People v Brooks

County Court, Tompkins County

Decided on May 18, 2026

Ind. No. 70338-25

Scott A. Miller, J.

Defendant is facing a five-count indictment charging Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Second Degree [Penal Law § 220.18(2)], three counts of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree [Penal Law § 220.16(12),(7) and (1)] and one count of Criminally Using Drug Paraphernalia in the Second Degree [Penal Law § 220.50(3)]. Defendant moves to suppress physical evidence recovered following a traffic stop conducted on August 20, 2025, contending that both the stop and subsequent canine-assisted vehicle search violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 12 of the New York Constitution. Following a suppression hearing conducted on March 26, 2026 and April 8, 2026, the motion is denied.

I. Findings of Fact

The Court credits the testimony of Tompkins County Sheriff Deputy Kiana Manuel, New York State Police (NYSP) Trooper Jared Bowling, NYSP Trooper Robert Gregory (now Investigator Gregory) and NYSP Trooper and K-9 handler Adam Vargeson in all material respects relevant to resolution of the suppression issues before the Court. Defendant did not call any witnesses. The Court does not credit the defense contention that the officers fabricated any of their observations. The officers' testimony is corroborated by the objective record, including synchronized body-worn-camera and dash-camera recordings admitted into evidence. (Exhibit 1). To the extent slight inconsistencies existed concerning peripheral details, the Court finds such variations consistent with minor and immaterial discrepancies one would expect when testing independent recollections of a rapidly evolving roadside encounter rather than indicative of any [*2]fabrication.

On a motion to suppress evidence, the People bear the burden of going forward to establish the legality of the police conduct at issue, while defendant bears the ultimate burden of establishing a constitutional violation warranting suppression. People v. Rockwell, 137 AD2d 874, 875 (3d Dept 1988). The Court finds that the People satisfied their burden of demonstrating the legality of the stop and ensuing investigation and that defendant failed to establish any constitutional violation requiring suppression.

The body-worn-camera (and dashcam) footage, while highly useful, captures only a limited two-dimensional perspective and does not necessarily replicate what an officer personally observes through shifting angles, peripheral vision, flashlight illumination, and direct line-of-sight. Accordingly, where the Court makes findings of fact that go beyond what the footage depicts, those findings rest on the Court's assessment of the testimonial evidence in conjunction with its independent review of the body-worn and dashcam recordings.

On August 20, 2025, members of a multi-agency Gun Involved Violence Elimination (GIVE) detail were conducting coordinated patrol operations within the City of Ithaca. Shortly before 22:30 hours, Investigator Andrews of the New York State Police, working undercover, observed defendant Breon Brooks's blue Mercedes SUV pull into the 7-Eleven parking lot, a location known to the GIVE detail as an area associated with recurring narcotics activity. Investigator Andrews reported over the Zello application — a password-secured, push-to-talk communication platform utilized by GIVE detail — that a female had approached defendant's vehicle, that there appeared to be a brief exchange or transaction of some type, and that she then appeared to retrieve something from the vehicle. (Hearing Tr. [March 26] at 64—65). Deputy Manuel, Trooper Gregory, and Trooper Bowling each testified that they received this information through the Zello platform contemporaneously with the events. (Hearing Tr. [March 26] at 65—66, 85—87; Hearing Tr. [April 8] at 111).

Shortly thereafter, Deputy Manuel personally observed defendant operating the same blue Mercedes SUV bearing a rear license plate dealer frame that covered the word "Excelsior" at the bottom of the plate almost in its entirety. (Hearing Tr. [March 26] at 28). Deputy Manuel initiated a traffic stop at approximately 22:30 hours at the intersection of West State and Plain Streets in the City of Ithaca. The body-worn-camera recording establishes that Deputy Manuel and the defendant made initial contact as she approached his driver's window at 22:30:58 hours.

Defendant exited the vehicle at Deputy Manuel's invitation. Manuel was positioned near the B-pillar area of the vehicle as defendant stepped out and walked past her toward the rear. As defendant exited, Manuel observed what she described as a small, knotted fragment of a plastic bag — specifically, the tied-off end piece separated from a larger bag, which law enforcement commonly refer to as a "knot" — on the driver-side floorboard in the area where the driver's feet would rest. (Hearing Tr. [March 26] at 31—34). The Court credits this testimony. The body-worn-camera footage does not clearly depict the item, which is not surprising given the inherent limitations of a fixed-perspective body-camera during a dynamic roadside encounter. Manuel herself acknowledged on direct examination that she did not see this item on the body camera despite reviewing the footage multiple times. (Hearing Tr. [March 26] at 17). Nevertheless, the Court finds her testimony credible.

With defendant at the rear of the vehicle, Gregory was engaged with him from close proximity of approximately 2 to 4 feet away explaining the nature of the Vehicle and Traffic Law § 402 violation. Gregory independently corroborated that the dealer frame blocked the [*3]bottom "Excelsior" portion of the plate. (Hearing Tr. [March 26] at 67). Additionally, the body-worn and dashcam footage conclusively establishes that the word "Excelsior" was almost totally covered by the dealer frame. (Exhibit 1; Exhibit L).

At 22:31:54—22:32:15, Deputy Manuel shined her flashlight through the rear passenger window behind the driver's seat and observed a plastic baggie in a waste basket on the rear passenger-side floorboard. (Exhibit 1). While remaining at the rear of the vehicle, Manuel questioned defendant (who was still standing with Gregory) about what she had just observed. (Exhibit 1 at 22:32:17—22:32:34; Hearing Tr. [March 26] at 14, 32—35). Manuel asked defendant, "what's in the baggie that's on the floor," "on the passenger's side." Defendant did not deny the existence of any object. He responded "nothing" and offered to retrieve the item himself. (Exhibit 1 at 22:32:17—22:32:34). The officers did not permit defendant to reenter the vehicle, which under the evolving circumstances was reasonable while suspected narcotics packaging remained under investigation.

Simultaneously and independently of Manuel's observation, beginning at 22:32:02 hours, Bowling was positioned on the opposite side of defendant's vehicle and shined his flashlight through the rear passenger-side window. Over the next 32 seconds, Bowling observed what Manuel had also seen, but in closer and better detail based upon his closer proximity. Bowling observed, towards the floorboard and back seat in the rear passenger compartment area, used plastic baggies which contained what appeared to be a white powdery residue — consistent, based upon his training and experience, with suspected narcotic residue. (Exhibit 1 at 22:32:02—22:32:34; Hearing Tr. [March 26] at 88). Bowling also observed a black backpack on the rear passenger-side seat, partially opened, through which he could see clean, unused, clear plastic baggies. (Hearing Tr. [March 26] at 88). Gregory, standing just a few feet away while still engaged with defendant about the obscured license plate, was a contemporaneous witness to both Manuel's and Bowling's flashlight illuminations of the rear passenger compartment and to defendant's reaction to it. At 22:32:35, Bowling directly advised defendant, "You also got packaging in there," referring to the black backpack and its contents. (Exhibit 1 at 22:32:35—22:32:40). Gregory's body-worn-camera footage at this moment captures defendant briefly peering into the rear of the vehicle through the window as Bowling pointed out what he was observing. The Court's independent review of the body-worn-camera recordings reveals that defendant's demeanor throughout the entire interaction — both prior to and after the K-9 deployment — was characterized by pronounced nervousness. (Exhibit 1).

The Court credits Manuel, Bowling, and Gregory on these observations. Manuel independently observed plastic baggies in the waste basket. Bowling independently observed, in greater detail and from closer range on the opposite side of the vehicle, the same used baggies with apparent white powdery residue consistent with narcotic residue as well as unused packaging materials in a black backpack on the rear seat. Those observations were made while the stop remained fully active and while defendant was still at the rear of the vehicle engaged in the license plate discussion with Gregory. The video and photographic exhibit admitted at the hearing materially corroborate Manuel's, Bowling's and Gregory's testimony that translucent used baggie material with apparent white residue was visible through the rear passenger windows. (Exhibit 1 and 2).

Deputy Manuel stated to defendant that she would not be issuing him a traffic ticket for the license plate violation. (Exhibit 1 at 22:32:54 and at 22:33:15). However, the plain-view observations by Manuel and Bowling of used baggies with suspected narcotics residue and [*4]unused packaging giving rise to continued investigation had already been made prior to Manuel's statements about not issuing a traffic ticket. (Exhibit 1, Manuel BWC, 22:31:54 - 22:32:15 and Bowling BWC 22:32:02 - 22:32:34).

Trooper Vargeson, who was positioned approximately 50 to 100 yards away as part of the coordinated GIVE deployment, had staged his vehicle down the street specifically to remain available for K-9 assistance while not crowding the stop unnecessarily. (Hearing Tr. [April 8] at 107—108). At 22:33:42, Bowling motioned to Vargeson with a hand gesture — a "come here" wave — to bring the K-9 forward. (Exhibit 1; Hearing Tr. [March 26] at 69, 90; Hearing Tr. [April 8] at 108). With Bowling having moved away from the passenger side of the vehicle to wave Vargeson forward, Gregory independently shined his own flashlight into the same rear compartment area and made his own confirmatory plain-view observation of the same contents Bowling had just observed. (Exhibit 1 at 22:34:11—22:34:14). Vargeson drove forward and the K-9 exterior sniff commenced at 22:34:25 — less than 43 seconds after Bowling's hand wave and 11 seconds after Gregory's independent confirmatory observation. (Exhibit 1 at 22:34:25). Vargeson testified that he saw "Trooper Bowling wave me up towards the traffic stop," and he understood the hand signal from Bowling — who was working alongside Manuel and Gregory — as effectively a request from the officers that a K-9 search was being requested. (Hearing Tr. [April 8] at 108, 111—112). This is entirely consistent with how coordinated multi-agency details operate in practice.

It is also worth noting that at no time did any officer draw a weapon. The tone of the investigation remained restrained and conversational throughout, notwithstanding defendant's evident argumentativeness and agitation. (Exhibit 1).

K-9 Rowe is a certified narcotics-detection dog who is recertified annually and, as of December 2025, was currently certified. Rowe is trained to detect narcotics. Notably, Rowe is specifically not trained to detect the odor of cannabis — indeed, cannabis odor is used as a negative proof in his annual certification testing, meaning a dog that alerts on cannabis fails certification — thereby ensuring that any positive alert reflects the presence of non-cannabis narcotics. (Hearing Tr. [April 8] at 106). Rowe conducted an exterior counterclockwise sweep of the vehicle. At 22:34:40 — fifteen seconds after the initial canine sniff commenced — Rowe exhibited a change of behavior, including a head snap, consistent with detecting a narcotics odor and gave a positive alert by scratching at the trunk area. (Exhibit 1 at 22:34:40; Hearing Tr. [April 8] at 109). After Rowe's positive alert, officers conducted a full search of the vehicle. Throughout the canine deployment and ensuing search, defendant had become increasingly argumentative and was observed by Bowling on his cell phone directing additional people to the scene, with bystanders arriving during the course of the stop. (Hearing Tr. [March 26] at 90—91). The search yielded, among other items, a significant quantity of methamphetamine and other controlled substances concealed within hollowed-out book safes in the rear seat, cash, pills, and additional packaging materials.

From Deputy Manuel's and Trooper Bowling's nearly simultaneous plain-view observations of baggies with apparent narcotics residue to Bowling waving Trooper Vargeson forward took about one minute. Within approximately 40 seconds of that wave, the exterior K-9 sniff began. The entire sequence — from initial contact between Manuel and defendant at 22:30:58 to the positive K-9 alert at 22:34:40 — consumed less than four minutes.

II. The Traffic Stop for a Violation of VTL § 402 was Lawful

The Court credits Deputy Manuel's testimony that she personally observed an objectively obstructed rear license plate in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 402, thereby providing lawful authority to initiate the traffic stop irrespective of any subjective investigative interest arising from the ongoing GIVE-detail operation. The body-worn camera footage and dashcam footage objectively (and independently) confirm the V.T.L. § 402 as well. (Exhibit 1; Exhibit L).

A traffic stop is lawful where police possess probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, regardless of the officer's subjective motivation. People v. Robinson, 97 NY2d 341 (2001). The Vehicle and Traffic Law provides "an objective grid upon which to measure probable cause justifying a stop." Id., at 355. Subjective intentions "play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." Id., at 349, quoting Whren v. United States, 517 US 806 (1996). See, People v. Hinshaw, 35 NY3d 427, 430 (2020) (an automobile stop "is a seizure implicating constitutional limitations" and is lawful only when "based on probable cause that a driver has committed a traffic violation.") The relevant constitutional inquiry is not whether officers subjectively hoped to investigate defendant for unrelated criminal activity, but whether an objectively valid Vehicle and Traffic Law violation was observed in their presence.

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 402 requires that license plates remain unobstructed. In People v Jones, the Third Department upheld a traffic stop where a license plate bracket covered "about an inch to an inch and a half of the bottom portion of the license plate," including the words "Empire State" and the area where inspection-sticker or commercial-vehicle information appeared. People v. Jones, 190 AD3d 1013, 1014-1015 (3d Dept 2021). The Court rejected the argument that no violation existed merely because the plate numbers themselves remained readable, explaining that the statute reflects legislative intent that no portion of a license plate be obstructed — not merely the alphanumeric identifiers — because the Legislature's repeated references to "number plates" demonstrate that, had it intended to prohibit only obstruction of the numbers themselves, it could have done so explicitly. Id. at 1015. The First Department has similarly upheld a stop where a license plate frame obscured part of the words "Garden State" appearing on a New Jersey plate. People v. Dula, 198 AD3d 463 (1st Dept 2021). As the First Department further observed, "[p]robable cause to believe that the Vehicle and Traffic Law has been violated provides an objectively reasonable basis for the police to stop a vehicle and . . . there is no exception for infractions that are subjectively characterized as 'de minimis.'" Dula, 198 AD3d at 464, quoting People v. Pealer, 20 NY3d 447, 457 n 2 (2013). The ubiquitous nature of dealer-frame license plate obstructions does not render such violations exempt from enforcement.

Here, Deputy Manuel credibly testified, and all of the video and photographic evidence conclusively established, that defendant's rear license plate dealer frame almost completely covered the word "Excelsior." (Hearing Tr. [March 26] at 28; Exhibit L). Under Jones and Dula, these observations supplied an objectively lawful basis for the traffic stop.

Even assuming arguendo that the precise application of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 402 to these facts is subject to competing interpretations, the stop was nonetheless supported by an objectively reasonable interpretation of the statute under People v. Guthrie, 25 NY3d 130 (2015). The relevant inquiry is not whether the officer ultimately proved correct as a matter of statutory interpretation, but whether her belief that a Vehicle and Traffic Law violation had [*5]occurred was objectively reasonable. Id., at 135—136. The Court finds that it plainly was. Accordingly, the initial traffic stop was lawful.

III. Founded Suspicion Justified the Exterior K-9 Sniff Without Impermissibly Prolonging the Stop

Under New York law, a canine sniff of the exterior of a lawfully stopped vehicle constitutes a search under article I, § 12 of the State Constitution requiring "founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." People v. Devone, 15 NY3d 106, 113 (2010). Founded suspicion is a lesser standard than probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Because there is a "diminished expectation of privacy attributed to individuals and their property when traveling in an automobile," law enforcement need only possess founded suspicion before conducting a canine sniff of the exterior of a lawfully stopped vehicle. Devone, at 113, quoting People v. Yancy, 86 NY2d 239, 246 (1995).

At the same time, a lawful traffic stop may not be prolonged beyond the time reasonably necessary to complete the mission of the stop absent additional justification. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 US 348, 350—351 (2015). Where, however, circumstances arising during the ongoing stop furnish police with founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, the stop may be extended beyond its original purpose and police may conduct a canine sniff of the vehicle's exterior. People v. Blandford, 190 AD3d 1033, 1034—1035 (3d Dept 2021), affd 37 NY3d 1062 (2021); People v. Almenteros, 214 AD3d 1027 (3d Dept 2023).

The defense argues that once Deputy Manuel stated she did not intend to issue a traffic ticket, the mission of the stop was complete and any further detention — including the canine sniff — became constitutionally impermissible. The body-worn-camera recording resolves the timing issue and refutes that argument.

The plain-view observations that transformed this encounter from a routine license-plate stop into an active narcotics investigation arose while the traffic stop remained fully underway and before any statement was made concerning the disposition of the traffic citation. Manuel independently observed a plastic baggie in the rear floorboard waste basket from the driver's side between approximately 22:31:54 and 22:32:15. (Exhibit 1). Bowling also, and nearly simultaneously with Manuel, observed through the rear passenger-side window under flashlight illumination and based upon his training and experience, used plastic baggies in the waste basket appearing to contain white powdery residue consistent with narcotic residue, together with clean unused clear plastic baggies visible through the partially opened black backpack on the rear seat. (Exhibit 1 at 22:32:02—22:32:34; Hearing Tr. [March 26] at 88). Bowling communicated those observations directly to defendant between approximately 22:32:35 and 22:32:40. Deputy Manuel's first statement that no ticket would issue did not occur until approximately 22:32:54, after these plain-view observations had already caused the investigation to evolve into a narcotics inquiry. No statement that a traffic ticket was not going to be issued could retroactively eliminate the objectively existing observations that had already transformed the nature of the encounter. The "mission of the stop" under Rodriguez is not measured by a single officer's isolated statement concerning a traffic citation; it is measured by the objective state of the investigation as a whole.

The chronology reflected on the body-worn-camera recordings further demonstrates that the canine deployment occurred as an immediate investigative response during the ongoing stop, not as a delayed extension of a completed encounter. Vargeson was not summoned from a [*6]distant location after the stop's mission had concluded. Rather, he had already been staged approximately 50 to 100 yards away as part of the coordinated GIVE deployment, monitoring the stop because K-9 availability was a standard feature of GIVE-detail operations. (Hearing Tr. [April 8] at 107). Bowling waved Vargeson forward at approximately 22:33:42 in direct response to the plain-view observations made moments earlier during the still-active roadside investigation. Trooper Gregory, who had been standing approximately 4 to 6 feet away during Manuel's and Bowling's observations and defendant's reaction thereto, independently confirmed the same contents with his own flashlight shortly before the canine sniff commenced. (Exhibit 1 at 22:34:11—22:34:14). The exterior K-9 sniff began at approximately 22:34:25.

The Court finds that these observations furnished founded suspicion of criminality afoot sufficient to justify the minimally intrusive exterior canine sniff. Officers who lawfully stop a vehicle are justified in the minimal intrusion of shining flashlights about the interior of the vehicle. People v. Wolf, 160 AD2d 1076, 1077 (3d Dept 1990). Here, three officers working the same GIVE detail independently observed the same plain-view evidence from multiple vantage points before the canine sniff began. Plastic baggies containing apparent white powdery residue are the "hallmark" of drug activity, and based upon his training and professional experience, Bowling reasonably believed the substance he observed to be narcotic residue. Wolf, at 1077.

The Court has reviewed People's Exhibit 2, a photograph of the waste basket taken following the search in improved lighting conditions. That photograph confirms the existence of the waste basket and its contents, depicting multiple crumpled clear plastic baggies consistent with used narcotics packaging. The founded-suspicion determination, however, rests upon what the officers reasonably observed in real time — at night, through tinted glass, under flashlight illumination — not upon what later investigation may reveal in hindsight. The Court recognizes that the baggies in the waste basket were not subsequently tested for narcotics residue and that the controlled substances ultimately recovered from the vehicle were found concealed elsewhere within hollowed-out book safes in the rear seat area. (Hearing Tr. [April 8] at 114—116). That fact does not diminish the constitutional significance of the officers' contemporaneous observations. The constitutional inquiry is not whether the officers ultimately proved correct in hindsight, but whether their observations, under the circumstances made, objectively supplied reasonable grounds for continued investigation. The Court finds that they did.

Those observations — used baggies with apparent narcotics residue together with unused packaging materials observed in plain view by multiple officers — independently and standing alone established founded suspicion of criminality afoot. The earlier suspicious interaction observed at the 7-Eleven parking lot and communicated over the Zello application and defendant's pronounced nervousness throughout the encounter (as observed by this Court upon independent review of the body-worn-camera recordings) further informed the totality of the circumstances confronting the officers. See Devone, 15 NY3d at 114 (defendant's "nervous behavior" may inform the founded suspicion analysis).

The defense's reliance upon People v. Dobson, 41 AD3d 496 (2d Dept 2007) and People v. Cureaux, 147 AD2d 493 (2d Dept 1989) is misplaced. In Dobson, the officer observed only generic plastic protruding from the defendant's waistband and offered no testimony concerning residue, visible contents, or distinctive narcotics-related characteristics. In Cureaux, the suspected narcotics were concealed entirely within opaque bags whose outward appearance disclosed nothing suggestive of contraband. Here, by contrast, trained officers observed in plain view used plastic baggies appearing to contain white powdery residue consistent with narcotic [*7]residue together with unused packaging materials visible through a partially opened backpack. These were specific and articulable observations made during a rapidly unfolding roadside encounter, not generalized suspicions untethered to observable facts.

Nor did the canine deployment impermissibly prolong the stop within the meaning of Rodriguez. The canine sniff occurred during the natural and ongoing progression of the roadside investigation and immediately followed observations that had already furnished founded suspicion of criminality afoot. The entire sequence from initial contact through the positive canine alert consumed less than four minutes. In Blandford, by comparison, the Third Department upheld a canine sniff deployed approximately nine minutes after the initial stop. Blandford, 190 AD3d at 1034—1035. Here, the canine sniff was not a delayed investigative detour following completion of the traffic stop; it was the immediate investigative response to observations made during the still-active encounter.

The fellow officer rule further reinforces this conclusion. Under the fellow officer rule, even if an officer lacks personal knowledge sufficient to establish the requisite level of suspicion, the officer's action will be lawful if taken "upon the direction of or as a result of communication with a superior or fellow officer or another police department provided that the police as a whole were in possession of information sufficient" to justify that action. People v. Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99, 113 (1996), quoting People v. Horowitz, 21 NY2d 55, 60 (1967). The "fellow officer rule has been employed in a variety of circumstances and through the use of various modes of communication." People v. Rosario, 78 NY2d 583, 588 (1991). Where officers operate as part of a coordinated multi-agency detail, communication between officers may be inferred from coordinated joint police activity. Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d at 113—114.

The defense's reliance upon People v. Palacios, 2026 NY Slip Op 02360 (Ct App 2026) is unpersuasive. In Palacios, a detective created an internal probable-cause "I-card" for the defendant based on a witness identification, but the actual arresting officers did not testify at the suppression hearing, the I-card was never entered into evidence, its contents were never established, and no evidence showed whether the arresting officers were even aware it existed. The Court of Appeals held suppression was required because the People failed to prove that the arresting officers received and relied upon the information allegedly communicated by the I-card. In doing so, however, Palacios reaffirmed rather than limited Ramirez-Portoreal, identifying it as the paradigm for permissible inference of communication where officers "were working together on a drug interdiction assignment, [ ] left the roof together, drove around the block in one car, and [ ] when they arrived at defendant's location [the arresting officer] exited the car and immediately detained defendant" and "[n]o other inference may be drawn from these facts but that [the arresting officer] was acting at the direction of, or upon knowledge shared by, [the first officer]." Palacios, 2026 NY Slip Op 02360, at *3, quoting Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d at 114. The present case is akin to Ramirez-Portoreal, not to Palacios. Manuel, Bowling, and Gregory were working the same GIVE detail, standing within several feet of each other and of the defendant and his vehicle, while simultaneously making plain-view observations. No relay of information across distance was required. Vargeson had been monitoring the stop from his nearby staging position, was aware of the earlier Zello communications, and understood from Bowling's hand signal that his fellow officers actively investigating the vehicle had determined canine assistance was warranted.

This Court confirmed from its review of the body-worn-camera recordings (Exhibit 1) that, just as Bowling and Vargeson described, Bowling directed Vargeson to come forward with [*8]a hand wave in order to commence the canine exterior sniff seconds after he made his plain-view observations of the baggies with suspected narcotics residue. No other inference may be drawn from these facts but that Vargeson was "acting at the direction of, or upon knowledge shared by," the officers whose observations justified the canine deployment. Id.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the officers possessed founded suspicion of criminality afoot sufficient to justify the immediate exterior canine sniff of defendant's vehicle and that the canine deployment did not impermissibly prolong the traffic stop under the totality of the circumstances.

IV. The K-9 Alert Supplied Probable Cause for the Vehicle Search

A positive alert by a properly trained and currently certified narcotics-detection canine supplies probable cause to search a vehicle. People v. Devone, 15 NY3d 106 (2010). Following the lawful canine deployment, K-9 Rowe positively alerted to the presence of narcotics at the rear of defendant's vehicle at 22:34:40, fifteen seconds into the exterior sweep. (Exhibit 1 at 22:34:40; Hearing Tr. [April 8] at 106, 109). Rowe exhibited a change of behavior (a head snap) followed by his trained positive alert of scratching at the trunk area. Consequently, K-9 Rowe's positive alert furnished probable cause to conduct the ensuing vehicle search under the "automobile exception to the warrant requirement." People v. Galak, 81 NY2d 463, 467 (1993).

The Court concludes:

(1) the traffic stop was supported by probable cause, i.e., a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 402;

(2) officers possessed founded suspicion of criminality afoot which authorized the exterior canine sniff, which occurred without any unlawful prolongation of the stop; and

(3) K-9 Rowe's positive alert supplied probable cause to search the vehicle under the automobile exception.

Defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence is denied in all respects.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence is DENIED in its entirety, and it is further

ORDERED that the defendant and counsel are required to appear before the Court for further proceedings on Tuesday June 9, 2026 at 11:00 a.m.

Ithaca, New York

May 18, 2026

Hon. Scott A. Miller

Tompkins County Court Judge