Evergreen Florist & Greenhouse, Inc. v Levy

Supreme Court, Richmond County

Decided on April 17, 2026

Index No. 153039/2025

Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219[a]

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion #001) numbered 5-24 were read on this motion. The following papers were considered on Defendants' motion for an Order pursuant to CPLR § 3211 [a] [8], CPLR § 327 [a], and CPLR § 3211 [a] [7]: (1) Notice of Motion, dated February 6, 2026; (2) Affirmation of Robert Hawkins, Esq., dated February 6, 2026, in Support of Defendant's Motion with annexed exhibits a through f; (3) Affirmation of Janae Tanner, dated February 5, 2026; (4) Plaintiff's Affirmation of Michael D. Fitzgerald, Esq., in Opposition, dated March 5, 2026, with exhibits A through H annexed; (5) Affirmation of Robert Hawkins, Esq., in Defendant's Reply.

II. Findings of Fact

This action arises from an alleged agreement for the design, fabrication, and provision of custom floral arrangements in connection with the wedding of Defendants Joseph Levy and Janae Tanner, scheduled to take place on December 27, 2025, at a venue located in the State of New Jersey. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 7 at ¶3)

Plaintiffs Evergreen Florist & Greenhouse, Inc. International Corp. ("Evergreen") and Robert Cancelleri allege that Evergreen is a New York corporation maintaining its principal place of business in Staten Island, Richmond County, and that Cancelleri is likewise a resident of that County. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 16; 17; 18; 19; 20). These allegations are supported by the pleadings and submissions in opposition and, for purposes of this motion, must be accepted as true.

The record, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, reflects that Defendants knowingly retained a New York-based florist to provide bespoke floral services. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants traveled to Plaintiffs' Staten Island premises for an in-person consultation, during which they reviewed available inventory, selected specific floral arrangements, and caused additional items to be ordered and delivered to Plaintiffs' New York location. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants were fully aware that Evergreen operated exclusively out of its Staten Island facility and that the contracted-for services would necessarily be performed there. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 7 at ¶7; 16 at ¶6-7).

Plaintiffs further allege that the core and substantial components of the agreement were performed in New York. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that all preparatory work, including the procurement of flowers and materials, the receipt of goods from suppliers, and the design, assembly, and customization of floral arrangements tailored to Defendants' specifications, was performed at Plaintiffs' Staten Island facility. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 16 at ¶9-10; see id at ¶12). The ultimate delivery and installation at the New Jersey venue constituted only the final stage of [*2]performance. (see id at ¶10)

The submissions further reflect that Defendants made partial payments toward the agreed-upon services and that Plaintiffs, in reliance upon the agreement, undertook substantial performance, including the creation of customized arrangements that were uniquely tailored to Defendants' preferences and not readily marketable to third parties. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 16 at ¶11-13; NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No 22). Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants thereafter directed Plaintiffs to cease work, thereby precipitating the instant action to recover damages in the approximate amount of $36,821.00. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 9; NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 16 at ¶14).

Defendants dispute the existence of a binding agreement, emphasize the absence of a signed writing, and contend that the transaction is centered in New Jersey, where the wedding was to take place. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 7 at ¶4-6). Defendants further assert that they are domiciliaries of New Jersey and that they lack sufficient contacts with New York to justify the exercise of jurisdiction. (see id at ¶9).

III. Conclusions of Law

A. Personal Jurisdiction (CPLR § 3211 [a][ 8])

Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is DENIED.

On a motion pursuant to CPLR § 3211 [a] [8], the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants. However, at this preliminary stage, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, and the Court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint and opposition papers as true, according the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference (see Nonnon v. City of New York, 9 NY3d 825 [2007]).

Jurisdiction is properly exercised under CPLR § 302 [a] [1], which provides that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts any business within the State or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the State, provided that the cause of action arises from such transaction.

Here, Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated that Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within New York. The record reflects that Defendants physically entered the State to engage Plaintiffs' services, participated in an in-person consultation at Plaintiffs' Staten Island place of business, selected goods and services within the State, and directed that materials be delivered to that location. These acts constitute purposeful and deliberate engagement with a New York-based enterprise and are sufficient to satisfy the "transacting business" prong of CPLR § 302 [a] [1].

Equally significant is Plaintiffs' allegation that the essential performance of the agreement occurred in New York. The design, procurement, and assembly of custom floral arrangements, services that form the gravamen of the contract, were performed at Plaintiffs' Staten Island facility. The statute expressly confers jurisdiction where a defendant contracts to supply goods or services in the State, and Plaintiffs' allegations bring this case squarely within that provision.

The Court rejects Defendants' contention that the situs of the wedding in New Jersey is dispositive. The mere fact that the final delivery occurred outside the State does not negate the substantial and purposeful activities undertaken within New York. Nor does it diminish the fact that Defendants knowingly engaged a New York business to perform significant services within this [*3]State.

Furthermore, the requisite nexus between Defendants' New York activities and Plaintiffs' claims is plainly established. Plaintiffs' cause of action arises directly from the alleged agreement formed and performed, in substantial part, within New York. The relationship between the transaction and the claim is therefore neither incidental nor attenuated.

The Court further finds that the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process. Defendants' purposeful contacts with New York render it entirely foreseeable that they could be hauled into court in this State. The assertion of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have established a prima facie basis for personal jurisdiction, and dismissal pursuant to CPLR § 3211 [a] [8] is denied.

B. Forum Non Conveniens (CPLR § 327 [a])

Defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens is DENIED.

The doctrine of forum non conveniens permits a court to dismiss an action where, in the interest of substantial justice, the action should be heard in another forum. The determination is discretionary and requires consideration of multiple factors, including the residency of the parties, the situs of the underlying events, the location of witnesses and evidence, and the burden on the courts (see Shin-Etsu Bank v ICICI Bank, 9 AD3d 171 [1st Dept 2004]; Aon Risk Servs. v Cusack, 102 AD3d 461 [1st Dept 2013]).

The burden rests upon the moving party to demonstrate that these factors strongly favor dismissal (see Wild v University of Pennsylvania, 115 AD3d 944 [2d Dept 2014]). Defendants have failed to satisfy this burden.

Plaintiffs are residents of New York, and Evergreen maintains its principal place of business in Staten Island. New York has a substantial interest in adjudicating disputes involving its resident businesses, and Plaintiffs' choice of forum is entitled to considerable deference.

Moreover, the record establishes a significant nexus between the transaction and New York. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants traveled to New York to engage their services, that the agreement was formed in part within this State, and that substantial performance occurred here. These factors weigh heavily against dismissal.

Defendants have failed to identify any specific nonparty witnesses who would be unavailable or unduly burdened by litigation in New York. Nor have they demonstrated that relevant evidence is inaccessible in this forum. The geographic proximity between Staten Island and the New Jersey venue further undermines any claim of inconvenience.

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants have not demonstrated that New York is an inconvenient forum or that substantial justice would be better served by dismissal. Accordingly, the branch of the motion seeking dismissal pursuant to CPLR § 327 [a] is DENIED.

C. Failure to State a Cause of Action (CPLR § 3211 [a] [7])

Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3211 [a] [7] is DENIED.

On such a motion, the Court must determine whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory, accepting those facts as true and affording Plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference (see Nonnon v. City of New York, 9 NY3d 825 [2007]).

Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded the elements of a breach of contract claim, including the existence of an agreement, Plaintiffs' performance, Defendants' breach, and resulting damages. Defendants' reliance upon the Statute of Frauds does not warrant dismissal at this stage. While UCC § 2-201 [1] generally requires a signed writing for contracts involving the sale of goods exceeding $500, Plaintiffs have invoked the exception set forth in UCC § 2-201 [3] [a], which permits enforcement where goods are specially manufactured for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of business.

Plaintiffs allege that the floral arrangements were custom-designed and created specifically for Defendants' wedding and were not suitable for resale. Plaintiffs further allege that they made a substantial beginning in the manufacture of those goods and incurred commitments for their procurement prior to Defendants' alleged repudiation. These allegations, if proven, would bring the agreement within the statutory exception.

Additionally, Plaintiffs allege partial payment by Defendants and substantial performance on their part. Such allegations may independently support enforcement notwithstanding the absence of a signed writing.

Defendants' argument that certain Defendants were not parties to the agreement is likewise unavailing at this stage. Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants participated in the transaction, attended meetings, and contributed to payments. These allegations are sufficient, at the pleading stage, to state a claim against each Defendant.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a cause of action, and dismissal pursuant to CPLR § 3211 [a] [7] is DENIED.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3211 [a] [8] is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 327 [a] is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3211 [a] [7] is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendants shall serve and file an answer to the complaint within twenty days of this Decision and Order; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties shall appear for a preliminary conference on May 13, 2026 at 9:30AM.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: April 17, 2026

Staten Island, New York

HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR.

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT