DeSouza-Schachner v Stoykov

Supreme Court, Richmond County

Decided on April 29, 2026

Index No. 152818/2024

Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion No. 002) numbered 57-63, 65-68 were read on this motion. The following papers were considered on defendants' motion for leave [*2]to reargue and renew: Notice of Motion, dated March 20, 2026, Affirmation of John Cosgrove, Esq., in Support, dated March 20, 2026, and Exhibits annexed thereto; Affirmation of Frank R. Pumarejo-Martin, Esq., dated April 16, 2026 in Opposition; Affirmation of John Cosgrove, Esq., dated April 22, 2026, in Reply; and all prior proceedings and submissions referenced therein.

II. Findings of Fact

This action arises from a motor vehicle collision occurring on May 16, 2024, on Corson Avenue in Staten Island, New York. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 65 at ¶5). Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained when her vehicle came into contact with a vehicle operated by defendant Francisco J. Toledo Stoykov. (see id at ¶6).

The procedural posture of this matter is of particular significance. Plaintiff previously moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 59). That motion was fully submitted as of February 18, 2026, and by Decision and Order dated February 20, 2026, this Court granted plaintiff summary judgment on liability and struck defendants' First, Fourth, and Fifth affirmative defenses. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 60).

The instant motion, made within thirty days of service of notice of entry, seeks relief pursuant to CPLR § 2221 [d] and [e], namely, leave to reargue and renew the prior motion. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 58). Defendants contend that the Court overlooked or misapprehended material facts and that newly available evidence warrants a different determination. (see id).

Defendants' application is predicated upon an affirmation from defendant driver, Francisco J. Toledo Stoykov, dated March 18, 2026, and certain photographic depictions of the accident location. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 61). Defendant avers that at the time of the occurrence, he had been parked on the left side of Corson Avenue, a one-way street, for approximately ten minutes, at a location approximately five to six car lengths in advance of the stop sign controlling the intersection of Corson Avenue and Daniel Low Terrace. (see id at ¶8).

Defendant further asserts that prior to moving his vehicle, he twice observed the roadway, through both direct observation and use of his side-view mirror and perceived no oncoming traffic. (see id at ¶12). He maintains that only after easing out of the parking position did contact occur with plaintiff's vehicle. (see id at ¶14). Defendant also submits that his co-worker entered the vehicle from the passenger side, purportedly without impeding traffic, which he contends bears upon the absence of approaching vehicles immediately prior to his movement. (see id at ¶11; ¶14).

Defendant additionally asserts that certain roadway features, including stop signs and a stop line at the relevant intersection, were installed less than one year prior to the accident. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 58 at ¶21). He posits that these circumstances, coupled with plaintiff's testimony that she did not observe defendant's vehicle prior to impact, create triable issues of fact regarding plaintiff's conduct, including whether she stopped at the stop sign or was traveling at an excessive rate of speed. (see id at ¶23).

As to the timing of this submission, defendant attributes the absence of this information from the prior motion record to his active military service. (see id at ¶26-28). Specifically, he avers that he enlisted in the United States Army on November 26, 2024 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 61 at ¶2), underwent training through September 20, 2025 (see id at ¶4), and was thereafter deployed overseas, rendering him unavailable to provide a complete opposition to plaintiff's motion. (see id at ¶7)

Plaintiff opposes the motion, asserting that the Court previously considered all relevant evidence, including deposition testimony and photographic exhibits, and properly determined that defendant's actions in entering the lane of travel from a parked position constituted negligence as a matter of law. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 65). Plaintiff maintains that defendant's current submission is speculative, inconsistent with prior testimony, and fails to raise any bona fide issue of fact. (see id).

III. Conclusions of Law

A motion for leave to reargue pursuant to CPLR § 2221 [d] must be based upon matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the Court and may not include new facts not previously presented. It is well settled that such a motion "is designed to afford a party an opportunity to establish that the court overlooked or misapprehended the relevant facts, or misapplied any controlling principle of law" (see Foley v Roche, 68 AD2d 558 [1st Dept 1979]; see also, McGill v Goldman, 261 AD2d 593 [2d Dept 1999]; Robinson v Viani, 140 AD3d 845 [2d Dept 2016]). Moreover, reargument is not a vehicle to relitigate issues previously decided or to present arguments different from those originally asserted (see Ahmed v Pannone, 116 AD3d 802 [2d Dept 2014]; Simon v Mehryari, 16 AD3d 664 [2d Dept 2005]).

Upon careful review, the Court finds that defendants have failed to demonstrate that this Court overlooked or misapprehended any material fact or controlling principle of law in rendering its prior determination. The arguments advanced on reargument largely reiterate defendants' prior contentions or constitute attempts to reinterpret the evidentiary record. Such use of a reargument motion is improper and warrants denial of that branch of the motion.

Turning to renewal, CPLR § 2221 [e] requires that a motion be based upon new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination and that the movant provide reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts earlier. While the Court may exercise discretion in entertaining renewal, it is well settled that such relief is to be granted sparingly (see Wade v Giacobbe, 176 AD3d 641 [1st Dept 2019]; United Med. Assoc., PLLC v Seneca Ins. Co., Inc., 125 AD3d 959 [2d Dept 2015]).

Here, defendants rely primarily upon the affirmation of the defendant driver and certain photographic materials. Although the Court credits defendant's explanation that his military deployment impacted his availability, the purported "new facts" do not alter the essential liability analysis.

Defendant's assertion that he looked for oncoming traffic and did not observe plaintiff's vehicle does not, in and of itself, create a triable issue of fact. Rather, it reinforces the conclusion that defendant failed to see what was there to be seen, a principle long recognized as indicative of negligence. The contention that plaintiff either failed to stop at a stop sign or was traveling at an excessive rate of speed is expressly couched in speculative and conclusory terms. As such, it lacks probative value and is insufficient to defeat summary judgment (see Carthen v Sherman, 169 AD3d 416 [1st Dept 2019]; Stanford v Dushey, 71 AD3d 988 [2d Dept 2010]).

Moreover, the proffered photographs concerning roadway conditions and signage do not materially alter the legal analysis. The location of the stop sign relative to defendant's parked position, and the timing of its installation, do not negate the statutory obligations imposed upon a driver entering the roadway from a parked position.

The governing provisions of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, as cited in the parties' submissions, [*3]remain dispositive. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1162 prohibits a driver from moving a parked vehicle unless such movement can be made with reasonable safety. VTL § 1143 requires a driver entering a roadway from a place other than another roadway to yield the right-of-way to approaching vehicles. VTL § 1128 [a] mandates that a vehicle remain within its lane until it is safe to move.

On the record presented, defendants have not demonstrated that the newly submitted materials would change the prior determination. At most, they reiterate a version of events previously considered and rejected, or introduce speculative theories insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.

With respect to defendants' contention that the Court improperly dismissed the affirmative defense of comparative negligence, the Court notes that while a plaintiff need not demonstrate freedom from comparative fault to obtain summary judgment on liability (see Rodriguez v City of New York, 31 NY3d 312 [2018]), dismissal of such a defense requires a prima facie showing that plaintiff was free from culpable conduct (see Kutsankou v Brink's Inc., 222 AD3d 855 [2d Dept 2023]; Ramirez v Wangdu, 195 AD3d 646 [2d Dept 2021]; Poon v Nisanov, 162 AD3d 804 [2d Dept 2018]).

Nevertheless, the present motion does not establish that the Court misapplied that standard. The speculative assertions advanced by defendants fail to demonstrate any evidentiary basis upon which a finding of comparative fault could reasonably be predicated.

Accordingly, defendants have not satisfied the statutory requirements for either reargument or renewal.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, that the branch of defendants' motion seeking leave to reargue pursuant to CPLR § 2221 [d] is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED, that the branch of defendants' motion seeking leave to renew pursuant to CPLR § 2221 [e] is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED, that the prior Decision and Order of this Court dated February 20, 2026 remains in full force and effect; and it is further

ORDERED, that any relief not expressly granted herein is DENIED.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: April 29, 2026

Staten Island, New York

HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR.

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT