD2d 229, 233—34 (1st Dept 1988).

DISCUSSION

The threshold question is whether the equitable claims asserted in plaintiff's complaint are substantive causes of action that independently require equitable intervention, or whether they are merely incidental devices in service of an ultimately monetary recovery. Upon careful review of the complaint, the Court concludes that plaintiff's equitable claims are not merely [*3]incidental and that monetary damages will not afford complete relief on all claims asserted. Accordingly, plaintiff has waived its right to a jury trial.

1. The Accounting Claims.

Plaintiff's first and second causes of action each seek a formal accounting — of G&R, and of Rayner and Rayner Law Group PLLC respectively. An accounting is a form of equitable relief. See Bonanni v Horizons Invs. Corp., 179 AD3d 995, 997 (2d Dept 2020); See also Gabbay v Ratchik, 60 AD2d 593, 593 (2d Dept 1977). Plaintiff argues, consistent with the holdings in Hebranko and its progeny, that the accountings are incidental to its claim for money damages because their purpose is merely to determine the quantum of monetary recovery owed to the Estate. The Court acknowledges that this argument has attracted favorable rulings from a number of trial courts in analogous partnership disputes. See, e.g., Abrams v. Rogers, No. 11793/89, 1992 WL 12664210 (Supreme Ct NY County Nov. 24, 1992); See also Bressler v. Kalow, No. 605941/01, 2004 WL 5487483 (Supreme Ct NY County June 15, 2004).

The argument is not without force when limited to the accounting claims, and in another case presenting only those claims alongside legal causes of action, the Court might find the exception applicable. However, the complaint here does not limit itself to claims that can be reduced to a monetary sum.

2. The Specific Performance Claims.

It is in the fifth and sixth causes of action that plaintiff's complaint decisively crosses into territory for which money damages are not full relief. Plaintiff's fifth cause of action seeks specific performance of ten obligations alleged under the partnership agreement. Plaintiff's sixth cause of action seeks: a complete inventory of all office contents; possession of the decedent's coffee maker and lobby pictures; possession of David Goldstein's personal effects; and a comprehensive listing of all client matters formerly handled by G&R, including the names of successor counsel. As defendants correctly observe, none of these demands can be satisfied by a monetary award. The personal effects of a deceased person, the physical objects in a former office, and a listing of client matters are not fungible; their value to the Estate is precisely that they are not reducible to money. Plaintiff does not seek the dollar value of the coffee maker — it seeks the coffee maker itself. These are textbook demands for specific performance and injunctive relief.

The Court is not persuaded by plaintiff's attempt to characterize the sixth cause of action as merely instrumental to the accounting. The relief demanded in the sixth cause of action stands independently; it does not dissolve into a monetary figure once the accounting is complete. This case is therefore readily distinguishable from Trimarco v Data Treasury Corp., 146 AD3d 1004, 1006 (2d Dept 2017); See also Kurzner v Sutton Owners Corp., 245 AD2d 101 (1st Dept 1997) — two cases in which plaintiffs sought specific, non-monetary equitable relief that could not be reduced to damages. Those cases support the result defendants urge here, not the result plaintiff urges.

3. The Incidental Equitable Relief Doctrine Does Not Apply.

The incidental equitable relief doctrine applies only when "monetary damages alone will afford full relief." Hebranko, 149 AD2d at 568. That condition is not met here. Plaintiff's own pleading demonstrates that it seeks relief — possession of personal property, inventories of [*4]tangible items, and a listing of client matters — that a money judgment cannot provide. The exception plaintiff invokes is therefore unavailable to it.

The Court further notes that the waiver is not cured by the fact that plaintiff's breach of contract and conversion claims are legal in character. As the Appellate Division has consistently held, it is the joinder itself — the deliberate inclusion of equitable claims in the same pleading with legal claims arising from the same facts — that effects the waiver. See Kaplan v Long Island Univ., 116 AD2d 508, 509 (1st Dept 1986) ("A party's entitlement to demand a jury trial is dependent upon the facts pleaded, not the demand for relief."). The critical inquiry is not how plaintiff describes its case but what the pleading reveals about the character of the relief actually sought. Here, that inquiry resolves in defendants' favor.

Finally, the Court is unpersuaded that any subsequent willingness by plaintiff to withdraw or narrow its equitable claims would restore the jury right. The law is clear: once the waiver has occurred by joinder, "any subsequent dismissal, settlement or withdrawal of the equitable claim(s) will not revive the right to trial by jury." Zimmer-Masiello, 164 AD2d at 846—47.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that defendants' motion to strike plaintiff's jury demand (Motion Sequence No. 5) is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that the jury demand contained in plaintiff's note of issue dated January 21, 2026, is hereby stricken; and it is further

ORDERED that this matter shall proceed as a bench trial; and it is further

ORDERED that defendants' counsel shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order with notice of entry upon all parties within twenty (20) days of entry.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: May 14, 2026

New City, New York

HON. JOHN P. COLLINS, JR., J.S.C.