Krasniaski v Lezell

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County

Decided on May 27, 2026

Index No. CV-024947-24/KI

Mark Kagan, J.

The defendant has moved pursuant to CPLR §3211 seeking to dismiss the action. The petitioner has opposed the motion. Papers were submitted by the parties and arguments were held. After reviewing all the arguments this court now renders the following determination.

This lawsuit was commenced by the plaintiff on November 1, 2024 seeking damages in the amount of $50,000. The defendant duly answered and asserted two affirmative defenses. First, the defendant asserted the complaint lacks sufficient particularity. Second, the defendant asserts that the complaint fails to state any cause of action. The plaintiff opposed the motion and was afforded an opportunity to supplement the opposition and the defendant submitted a reply.

Conclusions of Law

Pursuant to 902(a)(1) the New York City Civil Court Act a plaintiff in Civil Court, if the action is for money only, may commence an action by filing an indorsed complaint and avoid the requirements of filing a formal complaint. The "indorsement shall consist of a statement of the nature and substance of the cause of action" as well as the amount sought (see, CCA §902(a)(1)). Thus, the complaint need not provide any details regarding the claims as long as a summary statement is provided. More details concerning the plaintiff's claim can be obtained through the discovery process (Bing v. Gurtman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt P.C., 10 Mic3d 136(A), 814 NYS2d 559 [Appellate Term Second Department 2005]). Further, since the defendant is fully aware of the plaintiff's claims no further formal pleadings are required (Lindsey v. Metro [*2]Management Development Inc., 88 Misc 3d 1250(A), 253 NYS3d 874 [Civil Court Bronx County 2026]). Therefore, the motion seeking to dismiss the complaint based upon the failure to explain the nature of the claims pursuant to CPLR §3013 is denied.

Notwithstanding, the court should entertain a motion to dismiss if clear issues of law are presented and no further clarity of the pleadings can save plaintiff's claims (Penades v. Port Authority of New York, 85 Misc 3d 1211(A), 226 NYS3d 837 [Civil Court Kings County 2024]).

It is well settled that upon a motion to dismiss the court must determine, accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, whether the party can succeed upon any reasonable view of those facts (Perez v. Y & M Transportation Corporation, 219 AD3d 1449, 196 NYS3d 145 [2d Dept., 2023]). Further, all the allegations in the complaint are deemed true and all reasonable inferences may be drawn in favor of the plaintiff (Archival Inc., v. 177 Realty Corp., 220 AD3d 909, 198 NYS2d 567 [2d Dept., 2023]). Whether the complaint will later survive a motion for summary judgment, or whether the plaintiff will ultimately be able to prove its claims, of course, plays no part in the determination of a pre-discovery CPLR §3211 motion to dismiss (see, Lam v. Weiss, 219 AD3d 713, 195 NYS3d 488 [2d Dept., 2023]).

While it is true that the complaint itself does not really explain the nature of the allegations, the plaintiff's opposition explains the nature of the claims sufficiently so that they can be evaluated if they have any merit. Essentially, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant converted a joint account opened by both of them and thus essentially stole her money. She is seeking to recover those funds.

At common law the mere opening of a joint bank account, where the funds were sourced from one party, did not create any rights to those funds in the other party (see, In re Bolin, 136 NY 177, 91 Sickels 177 [1892]). The court analyzed these accounts under the law of gifts and held there was insufficient evidence a donative gift was intended. As the court observed in Beaver v. Beaver, 117 NY 421, 72 Sickels 421 [1889] "we cannot close our eyes to the well-known practice of persons depositing in savings banks money to the credit of real or fictious persons, with no intention of divesting themselves of ownership" (id). Therefore, to create any rights, the joint account holder was required to demonstrate that was the clear intent of the parties (Kelly v. Beers, 194 NY 49, 86 NE 980 [1909]). In 1909 the legislature changed the common law by enacting Section 144 of chapter 2 of the Consolidated Laws, entitled 'Banking Law' which removed any liability upon a bank for paying any funds in a joint account to either account holder. Consequently, a deposit in a joint account was now "presumptive evidence of an intent to make a gift" (Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 NY 380, 167 NE 506 [1929]). In 1965 the legislature enacted Banking Law §675 which established that the opening of a joint account created a rebuttable presumption of joint tenancy in the account. This really encompasses three presumptions, namely that each joint tenant maintains a one half interest in the account, that the depositor of the funds has created an irrevocable gift of half the amount deposited to the other joint tenant and that upon the death of one joint tenant, the other joint tenant has a right of survivorship in all of the funds. Therefore, each account holder, became owners of a moiety in the account, and each could withdraw, unilaterally, without the consent of the other, up to one-half of the account. Thus, each account holder becomes the legal owner of half the account. Consequently, if one of the joint tenants withdraws more than half of the account the other joint tenant has the right to recover the excess (Kleinberg v. Heller, 38 NY2d 836, 382 NYS2d 49 [1976]).

The presumption could be rebutted by presenting evidence that a joint tenancy was never intended or was established only for convenience only (see, Signature Bank v. HSBC Bank USA N.A., 67 AD3d 917, 889 NYS2d 242 [2d Dept., 2009]).

In this case there has been no evidence presented that the joint account opened wherein they were both accountholders was for convenience only. Thus, the account was joint in all respects. The defendant argues alternatively that if the account was joint then he was permitted to withdraw all the funds. The defendant does not present any case that supports that argument. Indeed, that premise conflicts with the law cited above. It is true that a joint tenancy creates a right of survivorship and that upon the death of one tenant the other tenant becomes the owner of the entire account (In re Fayo, 7 AD3d 795, 776 NYS2d 855 [2d Dept., 2004]). Since this remains true then the defendant was only permitted to withdraw up to half the amount of the account while the plaintiff remains alive. Therefore, the plaintiff has alleged a valid cause of action. Of course, the parties will be required to engage in discovery and the plaintiff maintains the burden whether she can ultimately prevail. At this juncture, the plaintiff has adequately pled a cause of action. Consequently, the motion seeking to dismiss the complaint is denied.

So ordered.

Dated: May 27, 2026

Brooklyn, NY

Hon. Mark Kagan, JCC