People v Emmanuel

Supreme Court, Bronx County

Decided on April 27, 2026

Ind. No. 74824-22

Verena C. Powell, J.

Defendant Eric Emmanuel moves to dismiss the indictment in the interest of justice. The People oppose. For the reasons stated herein, the motion is denied without a hearing.

Defendant was pursued by occupants of another vehicle who discharged a firearm at defendant's vehicle. Defendant exited and entered a vehicle belonging to another person in an apparent attempt to flee. In taking that vehicle to drive away from the gunfire, defendant struck and injured a bicyclist. The bicyclist sustained non-fatal injuries but remains unable to walk and continues to have difficulty speaking.

Approximately 38 months have elapsed since the alleged offense. Defendant has appeared at every court date, has no criminal history, and has apparently lived a law-abiding life since the incident. Defendant supports his mother and has since welcomed his first child with his partner.

It is presently unclear whether the People will be able to secure the presence of two key witnesses: the owner of the vehicle that defendant took and the bicyclist that defendant struck.

A combined Wade/Huntley/Dunaway hearing was conducted from December 12, 2024, through January 2, 2025. This court denied suppression. Defendant now moves to dismiss the indictment in furtherance of justice pursuant to CPL 210.40 (1).

An indictment may be dismissed "in furtherance of justice" even when there is no basis for dismissal as a matter of law (CPL 210.40 [1]; see People v Clayton, 41 AD2d 204, 207 [1973]). In determining whether dismissal in furtherance of justice is warranted, a court must consider the ten statutory criteria "individually and collectively" (CPL 210.40 [1]). Analysis of these various factors requires "a 'sensitive balancing' of the interests of the individual and the State" (People v Kwok Ming Chan, 45 AD2d 613, 616 [1st Dept 1974], citing Clayton, 41 AD2d at 207-208). Ultimately, there must be "some compelling factor" (CPL 210.40 [1]) that could warrant such "extraordinary relief" (People v Perez, 156 AD2d 7, 10 [1st Dept 1990]). Where dismissal is granted, the court must state its reasons on the record (CPL 210.40 [3]).

(a) Seriousness and Circumstances of the Offense

Defendant was indicted on assault in the first degree, which is a class B violent felony carrying a determinate sentence of 5 to 25 years (Penal Law § 120.10 [3], [4]; Penal Law § 70.02 [1] [a], [3] [a]). Defendant was fleeing armed individuals who fired upon his vehicle when he struck a bicyclist, an injury for which defendant expresses remorse. Given the context of the incident, defendant may seek to prove a justification defense at trial (Penal Law § 35.05 [2]). Even so, the charged offense remains a class B violent felony, and the bicyclist struck during the incident sustained critical injuries. This thus weighs heavily against dismissal (CPL 210.40 [1] [a]).

(b) Extent of Harm Caused by the Offense

The bicyclist whom defendant struck sustained severe injuries and currently lives in an assisted living facility. After the incident, the bicyclist was admitted to the intensive care unit for critical polytrauma. Critical polytrauma refers to two or more severe and life-threatening traumatic injuries affecting different body regions or organ systems. Even today, more than three years after the incident, the bicyclist remains unable to walk and continues to have difficulty speaking. The extent of harm caused by the offense weighs against dismissal (CPL 210.40 [1] [b]).

(c) Evidence of Guilt, Whether Admissible or Inadmissible at Trial

Evidence sufficient to support the indictment was presented to the grand jury, and defendant's statements related to the incident have not been suppressed. The People acknowledge, however, that they have been unable to secure the attendance of two key witnesses in this case. While the absence of these witnesses may arguably weaken the prosecution's case and could potentially hinder the People's ability to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, such evidentiary challenges are not, in themselves, dispositive. Doubts about the strength of the People's case and concern about witness reluctance do not warrant dismissal (People v Foster, 127 AD2d 684, 685 [2d Dept 1987]). A court may not "substitute[e] its own judgment concerning the credibility of the complainant and the culpability of the defendant for that of the jury" on a motion to dismiss in furtherance of justice (People v Rahmen, 302 AD2d 408, 409 [2d Dept 2003]). Whether defendant was actually under fire and whether striking the bicyclist was necessary to avoid that threat are factual issues that a jury must resolve. Thus, while the defense raised the availability of a justification defense, courts have held that this alone does not justify dismissal (see People v Field, 161 AD2d 660, 661 [2d Dept 1990] [holding that "circumstances which mitigate the defendant's culpability" do not warrant dismissal in furtherance of justice]). If the People cannot produce the two key witnesses, then they must prove their case with the remaining admissible evidence; the evaluation of such evidence remains a function of trial. Therefore, despite potential arguments regarding the weakness of the People's case, the evidence of guilt does not constitute a compelling factor favoring dismissal (CPL 210.40 [1] [c]).

(d) History, Character, and Condition of the Defendant

Defendant has no criminal history, has appeared at every court date on this case for over 38 months, and has apparently had no further contact with the criminal justice system since the incident. Furthermore, defendant has demonstrated ongoing personal responsibility by supporting his mother, partner, and had recently welcomed the birth of his first child, indicating a commitment to family obligations. These mitigating factors reflect positively on defendant's character, suggesting rehabilitation and responsible citizenship since the incident. However, while these facts speak favorably to defendant, they do not rise to the level of a compelling [*2]circumstance warranting dismissal. The absence of prior convictions, even alongside substantial law-abiding and familial conduct, is not a compelling circumstance (People v Harmon, 181 AD2d 34, 37 [1st Dept 1992]). An exemplary background "does not immunize [defendant] from the normal processes of the criminal law" (People v Varela, 106 AD2d 339, 340 [1st Dept 1984]). And 3½ years of satisfactory conduct since the alleged crime is not dispositive (People v Diggs, 125 AD2d 189, 192 [1st Dept 1986]). Defendant's 38 months of law-abiding conduct and personal responsibilities, while credited, are insufficient to warrant dismissal.

Defendant's status as a new parent does not change the analysis. The "disruptive effect" of prosecution on a defendant's family is "a factor common to countless criminal convictions" and does not constitute a compelling circumstance (People v Reyes, 174 AD2d 87, 89 [1st Dept 1992] [reversing dismissal where defendant faced deportation and permanent separation from United States citizen spouse]). If family impact were treated as compelling, nearly every defendant with a family would have a basis for relief, converting an otherwise extraordinary remedy into a routine one. The history, character, and condition of defendant do not constitute a compelling factor favoring dismissal (CPL 210.40 [1] [d]).

(e) Misconduct of Law Enforcement

This court previously conducted a combined Huntley/Wade/Dunaway hearing and denied suppression, finding that defendant's statements were voluntarily made and that the police conduct surrounding defendant's arrest was constitutionally adequate. The Wade portion of the hearing was withdrawn. Given the results of the suppression hearing, this factor is inapplicable or at best neutral (CPL 210.40 [1] [e]).

(f) Purpose and Effect of Imposing a Sentence

If convicted on the top charge, the sentencing court would be required to impose a determinate sentence of at least five years (Penal Law § 70.02 [3] [a]). Defendant asserts that the penological purposes of severe punishment would not be meaningfully advanced by severe punishment, given the mitigating circumstances unique to this case. However, sentencing defendant would serve the legitimate purpose of "deterring individuals from committing a similar crime in the future" (People v Snowden, 160 AD3d 1054, 1057 [3d Dept 2018]). This factor does not weigh in favor of dismissal (CPL 210.40 [1] [f]).

(g) Impact on Public Confidence in the Criminal Justice System

Dismissal in furtherance of justice requires that "public interests are as fully protected as the individual interests of the defendant for justice and mercy" (People v Clayton, 41 AD2d 204, 208 [1973]). Where the charge is serious, the public interest weighs against dismissal (see People v Andrew, 78 AD2d 683, 683 [2d Dept 1980] [holding that the public interest weighed heavily against dismissal where the crime charged involved a loaded firearm]). Dismissing a class B violent felony without adjudication on the merits based on defendant's personal circumstances risks undermining public confidence in the criminal justice system. This factor does not weigh in favor of dismissal (CPL 210.40 [1] [g]).

(h) Impact on the Safety or Welfare of the Community

Defendant has resided in the community for 38 months since the incident and has not had any subsequent contact with law enforcement or the criminal justice system. The absence of any [*3]new offenses or indications of ongoing risk supports the inference that defendant does not currently pose a threat to public safety. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal (CPL 210.40 [1] [h]).

(i) Attitude of the Complainant or Victim

There are two complainants in this case: the vehicle owner and the cyclist. The vehicle owner indicated that he did not seek to participate further in this case. The bicyclist who was struck by defendant is unable to testify due to his medical condition, allegedly resulting from defendant's actions. The bicyclist's family has expressed an interest in holding defendant accountable. This factor weighs against dismissal (CPL 210.40 [1] [i]).

(j) Any Other Relevant Fact

Defendant argues that the cumulative weight of the mitigating factors, the passage of 38 months since the incident, and the People's difficulties in securing the two key witnesses weigh in favor of dismissal. However, 38 months' time is not out of the ordinary for a case where pretrial suppression hearings have already been held. Defendant's law-abiding behavior during this time does not compel relief (Diggs, 125 AD2d at 192 ["the fact that . . . defendant has satisfactorily complied with the terms of his probation during the past 3½ years . . . is not dispositive"]). The other facts presented by defendant are matters reserved for a jury. This factor is at best neutral (CPL 210.40 [1] [j]).

Collective Assessment

To prevail on a motion to dismiss in furtherance of justice, defendant must demonstrate the existence of "some compelling factor . . . clearly demonstrating that conviction or prosecution of the defendant upon such indictment or count would constitute or result in injustice" (CPL 210.40 [1]). Although certain statutory factors — such as defendant's lack of prior criminal history, sustained law-abiding conduct, and obstacles faced by the People in securing witnesses — may individually weight in defendant's favor, more substantial factors, including the seriousness of the offense and the significant harm caused to the victim, outweighs these considerations. When analyzing the statutory criteria both individually and in relation to one another, the factors favorable to defendant are outweighed by those mitigating against dismissal. Therefore, both the separate and cumulative assessments of these considerations do not meet the demanding threshold for dismissal in the interest of justice.

Dismissal is reserved for "the unusual case that cries out for fundamental justice beyond the confines of conventional considerations" (People v Belge, 41 NY2d 60, 62-63 [1976] [Fuchsberg, J., concurring]). Each of the factors that defendant identifies falls within the ordinary framework of the criminal justice system. Evidentiary weaknesses in the People's case are matters for trial. The plea and sentencing consequences can be addressed through discussions between the People and defendant. These are not circumstances in which the criminal prosecution against defendant constitutes an injustice that might warrant dismissal (CPL 210.40 [1]; People v Pittman, 228 AD2d 225, 226 [1st Dept 1996] [reversing dismissal despite defendant's sympathetic personal circumstances]). Defendant has not demonstrated that dismissal is warranted (CPL 210.40 [1]).

Defendant alternatively requests a hearing on this motion. Where the essential facts are genuinely disputed, a hearing must be conducted (CPL 210.45 [6]; People v Burke, 174 AD3d 915, 916 [2d Dept 2019]). Where the motion can be denied even accepting defendant's factual [*4]assertions, no hearing is required (CPL 210.45 [4]-[5]; People v Schlessel, 104 AD2d 501, 502 [2d Dept 1984]).

No hearing is required here. The court has accepted defendant's assertions that defendant was fleeing armed individuals, that two witnesses are presently unavailable to testify at trial, that defendant has lived a law-abiding life since the incident, and that defendant cares for his mother and his newborn child with his partner. Even on those facts, the motion does not establish the extraordinary circumstance required for dismissal. The motion papers do not raise a genuine dispute over an essential fact requiring a hearing (CPL 210.45 [4]-[6]).

Defendant has not established a compelling factor clearly demonstrating that continued prosecution would constitute or result in injustice (CPL 210.40 [1]).

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment in furtherance of justice is denied (CPL 210.20 [1] [i]; 210.40); and it is further

ORDERED that defendant's request for a hearing on this motion is denied (CPL 210.45 [4]-[6]).

Dated: April 27, 2026

Bronx, New York

HON. VERENA C. POWELL, A.J.S.C.