KB v CP

Supreme Court, Richmond County

Decided on April 16, 2026

Index No. REDACTED

Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion #001) numbered 23-43 were read on this motion. The following papers were considered on the motion by defendant KMD for an order, pursuant to CPLR § 3211 [a] [1], [5], and [7], dismissing the Complaint insofar as asserted against her: Notice of Motion, dated March 23, 2026; Affirmation of KMD, Esq., dated March 20, 2026, with exhibits A through I annexed thereto; Memorandum of Law in Support; Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition, dated March 30, 2026; Plaintiff's Affirmation, dated March 30, 2026; and Defendant's Reply in Further Support, dated April 15, 2026.

Although the court set the matter down for oral argument on April 16, 2026, neither Plaintiff or her counsel appeared in court. No adjournment request was made, and efforts by the court clerk and this court's law clerk to reach the Plaintiff's counsel went unanswered. The court determined that taking the matter on submission without oral argument would be the most efficient way to proceed. Therefore, the matter is taken on submission alone.

Upon the foregoing papers, and after due deliberation, the motion is determined as follows.

II. Findings of Fact

This action arises out of the administration of the Estate of JR, deceased, and, more particularly, from plaintiff's claim that estate assets were not duly distributed to beneficiaries but were instead diverted to the benefit of the fiduciary. As framed by the pleadings and the motion practice, plaintiff KB is the decedent's granddaughter and a beneficiary of the Estate. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 25). Defendant CP is alleged to be the decedent's daughter and the Executrix of the Estate. (see id). Defendant KMD is an attorney who, through her law firm, represented the Estate and the fiduciary in her representative capacity. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 26). Plaintiff also names RMP III and VB as defendants. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 2).

JR executed a Last Will and Testament dated March 6, 2014. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 25). According to the papers, the Will provided that one-third of the Estate would pass to the decedent's daughter, CP; one-third to his son, MR; and one-third to certain grandchildren, including plaintiff. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 2 at ¶1). The papers [*2]further state that, at the time of the decedent's death, certain beneficiaries were minors and their shares were placed in trust, with CP acting in the capacity of trustee and fiduciary. (see id at ¶2). The Will is described in the motion papers as conferring upon the trustee authority to hold, manage, invest, and reinvest separate trust shares for the benefit of the named beneficiaries. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 25).

The record further reflects that KMD's law firm had a prior professional relationship with the decedent and, following his death, was retained in connection with the Estate. (see id; NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 26). The retainer, dated November 17, 2014, is described as having engaged the firm to represent the Estate and the fiduciary in connection with probate-related services, including obtaining valuations of estate assets, securing waivers and releases if required, preparing and filing a formal inventory of estate assets for the Surrogate's Court, and preparing an informal accounting. The moving papers also annex invoices for legal services rendered on behalf of the Estate. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 26; 27). On this record, those documents are relied upon by the movant to demonstrate both the existence and the scope of the engagement, namely, that KMD acted as counsel to the Estate and to CP in her representative capacity as fiduciary, rather than as counsel to plaintiff or to the body of beneficiaries at large. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 27).

The Estate, according to the submissions, included various parcels of Staten Island real property, among them XX University Place, XX Dongan Street, and XX Forest Avenue. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 28; 29; 30). The moving papers state that the buyers' down payments in those transactions were made payable to the firm's escrow or trust account and held there until closing, whereupon funds were disbursed in the customary course to satisfy liens, mortgages, taxes, adjustments, and closing costs. (see id). The papers further state that closing statements were prepared and that, with respect to the closings identified in the record, checks were made payable to the Estate and/or to CJ 823 LLC, which the Complaint describes as a real estate company, and those checks were thereafter given to CP, who, as fiduciary, bore responsibility for any further distribution. (see id). The record places the sales of XX University Place on December 11, 2015, XX Dongan Street on July 12, 2016, and XX Forest Avenue on April 12, 2019. (see id).

Plaintiff's core factual theory, as summarized in the moving papers and echoed in plaintiff's opposition, is that CP engaged in self-dealing and diverted estate proceeds to her own use rather than distributing them to the beneficiaries. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 2; 39). The Complaint alleges, in substance, that CP's residence went into foreclosure in or about March 2019 and that proceeds from the sale of the XX Forest Avenue property were used to satisfy or pay off the mortgage debt on that home, allegedly in the approximate amount of $600,000 and allegedly to the detriment of plaintiff and other beneficiaries. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 2). Plaintiff further alleges that KMD knew, or at the very least should have known, that estate assets were being misappropriated, and that KMD participated in, facilitated, or failed to prevent that alleged misuse. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 2; 26). The causes of action asserted against KMD sound in negligence, fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, and attorneys' fees related to fraud.

The motion record also contains documentary submissions upon which KMD relies to dispute plaintiff's factual premise that KMD acted as CP's personal attorney in connection with the foreclosure of CP's home. The moving papers refer to a stipulation discontinuing a foreclosure action against RMP and CP, and expressly contend that KMD did not handle that [*3]foreclosure matter. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 32). The moving papers additionally note that plaintiff commenced, in August 2025, a proceeding in Surrogate's Court seeking compulsory accounting and related relief, but that the petition in that proceeding was not served. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 33).

Plaintiff's opposition does not retreat from the central accusation that KMD knowingly participated in misconduct. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 39). Rather, the opposition insists that the pleading is to be construed liberally, that the Court must accept the factual allegations as true, and that the Complaint states viable claims because it alleges that KMD had knowledge of the fiduciary's obligations, participated in effecting sales of estate property, permitted the fiduciary to retain proceeds rather than distribute them, and thereby substantially assisted the wrongdoing. (see id). Plaintiff further argues that KMD owed a duty to third parties who relied upon her legal representation of the Estate, that the motion improperly seeks to resolve factual disputes in defendant's favor at the pleading stage, and that, at a minimum, discovery should be permitted. (see id). Plaintiff also requests leave to replead should the Court find any deficiency. (see id).

In reply, KMD argues that plaintiff's opposition does not cure the dispositive legal defects. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 43). The reply contends that plaintiff has failed to rebut the absence of any duty running from estate counsel to a beneficiary, has failed to plead fraud with the specificity CPLR § 3016 [b] requires, and cannot rely upon the prospect of future discovery to supply presently absent material facts. (see id). The reply further contends that plaintiff is attempting, for the first time in opposition, to inject a claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, a theory not pleaded in the Complaint and therefore not properly before the Court on this motion. (see id).

III. Conclusions of Law

The governing principles are settled, though their application requires some care. On a motion addressed to the sufficiency of a pleading under CPLR § 3211 [a] [7], the Court must accept the facts alleged as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether those facts fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]). The Court's task at that stage is not to decide whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the law recognizes a cause of action on the facts alleged (see EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11 [2005]; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268 [1977]). That said, the rule of liberal construction is not a license to overlook pleading defects of substance. A court need not accept bare legal conclusions, inherently incredible assertions, or factual claims flatly contradicted by documentary evidence (see Dinerman v Jewish Bd. of Family & Children's Servs., Inc., 55 AD3d 530 [2d Dept 2008]; Jennings v Metro. Transp. Auth., 226 AD3d 662 [2d Dept 2024]). Nor may a plaintiff stave off dismissal merely by expressing a hope that discovery will someday reveal the facts the pleading presently lacks, for the mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat the motion may be uncovered during discovery is insufficient to postpone determination of a facially deficient claim (see Clochessy v Gagnon, 58 AD3d 1008 [3d Dept 2009]; see also Cracolici v Shah, 127 AD3d 413 [1st Dept 2015]; Salameh v Yarkovski, 156 AD3d 659 [2d Dept 2017]).

A separate and equally important principle governs dismissal under CPLR § 3211 [a] [1] and [5]. Documentary evidence may warrant dismissal where it conclusively establishes a [*4]complete defense as a matter of law (see Shanghai Yongrun Inv. Mgt. Co. v Kashi Galaxy Venture Capital Co., 2021 NY Misc LEXIS 14235 [Sup Ct New York County 2021]). Likewise, dismissal is required where a claim is barred by the statute of limitations (see Hahn v Dewey & Leboeuf Liquidation Trust, 2015 NY Misc LEXIS 2888 [Sup Ct New York County 2015]). It is against that doctrinal background that the several causes of action must be examined.

A. The Negligence Claim

The negligence claim cannot survive. First, and dispositively, it is time-barred. A negligence claim is governed by the three-year limitations period set forth in CPLR § 214, and accrues when the injury occurs, not when it is discovered (see Nothnagle Home Sec. Corp. v Bruckner, Tillet, Rossi, Cahill & Assoc., 125 AD3d 1503 [4th Dept 2015]). Here, the wrongdoing alleged against KMD is tethered to discrete transactions occurring no later than 2019, most notably the April 2019 sale of 823 Forest Avenue and the alleged use of those proceeds in connection with CP's personal mortgage. Yet plaintiff did not commence this action until January 2026. No act of negligence within the three years preceding commencement is identified in the pleading, and no tolling doctrine is pleaded with factual support. To the extent plaintiff's theory might be read to invoke some continuing wrong, the moving papers correctly note that the conduct alleged consists of completed and discrete transactions, not a continuing course of wrongful conduct that would defer accrual (see Farina v Katsandonis, P.C., 2020 NY Misc LEXIS 786 [Sup Ct New York County 2020]). The negligence claim is therefore dismissed pursuant to CPLR § 3211 [a] [5].

Even were the negligence claim timely, it would nonetheless fail on the merits because the pleading does not establish the threshold element of duty. Under New York law, negligence requires duty, breach, damages, causation, and foreseeability (see Hyatt v Metro-North Commuter R.R., 16 AD3d 218 [1st Dept 2005]). Plaintiff's opposition labors to recast estate counsel's role as one giving rise to duties toward beneficiaries as foreseeable third parties. But the case law, and the documentary materials in the record, do not permit that transmutation.

It is well settled that an attorney-client relationship arises when a client contracts with an attorney for legal advice or services (see Matter of Priest v Hennessy, 51 NY2d 62 [1980]), and CPLR § 4503 [a] [2] expressly provides that, absent contrary agreement, no beneficiary of the estate is or shall be treated as the client of the attorney for the personal representative. The cases cited by the movant reinforce the point with particular clarity in the estate context: no beneficiary of an estate is treated as the client of the fiduciary's attorney (see Matter of Poster, 25 Misc 3d 780 [Sur Ct Bronx County 2009]), and an attorney representing the executor of an estate is generally not liable to estate beneficiaries absent fraud, collusion, or malicious acts (see Davis v Farrell Fritz, P.C., 201 AD3d 869 [2d Dept 2022]; Kramer v Belfi, 106 AD2d 615 [2d Dept 1984]). The fiduciary, not the fiduciary's lawyer, owes the fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries (see National Bank of North America v Duramark, Inc., 97 AD2d 816 [2d Dept 1983]). On this record, the retainer documents and invoices are consistent with that legal architecture. They establish representation of the Estate and the fiduciary in her representative role, not representation of plaintiff.

Plaintiff's insistence that KMD was CP's "personal attorney" does not alter the analysis. As the moving papers argue, and as the documentary submissions are offered to show, the pertinent representation was in connection with estate administration, probate, and the closing of [*5]estate properties. Representation of a fiduciary in a representative capacity does not, without more, create obligations to beneficiaries or to third parties generally (see Parker v Rogerson, 33 AD2d 284 [4th Dept 1970]). Nor does plaintiff allege payment of legal fees, a retainer, or any objective basis upon which plaintiff could reasonably have believed that KMD represented her interests (see First Hawaiian Bank v Russell & Volkening, Inc., 861 F Supp 233 [SD NY 1994]). Thus, the negligence claim founders not only on timeliness but on the absence of duty itself.

Nor does the pleading adequately allege control, participation, breach, or causation on KMD's part. The Complaint attributes the alleged self-dealing and non-distribution of funds to CP, the Executrix. Yet it does not allege that KMD possessed estate funds after closing in any discretionary sense, directed the fiduciary's distributions, determined the allocation of proceeds among beneficiaries, or exercised independent authority over estate assets. The moving papers describe a more circumscribed role: receipt of down payments into escrow, disbursement at closing to satisfy transactional obligations, preparation of closing statements, issuance of checks payable to the Estate and/or CJ 823 LLC, and delivery of those checks to the fiduciary. That circumscribed role is congruent with settled fiduciary law, which places the obligation to marshal assets, pay administration expenses, and distribute estate property upon the fiduciary (see Matter of Haberstich, 169 Misc 2d 543 [Sur Ct New York County 1996]; Matter of Kulukundis [Sigal], 2018 NY Misc LEXIS 2477 [Sur Ct New York County 2018]). An attorney who does not control or direct the disposition of funds cannot be held liable merely because a fiduciary later misuses them (see Muscara v Lamberti, 133 AD2d 362 [2d Dept 1987]). Knowledge, even if sufficiently pleaded, does not alone create liability absent control, direction, or participation in the alleged wrongdoing (see Utilisave, LLC v Fox Horan & Camerini, LLP, 2026 NY Misc LEXIS 100 [Sup Ct New York County 2026]). Here, the pleading alleges no concrete act by KMD constituting a negligent breach of a legally cognizable duty. The claim therefore fails independently under CPLR § 3211 [a] [7].

The deficiency in causation is equally fatal. A plaintiff must show not merely negligence in the air, but that defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the injury claimed (see Hain v Jamison, 28 NY3d 524 [2016]; Sheehan v City of New York, 40 NY2d 496 [1976]). The harm alleged here is the non-distribution or diversion of estate proceeds by the Executrix. Even accepting that allegation as true for pleading purposes, the direct and immediate causal actor identified by the Complaint is CP, not KMD. The chain plaintiff proposes depends upon the proposition that estate counsel's role in handling closings and issuing checks to the fiduciary transformed counsel into a guarantor of the fiduciary's future fidelity. The law does not countenance so elastic a theory. The conduct alleged against the fiduciary cannot be imputed to her attorney absent a properly pleaded basis for doing so, and none is alleged here. The Complaint does not set forth that KMD directed the misuse, instructed the fiduciary to withhold distributions, or made any determination as to who should receive estate funds and when. Accordingly, proximate causation is absent as a matter of pleading (see P.T. Bank Cent. Asia v Chinese Am. Bank, 301 AD2d 373 [1st Dept 2003]). The negligence cause of action must therefore be dismissed in all events.

B. Fraud

The fraud cause of action fares no better. Fraud is not pleaded by incantation. CPLR § 3016 [b] requires that the circumstances constituting the wrong be stated in detail. The elements [*6]remain familiar: a material misrepresentation or omission of fact, knowledge of falsity, intent to induce reliance, justifiable reliance, and damages (see Eurycleia Partners, LP v Seward & Kissel, LLP, 12 NY3d 553 [2009]). While a plaintiff need not prove the case at the pleading stage, the statute demands enough factual specificity to apprise the defendant of the complained-of conduct and to demonstrate that the claim is more than conjecture (see Pludeman v N. Leasing Sys., Inc., 10 NY3d 486 [2008]). The Complaint does not identify any actionable statement by KMD to plaintiff, any omission by KMD in the face of a duty to speak to plaintiff, any communication directed to plaintiff on which plaintiff acted, or any factual basis to infer that plaintiff justifiably relied on KMD to her detriment. The pleading does not allege when such a statement was made, to whom, in what context, or with what resulting change in position. Instead, it alleges in broad and generalized terms that KMD knew or should have known of CP's alleged misuse of estate assets. That is not the detailed pleading of fraud contemplated by CPLR § 3016 [b]. It is, rather, the sort of conclusory formulation New York courts routinely reject (see Edelman v Berman, 195 AD3d 995 [2d Dept 2021]; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Sinclair, 68 AD3d 914 [2d Dept 2009]; Orlando v Kukielka, 40 AD3d 829 [2d Dept 2007]).

The opposition papers do not rescue the fraud claim. Plaintiff invokes the favorable-inference standard of Leon and insists that KMD "substantially assisted" the fiduciary's misconduct. But even under Leon, the Court must ask whether the facts alleged fit within a cognizable legal theory; it need not accept a legal conclusion dressed in factual garb. The allegation of "substantial assistance" appears in the opposition as a characterization, not as a series of particularized supporting facts. Plaintiff does not identify a false statement by KMD; does not allege that KMD advised plaintiff of anything untrue; does not plead that KMD concealed a fact from plaintiff despite a duty to disclose; and does not plead reliance in the manner demanded by the cited cases. Indeed, the authorities cited in the moving papers show that reliance cannot be left abstract. A pleading that fails to allege that the plaintiff actually relied upon a specific misrepresentation of fact, and that such reliance was justifiable, is legally insufficient (Colasacco v Robert E. Lawrence Real Estate, 68 AD3d 706 [2d Dept 2009]; Ginsburg Dev. Cos., LLC v Carbone, 134 AD3d 890 [2d Dept 2015]; Matthews v Schusheim, 42 AD2d 217 [2d Dept 1973]; McMorrow v Dime Sav. Bank of Williamsburg, 48 AD3d 646 [2d Dept 2008]; Nabatkhorian v Nabatkhorian, 127 AD3d 1043 [2d Dept 2015]). Plaintiff has not pleaded those elements here. The fraud claim must therefore be dismissed pursuant to CPLR § 3211 [a] [7].

C. Conspiracy to Commit fraud

Once the fraud claim falls, the claim denominated as conspiracy to commit fraud necessarily falls with it. New York does not recognize civil conspiracy as an independent tort. Rather, the concept operates, if at all, only to connect a defendant to an underlying actionable wrong (see Agostini v Sobol, 304 AD2d 395 [1st Dept 2003]; Dickinson v Igoni, 76 AD3d 943 [2d Dept 2010]; Hoeffner v Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, 85 AD3d 457 [1st Dept 2011]; McSpedon v Levine, 158 AD3d 618 [2d Dept 2018]). Where the underlying fraud is not adequately pleaded, there is no underlying tort upon which the conspiracy allegation may stand. Here, plaintiff's conspiracy allegations add little beyond assertion. They do not supply the missing details of misrepresentation, reliance, or fraudulent agreement. They merely recast the same conclusory accusations in collective terms. Such pleading is insufficient as a matter of law.

D. Amendment of the Complaint

The Court also agrees with defendant that plaintiff may not amend the Complaint through the medium of opposition papers. The opposition refers to "aiding and abetting of Fiduciary Duty" and argues that KMD knowingly participated in fiduciary wrongdoing. But the Complaint, as described in both the moving and reply papers, asserts against KMD only negligence, fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, and attorneys' fees related to fraud. A new claim may not be smuggled into the case for the first time in opposition to a motion to dismiss (see Anderson v City of New York, 234 AD3d 902 [2d Dept 2025]). Even were the Court to overlook that procedural impropriety, the reply correctly observes that such a theory would require allegations that a fiduciary duty owed to plaintiff was breached, that defendant knowingly induced or participated in the breach, and that plaintiff sustained damage as a result (see Smallberg v Raich Ende Malter & Co., LLP, 140 AD3d 942 [2d Dept 2016]). The pleading described in this record does not set forth those elements with the requisite factual concreteness. This Court therefore disregards the newly advanced theory.

i. Discovery is Not a Substitute for Pleading

Plaintiff's invocation of discovery as a reason to deny dismissal is likewise unavailing. The Court is mindful that pre-answer motions should not be used to truncate potentially meritorious claims before they are fairly tested. But a plaintiff may not use discovery as a substitute for pleading. The reply is correct on that point. Where the facts necessary to state a claim are absent from the pleading itself, the mere possibility that discovery might later furnish them does not require denial of a CPLR § 3211 motion (see Cracolici v Shah, 127 AD3d 413 [1st Dept 2015]; Clochessy v Gagnon, 58 AD3d 1008 [3d Dept 2009]; Salameh v Yarkovski, 156 AD3d 659 [2d Dept 2017]; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268 [1977]). Here, the defects are not defects of evidentiary detail alone. They are defects of legal structure: the absence of duty, the expiration of limitations, the lack of pleaded reliance, and the failure to plead fraud with particularity. Discovery cannot create a duty where the law recognizes none.

ii. Attorney's Fees Related to Fraud

The claim for attorneys' fees related to fraud must likewise be dismissed. The American Rule governs, and attorneys' fees are not recoverable absent contractual provision, statutory authority, or a recognized exception (see Hooper Assoc. v AGS Computers, 74 NY2d 487 [1989]). The moving papers treat the fees claim as derivative of the failed fraud theory, and plaintiff's opposition does not supply an independent legal basis for such recovery against KMD. To the extent the claim depends upon the viability of the tort claims asserted against KMD, it falls with them (see Panish v Panish, 24 AD3d 642 [2d Dept 2005]; Sammy v Haupel, 170 AD3d 1224 [2d Dept 2019]; Small v Lorillard Tobacco Co., 94 NY2d 43 [1999]). The claim is therefore dismissed.

There remains plaintiff's request for leave to replead. CPLR § 3025 [b] embodies a liberal policy toward amendment, and plaintiff cites that provision in seeking leave should the Court find the present pleading deficient. Yet liberality is not compulsion. Leave may properly be denied where the proposed amendment would be palpably insufficient or where the [*7]underlying defect is substantive rather than merely formal (see McCaskey, Davies & Assoc., Inc. v N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 59 NY2d 755 [1983]). Here, the principal defects identified by this Court are not curable by rephrasing alone. The negligence claim is time-barred. The absence of any attorney-client relationship, and thus of any duty running from estate counsel to this beneficiary on the facts pleaded, is a matter of law grounded in both statute and precedent. The fraud claim fails not simply because it lacks polish, but because it lacks the essential building blocks of actionable fraud: a specific misrepresentation or omission directed to plaintiff and plaintiff's justifiable reliance thereon. The conspiracy claim is derivative and therefore necessarily fails. On this record, leave to replead would serve only to prolong motion practice without any showing of a viable amended claim grounded in the law and facts contained in the submitted papers. Leave is therefore denied.

The Court has not overlooked plaintiff's repeated exhortation that the Complaint be read indulgently and that all inferences be drawn in her favor. The Court has done so. But even the most generous reading of the pleading cannot erase the legal distinction between a fiduciary and the fiduciary's attorney, cannot revive a negligence claim commenced years after accrual, and cannot manufacture the particularized allegations of misrepresentation and reliance that a fraud claim demands. The law, faithfully applied to the facts herein, compels dismissal of the claims asserted against KMD.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the motion of defendant KMD to dismiss the Complaint insofar as asserted against her is GRANTED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that the sixth cause of action sounding in negligence, the seventh cause of action sounding in fraud, the eighth cause of action sounding in conspiracy to commit fraud, and the ninth cause of action seeking attorneys' fees related to fraud are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDUCE as against defendant KMD; and it is further

ORDERED that the Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety as against defendant KMD, WITH PREJUDICE; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff's request for leave to replead is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly in favor of defendant KMD; and it is further

ORDERED that any relief not expressly granted herein was considered and is DENIED.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: April 16, 2026

Staten Island, New York

HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR.

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT