S.C. v P.C.

Supreme Court, Nassau County

Decided on April 30, 2026

Index No. XXXXX

Jeffrey A. Goodstein, J.

The following papers were read on these motions:

Notice of Motion/Affidavits/Affirmations/Exhibits

Memorandum of Law 2

Affidavit/Affirmation in Opposition to Cross Motion/Exhibits 3

Memorandum of Law 4

(NYSCEF 1-26)

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

In their Complaint, plaintiffs S.C. and A.C. ("Plaintiffs") bring five causes of action:(1) annulment of the marriage between defendant and the plaintiffs' father, N.C. ("decedent"); (2) a declaratory judgment stating that the marriage be voided from the time of its inception due to fraud and the defendant forfeited her elective share in decedent's estate; (3) a finding that defendant made fraudulent transfers from the decedent, due to defendant's influence on him while he was suffering from dementia; unjust enrichment, alleging that defendant knew decedent did not have the capacity to enter into their marriage, concealed his decline from plaintiffs, and transferred his assets to herself; and (5) a constructive trust on what were decedent's assets now in her possession.

The defendant seeks an Order dismissing the Summons and Complaint pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(1),(2)(3) and (7). Defendant argues that all of the Causes of action should be dismissed as the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate they have standing. She also seeks an award of attorneys fees pursuant to Domestic Relations Law ("DRL")§ 237(a). Plaintiffs oppose.

Plaintiffs allege that the defendant was aware of decedent's lack of capacity and married him, thereafter transferring his property to herself and induced him to execute a new will, transferring all of his property from his natural heirs, the plaintiff to herself.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

It is undisputed that defendant married the decedent in a civil ceremony on April 3, 2023. Decedent added the defendant to the deed of real property located at 136 Piping Rock Road, Glen Head, New York on May 26, 2023. On July 24, 2023, decedent allegedly executed a Last Will and Testament, naming the defendant as Executrix of his estate and leaving no assets to [*2]Plaintiffs. Decedent died on September 19, 2024.

Co-Plaintiff S.C. filed a Petition for Probate with the Nassau County Surrogate's Court on January 10, 2025 to probate a will decedent allegedly executed in 2000. In that will S.C. was named as executor and all of the decedent's property was left to his children. On March 14, 2025, defendant filed a Petition for Probate with the Nassau County Surrogate's Court to probate the will decedent allegedly executed in 2023. In that will the decedent states that he revoked all prior wills, named defendant as executrix of his estate, and left his property to her.

To date, the Surrogate has not issued Letters to either S.C. or to the defendant

MOTION

Defendant argues that this Court should dismiss the entire Complaint, primarily alleging that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring any of the causes of action. Defendant alleges that the Complaint is inadequate in its details to support a claim of standing for an action for annulment. She also argues that the Plaintiffs have failed to make factual allegations necessary to maintain their actions alleging fraudulent conduct.

The defendant alleges that the decedent was of sound mind when he married her, when he executed his 2023 will, and when he added her to the deed of 136 Piping Rock Road, Glen Head. She argues that there is no evidence that he did not take all of these actions voluntarily. She alleges that when she and decedent married on April 3, 2023, the wedding was officiated by the Town Clerk of Oyster Bay, who did not question decedent's capacity.

The defendant argues that although the Plaintiffs allege that decedent declined cognitively in October 2021, they never filed for guardianship over him.

DISCUSSION

CPLR §3211

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(1) the court may grant dismissal only when documentary evidence submitted conclusively establishes a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law (Goldman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 5 NY3d 561 [2005]; Held v. Kaufman, 91 NY2d 425[1998]; Goshen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of NY, 98 NY2d 314 [2002]; Leon v. Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]). A defendant must establish that the documentary evidence resolves all factual issues as a matter of law and conclusively disposes of the plaintiff's claim (Epifani v. Sale Johnson, 65 AD3d 224 [2d Dept, 2009]; Mazur Bros. Realty, LLC v. State of New York, 59 AD3d 401 [2d Dept, 2009]; Sullivan v. State of New York, 34 AD3d 443 [2d Dept, 2006]).

CPLR § 3211(a)(2) permits dismissal when the court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the cause of action. NY CPLR 3211 (a)(2). In determining a CPLR § 3211(a)(2) motion, the court must consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the action or defense is based. In this instance, the plaintiffs have alleged causes of action which could be determined by this Court, thus that portion of the motion seeking to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is DENIED.

CPLR § 3211(a)(7) allows the court to dismiss for a failure to state a claim. The only question is whether the complaint states a cause of action. The court must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the allegations of the complaint as true and provide plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (Mehl v Mehl, 80 AD3d 674 [2nd Dept. 2011]; Gianis v Gianis, 67 AD3d 963[2nd Dept. 2009]; Bordeleau v. State, 74 AD3d 1688 [3rd Dept. 2010]; 511 West 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144 [2002]). In order to [*3]dismiss, the court accepts as true the factual allegations of the complaint and there is no reasonable view of the facts which supports such a cause of action (Hirschhorn v Hirschhorn, 194 AD2d 768 [1993]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]. That portion of the defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the causes of action for failing to state a claim is DENIED.

Under CPLR § 3211(a)(3), a court must accept all allegations as pleaded to be true. The burden is on the defendant movant to establish no legal capacity (Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Americas v. Vitellas, 131 AD3d 52 [2d Dept. 2015]). If the plaintiff raises a question of fact as to standing on a motion challenging legal capacity, the motion should be denied (U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Guy, 125 AD3d 845 [2d Dept. 2015]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Taylor, 170 AD3d 921[2d Dept. 2019]). The burden is on the defendant to establish, prima facie, the plaintiffs lack of standing (Berger v. Friedman, 151 AD3d 678, 679 [2d Dept. 2017];Johnson v. 275 Clermont, LLC, 235 AD3d 731 [2d Dept. 2025]).

The question of standing is generally answered by the statute at issue, which may identify the class of persons entitled to seek review (Soc'y of Plastics Indus. v. Cty. of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761 [1991]).

First Cause of Action

In the First cause of action the plaintiffs seek to annul the marriage of the defendant to the decedent pursuant to DRL § 140. Plaintiffs state that they have standing to bring this action pursuant to DRL § 140(c). They allege they are the children and natural heirs of decedent, therefore they have an interest to void the marriage.

Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs have not satisfied the third prong of DRL § 140(c), an interest to void the marriage. She argues that Decedent executed a Last Will and Testament on July 24, 2023, leaving no assets to Plaintiffs. She claims that due to the will, the plaintiffs fail to meet the full criteria set forth in that section of the law.

DRL § 140(c) states that an action to annul a marriage on the ground that one of the parties thereto was a person with a mental illness "may be maintained at any time during the continuance of the mental illness, or, after the death of the person with a mental illness in that condition, and during the life of the other party to the marriage, by any relative of the person with a mental illness who has an interest to avoid the marriage".

An action to annul a marriage on the ground that one of the parties thereto was a person with a mental illness may be maintained at any time during the continuance of the mental illness, or, after the death of the person with a mental illness in that condition, and during the life of the other party to the marriage, by any relative of the person with a mental illness who has an interest to void the marriage (Soc'y of Plastics Indus. v. Cty. of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761,[1991]; DRL § 140(c) .

Plaintiffs rely upon Campbell v. Thomas, 73 AD3d 103 (2d Dept. 2010) in contending that they have standing to annul Defendant's marriage to Decedent. In Campbell, the decedent was a terminally ill man with dementia, whose primary caretaker was his daughter, a plaintiff. This plaintiff left defendant to care for the decedent while she went away on a short vacation. During that time, the defendant married the decedent. In Campbell, two physicians who examined the decedent less than a year before the marriage confirmed that he was already suffering from dementia.

The Appellate Court held that the marriage was null and void because the decedent was incapable of consenting pursuant to DRL § 7(2). The Court noted that the caretaker married the [*4]decedent, who was in her care, only after his daughter left to go on vacation. The court noted that after the marriage the caretaker then arranged to add her name to the decedent's bank account and made herself the sole beneficiary on his retirement account (Campbell v Thomas, 73 AD3d 103 [2d Dept 2010]).

The court found the plaintiffs had standing to annul the marriage after their father's death, finding that they were the decedent's natural beneficiaries. The court found that after said annulment the plaintiffs had standing to claw back assets and monies to the decedent's estate, and prevent the defendant from exercising the right of spousal election against the estate.^FN1

Defendant claims that this action is distinguishable from Campbell, as the plaintiffs have not received letters of representation from the Surrogate's Court and there are no physician's affidavits or competent evidence that Decedent was mentally ill on the day he married Defendant. She argues that it is conceded by the plaintiffs that Defendant cohabitated with Decedent for several years before they married. Further, she offers evidence that the decedent held himself out as her husband to a psychologist who states in an affirmation that he "knew Decedent for over a decade" and who states he believed Decedent to be of sound mind upon marrying Defendant (see Affirmation of Victor DeFazio). There is no evidence that this doctor ever examined the decedent.

The defendant argues that based on the above, this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' first cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211, not summary judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3212. As this is not a motion for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3212, the Court need not address the full merits of the allegations, nor search the record for supporting proof. The review does not extend to the supporting documentation whether it be the physician's affirmation from the defendant, or the decedent's death certificate, filed by the plaintiffs, which states that the decedent was suffering from "Lemy dementia".

To review the first cause of action for the purposes of DRL §140 and CPLR § 3211, three requirements are necessary:(1) the plaintiffs must allege that the decedent was mentally ill, (2) that they are relatives of the decedent; and (3) that they have an interest to void the marriage. The plaintiffs are the decedent's children, qualify as "relatives" under the statute. Tabak v. Garay, 237 AD2d 510 [2nd Dept. 1997]). In this instance, the plaintiffs have alleged the decedent suffered from mental illness, they are his relatives. Thus, they meet the first and second prong of the test under Section 140(c); (K.A.L. v R.P., 35 Misc 3d 1211[A] [Sup Ct, Monroe County 2012]).

The complaint also meets the test required by the third prong of the Section 140(c), [*5]which requires an allegation that the plaintiff has "an interest to avoid the marriage." The Court finds that the complaint sufficiently alleges that the plaintiffs' finances will be impacted by granting the suggested relief. The plaintiffs allege that even if the 2023 will is not admitted to probate, if the marriage is not annulled, the defendant's marriage to their father will impact them financially.

Based on the proof and arguments presented, the defendant's motion to dismiss the First Cause of action is DENIED. The plaintiffs have stated a cause of action and alleged a basis for standing. The documentary evidence presented by the defendant as part of her motion does not necessitate dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1)(2)(3) & (7).

The Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action

The four additional causes of action sound in equity. Without addressing the merits of claims, the court must first address whether these causes of action may be maintained by the plaintiffs in their current capacity.

A personal representative who has received letters of administration of the estate of a decedent is the only party who is authorized to bring these causes of action(EPTL 1-2.13, 5-4.1 [1]; 11-3.2 [b]; Mingone v State of New York, 100 AD2d 897[1984]; Jordan v. Jordan, 120 AD3d 632 [2d Dept. 2014]). Plaintiffs have not received letters of representation and thus have no standing to bring a cause of action on behalf of Decedent's estate.

Plaintiffs cite Barker v. Gervera, 236 AD3d 1318 (4th Dept. 2025) to assert they have standing to bring a cause of action for the imposition of a constructive trust on behalf of Decedent's estate. In Barker, the plaintiff brought an action for the imposition of a constructive trust on his own behalf. This matter is distinguishable from Barker in that Plaintiffs are attempting to bring an action for the imposition of a constructive trust on behalf of Decedent's estate without having received letters of representation.

Based on the proof and arguments presented, Plaintiffs' remaining causes of action are properly DISMISSED for lack of standing, not on the merits.

CONCLUSION

Based on the proof and arguments presented, the defendant's motion to dismiss the First cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 is DENIED.

As to defendant's request for attorneys fees, she argues that the Court should award Defendant reasonable counsel fees and costs for having to defend this annulment action. Pursuant to DRL 237(a) and the proof and arguments presented, that request is DENIED. It is hereby

ORDERED, that the parties and counsel are directed to appear for a conference before this Court on May 20, 2026 at 9:30 am; it is further

ORDERED that any issue raised and not specifically addressed herein is DENIED.

This constitutes the DECISION AND ORDER of this Court.

Dated: April 30,2026

Mineola, New York