People v I.Y.
2026 NY Slip Op 50769(U)
May 21, 2026
Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County
Ilona B. Coleman, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.
The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff,
v
I.Y., Defendant.
Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County
Decided on May 21, 2026
CR-005382-26NY
Alvin L. Bragg, Jr., District Attorney, New York County (Morgan Woodbridge of counsel), for plaintiff.
The Legal Aid Society, New York City (Molly Ketterer of counsel), for defendant.
Ilona B. Coleman, J.
[*1]The defense moves this court to dismiss pursuant to CPL §§ 30.30 (1) (c) and 170.30 (1) (e). The parties agree that 70 days are chargeable to the People, but they disagree regarding how much speedy trial time remains. The defendant is charged with violating VTL § 600 (2) (a), which can be charged as either a class A or B misdemeanor (see VTL § 600 [2] [c]). If a class A misdemeanor, the People have 90 days of speedy trial time, and the motion must be denied (CPL 30.30 [1] [b]). If a class B misdemeanor, the People have 60 days, and the motion must be granted (CPL 30.30 [1] [c]). Here, because the information unambiguously "accuse[s]" the defendant of only a class B misdemeanor, the motion to dismiss is granted (CPL 30.30 [1] [c]; see also CPL 100.15 [2]).
Whether CPL § 30.30 (1) (b) or (c) applies is a question of statutory interpretation turning on whether the defendant is "accused of" leaving the scene of an accident in violation of VTL § 600 (2) (a) as an A or B misdemeanor.FN1 Following several trial court decisions, the parties largely focus their arguments on whether the factual part of the superseding information (SSI) alleges only a failure to display a license and insurance card or a more serious violation of the statute (see People v Ghorab, 51 Misc 3d 1225[A] [Crim Ct, Queens County 2016]; People v Auguste, 64 Misc 3d 1240[A] [Crim Ct, Queens County 2019]; People v Lopez, 80 Misc 3d 1215[A] [Crim Ct, NY County 2023]).
This approach is misguided. It is the offense actually charged — not an offense that [*2]could hypothetically have been charged given the factual allegations — that determines which subparagraph of CPL § 30.30 (1) applies (see People v Cooper, 98 NY2d 541, 546 [2002] [explaining that CPL 30.30 [1] "correlates the applicable time period to the highest grade of offense charged in a criminal action"]). Under the CPL, a person is only charged with an offense specifically designated in the accusatory instrument (see CPL 100.15 [1] [complaint or information "must contain an accusatory part and a factual part"], [2] [the accusatory part "must designate the offense or offenses charged"]). In fact, a complaint or information that fails to designate the offense or offenses charged is facially insufficient and subject to dismissal (CPL 100.40 [1] [a], [4] [a]).
Indeed, the primary purpose of an accusatory instrument is to "provid[e] the defendant with fair notice of the accusations made against him," which every defendant is entitled to under both the U.S. and the New York Constitutions (People v Iannone, 45 NY2d 589, 594 [1978]). A complaint or information that forces the defendant to guess whether he is charged with a class A or B misdemeanor is both constitutionally and statutorily defective (see People v McGuire, 5 NY2d 523, 526 [1959] ["It is fundamental that a person accused of crime is not required to speculate as to what crime, if any, the information charges, for he is entitled to know in advance of trial what crime he is called upon to defend"]). For the purposes of CPL § 30.30 (1), the question is not what the People intended to charge or even what the facts would support. Rather, the question is what charge or charges are clearly designated in the accusatory portion of the instrument.
Applying these principles to this case, the court finds that the defendant is "accused of" violating VTL § 600 (2) (a) as a class B misdemeanor, and therefore CPL § 30.30 (1) (c) applies. The accusatory portions of the complaint and the SSI both state that the offense charged is "Leaving the Scene of an Incident with Mere Failure to Exhibit Documents, with Personal Injury," which corresponds with the class B offense (see VTL 600 [2] [c]). The accusatory portion further alleges that the defendant "failed to exhibit his license and insurance identification card for the vehicle to the injured person and to a police officer." Again, this tracks the statutory language relevant to the class B offense (see VTL 600 [2] [c]). Nothing in the accusatory portion of the SSI indicates that the defendant is charged with a class A misdemeanor. Nor does the SSI provide the defendant with sufficient notice that the prosecution will attempt to prove that he committed a class A misdemeanor at trial. Thus, the court concludes that the SSI unambiguously charges the defendant with violating VTL § 600 (2) (a) as a class B misdemeanor.
Because the defendant is charged with a B misdemeanor and no A misdemeanors or felonies, the People must be ready for trial within 60 days of the commencement of the criminal action (CPL 30.30 [1] [b]). The parties agree that 70 days are chargeable to the People. This exceeds the People's 60-day limit, and the defendant's motion to dismiss is therefore GRANTED.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.
Dated: May 21, 2026
New York, NY
Ilona B. Coleman, J.C.C.
Footnotes
A violation of VTL § 600 (2) (a) "resulting solely from the failure of an operator to exhibit his or her license and insurance identification card" is a class B misdemeanor, while any other violation is a class A misdemeanor (VTL 600 [2] [c]).