RJ v KJ

Supreme Court, Richmond County

Decided on April 10, 2026

Index No. Redacted

Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion No. 001) numbered 3-8, 11-17 were read on this motion. The following papers were read on petitioner's application, by order to show cause, for a preliminary injunction and related interim relief: the Order to Show Cause; the Affirmation in Support of Allyn J. Crawford, Esq., dated January 30, 2026, together with exhibits; the affirmation of RJ , dated January 30, 2026, together with exhibits; the respondent's affirmation in opposition; the Reply Affirmation of Allyn J. Crawford, Esq., dated April 7, 2026, together with exhibits; the affidavits of service; and the prior proceedings had herein.

II. Findings of Fact

This proceeding concerns the real property known as XXX Leverett Avenue, Staten Island, New York XXXXX, identified in the moving papers as Richmond County Block XXXX, Lot 6, and described throughout the record as the "Subject Property." The Court finds from the papers before it that the Subject Property is the sole asset of the IF Irrevocable Trust, and that petitioner RJ appears herein not individually, but in his fiduciary capacity as trustee of that trust. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 5). The moving papers specifically aver that on October 29, 2019, IF, also known as IG, appointed petitioner as trustee of the trust and, on that same date, transferred ownership of the Subject Property to the trust. (see id). The record further reflects that IF thereafter died on September 9, 2024. (see id at Exhibit C). Thus, as framed by the record, the trust became the title-holding entity for the Subject Property during the settlor's lifetime, and petitioner has continued as trustee after the settlor's death.

The parties are brothers. Petitioner resides at XXX Hillside Terrace, Staten Island, New York XXXXX. (see id at ¶1). Respondent is alleged in the moving papers to reside at XXX Joline Avenue, Staten Island, New York XXXX9. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 5 at ¶2; NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 4 at ¶4). In the later affidavit of service annexed to the reply, the process server avers that service was effected at XXX Joline Avenue, Staten Island, New York XXXX7, and further states that a neighbor confirmed that respondent resided there. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 8). The Court does not treat the discrepancy in zip code as material on this motion; the record consistently identifies XXX Joline Avenue as respondent's residence for service purposes.

The gravamen of the application is not a merely abstract dispute over title, but an asserted course of physical entry upon and alteration of the Subject Property. Petitioner alleges that on December 11, 2025, respondent came upon the Subject Property and used a heavy "bobcat" type excavator to demolish retaining walls adjacent to the driveway, damage the sidewalk, cover the sidewalk with dirt, remove a set of metal steps leading to the backyard, and place a large boulder in the path of the sidewalk. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 5 at ¶5). Petitioner further alleges that, between December 19, 2025 and January 12, 2026, respondent again appeared at the Subject Property and caused further damage, including the infliction of additional damage to retaining walls adjacent to the driveway, front lawn, and front stairs, the movement of boulders by means of the bobcat, the removal of a drainpipe which prevented water backup into the garage, the starting of a fire using gasoline as an accelerant to burn brush and other debris, and the creation of a makeshift memorial. (see id at ¶7). Petitioner states that he contacted the New York City Police Department but was advised by the responding officer that the matter was to be addressed in civil court. (see id at ¶6).

The Court finds that these factual allegations are particularized, internally consistent, and [*2]directed to specific acts occurring on identified dates or during a defined interval. They are not framed in vague or conclusory terms. They describe the use of machinery, the removal of appurtenances, the impairment of drainage, the displacement of stone materials, and the ignition of fire on the premises. Those asserted acts, if credited, are plainly directed toward the physical condition of the land itself and its improvements.

Respondent's opposition, by contrast, is sparse and only partially legible in the record as filed. Even giving respondent every favorable intendment appropriate to a self-prepared submission, the opposition appears to assert that respondent has lived at the property for many years and that he regards himself as having some "half" interest in it. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 11). The reply papers, however, state that respondent submitted no documentary proof establishing any legal ownership interest or right of possession, and they further assert that respondent has not had access to the interior of the house for more than two years. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 15 at ¶8). The reply also points out that respondent's claim of residence is in tension with his own assertion that the property is "uninhabitable." (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 14 at ¶7). The Court does not make a final determination of all issues that may ultimately arise between the parties, but on this motion it finds that respondent's papers do not furnish evidentiary matter sufficient to rebut petitioner's prima facie showing that legal title is vested in the trust and that petitioner, as trustee, is the legal title holder acting for the trust estate.

The Court also takes cognizance of the later averment in the reply papers that, notwithstanding the interim restraints previously imposed, respondent allegedly contracted on or about March 5, 2026 for the removal of certain trees from the Subject Property, and that such removal was allegedly necessitated by a compromised root system attributable to respondent's earlier removal of retaining walls. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 15 at Exhibit E; Exhibit F). This later allegation, though arising after the initial motion papers, bears directly upon the practical necessity of preserving the property from further unilateral alteration while the action proceeds.

Upon the whole record, the Court finds for purposes of this motion that petitioner has established that the Subject Property is trust property; that petitioner, as trustee, is the legal title holder charged with stewardship over that property; that respondent has engaged in repeated entries upon the property and in repeated physical alterations to it; and that, absent judicial restraint, there exists a substantial risk of continued interference with the corpus of the trust.

V. Conclusions of Law

The application is governed first by the text of CPLR § 6301, which the moving papers correctly quote. That statute provides, in substance, that a preliminary injunction may be granted where the defendant "threatens or is about to do, or is doing or procuring or suffering to be done, an act in violation of the plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual," and further where the plaintiff has demanded and would be entitled to a judgment restraining the commission or continuance of an act which, if committed or continued during the pendency of the action, would produce injury to the plaintiff. CPLR § 6313 [a], also quoted in the moving papers, separately authorizes a temporary restraining order where immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result unless the defendant is restrained before a hearing can be had.

From those provisions, New York law has long distilled the familiar tripartite standard: [*3]likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury absent the injunction, and a balance of equities in the movant's favor, as articulated in Aetna Ins. Co. v Capasso (75 NY2d 860 [1990]), Doe v Axelrod (73 NY2d 748 [1988]), and W.T. Grant Co. v Srogi (52 NY2d 496, 517 [1981]). The Second Department formulation cited in the papers, Golden v Steam Heat, Inc. (216 AD2d 440 [2d Dept 1995], see also, Chana v Machon Chana Women's Inst., Inc., 162 AD3d 635 [2d Dept 2018]; Long Is. Roller Rebels v. County of Nassau, 242 AD3d 860 [2d Dept 2025]), reiterates the same rule. The function of this provisional remedy is preservative, not determinative; it exists so that rights, if ultimately adjudicated in the movant's favor, are not defeated by interim conduct that alters the subject matter of the controversy beyond meaningful restoration.

That principle is reinforced by Uniformed Firefighters Assn. v City of New York (79 NY2d 236 [1992]), for the proposition that a preliminary injunction prevents litigants from taking actions they might otherwise be legally entitled to take in advance of adjudication on the merits. (see also, Matter of Related Props., Inc. v. Town Bd. of Town/Village of Harrison, 22 AD3d 587 [2d Dept 2005]). Precisely because the remedy is extraordinary, the Court must take care that it is not converted into a premature final adjudication. Yet the corollary is equally true: where the subject of the suit is susceptible to ongoing change, destruction, or depletion, a refusal to act can itself become an implicit and inequitable adjudication in favor of the party who acts first and asks questions later. Thus, Heisler v Gingras (238 AD2d 702 [3d Dept 1997]), and Gambar Enters., Inc. v Kelly Servs., Inc. (69 AD2d 297 [4th Dept 1979]), stand for the settled understanding that the office of a preliminary injunction is the preservation of the status quo pending resolution of the action.

On the first element, likelihood of success, the Court concludes that petitioner has met the burden applicable at this stage. The papers correctly observe that only a prima facie showing of a right to relief is required, and not a trial-ready demonstration of every factual and legal issue. Akos Realty Corp. v Vandemark (157 AD2d 632 [1st Dept 1990]), stands for the proposition that a prima facie showing suffices; McLaughlin, Piven, Vogel, Inc. v W.J. Nolan & Co., Inc., (114 AD2d 165 [2d Dept 1986]), and Tucker v Toia (54 AD2d 322 [4th Dept 1976]), maintain that the concomitant proposition that actual proof is left to later proceedings. These authorities are particularly apt here, where the respondent's opposition does not present a developed evidentiary showing sufficient to put petitioner's chain of title or fiduciary authority into serious doubt.

The Petitioner's reply papers deepen that conclusion by invoking EPTL § 7-2.1, which states that an express trust vests in the trustee the legal estate, while the beneficiary does not take a legal estate in the property but may enforce the trust. The reply also cites General Obligations Law § 5-703 for the proposition that a trust of real property, or a power concerning real property, must be created or declared by a subscribed writing. Further, the reply relies upon In re Doman (68 AD3d 862 [2d Dept 2009]), for the elements of a valid express trust, and Matter of Hanlon (245 AD3d 707 [2d Dept 2026]), for the proposition that once property is successfully deeded to the trust, it is trust property as of the decedent's death and is not withdrawn from the trust by the will. The reply additionally cites Larchmont Pancake House v Board of Assessors (33 NY3d 228 [2019]), In re Patchogue Bank (80 NYS2d 603 [Sup Ct Suffolk County 1948]), and Henning v Rando Mach. Corp. (207 AD2d 106 [4th Dept 1994]), all for the basic conceptual distinction between legal and equitable ownership in trust law. On the papers before the Court, those authorities support petitioner's contention that even if respondent were a beneficiary or claimed some equitable expectancy through familial relation, that would not translate into a present unilateral right to enter upon, alter, damage, or control the trust realty.

This is a point of considerable importance. The law of provisional relief does not require the Court to resolve every possible future issue concerning beneficial interests, succession, occupancy claims, or equitable disputes. It requires the Court to assess whether the movant has sufficiently shown a present right likely to prevail as against the conduct sought to be restrained. Here, petitioner's present right is not merely possessory in the colloquial sense; it is the right and duty of a trustee to preserve the trust res from waste, destruction, unilateral appropriation, or self-help by a person who has not established a legal estate superior to or coextensive with that of the trustee. On this record, that showing has been made.

Indeed, even were there "grave doubts" as to some ultimate feature of the parties' rights, provisional relief may still issue where denial would render judgment ineffectual. Schlissel v United Presbyt. Home at Syosset, Inc. (56 AD2d 615 [2d Dept 1977]), Hudson Riv. Tel. Co. v Watervliet Turnpike & R. Co. (121 NY 397 [1890]), Wainer v Village of Ellenville (76 AD2d 960 [3d Dept 1980]), State v City of New York (275 AD2d 740 [2d Dept 2000]), Republic of Lebanon v Sotheby's (167 AD2d 142 [1st Dept 1990]), Bisca v Bisca (108 Misc 2d 227 [Sup Ct Nassau County 1981]), Valdez v N.E. Brooklyn Hous. Dev. Corp. (8 Misc 3d 1008[A] [Sup Ct Kings County 2005]), and DiCostanzo v C.L. Tower Co. (96 Misc 2d 109 [Sup Ct Kings County 1978]), all cited in the moving papers, point toward the broader equitable proposition that the Court is not required to stand idle where the subject matter of the litigation may be irreversibly altered before final adjudication can occur.

As to irreparable harm, the Court concludes that petitioner has made an especially strong showing. The injury alleged is not confined to monetary loss or to a past trespass that has fully concluded. The alleged conduct concerns continuing and repeated physical alteration to a unique parcel of real property, including its retaining structures, drainage features, ingress and egress components, and landscape. It is well settled that each parcel of real property is unique (see EMF Gen. Contr. Corp. v Bisbee, 6 AD3d 45, 52 [1st Dept 2004]). Limited injunctive relief has been upheld where it preserved the condition of the property while the opponents' claimed harm was speculative (see Zwickel v Underhill Land LLC, 243 AD3d 973 [3d Dept 2025]).

Real property, especially when held as the sole corpus of a trust, is not interchangeable merchandise. Once walls are demolished, drainage is disturbed, stairs removed, trees compromised, and land contours altered by machinery and fire, a later money judgment may prove an incomplete and blunt instrument. The law therefore classifies such injury as irreparable in the equitable sense, not because money is metaphysically unavailable, but because money cannot fully restore the precise land condition, stability, structural context, and practical utility that existed before continued unilateral alteration.

The record also satisfies the statutory language of CPLR § 6301 that the challenged conduct tends to render a judgment ineffectual. If the trustee were to prevail after trial, yet the retaining structures, drainage systems, access points, and natural features of the property had by then been materially altered or degraded, the practical worth of the adjudication would be diminished. An equity court is not required to accept such a result where the danger is concrete and the relief sought is preservative.

On the balance of equities, the Court again finds in petitioner's favor. Injunctive relief is appropriate where the harm to the movant from denial exceeds the inconvenience to the opponent from the grant (see Laro Maintenance Corp. v Culkin, 255 AD2d 560 [2d Dept 1998]; Konishi v Lin, 88 AD2d 905 [2d Dept 1982]; and J. Radley Metzger Co. v Fay, 4 AD2d 436 [1st Dept 1957]). This court has the duty and the authority to balance the hardship and inconvenience flowing from the [*4]grant or denial of provisional relief (see McNulty v Chinlund, 62 AD2d 682 [3d Dept 1978]; Walsh v St. Mary's Church, 248 AD2d 792 [3d Dept 1998]; and Poling Transp. Corp. v A & P Tanker Corp., supra)

In applying that principle, the Court notes that the injunction sought here is not one that confers possession on a stranger, compels complicated affirmative performance, or grants petitioner the entirety of the final relief demanded in the action. Rather, it restrains respondent from accessing and further altering the Subject Property and authorizes removal and storage of the bobcat excavator located there. That relief is tailored to the preservation of the corpus of the dispute. If respondent ultimately establishes some legal or equitable right warranting judicial protection, that right can be addressed in due course. But respondent identifies no legitimate prejudice arising from being barred, in the interim, from engaging in self-help construction, demolition, excavation, or alteration activities on trust real property the legal title to which he has not shown himself entitled to control. By contrast, petitioner, as trustee, faces immediate and continuing prejudice if the property remains exposed to further unilateral acts. The balance of hardship therefore weighs decidedly in petitioner's favor.

The Court further concludes a trustee's role is fiduciary and preservative. If the Court were to deny provisional relief in the face of a record showing repeated intrusions and physical alterations to the trust corpus, it would effectively disable the trustee from carrying out the very office that the law assigns to him. Conversely, maintaining the restraints simply holds the property in place while the parties' claims are examined under ordinary adjudicative processes. Equity, at its highest level, is concerned not only with abstract rights but with the conservation of the subject matter so that law may speak meaningfully at the end of the case. That concern is directly implicated here.

Accordingly, upon the facts found and the authorities supplied in the papers, the Court determines that petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits sufficient for provisional relief, irreparable harm in the absence of such relief, and a balance of equities that tips sharply in petitioner's favor. The application should therefore be granted.

V. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that petitioner's application for a preliminary injunction is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent KJ is hereby enjoined and restrained, during the pendency of this action and until further order of this Court, from accessing the property known as XXX Leverett Avenue, Staten Island, New York XXXXX; and it is further

ORDERED that petitioner RJ, solely in his capacity as Trustee of the IF Irrevocable Trust, is authorized, during the pendency of this action and until further order of this Court, to remove and store the heavy machinery described in the papers as the "bobcat" type excavator from the Subject Property; and it is further

ORDERED that the foregoing relief is granted for the purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing further alteration, waste, destruction, or interference with the Subject Property pending determination of the action; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties are directed to appear for a preliminary conference on April 23, 2026, at 9:30 AM, at the Courthouse located at 26 Central Avenue, Courtroom 330, Staten Island, NY; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties shall thereafter proceed with disclosure and all further pretrial proceedings in accordance with the directives issued at such preliminary conference and any subsequent order of this Court.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: April 10, 2026

Staten Island, New York

HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR.

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT