Supreme Court, Kings County

Decided on May 26, 2026

IND-75222-25

Dale Fong-Frederick, J.

[*1]

The defendant, Tyrone Blackburn, is charged with Assault in the Second Degree (PL §120.05[14]) and other related charges. The defendant moves for an order dismissing the indictment (CPL §210.35[5]). The People oppose.

For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion is granted.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

It is alleged that on May 12, 2025, while the complainant, Jim Hunt ("Hunt"), was attempting to serve the defendant with a summons and complaint in a civil proceeding, the defendant reversed his car, struck and injured the complainant, and then left the scene without exchanging information with Hunt or contacting the police, while knowing or having reason to know that Hunt was injured. On June 25, 2025, the defendant was arraigned on a felony complaint in lower criminal court charging him with several counts of Assault in the Second Degree (PL §§120.05[2], 120.05[4], and 120.05[12]) and other related charges. The defendant then testified before the Grand Jury on October 15, 2025. The Grand Jury voted to indict the defendant. The defendant was arraigned on the indictment in Supreme Court on October 29, 2025. The defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss the indictment.

GRAND JURY EVIDENCE

1. The People's Witness

In the Grand Jury, the People presented testimony from Hunt, as well as an eyewitness named Nicholas Palmeri ("Palmeri"), and Detective Jason Sharp. Hunt is a private investigator who had been hired to serve process on the defendant. According to Hunt, on May 12, 2025, Hunt and Palmeri went to the defendant's address and observed the defendant park in his driveway and remain seated in the driver's seat of his vehicle. Hunt went to the defendant's [*2]vehicle and waited for a couple of minutes for the defendant to exit. The defendant did not exit the vehicle and instead put the car in reverse. Hunt got behind the car and tapped on it. Hunt walked to the driver's side, told the defendant he was served, and put the papers under the windshield wiper of the car. The defendant turned the wheel, reversed the vehicle, hit Hunt's left knee, and drove away.

Palmeri testified that Hunt initially stood off to the left of the rear driver's side of the defendant's vehicle. Hunt approached the driver's side window and told the defendant that he was served. The defendant reversed and struck Hunt with the left wheel of the vehicle. Palmeri grabbed Hunt and pulled him away from the vehicle, so it did not roll over Hunt's knee. Palmeri recorded the incident on his cellphone.

The People introduced videos of the incident. On video, Hunt can be seen moving with the vehicle as it reverses. Hunt visibly stumbles but remains standing. The defendant's vehicle pauses, and the defendant is seen to be mouthing words at Hunt and Palmeri through the closed car window. The defendant makes various hand gestures while mouthing words at Hunt and Palmeri. Hunt's injury is visibly bleeding on the side of his left knee. The defendant then drives away and Hunt limps away.

2. The defendant's direct testimony

The defendant is a "licensed lawyer here in the City of New York" (Blackburn tr at 11, lines 10-11). The defendant has "been practicing law since around 2015 . . . [representing] individuals who are survivors of sexual assault" as well as handling "employees against their employers," and "survivors of medical malpractice" (Blackburn tr at 11, lines 13-18).

Prior to May 12, 2025, he had been served four times in the same lawsuit, despite sending a waiver of service to the opposing counsel. On May 12, 2025, the defendant was present at the Sean Combs trial, as he represented several people who testified or provided information in that trial. The defendant was harassed and threatened by people while leaving the Sean Combs trial where people knocked on his vehicle window, followed him with phones, and yelled and screamed. He "didn't think anything of it" (Blackburn tr at 14, lines 1-2). The defendant drove from court at the Southern District of New York to his home in Brooklyn.

After driving home and pulling into his driveway, the defendant stayed in the vehicle while talking to a client on the phone. While speaking with his client, he began to reverse out of the driveway to go to the store, at which point he did not see anyone near his car. The defendant's vehicle had sensors that notified him if there was anyone around the vehicle and automatically braked if it detected anything within two to three feet. The vehicle had a black box that kept records of collisions, and he had a screenshot of the black box register that showed the last time his vehicle was involved in a collision, which was on April 25, 2025.

While the defendant was reversing his vehicle, he looked around and didn't see anyone, but he suddenly heard banging on his driver's side window and tugging on his door handle. The defendant thought someone had followed him home from the trial and screamed. When he looked out his window, the defendant saw one man holding up a cell phone and another man with something large and black in his hand. He believed the black object was a gun, feared for his life, and continued to reverse. One of the men then jumped on the hood of his vehicle and stuck something in his windshield and then jumped off. The defendant then drove two blocks away, pulled over to get the item that was on his windshield, at which point he discovered that it was the legal papers from the lawsuit for which he had been previously served. The defendant expressly stated that he never hit Hunt with his car. He said that he is an officer of the court and [*3]has never been arrested before, but he was taken into custody and fingerprinted.

3. Cross-examination of the Defendant

The People focused their cross-examination of the defendant on three topics: the incident itself, service of the civil suit, and allegations of the defendant's purported prior attorney misconduct. The transcript of the People's cross-examination consisted of approximately 47 questions about the incident and approximately 70 questions about service of the unrelated civil suit and attorney misconduct.

The People commenced cross-examination by asking the defendant to identify himself in the video and to provide his cellphone number and email address. The People then questioned the defendant about the underlying incident, during which the following colloquy ensued:

Q: Now, at that time, an old man approached your car?

A: At that time, like I said before, two males approached my car. I did not know anyone's age. I couldn't tell from how they look what age they were. (Blackburn tr at 25, lines 8-11).

The defendant stated that he never spoke with the men and could not hear their voices because he had his air conditioner on. He stated that he never saw the two men until he was halfway out of his driveway. He was facing backwards to reverse when one of the men ran up to the vehicle and banged on his window, at which point he had already cleared the driveway. He thought the black rolled up object was a gun, and it was not until after he drove away that the defendant looked at the object under his windshield and learned that it was paperwork for the civil proceeding.

During this line of questioning the following colloquy transpired:

Q: To be clear, the object that you believed he was holding that was a gun, that's the same object that he put under your windshield wiper, correct?

A: No. Incorrect. If you want me to elaborate, I can.

Q: No, sir. So, he had a second black object then?

A: Could I answer? Okay . . . . So, it's not a simple yes or no that what I believed he had in his hand was a gun was stuck into my windshield. He stuck something in my windshield and I thought he had a gun. Two of those things can be true at the same time

Q: Now, after you struck the individual with your car, you actually sat in your car for a period of time, right, on the street?

A: I did not hit anybody with my car.

Q: After an individual was struck. Fair to say?

A: I did not hit anyone with my car.

Q: After the incident in your driveway, sir, however we want to characterize it, you sat in the street for a period of time and looked at the individuals, correct? (Blackburn tr at 31, line 7, through 32, line 18).

The People inquired about the defendant having waived service of process in the unrelated civil suit for which Hunt and Palmeri had come to serve him. Referring to an email exchange between the defendant and opposing counsel in the unrelated civil suit, the following colloquy occurred:

Q: Now, sir, you mentioned that you were willing to waive service of process for this civil case that was being filed against you. Is that right?

A: Yes.

Q: But isn't it true that you were only willing to do that under certain conditions that were not agreed to?

A: No, not true at all, and if you're referring —

Q: So, you never emailed Joe Tacopina saying that you would only waive service if he met you at the federal DA's office?

A: No. I said to Joe Tacopina, in an email, which I don't have in front of me, but I will be more than happy to present it to you guys, that's accusing me of engaging in acts of extortion for having — engaging in free litigation communications. And I said, if you believe that I extorted your client, meet me at the Southern District of New York and present your case for extortion and I will bring my client and he will present his case for sex trafficking, and we will see who the prosecutors arrest. I have —

MR. PRINCE: Madam Foreperson, at this point I have to ask you to instruct the witness to answer the question.

THE WITNESS: He asked me a question. I'm trying to answer it.

FOREPERSON: Sir, please just answer the question.

THE WITNESS: I am trying to.

Q: I will reask [sic]. The condition for you waiving service was that Mr. Tacopina meet you at the federal DA's office, per your email to him on May 8, 2025?

A: No because according to the April 29th email where I said to him, I would waive service of process and he responded good, I'm happy that you would waive service of process, and attached a copy of the complaint that had just been filed, I was already served at that point. So whatever emails back and forth that he — him and I had after that point, I — I had already been served four times. There was no purpose for us to — for him to even continue to try to serve me. I had already been served. I have all the certifications of service. It was filed in the Southern District of New York docket.

Q: You're a lawyer, right?

A: Yes.

Q: So you know the important of serving process?

A: Of course.

Q: It is a requirement to bring a lawsuit, right?

A: Yes...

...

Q: Process servers traditionally serve papers on people personally, correct?

A: Not necessarily, no. As evidenced by the fact that they served me four times prior, and it was never done through personal service. Like I said before, I am a PLLC, and once you serve it on the Secretary of State, that's serving it on me, and they had already accomplished that weeks in advance, and more times — five times, essentially, if you add the May 12th.

Q: The traditional way to serve somebody is to hand them and say "you are served;" everybody understands that?

A: That's not accurate. (Blackburn tr at 35, line 8, through at 37, line 10; at 37 line 18, through 38, line 7).

The People then questioned the defendant about an unrelated matter he handled as an [*4]attorney where he allegedly filed jurisdictionally defective lawsuits in Federal Court. During this line of questioning, the following colloquy ensued:

Q: There are a number of cases where you filed federal lawsuits in the wrong jurisdiction. Isn't that correct?

A: If you're talking about the opinion from Judge Denise Cote in the Souther[n] District of New York, that was a case which, if you're gonna bring it up, please allow me to explain it; I will be more than happy to.

Q: Please allow me to ask the questions.

A: Ask your question.

Q: Now, you had a case in front of her. Yes or no?

A: Yes, I did. It lasted about 60 days.

Q: And that was a case where you had filed a lawsuit in the wrong jurisdiction.

A: I filed a lawsuit in the jurisdiction that I believed was accurate in accordance with my research and in accordance with what my client provided me.

Q: But it turned out to not be the correct one, right?

A: And when I learned that, I withdrew it, as I am required to do under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It was voluntary dismissal without prejudice. So, I can re-file it in state court, which is what I did.

Q: Now, Judge Cote looked at some prior cases where you had done similar things, right; filed cases in the wrong jurisdiction?

A: There were, I think, about six cases that I had filed — I don't have it in front of me — in the Southern District of New York. One of them I was acting as—

Q: The question is just whether she brought up the other cases.

A: She did, and she wasn't the judge on any of those cases.

Q: Now in — And she reviewed all those, and issued a decision and an order in your case that you had in front of her, correct?

A: She issued an opinion, yes.

Q: Now, in her opinion, you improperly filed cases in federal court to garner media attention. Isn't that right?

A: That's what she said, but not true.

Q: And to embarrass defendants with salacious allegations.

A: That's her opinion. Again, not true.

Q: And to pressure defendants to settle quickly. That's her opinion of you, correct?

A: That's her opinion, and I don't agree with that opinion, because as is the case with any case, I don't pick my — I pick my clients; I don't pick their facts. Clients come with facts and evidence, and you put that together, and you file the lawsuit based on the facts and the evidence that's presented to you, so long as there is a colorable area of law that you believe has been violated. I am an advocate. I advocate on behalf of individuals of sexual assaults, survivors of sexual assault. I am a survivor of sexual assault. That's why I do the work that I do.

MR. PRINCE: Madam Foreperson, at this point I have to ask you to instruct the witness again.

FOREPERSON: Can you please answer the question.

Q: The question has been answered, sir.

A: Okay.

Q: Judge Cote referred you to the Grievance Committee for your conduct on all those cases, correct?

A: She said she would. She never did. (Blackburn tr at 40, line 4, through 42, line 24).

The People also questioned the defendant about another unrelated case in which another Federal judge found that the defendant filed motions with hallucinated citations. The defendant did not dispute that his motion papers contained hallucinated citations and stated that when upgrading his research tool, it used a new Artificial Intelligence ("A.I.") component that hallucinated citations. The defendant testified that relying on the A.I. component had been a mistake, not intentional or malicious, and that he was not careful in reviewing his motion papers.

During this portion of cross-examination, the following colloquy transpired:

Q: It is June 26, 2025 decision.

A: Okay. So, that's the Order to Show Cause when he asked me to come in and explain what happened. And in his October opinion, after he had made his final decision, he said that what I did was not novel, and that it's a trend within the industry since the introduction of AI And as I explained to you earlier, there were two federal judges who had to pull opinions because of the same thing.

MR. PRINCE: Madam Foreperson, please instruct the witness.

FOREPERSON: Please answer the question.

THE WITNESS: Sorry.

Q: If you want to bring up the October decision, we can look at that also.

A: He fined me $5,000.

Q: You had to go and make arguments at an Order to Show Cause; basically, explain yourself; explain why these fabricated motions were being filed.

A: To explain what happened with LexisNexis, the new program I was using.

Q: Now, Judge Stickman, in his October 5, 2025 opinion, said: The Court does not find Blackburn's explanation of what occurred entirely credible. Is that true? That's what he said?

A: Okay.

Q: Correct? Yes or no?

A: Yes; that's what he wrote. (Blackburn tr. at 49, line 8, through 50, line 12).

The Grand Jury requested to see the defendant's black box evidence and the email exchange that the defendant testified to for their review. However, the People instructed the Grand Jury that they did not have the proper foundational witness available to introduce the information from the black box or the email and instructed the Grand Jury not to speculate about the black box information or about what was contained in the email. The Grand Jury returned a True Bill.

ANALYSIS

The court may dismiss an indictment that fails to conform to the requirements of Article 190 of the Criminal Procedure Law when the error rises to such a degree that the integrity of the Grand Jury proceeding is impaired and prejudice to the defendant may result (CPL §§210.35[5], 210.20[1]; People v Thompson, 22 NY3d 687, 691 [2014]). Dismissal of an indictment pursuant to CPL §210.35(5) should be limited to those instances where there is prosecutorial wrongdoing, [*5]fraudulent conduct, or errors that potentially prejudice the ultimate decision reached by the grand jury (People v Huston, 88 NY2d 400 [1996]). Although this statutory test is precise and very high, it does not require actual prejudice, but rather that prejudice to the defendant may result (id. at 409). Improper hearsay elicited in the Grand Jury may be considered a defect but will generally only be deemed fatal where the remaining evidence is insufficient to sustain the charges (People v Moffitt, 20 AD3d 687 [3d Dept], lv denied [2005]). Not every improper comment, elicitation of inadmissible testimony, or impermissible question will render an indictment defective, nor will isolated instances of misconduct automatically rise to the level that the possibility of prejudice will ensue and impair the integrity of the proceedings (id.; People v. Alicea, 276 AD2d 915 [3d Dept], lv denied [2001]). Rather, "[t]he likelihood of prejudice turns on the particular facts of each case, including the weight and nature of admissible proof adduced to support the indictment and the degree of inappropriate prosecutorial influence or bias," and, "where irregularities in presenting the case to the Grand Jury rise to the level of impairing those proceedings and creating the risk of prejudice" (Huston at 410). Where such irregularities exist, the indictment cannot stand even if supported by legally sufficient evidence (id.)

The People have "broad power and duties, as well as wide discretion in presenting" their case to the Grand Jury (Huston at 406). The People must exercise impartial judgment and discretion in providing both legal instructions to the Grand Jury and determining what evidence is presented or excluded (People v Di Falco, 44 NY2d 482 [1978]). However, this discretion is not absolute. As the Grand Jury's legal advisor, the People perform the dual functions of investigating criminal activity to determine if charges are warranted and protecting individuals from needless or baseless prosecutions (People v Lancaster, 69 NY2d 20 [1986]). The People are "charged with the duty not only to secure indictments but also to see that justice is done" (id. at 26; see also, People v Pelchat, 62 NY2d 97, 105 [1984]). With great power comes great responsibility, including "the People's duty of fair dealing" (Pelchat at 104; see also Huston at 406). The People may not act as an unsworn witness by expressing their own personal beliefs on matters which may influence the jury or suggesting the existence of facts not in evidence (People v Paperno, 54 NY2d 294 [1981]). Such conduct violates their duty of fair dealing and impairs the integrity of the Grand Jury when it rises to the level that prejudice to the defendant may result (CPL §210.35[5]; Huston, supra; Pelchat, supra).

1. Examination of the Defendant

In oral arguments the People conceded that the Grand Jury's determination in this case would be based largely on the Grand Jury's evaluation of the credibility of the main witnesses: Hunt and the defendant. Here, the People's cross-examination focused mostly on efforts to attack the defendant's credibility. Their questions on cross-examination involved instances of improper characterization of Hunt as an old man; belittling the defendant for not acquiescing to the People's characterization of the allegations as either the defendant striking Hunt with his vehicle or that an individual was struck with his vehicle; unfounded assertions that the defendant was not credible because he filed papers in the wrong jurisdiction in Federal court despite the absence of any judicial hearing or disciplinary committee finding of attorney misconduct; and even where there was a judicial determination of misconduct for filing legal papers with hallucinated citations that went to credibility, the People improperly characterized the finding to imply that the defendant intentionally fabricated citations. The People's cross-examination of the defendant was improper (Paperno, supra).

a. Improperly filed Federal suits

While not all hearsay evidence will render an indictment defective, here, the People introduced allegations that the defendant had a pattern of intentionally filing court pleadings in the wrong jurisdiction to gain media attention, tactical advantage, and embarrass litigants. This hearsay was not introduced by a sworn rebuttal witness or admissible documentary evidence, but rather by the People as an unsworn witness and was presented for its truth. This inappropriate prosecutorial influence was not just an isolated instance of improper questioning, but part of a pattern of questions that encompassed more than half of the People's cross-examination (Huston, supra; cf. Alicea, supra).

More troubling was that the hearsay regarding the improper filing of civil suits did not address the credibility of the defendant. Indeed, there is no evidence that the Federal judge made a finding of misconduct, only that the Federal judge intended to refer the conduct to a disciplinary committee. There was no evidence that the Federal judge sanctioned the defendant or that the conduct was ever referred to a disciplinary committee and the committee made a finding of misconduct that went to the defendant's credibility. Under these particular facts, the introduction of the hearsay constitutes an inappropriate prosecutorial influence that rises to a level that impaired the Grand Jury function and may have prejudiced the defendant (Pelchat, supra; Houston, supra; Moffitt, supra).

b. Service of Process

The People also erred by questioning the defendant about the contents of emails regarding service of process in the unrelated civil proceeding. This was compounded by the People instructing the Grand Jury that they did not have the proper witnesses available to introduce the emails after the defendant testified that he could provide them to the Grand Jury if they wanted to review the emails. There is also no indication that the People made any effort to obtain the proper witness to introduce the documents despite the Grand Jury request.

In any event, this hearsay was introduced by the People and was presented for the truth of the matter asserted but had no bearing on the defendant's credibility as presented. In their failure to lay a foundation to impeach the defendant, the People conceded that the defendant waived service but that the waiver was conditional. This distinction had no probative value and only served to mislead the jury and potentially prejudice the defendant. Indeed, from the questions asked it was clear that the People, the legal advisor to the Grand Jury (CPL§190.25[6]), was unfamiliar with the law concerning service of process on an individual (CPLR §308) or a corporation (CPLR §311). Instead, the People impermissibly inserted an inference that is not grounded in law or fact: that everybody knows the traditional way to serve process is to hand papers and say you've been served. While this may be true on television, it is not the law in New York State.

By introducing this misleading evidence, the People again became an unsworn witness by inserting their own beliefs into the proceeding instead of presenting admissible evidence to impeach the defendant's credibility regarding a denial of service of process, and through their improper influence mislead the Grand Jury on a legal standard. In doing so, the People failed to exercise impartial judgment (Difalco, 44 NY2d 482; Paperno, 54 NY2d 294) and violated their duty of fair dealing (Pelchat, supra; Huston, supra). Moreover, the Grand Jury's request to review the email indicates that the Grand Jurors did consider this line of questioning as germane to their decision and, therefore, it may have resulted in prejudice to the defendant (CPL §§210.35[5], 210.20[1]; Thompson, supra).

c. A.I. Hallucinations

The People's questions regarding the Federal court's finding that the defendant was not entirely credible was an appropriate cross-examination subject. This subject matter was based on a judicial finding, after an Order to Show Cause, that bore directly on the defendant's credibility. However, it was improper for the People to question the defendant on the underlying facts regarding use of A.I., when that information itself was irrelevant to the defendant's credibility. The evidence before the Grand Jury was the defendant's response to the Order to Show Cause was not entirely credible and not that the defendant intentionally fabricated citations. The People should have simply asked if the Federal judge had sanctioned the defendant after finding that his responses to the legal issue were not credible and presented admissible evidence to complete the impeachment if the defendant denied the finding and sanction. Standing alone, this error would be an insufficient basis to warrant the drastic remedy of dismissal, but when taken in conjunction with a largely impermissible cross-examination, it lends further support to the potential of prejudice to the defendant.

The totality of the People's cross-examination of the defendant undermined their duty of fair dealing and may have impaired the Grand Jury's fact-finding process (Pelchat, supra; Huston, supra; Thompson, supra). While the People provided some curative and limiting instructions during the proceedings, the cumulative impact of the People's improper questioning on issues of credibility impaired the integrity of the Grand Jury proceedings and may have resulted in prejudice to the defendant, thus warranting dismissal of the indictment (Huston, supra).

Under the facts presented, the motion to dismiss the indictment is granted on these grounds.

2. Notice of the Scope of the Grand Jury Presentation

The People are not required to provide notice to a defendant regarding the expanded scope of the Grand Jury proceedings (People v Guzman, 233 AD2d 527 [2d Dept 1996]). Once the People have "notified the defendant that the charges in the felony complaint would be presented to the Grand Jury, the People [have] satisfied their statutory obligation" (People v Choi, 210 AD2d 495, 496 [2d Dept], app denied 85 NY2d 971 [1995]; see also, Guzman, supra). Here, the People met their statutory obligation with the felony complaint (Choi, supra; People v Feliciano, 207 AD2d 803 [2d Dept], app denied 84 NY2d 1031 [1995]). The charges in the indictment involved the same complainant and incident contained in the felony complaint, and the "defendant [should] have been aware that the nature and scope of the Grand Jury's inquiry could lead to less or more serious charges" (Guzman, supra).

Since the People satisfied their notice obligation, the motion to dismiss is denied on these grounds (Guzman, supra; Feliciano, supra; Choi, supra).

3. Exculpatory Information

The defendant argues that the People failed to present exculpatory evidence to the Grand Jury by (1) not playing the entire surveillance videos; (2) not presenting Hunt's medical records; and (3) not presenting affidavits of service which showed Hunt's ability to work in the days after the incident. The People are not obligated to disclose all evidence in their possession that is favorable to the defendant or to instruct the Grand Jury as to every possible defense suggested by the evidence at the Grand Jury stage (Lancaster at 26). The integrity of the Grand Jury proceedings was not impaired by the People's decision not to present any of the evidence challenged by the defendant (id.).

The motion to dismiss the indictment is denied on these grounds (Huston, supra;[*6]Lancaster, supra).

4. Justification, and Assumption of the Risk Instructions

When viewing the evidence presented to this Grand Jury in the light most favorable to the defendant, the People were not required to charge the justification defense in this criminal action. Indeed, the court is hard pressed to see the validity of this argument where the defendant is alleged to have been inside of his vehicle the entire time leading up to the alleged collision with Hunt, who was a pedestrian, and the defendant claimed he did not even know Hunt was present. Furthermore, the defendant repeatedly denied striking Hunt with his vehicle. Since the use of physical force is a necessary component of the justification defense, the evidence does not support the need for the Grand Jury to make a determination regarding justification or appropriate use of force (PL §35.15; People v Valles, 62 NY2d 36 [1984]; People v Mitchell, 82 NY2d 509 [1993]; People v. Ramjit, 203 AD2d 488 [2nd Dept 1994]; People v Singh, 139 AD3d 761 [2d Dept], lv denied 28 NY3d 936 [2016]).

The charge of assumption of risk is inapplicable (Morgan v. State, 90 NY2d 471 [1997]).

The motion to dismiss is denied on these grounds.

CONCLUSION

The evidence presented by the People to the Grand Jury, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People, was sufficient to establish the offenses charged. However, improper cross-examination of the defendant impaired the integrity of the Grand Jury proceedings to such a degree that it may have resulted in prejudice, and the indictment cannot stand even though otherwise sufficient (Huston, 88 NY2d 400).

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, that the indictment is dismissed with leave to re-present.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: May 26, 2026

Kings County, New York

Hon. Dale Fong-Frederick

Acting Justice, Supreme Court