Northfield Bank v Credenza Kitchens Inc.

Supreme Court, Richmond County

Decided on May 4, 2026

Index No. 150136/2026

Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion #001) numbered 2-10 were read on this motion. The following papers were considered on this motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint: Notice of Motion dated January 16, 2026; Affirmation of Allyn J. Crawford, Esq., dated January 16, 2026, with exhibits annexed; Affidavit of Douglas Cummings, sworn to on January 16, 2026, with exhibits annexed; Opposition of Farva Jafri, Esq., dated March 5, 2026; Affirmation in Reply of John W. Pilkington, Esq., dated April 21, 2026; and all prior pleadings and proceedings herein.

[*2]II. Findings of Facts

Plaintiff Northfield Bank ("Plaintiff") commenced this action by motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint pursuant to CPLR §3213, seeking recovery of monies allegedly due under a commercial lending transaction.

The record establishes that on or about January 5, 2022, defendant Credenza Kitchens Inc. ("Credenza") executed and delivered to Plaintiff a commercial line of credit agreement and promissory note (the "Note"), pursuant to which Plaintiff extended a line of credit with a maximum limit of $250,000.00. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 4). The Note obligated Credenza to repay amounts advanced, together with interest, and provided for monthly payments calculated as a percentage of the outstanding balance plus accrued interest. (see id). The Note further contained provisions governing variable interest rates, late charges, and the lender's rights upon default, including the right to demand payment in full. (see id).

Contemporaneously with the execution of the Note, defendant Joel Berkowitz ("Berkowitz") executed an Unlimited Continuing Guaranty (the "Guaranty"), pursuant to which he unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed the full payment and performance of all obligations of Credenza to Plaintiff. (see id). The Guaranty is absolute in form and encompasses all indebtedness, whether direct or indirect, matured or unmatured, and expressly obligates the guarantor to pay enforcement costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees. (see id).

The affidavit of Douglas Cummings, a Vice President and Loan Workout Specialist employed by Plaintiff, attests that defendants defaulted under the Note, Guaranty, and related agreements by failing to make the required payment due December 1, 2025, and all payments thereafter, and by failing to satisfy the outstanding indebtedness when due. (see id). Based upon Plaintiff's business records maintained in the ordinary course, Cummings avers that there is due and owing the principal sum of $116,657.88, together with interest at the contractual rate of 10.25% per annum from December 1, 2025, and late charges in the amount of $1,330.20. (see id).

Plaintiff further seeks recovery of attorneys' fees in the amount of $2,000.00 and costs in the amount of $650.00, pursuant to the contractual provisions contained in the Note and Guaranty. (see id).

In opposition, defendants contend that the instant action is not properly maintainable under CPLR § 3213. Defendants argue, in substance, that the transaction at issue involves more than a simple instrument for the payment of money only, pointing to the existence of a revolving line of credit, provisions relating to variable interest rates, discretionary allocation of payments, and the necessity of reference to additional agreements and records, including a modification or term-out arrangement and payment histories. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 8). Defendants assert that these features render the instruments unsuitable for summary disposition under CPLR § 3213 and instead require plenary adjudication. (see id at ¶24).

In reply, Plaintiff contends that the Note and Guaranty constitute qualifying instruments within the meaning of CPLR § 3213, and that any ancillary provisions do not alter their fundamental character as instruments evidencing an unconditional obligation to pay a sum certain. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 10). Plaintiff further argues that it has established its prima facie entitlement to judgment through production of the instruments and proof of defendants' default, and that defendants have failed to raise any triable issue of fact. (see id).

[*3]III. Conclusions of Law

CPLR § 3213 provides a streamlined procedural device whereby a plaintiff may move for summary judgment in lieu of complaint where the action is based upon "an instrument for the payment of money only." The statute is to be strictly construed, and its applicability depends upon whether the instrument, on its face, contains an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain, such that proof of the instrument and nonpayment alone establishes a prima facie case (see Kornfeld v NRX Technologies, Inc., 93 AD2d 772 [1st Dept 1983]; European Am. Bank v Lofrese, 182 AD2d 67 [2d Dept 1992]).

The threshold inquiry, therefore, is whether the Note and Guaranty at issue qualify as instruments for the payment of money only within the meaning of CPLR § 3213.

Upon careful review, the Court concludes that they do.

The Note, although denominated as a commercial line of credit agreement, contains an express promise to repay amounts advanced, together with interest, and is payable on demand by the lender. The existence of provisions relating to variable interest rates, late charges, and payment allocation does not, in and of itself, remove the instrument from the ambit of CPLR § 3213, where the borrower's obligation to pay is otherwise unconditional and ascertainable from the face of the instrument and supporting proof.

Similarly, the Guaranty executed by Berkowitz is absolute and unconditional, guaranteeing full payment of all obligations owed by Credenza to Plaintiff. Such guaranties have long been recognized as proper predicates for CPLR § 3213 relief where the underlying indebtedness is established (see European Am. Bank v Lofrese, 182 AD2d 67 [2d Dept 1992]).

Defendants' contention that the Court must resort to extrinsic proof does not compel a different result. While Plaintiff has submitted business records, including payment histories and loan summaries, such submissions are not to establish liability in the first instance, but rather to quantify the amount due following defendants' default. The essential elements of Plaintiff's claim, namely, the existence of the Note and Guaranty and defendants' failure to pay, are established by the instruments themselves and the uncontroverted affidavit of default.

Indeed, it is well settled that the need to compute interest or apply contractual charges does not defeat CPLR § 3213 treatment, provided that the underlying obligation to pay is unconditional (see Kornfeld v. NRX Technologies, Inc., 93 AD2d 772 [1st Dept 1983]). Here, the amount due is readily ascertainable from Plaintiff's records, which are properly authenticated and unrefuted.

Turning to the sufficiency of Plaintiff's proof, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established its prima facie entitlement to judgment by producing the Note and Guaranty and demonstrating defendants' default thereunder. The affidavit of Douglas Cummings, based upon personal knowledge and review of business records maintained in the ordinary course, is sufficient to establish the outstanding indebtedness and defendants' failure to pay.

In opposition, defendants have failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Their arguments are directed primarily at the procedural propriety of CPLR § 3213 relief, rather than at disputing the existence of the debt, the execution of the instruments, or the occurrence of default. No evidentiary showing has been made to contradict Plaintiff's proof or to demonstrate any bona fide defense to the claim.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment in lieu of complaint.

With respect to attorneys' fees and costs, the Note and Guaranty expressly provide for recovery of such expenses incurred in enforcement. Plaintiff's submission, including counsel's affirmation detailing time expended and anticipated services, supports an award of attorneys' fees in the amount of $2,000.00 and costs in the amount of $650.00, which the Court finds to be reasonable under the circumstances.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint pursuant to CPLR §3213 is granted in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff Northfield Bank and against defendants Credenza Kitchens Inc. and Joel Berkowitz, jointly and severally, in the principal sum of $116,657.88, together with interest thereon at the contractual rate of 10.25% per annum from December 1, 2025 through the date of entry of judgment, as calculated by the Clerk, and statutory interest thereafter; and it is further

ORDERED, that Plaintiff is awarded late charges in the amount of $1,330.20; and it is further

ORDERED, that Plaintiff is awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of $2,000.00 and costs in the amount of $650.00; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk shall compute the total amount due, including interest, and enter judgment accordingly.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: May 4, 2026

Staten Island, New York

E N T E R,

HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR.

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT