People v Jorge

Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County

Decided on May 29, 2026

Docket No. CR-025777-25BX

David L. Goodwin, J.

Pending is the defense's fully briefed, counseled omnibus motion. Upon review of the filings and the record of proceedings thus far, the motion is resolved as follows. As the parties are the primary audience, familiarity with the case is assumed.

It is ORDERED that the branches seeking to dismiss the accusatory instrument on C.P.L. § 30.30 speedy trial grounds and facial sufficiency grounds, and to invalidate the certificate of compliance (COC), are DENIED. The People are ORDERED to investigate the "unauthorized use" issue raised by the defense and to produce records relevant to the vehicle stop. It is further ORDERED that Mapp/Huntley/Dunaway/Ingle hearings are granted. All other requests for relief are either DEFERRED or DENIED.

This is a desk appearance ticket (DAT) case where the only count charged is a class A misdemeanor. According to court records, the defendant was in custody during both the initial scheduled arraignment date on October 12, 2025, and the second, rescheduled arraignment date on October 27. During the October 27 calendar call, defense counsel specifically waived the defendant's appearance and indicated that the defendant was in New York City Department of Correction custody. The matter was adjourned a third time to November 12, at which point the [*2]defendant was produced and finally arraigned on the DAT.

The People then filed their certificate of compliance (COC) and declared ready on February 9, 2026—89 days after November 12, but 120 days as measured from the original arraignment date of October 12.

In an initial argument in support of § 30.30 dismissal, the defense contends that the People's failure to produce the defendant for arraignment on October 12 and October 27 triggered commencement of the case and should result in chargeable time. This additional time would, in the defense's view, push the People's declaration of readiness past the 90-day period. See Defense's Mot. at 5; Defense's Reply at 3-4.

This argument is unavailing. A DAT case does not commence for § 30.30 purposes until the defendant's first appearance in court on the DAT. C.P.L. § 30.30(7)(b); People v. Stirrup, 91 NY2d 434, 439 (1998). When a defendant does not appear on the scheduled date, the § 30.30 clock does not start. People v. Parris, 79 NY2d 69, 71-72 (1992) (per curiam). This rule governs even if the defendant is in custody and the People have not "take[n] any action to secure his attendance" for arraignment on a DAT. Id. at 71.

Here, the defendant was in custody during the first two attempts at arraignment, yet was not produced for arraignment. Even though the People "knew his location and could have procured his presence in court," the § 30.30 clock did begin to run until the defendant actually appeared on the November 12 arraignment date. Parris, 79 NY2d at 71.

Accordingly, the case commenced for § 30.30 purposes on November 12. Thus, only 89 days elapsed prior to the People's declaration of readiness—just under the 90 days allowed.^FN2

The defense also argues that the People's COC was not valid, and did not stop the § 30.30 clock, primarily because of incomplete impeachment disclosures and certain shortcomings in form. See Defense's Mot. at 8-10; Defense's Reply at 9-12. This argument also does not succeed.

Regarding the Giglio materials for Officer Marschall, the defense's position appears to be that substantiated misconduct findings were required to be acknowledged and accurately described in the COC and associated materials. See Defense's Mot. at 9; see also Defense's Mot., [*3]Ex. H. But the defense has the underlying documents, so any error would be of no moment.^FN3

Regarding Officer Monahan, the defense objects to his not being listed in the automatic disclosure form as a witness or person with information about the case, even though his body-worn camera footage and activity logs were disclosed to the defense. Defense's Mot. at 9; see also Defense's Mot., Ex. C. The defense is correct that Officer Monahan is not listed in the automatic disclosure form; to the extent that Officer Monahan has "evidence or information relevant to any offense charged or to any potential defense thereto," C.P.L. § 245.20(1)(d), this could be a formal error in the People's discovery materials. But while omissions of this sort can sometimes cause mischief, the defense was actually aware of Officer Monahan due to the aforementioned disclosures, softening the impact of the omission—even assuming there was any formal "omission" at all, as Officer Monahan's name and work affiliation might have been set out elsewhere in the discovery proffer.

Finally, the defense contends that (1) an "unauthorized use" notation in the arrest report may be potentially exculpatory, and that documents connected to that notation should have been disclosed, and (2) an inconsistency in the officers who are named as the arresting and desk officers in the defense's version of the DAT requires a hearing and potential invalidation of the COC. Defense's Mot. at 9-11. The People respond that (1) no relevant documents have been produced by the NYPD pertaining to the unauthorized use issue, and (2) any discrepancy in the DAT was immaterial, as the record otherwise confirms that Officer Fennell was the arresting officer. See People's Resp. at 18-19.

As the basis for the stop might be relevant to the suppression issues raised by the defense, the People are ORDERED to investigate the "unauthorized use" issue and produce the fruits of that investigation to the defense. Regarding the discrepancy in the DAT, the People have the better argument. The trial court may of course exercise its discretion to permit the defense to utilize the document reflecting the wrong officers for, among other things, impeachment purposes.

In sum, none of the identified deficiencies, either individually or cumulatively, requires invalidating the COC, as the C.P.L. § 245.50(5)(a) factors—which have all been considered—weigh in favor of the People. In light of the narrow scope of the defense's objections, the People have met their burden of demonstrating due diligence in connection with their statutory discovery obligations.^FN4 See C.P.L. § 245.50(5)(a); People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200, [*4]211-12 (2023). The COC is thus deemed VALID and, as previously mentioned, the branch of the motion seeking dismissal on this ground is DENIED.

Regarding facial sufficiency, the allegations contained in the misdemeanor information establish both reasonable cause and a prima facie case, rendering the instrument facially sufficient. See People v. Burgess, — NY3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op 02438, at *1 (Apr. 23, 2026).

The defendant is charged with fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon in violation of P.L. § 265.01(1) for allegedly possessing a switchblade. The deponent officer states that the officer tested the knife, which has a "blade that is released from the handle by the application of hand pressure applied to a spring, lever or other device on the handle," and concluded based on training and experience that the knife was a switchblade. Defense's Mot., Ex. A at 1.

As an initial matter, any discrepancy between the accusatory instrument and arrest documentation is irrelevant to facial sufficiency. "Facial sufficiency depends on the adequacy of the factual allegations contained within the four corners of the accusatory instrument, and a court may only consider additional documents if the accusatory instrument appends, references, or incorporates them." People v. Morel, — NY3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op. 00822, at *2 (Feb. 17, 2026). Defects that do not appear on the face of the instrument, or in the limited materials that may otherwise be considered, are "latent" and do not undermine facial sufficiency. People v. Slade, 37 NY3d 127, 137-38 (2021). So while these discrepancies may be relevant for other purposes, they do not bear on the facial sufficiency of the accusatory instrument.

The allegations are otherwise sufficient. While the defense correctly observes that the officer's observations parrot the definition of a switchblade found in P.L. § 265.00(4), matching the language of the statute does not render those observations conclusory. A statement is conclusory if it pleads a legal label disguised as a fact, or expresses "a factual inference without stating the underlying facts on which the inference is based." Conclusory, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Here, by contrast, the officer described why the knife was a switchblade, and did not resort to unsupported legal labels.

Moreover, and contrary to the defense's contention, see Defense's Mot. at 4; Defense's Reply at 2, neither People v. Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100 (2010), nor People v. Ocasio, 28 NY3d 178 (2016), requires that an accusatory instrument detail the test conducted to determine the nature of a putative prohibited weapon. Under Dreyden, an officer is expected only to "explain briefly, with reference to his training and experience, how he or she formed the belief that the object observed in defendant's possession was" a prohibited item. Dreyden, 15 NY3d at 104. The allegations here satisfy that Dreyden's requirement, and Ocasio is not otherwise on point.

Furthermore, at least one subsequent Court of Appeals decision undermines the defense's contention that a test must be described with greater specificity. In People v. Sans, 26 NY3d 13, 15-17 (2015), an allegation that an officer "tested the . . . knife and determined that it was a gravity knife, in that it opens with centrifugal force and locks automatically in place" permitted the reasonable inference "that the officer flicked the knife open with his wrist," so "the officer's failure to specify the precise motion he used to open the knife did not . . . amount to a jurisdictional defect." Here, as in Sans, the officer's description of the knife permits the reasonable inference that the officer applied pressure to a spring, lever, or other device, releasing the blade from the handle. Thus, dismissal is not warranted.

As set forth above, Mapp/Huntley^[FN5]/Dunaway/Ingle hearings are granted. All Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia/preclusion issues are referred to the trial court. Any request for relief not specifically mentioned is DENIED.

Dated: May 29, 2026

Bronx, NY

David L. Goodwin

Judge of the Criminal Court