People v C.J.

Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County

Decided on May 21, 2026

CR-038842-25NY

Ilona B. Coleman, J.

The defense moves this court to find the People's certificate of compliance (COC) invalid pursuant to CPL § 245.50(1) and subsequently to dismiss pursuant to CPL §§ 30.30 (1) (b) and 170.30 (1) (e). Specifically, the defense argues that the People did not satisfy their discovery obligations under CPL § 245.20 in that they failed to timely produce body-worn camera (BWC) footage, activity logs, 911 and radio recordings, medical records, the complainant's criminal record, and records related to law enforcement misconduct, complete text messages between the complainant and the People, and a complete police witness list. In opposition, the People argue that some of these materials are not discoverable and that, regardless of any discovery defects, they exercised due diligence prior to filing their COC.

Overall, the People have not demonstrated that they "exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide" discoverable materials to the defense (CPL 245.50 [6]). As a result, their COC was invalid, and they have exceeded their allowable speedy trial time (People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 211 [2023]; CPL 30.30 [1] [b]). Accordingly, the case must be dismissed (CPL 170.30 [1] [e]).

I. Relevant Facts

The defendant is charged with violating PL § 120.00 (1) and related offenses on December 18, 2025, for allegedly striking the complainant, causing physical injury. On December 23, 2025, the defendant was arrested, and the People filed a criminal complaint. On December 24, 2025, she was arraigned on the complaint, and the case was adjourned to February 10, 2026, for conversion.

On February 10, 2026, the People were not ready for trial. They had not converted the complaint and had not fulfilled their initial discovery obligations. The case was adjourned to March 30, 2026, for conversion.

On March 18, 2026, the People produced discovery and filed and served a COC, a superseding information (SSI), and a certificate of readiness (COR).

On March 23, 2026, defense counsel emailed the People a list of allegedly outstanding [*2]discovery. The parties proceeded to confer regarding outstanding discovery over the next several days, and the People produced additional discovery on March 26 and March 30, 2026.

On March 30, 2026, the defense informed the court that they intended to file a motion challenging the People's COC. On April 21, 2026, the defense filed their motion; on May 6, 2026, the People filed their opposition; and on May 14, 2026, the defense filed their reply.

II. Validity of the People's COC

The defense argues that the People's August 13, 2025 COC was invalid. The court will first examine the alleged discovery violations individually (see People v Lodgson-McCray, 88 Misc 3d 1212[A] [Crim Ct, NY County 2026]), then the court will examine any violations in the context of "the totality of the [People's] efforts to comply with the provisions of [Article 245]" to determine whether the People "exercised due diligence and acted in good faith" in discharging their duties (CPL 245.50 [5], [6]; see also People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 211 [2023]).

1. The People's Compliance with CPL § 245.20

CPL § 245.20 defines the People's discovery obligations before filing a COC. The People must "disclose to the defendant" several categories of "material and information in the possession, custody or control of the prosecution" (CPL 245.20 [1]). The defense argues that the People did not satisfy these obligations in that they failed to timely produce body-worn camera (BWC) footage, activity logs, 911 and radio recordings, complete text messages between the complainant and the People, a complete police witness list, medical records, the complainant's criminal record, and records related to law enforcement misconduct. The court will examine each of these alleged lapses in turn.

Undisputedly Discoverable Materials

The defense argues, and the People do not dispute, that the BWC footage, activity logs, 911 and radio run recordings, text messages, and police witness list are discoverable (see CPL 245.20 [1] [d], [e], [g]). The People argue in opposition that these discovery lapses do not reflect negatively on their overall diligence, which the court will discuss in section II.2, infra.

Medical Records

The defense next argues that the People failed to produce the complainant's medical records, discoverable under CPL § 245.20 (1) (e) and (j). However, the People allege, and the defense does not dispute, that they did not possess the records at the time they filed their COC. Indeed, they did not issue a subpoena for the records until March 18, 2026, the day they filed their COC. Because the medical records undisputedly were not in the People's actual or constructive possession, their nondisclosure does not affect the COC's validity (see People v Haggan, — NYS3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op 02462, at *1 [1st Dept 2026] [holding that materials "in the possession and control of third parties not under the prosecution's direction or control" are not "part of [the People's] initial discovery obligation"]).

Records Related to the Complainant's Criminal Conviction

The defense next argues that the People failed to produce adequate information related to the complainant's conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor, discoverable under CPL § 245.20 (1) (p). In opposition, the People argue that, like the medical records, records related to the complainant's non-NY State conviction were not in their actual or constructive possession and thus fall outside their initial discovery obligation under Haggan (2026 NY Slip Op 02462, at *1). In this case, however, the People have not established that Haggan applies because they have not made a sufficient showing that the complainant's "complete record of judgments of conviction" was not within their actual or constructive possession when they filed their COC [*3](CPL 245.20 [1] [p]).

First, it appears that the People did not provide the defense with all the information in their actual possession. The initial disclosure only provided the complainant's current name, the name of the statute she was convicted of violating, and the year of her arrest. Just a week later, after an inquiry from the defense, the People provided additional information from the complainant's "FBI report," which included (along with other information) a different name under which she was convicted. The People's affirmation does not state when they received the FBI report, and they do not deny that it was in their possession at the time they filed their COC. The court infers from the People's silence that they in fact possessed the FBI report when they filed their COC.

Further, the information from the FBI report is not a "complete record" of the complainant's "judgments of conviction" as required under CPL § 245.20 (1) (p), and the People have not established that additional records are outside their possession. The court takes judicial notice of the fact that the complainant is a registered sex offender. She is a resident of New York City, and the NYPD is the "law enforcement agency having jurisdiction" over her. In that capacity, the NYPD is likely to possess further records related to the complainant's conviction (see Corrections Law 168-a [4]). Materials in NYPD's possession are constructively in the People's possession (CPL 245.20 [2]).

Also, the complainant's records are likely in the possession of the New York Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS). In addition to administering the sex offender registry, DCJS acts as a statewide repository for criminal record information. DCJS is charged with providing law enforcement agencies "access to information . . . [including] criminal record[s]" (Exec Law 837 [5]). District attorneys' offices are among the "qualified agencies" entitled to access DCJS's criminal record database (Exec Law 835 [9]). Because DCJS has a statutory duty to provide the District Attorney's Office with criminal record information as needed, they are — at least in this limited role — "under the prosecution's direction or control" within the meaning of CPL § 245.20 (1). Reading the statute otherwise would be contrary to the legislature's clear intent. CPL § 245.20 (1) (p) requires disclosure of "[a] complete record of judgments of conviction for all defendants and all persons designated as potential prosecution witnesses" (id. [emphasis added]), but district attorneys' offices prosecutors do not maintain such broad records. If DCJS records were not constructively in the People's control — and thus, following Haggan, were outside the People's initial discovery obligation — the records produced in initial discovery would never be "complete," as required by the legislature (CPL 245.20 [1] [p]).

Both NYPD and DCJS likely possess additional discoverable records related to the complainant's criminal record, which would mean that those records are constructively in the People's possession (CPL 245.20 [1], [2]). The failure to take any steps to obtain and produce those records was a violation of the People's discovery obligations.

Law Enforcement Misconduct Materials

Finally, the defendant argues that the People failed to disclose materials related to allegations that PO Christian Tineo falsely swore to facts contained in a search warrant affidavit. The defense argues that the materials are discoverable pursuant to CPL § 245.20 (1) (k) (i), (iii), and (iv). However, the People argue that they did not violate their discovery obligations for three reasons: (1) the portions of the material they disclosed satisfied their discovery obligations; (2) none of the material is discoverable under subparagraph (k) (iv) because the People have decided not to call PO Tineo as a witness; and (3) none of the material is discoverable under [*4]subparagraphs (k) (i) and (iii) because PO Tineo did not play an "integral" role in the case.

First, at the time the People filed their COC, they intended to call PO Tineo as a witness, as indicated in their automatic disclosure form (ADF). The People were therefore obligated to produce "[a]ll evidence and information" that "tends to . . . impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness" before filing their COC (CPL 245.20 [1] [k] [iv] [emphasis added]). A witness swearing falsely in court tends to impeach (People v Coley, 240 AD3d 122, 136 [2nd Dept 2025]). While the exact scope of required disclosure is not clear from the statute, a summary is insufficient (Matter of Jayson C., 200 AD3d 447, 448-449 [1st Dept 2021]; People v Rodriguez, 77 Misc 3d 23, 25 [App Term, 1st Dept 2022]; see also Coley, 240 AD3d at 135 [requiring production of "underlying documents related to the case" in which false testimony occurred]). The People's disclosure letter falls short of this standard. The People produced only an unsigned summary that neither identifies its author nor attributes the allegations to anyone other than an unnamed ADA. Additional documents that would "tend to impeach" PO Tineo almost certainly exist. If the unnamed ADA first made these allegations in an email or an internal memorandum, for example, that email or memorandum would be discoverable. Also, the People likely possess documents from the underlying case that contradict the falsely sworn affidavit, but there is no indication that they made any attempt to gather and produce such evidence.

Next, the People's post-COC decision not to call PO Tineo to testify is irrelevant to the question of whether their failure to produce this material was a discovery violation in the first instance. However, it is relevant to some of the CPL § 245.50 (5) (a) factors for assessing diligence and will be discussed in section II.2 below.

Finally, the court need not consider whether the materials are also discoverable under CPL § 245.20 (1) (k) (i) and (iii). This is a close, fact-intensive question, and its resolution is ultimately irrelevant to the court's final determination. Even assuming the materials are not discoverable under those subparagraphs, the People failed to exercise due diligence (see section II.2, infra).

2. The People's Diligence and Reasonableness

Even where the People have not satisfied all of their discovery obligations, their COC will not be invalidated where they have "exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide the material" (CPL 245.50 [6]; see also Bay, 41 NY3d at 211). To determine whether the People acted diligently, the court must consider:

[T]he efforts made by the prosecutor to comply with [their discovery obligations]; the volume of discovery provided and the volume of discovery outstanding; the complexity of the case; whether the prosecutor knew that the belatedly disclosed or allegedly missing material existed; the explanation for any alleged discovery lapse; the prosecutor's response when apprised of any allegedly missing discovery; whether the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied; whether the omission was corrected; whether the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention; and whether the prosecution's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial.

(CPL § 245.50 [5] [a]; see also Bay, 41 NY3d at 212). Applying this standard, the People have not met their burden of showing that they exercised due diligence.

Most importantly, the People's efforts to obtain and produce discovery prior to filing their COC were insufficient. The People's affirmation leaves the court wondering how the People produced any discovery to the defense at all. According to their affirmation, the People did not request BWC footage until March 17, 2026 — 83 days after the defendant's arraignment and one day before they filed their COC, without having obtained all the BWC footage. The People provide no details about how or when they obtained information about the complainant's criminal record, and they provide no details about how or when they learned of PO Tineo's impeachment materials. They do not claim to have made any effort to track down additional records related to those disclosures. Other than a request for 911 calls, a couple of witness conversations, and a request for "any and all paperwork" — the affirmation does not say to whom that request was made — the People seem to have done remarkably little to obtain discovery in the early days of this case. The People did not produce any discovery until the 84th day after the defendant's arraignment, a completely unexplained violation of CPL § 245.10 (1) (a) (ii).

The People's claim that they attempted to contact the arresting officer 13 times to obtain missing discovery is not impressive where only two of the attempts preceded their COC. The court is troubled that after a single conversation with the arresting officer, in which he "promised to turn over" outstanding discovery (People's affirmation, p. 15), the People filed a COC the same day without receiving the outstanding discovery. As this court has observed before, "[t]he People cannot say that they have made 'reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain' discoverable material when the material is in their constructive possession and they have not, at minimum, (1) allowed sufficient time for their normal discovery procedures to bring that material into their actual possession, and (2) determined why the normal procedures were not producing results" (Lodgson-McCray, 88 Misc 3d 1212[A], *4). Overall, the People's affirmation suggests that the People filed their COC not out of a sincere belief that they had satisfied their obligations, but out of a desire to stop the speedy trial clock.

Especially considering the simplicity of the case — a misdemeanor assault with one complainant, one defendant, and no significant search and seizure issues — the amount of discovery that remained outstanding when the People filed their COC was significant. The discoverable material that had not been turned over included 911 calls, radio runs, BWC footage, activity logs, text messages from the complainant, records related to the complainant's criminal record, and impeachment materials for PO Tineo. These undisclosed materials are not duplicative of other discovery and are not insignificant. The undisclosed BWC footage contains the complainant's first and likely most detailed account of the incident. Information about the complainant's criminal history is also essential in this case, which turns on the complainant's credibility. Overall, the defense would not have been able to properly prepare for trial without the missing discovery.

For much of the outstanding discovery, the People offer little explanation for the delay. With respect to the BWC footage and activity logs, the primary explanation appears to be that the People did not attempt to obtain them until it was too late. There is no indication in the People's affirmation that they made any effort to obtain the materials until they sent a text message to the arresting officer 83 days after the defendant's arraignment. The arresting officer's lack of responsiveness only explains the post-COC delay, not the People's initial failure to obtain and produce the discovery. The People's failure to produce the 911 call and radio run recordings is largely explained by the NYPD's Tapes and Records backlog, but the People do not explain [*5]why they could not have requested expedited production (which was ultimately how they obtained the recordings) at an earlier date. Nor do they explain what efforts, if any, their office has made to address the Tapes and Records backlog (see CPL 245.55 [1]).

For the impeachment material and the complainant's criminal record, the People again offer little explanation. The case in which PO Tineo allegedly falsely swore is sealed, but that neither explains nor excuses the People's failure. The People may not hide constitutionally mandated disclosures behind a state sealing statute. In fact, the People disclosed a portion of the false affidavit, which they could not have done if they believed that the sealing statute prohibited all production of records related to the case. The People's decision not to call PO Tineo to testify negated their post-COC obligation to rectify the discovery lapse, but it does not cure their failure to diligently obtain and produce the materials in the first place. For the complainant's criminal record, the People do not attempt to offer an explanation, asserting simply that the material is outside their possession. But the People reached that conclusion prematurely. In fact, it seems very likely that further discoverable materials were in their constructive possession, but the People were not motivated to find them. In the context of Giglio material, this lack of effort is disturbing.

The court agrees with the People that their post-COC efforts to obtain missing discovery were significant, and they responded promptly to defense counsel's discovery objections. However, the ultimate question is whether the People acted in good faith and with due diligence before they certified compliance (see CPL 245.50 [1]). Post-COC efforts will not excuse a lack of pre-COC diligence (Bay, 41 NY3d at 212).

On balance, considering all of the factors set forth in CPL § 245.50 (5) (a), the court finds that the People did not "exercise[] due diligence and act[] in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide the material required to be disclosed pursuant to [CPL § 245.20]" prior to filing their March 18, 2026 COC (CPL 245.50 [6]). The defendant's motion to deem the People's COC invalid is therefore GRANTED.

III. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to CPL § 30.30

In this case, in which the defendant is charged with an A misdemeanor and no felonies, the People must be ready for trial within ninety days of the commencement of the criminal action (CPL 30.30 [1] [b]). Because the People's March 18, 2026 COC was invalid, their COR filed on the same date was illusory (see Bay, 41 NY3d at 213). The People are therefore charged for the time from the defendant's arraignment on December 24, 2025, to the defendant's March 30, 2026 court appearance, a total of 96 days. This exceeds the People's 90-day limit, and the defendant's motion to dismiss is therefore GRANTED.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: May 21, 2026

New York, NY

Ilona B. Coleman, J.C.C.