Sanchez v Vargas

Supreme Court, New York County

Decided on April 27, 2026

Index No. 154886/2026

Matthew V. Grieco, J.

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 3, 5 were read on this motion to/for ELECTION LAW - INVALIDATE PETITION — VENUE.

Upon the foregoing documents and oral arguments on the record on April 24, 2026, the motion of respondents candidates Andreas Y. Vargas and Monica V. Valdes to change venue is [*2]granted.

Petitioners aggrieved candidates Rosa Sanchez and Fausto Rodriguez, and petitioners objectors Toni Diaz and Kendra Sanchez, commenced this special proceeding pursuant to Election Law §§ 16-100, 16-102, and 16-116 to invalidate the designating petition filed by respondents candidates Andreas Y. Vargas and Monica V. Valdes with respondent Board of Elections in the City of New York ("BOE") to appear as candidates for District Leader, Democratic Leadership District 34, Part B, Queens County, New York, on the ground that they have not obtained the minimum number of required valid signatures.

Respondents candidates Vargas and Valdes move to change venue to Queens County pursuant to CPLR 510 ("The court, upon motion, may change the place of trial of an action where: 1. the county designated for that purpose is not a proper county; or 2. there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had in the proper county; or 3. the convenience of material witnesses and the ends of justice will be promoted by the change"). Respondents, as movants, have the burden of showing that petitioners' choice of venue was improper (see Lividini v Goldstein, 37 NY3d 1047 [2021]; Rivera v Jensen, 307 AD2d 229 [1st Dept 2003]) or to change venue for the convenience of the material witnesses (see 10 Two Trees Lane LLC v Mahoney, 192 AD3d 468 [1st Dept 2021]).

Under CPLR 506(a), "[u]nless otherwise prescribed in subdivision (b) or in the law authorizing the proceeding, a special proceeding may be commenced in any county within the judicial district where the proceeding is triable."

The principal office of the BOE is in New York County, and thus that is one permissible venue (see CPLR 503, 504).

The Uniform Rules for the New York State Trial Court, 22 NYCRR 202.64(a), however, provides:

All applications to the Supreme Court, or to a judge thereof, pursuant to the Election Law, shall be made at the special part designated for such proceedings, and where there is no special part, before the judge to whom the proceeding is assigned. As far as practicable, the application shall be brought in the county in which it arose [emphasis added].

The Rule thus limits a petitioner's choice of venue and sets a standard for the courts to follow (see Wills v Hankerson, — Misc 3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 31555[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2025]; Cartwright v Kennedy, 84 Misc 3d 497, 509 [Sup Ct, Dutchess County 2024]; see also Smith v Kennedy, 83 Misc 3d 1239[A] [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2024]).

Petitioners maintain that the location of BOE's principal office is controlling, documents can easily be produced in and reviewed at that New York County location, and they don't believe any witnesses need be called.

Respondents contend that, under that reasoning, every election proceeding would be venued in New York County, which would place an inordinate burden there. Moreover, the petition concerns election to a position exclusively within a Queens jurisdiction (a Queens District Leader), all signatures were obtained in Queens from Queens voters, all documents are located at the Queens BOE offices, and all witnesses would be Queens residents.

Petitioners' reliance on Cartwright v Kennedy (84 Misc 3d 497 [Sup Ct, Dutchess County 2024]) is unavailing. That proceeding sought to invalidate a nominating petition of candidates for President and Vice President of the United States in a statewide general election, on the basis [*3]of fraudulent (or fraudulently obtained) signatures. The petitioners filed in Dutchess County, asserting that it was an appropriate venue because the purported fraud affected all New Yorkers and signatures were obtained from all New Yorkers.^FN1 The court granted the candidates' motion to change venue to Albany County, where the petition had been filed with the State Board of Elections. The court rejected the petitioners' two bases for siting venue in Dutchess County, finding: (1) there was no way to assess their assertion that candidate Kennedy's allegedly fraudulent statement that he was a New York resident, not a Californian, affected Dutchess County voters; and (2) there was no evidence that any Dutchess voter signed the nominating petition (id. at 507-508).

Cartwright thus stands for the proposition that where there is no connection to the originally selected venue, the proceeding should be transferred to the venue of the Board's principal office. That is the opposite situation of the proceeding here, where all pertinent factors are Queens-based, and New York County has no connection other than being the address of the Board's main office. In fact, in Smith v Kennedy (83 Misc 3d 1239[A] [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2024]), which involved the same candidates in the same election as Cartwright, the court denied transfer of venue from Nassau County to Albany upon finding that the proceeding arose in Nassau, where the petitioners resided and communicated their objections, as did a number of witnesses, parties, and attorneys; Albany was only where the State Board was located, and it did not take a position on venue.

Reinhart v New York State Bd. of Elections (— Misc 3d —, 2021 NY Slip Op 31990[U] [Sup Ct, Albany County 2021]), also cited by petitioners, if anything, supports a change of venue here. In Reinhart, the court transferred venue from Albany County, the principal place of the State Board of Elections, to New York County, where a companion proceeding was already pending, and in close proximity to Richmond County, where the material witnesses resided.

As noted, 22 NYCRR 202.64 states that, "[a]s far as practicable," an Election Law special proceeding "shall be brought in the county in which it arose." If the intent had been that every proceeding "arises" in the County where BOE's main office is located, it easily could have stated so. Indeed, Election Law § 16-101 specifies one County in each of the four Judicial [*4]Departments for venue for "any action or proceeding in which any party challenges the constitutionality of a provision of this chapter, and any related statutory claims"; 22 NYCRR 202.64 could also have used simple language to venue proceedings in the County of the BOE's principal office had that been the intent.

Respondents are correct that the petition arises from Queens County, because it pertains to a local Queens election, signatures procured only in Queens from people who must be Queens residents, and documents held at BOE's Queens offices; accordingly, venue is transferred to Queens County (see Wills v Hankerson, — Misc 3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 31555[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2025] [transferring from New York County to Queens an Election Law proceeding regarding a Queens City Council District]; Smith v Kennedy, 83 Misc 3d 1239[A] [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2024] [denying transfer of venue from Nassau County to Albany, as discussed supra]; see also Lucchese v Rotella, 60 NY2d 815 [1983] [in Election Law proceeding, stating: "While we do not address the appropriateness or propriety of instituting this proceeding in Albany County rather than in Rockland County where the controversy arose, we do not condone the practice"]; Del Pellegrino v Giuliani, 153 AD2d 724 [2d Dept 1989] [ruling that "the determination of the validity of the petitions for New York County positions should be made by the courts in New York County where jurisdiction properly lies," even though the parties stipulated to Kings County venue]).

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that respondents' motion is granted and venue is transferred to Queens County.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

DATE 4/27/2026

MATTHEW V. GRIECO, J.S.C.