Supreme Court, Rockland County

Decided on May 29, 2026

Index No. 031805/2023

John P. Collins, Jr., J.

[*1]

The following papers numbered 1- 10 were read and considered in connection with Plaintiff's Notice of Motion (Motion Seq. No. 1) for an Order (a) pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3212 and Labor Law § 200, granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants JASON KANTER, KRISTINE LINDSAY and GEORGE HODOSH ASSOCIATES-ARCHITECTS, P.C.; (b) pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3212 and Labor Law § 240(1), granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants JASON KANTER, KRISTINE LINDSAY and GEORGE HODOSH ASSOCIATES-ARCHITECTS, P.C.; (c) pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3212 and Labor Law § 241(6) and Industrial Codes §§ 23-1.7(f), 23-1.11, and 23-2.7(e) granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants JASON KANTER, KRISTINE LINDSAY and GEORGE HODOSH ASSOCIATES-ARCHITECTS, P.C.; and (d) granting Plaintiff such other, further and different relief as this Court deems just, proper and equitable; and also read and considered in connection with Defendant GEORGE HODOSH ASSOCIATES-ARCHITECTS, P.C.'s Notice of Motion (Motion Seq. No. 2) for an Order pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3212 (a) for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's Verified Complaint against GEORGE HODOSH ASSOCIATES-ARCHITECTS, P.C. in its entirety; (b) for summary judgment against Defendants JASON KANTER and KRISTINE LINDSAY on GEORGE HODOSH ASSOCIATES-ARCHITECTS, P.C.'s cross-claims for common law indemnification and failure to procure insurance; and (c) granting such other, further and different relief as this Court deems just and proper; and also read and considered in conjunction with Defendants JASON KANTER and KRISTINE LINDSAY's Notice of Motion (Motion Seq. No. 3) for an Order pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3212, granting summary judgment and dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint and for such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper:

[*2]PAPERS      NUMBERED

Notice of Motion (Motion Seq. No. 1)/Affirmation of Julia Fayziyev, Esq./Exhibits A-M 1

Notice of Motion (Motion Seq. No. 2)/Affirmation of Christopher J. Biggin, Esq./ Exhibits A-Q/Expert Affirmation of Anthony S. DiPropezio, AIA/Statement of Material Facts/Memorandum of Law in Support 2

Notice of Motion (Motion Seq. No. 3)/Affirmation of Brian K. Condon, Esq./Exhibits A-B 3

Affirmation of Christopher J. Biggin, Esq. in Opposition (Motion Seq. No.1)/ Exhibit A/Response to Statement of Material Facts/Affirmation ofAnthony S. DiPropezio, AIA^FN1 4

Affirmation of Christopher J. Biggin, Esq. in Opposition (Motion Seq. No. 3)/ Exhibit A/Response to Statement of Material Facts/Affirmation ofAnthony S. DiPropezio, AIA^FN2 5

Affirmation of Brian K. Condon, Esq. in Opposition (Motion Seq. No. 1)/Exhibit A 6

Affirmation of Julia Fayziyev, Esq. in Opposition (Motion Seq. No. 2) 7

Affirmation of Julia Fayziyev, Esq. in Opposition (Motion Seq. No. 3) 8

Reply Affirmation of Christopher J. Biggin, Esq. (Motion Seq. No. 2) 9

Affirmation of Brian K. Condon, Esq. in further support of motion (Motion Seq. No. 3) 10

The instant action is a negligence action to recover for personal injuries sustained by the Plaintiff on December 27, 2022, while inside 7 Indian Hill Lane, Palisades, New York -- owned by Defendants JASON KANTER and KRIS LINDSAY (hereinafter KANTER and LINDSAY)-- when the staircase he was using to descend to the basement collapsed causing the Plaintiff to fall approximately six (6) feet to the ground.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Plaintiff commenced the instant action with the filing of a Summons and Complaint on April 25, 2023. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 1. Defendant GEORGE HODOSH ASSOCIATES-ARCHITECTS, P.C. (hereinafter GHA) was served personally on April 13, 2025, at 120 North Main Street, Suite 501, New City, New York by service on Audrey Lupachino, an associate. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 2. Defendant GHA was also served pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 306 by service on the Office of the Secretary of State of the State of New York. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 6. Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY were served on May 5, 2023, at 7 Indian Hill Lane, Palisades, New York pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 308(4). See NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 3, 4.

Defendant GHA joined issue on May 16, 2023, with the filing of a Verified Answer raising sixteen (16) Affirmative Defenses and two (2) cross-claims against Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 9. Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY joined issue on June 16, 2023, with the filing of a Verified Answer^FN3 raising sixteen (16) Affirmative Defenses. [*3]See NYSCEF Doc. No. 27. Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY also joined issue on June 16, 2023, as to Defendant GHA's cross-claims with the filing of a Verified Answer^FN4 raising Affirmative Defenses.

Plaintiff filed a Note of Issue on November 11, 2025, certifying that the matter was ready for trial. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 75. Plaintiff filed a timely motion for summary judgment (Motion Seq. No. 1) on January 7, 2026. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 94-109. Defendant GHA filed a timely motion for summary judgment (Motion Seq. No. 2) on January 9, 2026. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 110-128. Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY filed a timely motion for summary judgment (Motion Seq. No. 3) on January 9, 2026.

FACTS

Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY purchased the premises located at 7 Indian Hill Lane, Palisades, New York (hereinafter "the premises") in or about October 2019. On January 24, 2020,^FN5 Defendant KANTER^FN6 entered into a contract, titled "Architecture Agreement," with Defendant GHA^FN7 for architectural services related to the premises. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 117. On August 27, 2020,^FN8 Defendant KANTER^FN9 entered into a contract, titled "Construction Management Agreement," with Defendant GHA for "the completion of construction work" at the premises based upon plans from August 26, 2020, and an attached preliminary estimate. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 117, Construction Management Agreement, ¶ 2. On March 5, 2021^FN10 Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY entered into a contract, titled "Contractor Agreement," [*4]with Woodford Mechanical Services, LLC (hereinafter "WMS")^FN11 for plumbing services based upon a proposal dated February 10, 2021, attached to the contract.^FN12See NYSCEF Doc. No. 118.

Construction Management Agreement

The Construction Management Agreement (hereinafter "Construction Agreement") entered into by Defendant KANTER and GHA defines construction management services as follows: "that GHA shall, on behalf of Owner, assist Owner in hiring all contractors, obtaining all material and supplies, supervising either directly or indirectly all labor, inspecting and approving all work, and otherwise managing and controlling the progress of The Project from the date hereof to the completion of the Project." See NYSCEF Doc. No. 117, Construction Management Agreement, ¶ 3.

As to payment of "contractor," the Construction Agreement states that all invoices from contractors are to be sent to GHA, which would disseminate the invoices to Defendant KANTER every Wednesday for payment by the following Friday with "all approved payments . . . dispersed by GHA from the Construction Account to each contractor."See NYSCEF Doc. No. 117, Construction Management Agreement, ¶5. Further, the Construction Agreement explicitly states that Defendant KANTER was prohibited from paying a contractor directly without the approval of GHA and that no payments would be sent by GHA to a contractor or supplier without KANTER's approval. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 117, Construction Management Agreement, ¶5, 15.

The Construction Agreement contains a clause requiring Defendant KANTER to contract directly with "all contractors, laborers, materialmen, tradesmen, and others who provide labor, services, and/or material in connection with The Project" and that "[u]nder no circumstances shall GHA be financially or legally responsible to any of the aforementioned, nor shall GHA serve as guarantor of any such payments."See NYSCEF Doc. No. 117, Construction Management Agreement, ¶ 6.

However, the Construction Agreement provides that all contracts and agreements between Defendant KANTER and the contractors as to the construction project were required to be negotiated by GHA "on behalf of the owner" and in fact prohibited Defendant KANTER from entering into contracts or amendments to contracts without GHA's written approval. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 117, Construction Management Agreement, ¶ 7.

As to insurance, the Construction Agreement provides that Defendant KANTER was required to maintain "adequate insurance" or payment of all contractors, suppliers and material men "in the event of a casualty." See NYSCEF Doc. No. 117, Construction Management Agreement,¶ 16. Further, Defendant KANTER was required to maintain "adequate liability insurance (minimum $1,000,000) for the duration of The Project." See NYSCEF Doc. No. 117, Construction Management Agreement, ¶17.

With regard to the supervision and control of the construction work, the Construction Agreement provides that Defendant "GHA shall visit the premises . . . on a periodic and as-needed basis to assure timely completion and workmanlike performance." See NYSCEF Doc. No. 117, Construction Management Agreement, ¶ 24. Further, the Construction Agreement provides that "GHA shall to the extent possible serve as Owner's [KANTER] representative in the event a dispute arises with any person or entity providing services or materials in connection [*5]with The Project, except in the case of litigation." See NYSCEF Doc. No. 117, Construction Management Agreement, ¶ 24.

Contract Between Defendants KANTER, LINDSAY and Woodford Mechanical Services, LLC

On March 5, 2021, Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY entered into a contract, titled "Contractor Agreement," with WMS for plumbing services based upon a proposal dated February 10, 2021. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 118. The Contractor Agreement with WMS provides an acknowledgment that GHA was retained by Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY as construction manager and, as a result, changes to work being performed and payments to be made would only be binding upon GHA's approval. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 118, Contractor Agreement, ¶ 2. Similarly, the next paragraph of the Contractor Agreement provides an acknowledgment that all invoices were to be submitted to Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY by "c/o" of Defendant GHA and that payments would only be made after written approval by Defendant GHA. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 118, Contractor Agreement, ¶3.

Contract Between Defendants KANTER, LINDSAY and Riverview Restoration Corporation

On September 28, 2020, Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY^FN13 entered into a contract, titled "Contractor Agreement," with Riverview Restoration Corporation (hereinafter "RRC") for construction services based upon a proposal dated September 23, 2020, which was allegedly attached to the contract.^FN14See NYSCEF Doc. No. 118. The Contractor Agreement with RRC provides an acknowledgment that GHA was retained by Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY as construction manager and as a result changes to work to being performed and payments to be made would only be binding upon GHA's approval. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 118, Contractor Agreement,¶ 2. Similarly, the next paragraph of the Contractor Agreement provides an acknowledgment that all invoices were to be submitted to Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY by "c/o" of Defendant GHA and that payments would only be made after written approval by Defendant GHA. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 118, Contractor Agreement, ¶3.

Deposition Testimony

There was extensive Examination Before Trial (hereinafter EBT) testimony in this matter submitted in support of each of the summary judgment motions. The Court reviewed the EBTs of the Plaintiff, Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY, Jonathan Hodosh on behalf of Defendant GHA, non-party Audrey Lupachino, non-party Jessie Woodford (the Plaintiff's son and co-worker on the date of the accident), and non-party Michael Vincent Melita of APEX Homes.

ARGUMENTS

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion Seq. No. 1)

Plaintiff's Arguments in Support — Labor Law § 200

Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability pursuant to Labor Law § 200 based upon the dangerous condition in the property owned by Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY, to wit, the defective temporary staircase that collapsed beneath the Plaintiff.

Plaintiff asserts that the record establishes that all three (3) defendants controlled the worksite at KANTER and LINDSAY's property and had constructive notice of the defect. Turning first to the property owners, Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY, the Plaintiff contends that they were not passive homeowners and instead acted as general contractors exercising authority over the work site. Plaintiff asserts that, among other things, the owners (1) selected, hired and contracted directly with the subcontractors; (2) oversaw the project to ensure the [*6]working conditions were safe for the contractors; (3) coordinated schedules, approved work and monitored the subcontractor's performance; (4) frequently came to the project worksite throughout the construction; and (5) were present at the worksite in the cellar at the time the temporary staircase collapsed from the first floor to the cellar.

According to the Plaintiff, based upon the deposition testimony before the Court, KANTER and LINDSAY testified that they actively monitored every contractor's work during the construction. When they observed issues with the work of any of the subcontractors, they contacted the contractor, Hodosh (on behalf of GHA), asking for remedy of the issue including correction of deficient work. The Plaintiff avers that Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY shared the responsibility to approve all of the subcontractor's work on the project, thus assuming the role of a general contractor and creating a non-delegable obligation to ensure the premises safety.

Next, the Plaintiff contends that Defendant GHA controlled the worksite at the property-- including the construction and movement of the temporary staircase between the first floor and the cellar. Plaintiff asserts that Hodosh controlled the worksite by: (1) scheduling and coordinating the hiring of the subcontractors; (2) visiting the project site regularly; (3) running job meetings and directing work sequencing; (4) inspecting subcontractor's work for compliance with building codes and plans; (5) directing contractors to correct deficiencies; (6) having authority to stop work he believed was unsafe; and (7) functioning as KANTER and LINDSAY's "eyes and ears" while at the property. As to temporary staircase, the Plaintiff argues that Hodosh instructed a contractor to install guardrails — which demonstrates his awareness of safety guidelines. Further, the Plaintiff indicates that Hodosh's active involvement is confirmed through his directing the repairs and reinstallation on the subject staircase.

Finally, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendant GHA had constructive notice of the deficiencies in the temporary staircase as a matter of law. The Plaintiff alleges that all of the Defendants were aware that the temporary staircase had been relocated and reinstalled multiple times during the construction project, and that the staircase was the only means of access to the cellar level of the home. Further, Plaintiff asserts that all of the Defendants were regularly present at the worksite, observed the temporary staircase and had the ability to inspect and remedy the deficiencies of the temporary staircase. Plaintiff also notes that non-party Michael Vincent Melita was instructed by Hodosh to install guardrails on the temporary staircase, thus demonstrating Hodosh's knowledge of safety measures.

Similarly, the Plaintiff asserts that Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY had constructive notice of the temporary staircase's condition based upon their regular visits to the property during the construction project -- including on the day of the accident. Also, the Plaintiff argues that KANTER and LINDSAY had constructive notice because they were aware that GHA's subcontractors were using the staircase as the only access to the home's cellar. Further, Plaintiffs also contend that KANTER and LINDSAY had a duty to inspect the project site for safety issues, ensure the staircase was safely installed and failed to inspect the staircase despite a reasonable opportunity to do so.

Plaintiff's Argument in Support — Labor Law § 240(1)

The Plaintiff contends he is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1) because: (1) his injuries were caused by the temporary staircase collapsing underneath him; and (2) the temporary staircase was the sole means of access between the levels of elevated work. Plaintiff asserts that Labor Law § 240(1) is applicable because the failure of the temporary staircase exposed Plaintiff to a gravity-related risk. According to the Plaintiff, there was no other means to access the cellar within the property and therefore the temporary staircase acted as a safety device within the meaning of § 240(1). Further, the Plaintiff avers that the catastrophic failure of the staircase demonstrates, as a matter of law, that the "safety device" was inadequate to protect the Plaintiff from the elevation-related risk. Moreover, the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants' duty to provide a safe temporary staircase is non-delegable and the failure to provide a structurally sound staircase was the proximate cause of [*7]Plaintiff's injuries.

Plaintiff's Argument in Support — Labor Law § 241(6)

The Plaintiff argues that the Defendants are liable as a matter of law under Labor Law § 241(6) because the record demonstrates violations of the Industrial Code provisions and those violations were the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges violations of Industrial Code §§ 23-1.7(f) (failing to provide a safe staircase), 23-1.11 (improperly fastening the staircase), and 23-2.7(e) (failing to provide handrails and safety railings).

As to Industrial Code § 23-1.7(f), the Plaintiff asserts that the temporary staircase was defective because it broke off the landing and collapsed upon the Plaintiff's first step. This demonstrates that the staircase was improperly installed, defective, and the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries. Next, Plaintiff contends that Industrial Code §§ 23-1.11(a) and (c) are applicable to the subject accident and were violated by Defendants because the nails fastening the temporary staircase to the landing were too short, improperly driven and insufficient to support the structure. Finally, the Plaintiff alleges that that the Defendants violated Industrial Code § 23- 2.7(e) because the temporary staircase did not have handrails or guardrails at the time of the accident.

Defendant GHA's Opposition — Labor Law § 200

Defendant GHA contends that it is not liable for Plaintiff's injury since there was no contractual duty set forth in the Construction Management Agreement to control the construction that was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury.

Specifically, GHA asserts that they were initially retained by Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY to provide architectural services and then expanded their relationship to include construction management services. According to Defendant GHA, Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY are the owners of the property and agreed to act as their own general contractors. Further, Defendant GHA argues that its conduct did not include directing, supervising or controlling the work that the Plaintiff was performing at the time of the accident and that no one from GHA was present at the property on the date of the accident.

In addition, GHA contends that it was not involved in the decision of subcontractor RCC to relocate the original staircase to its temporary location at the time of Plaintiff's accident. Specifically, GHA argues that KANTER and LINDSAY retained RCC and that neither the architectural nor the construction management agreement provide for relocation of the original staircase. The decision to relocate the original staircase and the means and methods of the relocation were made by RCC alone and not at the direction of GHA. GHA asserts that it had no actual or constructive notice of issues with the temporary staircase since there were no complaints or concerns raised about the condition of the temporary staircase before the accident and Plaintiff had used the temporary staircase prior to the accident without issue.

Defendant GHA also asserts that the arguments made by Plaintiff in support of its motion for summary judgment are supported by misstatements. Specifically, GHA notes that Plaintiff incorrectly stated that the only access to the cellar was from the temporary staircase despite KANTER's EBT testimony that the home had a walkout cellar which provided direct access to the lower level from the outside rear of the home. According to GHA, the Plaintiff also misrepresented the EBT testimony of Lupachino, as there is no indication that she testified that the staircase was inspected to determine whether it was structurally sound. Finally, GHA contends that the Plaintiff states, without citation, that Michael Melita (from RCC) testified that he was directed by Hodosh to install guardrails on the staircase -- which would demonstrate that Hodosh inspected the staircase. In any event, GHA argues that the guardrail "issue" is a red herring as there is no allegation that the Plaintiff fell off the side or tripped down the staircase.

Defendant GHA's Opposition — Labor Law § 240

Defendant GHA also contends that they cannot be found liable for a violation of Labor Law § 240 since they did not own, operate, maintain, control or manage the premises and did not [*8]act as the general contractor for the construction project. Rather, GHA asserts that Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY were both the homeowners and acted as their own general contractors for the construction project.

GHA's involvement in the construction project was limited to assisting KANTER and LINDSAY with retaining contractors, obtaining materials and supplies, and assisting KANTER with the supervision of labor and inspection of work for approval. In addition, GHA avers that it periodically visited the worksite to ensure timely completion of the project and workmanlike performance, and those visits does not amount to supervision and control of the contractor's performance or their means or methods of work. GHA contends that each contractor was responsible for the safety of their own employees and any subcontractors they hired. Similarly, GHA asserts that Construction Management Agreement between it and Defendant KANTER provides that KANTER was acting as the general contractor of the construction project since he was responsible to contract directly with the contractors, laborers, materialmen, tradesmen and anyone who provided labor services and GHA was specifically not to be held financially or legally responsible for the contractors. Finally, GHA notes that Plaintiff's reliance on Megan v Tishman Constr. Corp., 306 AD2d 163 [1st Dept 2003] is misplaced, as the Plaintiff in the instant action had an alternative means of access to the lower level of the work site and chose to use the temporary stairs rather than enter through the rear sliding glass doors of the walkout cellar.

Defendant GHA's Opposition — Labor Law § 241(6)

Last, Defendant GHA contends that they cannot be found liable under Labor Law § 241(6) as the sections of the Industrial Code the Plaintiff alleges are inapplicable to the facts in the instant action. At the outset Defendant GHA asserts that the Plaintiff's arguments as to violations of Industrial Code §§ 23-1.11(c) and 23-2.7(e) should be disregarded by the Court since the Plaintiff failed to specify those sections in its Complaint and Bill of Particulars.

Defendant GHA asserts that § 23-1.7(f), which requires the provision of stairways for access for work above or below ground, is inapplicable since the temporary stairway was not the sole means of access to the cellar because the lower level was accessible through the ground level sliding doors in the rear of the premises. Next, Defendant GHA contends that § 23-1.11(c), which addresses the condition of lumber and nail fastenings, is also inapplicable because this provision is solely applicable to contractors, such as RCC, who performed the work of relocating and installing the temporary staircase. Last, Defendant GHA contends that § 23-2.7(e), which requires temporary wooden stairways to have enclosures or guard rails, is also inapplicable because: (1) there was a railing on the staircase at various times during the project; (2) GHA did not have control over the staircase; (3) the Plaintiff did not fall off the staircase and instead fell downward with the staircase.

Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY Opposition — Labor Law § 200

Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY contend that Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment pursuant to either Labor Law § 200 or common law negligence as they did not direct and control the manner in which the work was performed and, at most, they had general supervisory authority regarding the construction project. According to KANTER and LINDSAY, they did not supervise, direct or control the method or means in which the Plaintiff, or any other subcontractor, performed their work. Specifically, the Defendants assert that they did not provide any tools, materials or safety devices used by Plaintiff or any other contractor. In addition, Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY argue that there is no testimony or written evidence indicating that they were aware of any structural defects with the temporary staircase or that there were any complaints of observable structural defects over a sufficient period of time that would impose constructive notice.

Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY Opposition — Labor Law §§ 240 and 241^FN15

The homeowners, Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY also argue that Labor Law §§ 240 and 241 are inapplicable them as they are entitled to "the homeowner's exemption." KANTER and LINDSAY assert that the testimony in this action established that they did not direct or control the manner or method of Plaintiff's work and instead the renovation project was managed and overseen by Hodosh and staff of Defendant GHA, who was the "defacto general contractor" for the construction project. According to Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY, the agreement between themselves and GHA -- along with KANTER's EBT testimony -- provide that GHA was to hire all the contractors, obtain all materials and supplies, supervise directly and indirectly all labor, inspect and approve all work, manage and control the progress of the construction, and be responsible for the safety of the laborers of the construction project.

Defendants contend that GHA's status as a general contractor is evidenced by the fact that Hodosh solicited the estimates from all the contractors and vendors regarding pricing for the construction project and controlled all financial aspects of the project. The Defendants argue that Hodosh compiled all of the contractors and subcontractors' invoices, collected the monies owed from the Defendants, distributed the monies to the contractors and subcontractors, and retained a management fee.

In addition, the Defendants assert that Lupachino, an employee of GHA, verified that each contractor and subcontractor had proper insurance and licensure prior to the commencement of work on the project. Further, Defendants contend that Hodosh communicated with the contractors and vendors directly, advised them of the schedule for the project, and coordinated their work regularly. In contrast, Defendants argue that notwithstanding that the contracts are directly between themselves and the contractors and subcontractors and that they visited the work site, (which was their home) to check on the status of the project, they did not direct or control the construction work or supervise the method and manner of the work as a general contractor.

Defendant GHA's Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion Seq. No. 2)

Defendant GHA's Arguments in Support of Dismissal of Labor Law § 200 Claims

Defendant GHA contends that, as an architect, it cannot be held liable to injured workers under Labor Law § 200 or common law negligence unless it has a contractual right to control the activity that allegedly caused the injury. GHA was not responsible for the means, methods, techniques, sequences utilized by the contracts, RCC, WMS and/or Plaintiff and it did not direct, supervise or control the work performed by the contractors as to the relocation of the temporary staircase. Thus, it cannot be held liable pursuant to Plaintiff's Labor Law § 200 causes of action.

Defendant GHAS's Arguments in Support of Dismissal of Labor Law §§ 240 and 241 Claims

GHA argues that the Plaintiff's Labor Law §§ 240 and 241 causes of action should be dismissed since GHA did not direct, supervise or control the construction work at the subject project. GHA asserts that based upon the agreement/contract between GHA and the homeowners, Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY, the homeowners retained and paid for all of the contractors and they acted as their own general contractors. Further, GHA contends that its involvement with the construction project was merely assisting the homeowners with retaining contractors, obtaining materials and supplies, assisting Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY with their responsibility to supervise labor and inspect and approve work, and periodic as needed "on-site services" to assure timely completion and "workmanlike performance."

GHA contends that it was not at the property when the accident occurred so there is no [*9]way that it could have directed, supervised, or controlled WMS and Plaintiff's work. GHA argues that contractors control the means, methods, techniques and procedures for site safety. In addition, GHA avers that based upon paragraph 6 of the contractors' agreements with Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY, each contractor was responsible for safety of their own employees at the time they were present at the construction site.

GHA also contends that Plaintiff's Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action should be dismissed since the Industrial Code sections alleged are inapplicable to the facts in this action. Based upon the Complaint, GHA notes that Plaintiff has alleged Defendants violated Industrial Code §§ 23- 1.5. 23-1.7, 23-1.15, 23-1.16, 23-1.17, 23-1.21. 23-1.32, 23-1.33 and OSHA. GHA contends thatany claims related to OSHA complaints should be dismissed since OSHA regulations do not establish a non-delegable duty from which a breach would constitute negligence and do not form the basis of liability pursuant to Labor Law § 241(6).

Next, GHA asserts that Industrial Code § 23-1.5 is a general safety standard for employers and is insufficient to support a § 241(6) claim. As to Industrial Code § 23-1.7, Defendant GHA contends that the only applicable section is § 23-1.7(f) but the section is inapplicable to the facts in the instant action since the temporary stairway that collapsed was not necessary since it was not the only means of access to the lower level of the premises. Turning to §§ 23-1.16, 23-1.17, 23-1.21, 23-1.32, and 23-1.33 Defendant GHA argues that none of them are applicable to the instant action as they do not pertain to a stairway or staircase, which is the alleged means of injury.

Defendant GHA's Arguments in Support of Dismissal of Negligence Claims

Defendant GHA contends that the cause of action alleging negligence must be dismissed since GHA did not owe or breach a duty to Plaintiff. GHA was retained by Defendant KANTER to provide architectural services and specific construction management services which are articulated in the two (2) agreements and neither of the agreements included the design, construction, relocation or installation of the temporary staircase that allegedly caused Plaintiff's injuries.

Rather, GHA asserts that the decision to relocate the staircase to provide access to the premises' lower level was made by RCC and was completed in its chosen means and methods. Therefore, GHA avers that since they were not present when the staircase was relocated, or when the accident occurred, it acted consistently with its contractual standard of care and did not commit an affirmative act of negligence. Further, GHA argues that, at the time of the Plaintiff's accident, Plaintiff was walking down the stairs to access the lower level and not engaged in any construction work. Therefore, GHA could not have breached any duty to Plaintiff. As to any claims of professional negligence against GHA stemming from the architecture agreement, Defendant GHA contends that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that GHA was required to provide any architectural services related to the temporary staircase or that GHA departed from the standard of case as to architecture services provided for the subject project.

Defendant GHA's Arguments in Support of their Cross Claim for Indemnification from Defendant KANTER

Defendant GHA argues that paragraph thirteen (13) of the agreement between KANTER and WMS provides that each contractor is responsible for the safety of its own employees and subcontractors. Further, GHA asserts that paragraph six (6) of the same agreement provides that Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY, as owners, were required to contract directly with all contractors and subcontractors in connection with the subject project and that GHA would not be financially or legally liable. Based upon the language in paragraph six (6), Defendant GHA contends that it is entitled to be indemnified by Defendant KANTER. In addition, GHA asserts that the contracts between KANTER and the contractors included an indemnification clause in which the contractors, such as WMS agreed to indemnify and hold KANTER and GHA harmless for damages claimed by third parties for bodily injury regardless of the cause. GHA contends that it tendered its defense to WMS, but WMS has not responded or agreed to indemnify GHA in this [*10]action. As such, GHA asserts they are entitled to summary judgment on their common law indemnification claim against Defendant KANTER.

Defendant GHA's Arguments in Support of their Cross Claim for Defendant KANTER's failure to procure insurance

According to GHA, Defendant KANTER was responsible for maintaining adequate liability insurance of at least $1 million dollars for the duration of the project. After the commencement of the instant action, GHA learned that Defendant KANTER had only obtained a commercial general liability policy which contained an endorsement that specifically excluded claims arising from construction operations and breached their contract. GHA asserts that the insurance policy obtained by Defendant KANTER was inadequate to comply with the parties' contractual requirements -- as it specifically excluded coverage arising from construction operations.

Plaintiff's Arguments in Reply to Defendant GHA's Motion for Summary Judgment

In opposition, Plaintiff raised the same arguments proffered in support of his motion for summary judgment, Motion Seq. No. 1. As such, the Court need not repeat the already delineated arguments.

Defendant GHA's Reply Arguments in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

Similarly, Defendant GHA's reply again addressed the same arguments that have already been proffered in support of the instant application and in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, except GHA did note that Plaintiff did not submit an affidavit from an expert in support of its position or to rebut GHA's expert's testimony, as required to support a claim against a professional architect.

Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY's Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion Seq. No. 3)

Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY's Arguments in Support

Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY again assert that Labor Law §§ 240 and 241 are inapplicable to the instant action based upon the homeowner's exemption since they did not direct or control the work being performed in their home as part of the construction project. Similarly, Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY contend that they are entitled to summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's Labor Law § 200^FN16 and common law negligence claims. Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY assert that they merely had general supervisory authority, which is insufficient to impose liability under Labor Law § 200. Specifically, Defendants argue that there is nothing to indicate that they had authority to direct or control the manner or method in which the Plaintiff performed his work, and they did not provide any of the contractors with tools, materials or safety devices.

Defendant GHA's Arguments in Opposition

Defendant GHA submitted the same arguments that they raised in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Motion Seq. No. 1) and in support of their motion for summary judgment (Motion Seq. No. 2).

Plaintiff's Arguments in Opposition

Plaintiff asserts that the homeowner's exception set forth in Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) does not apply to the instant action because Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY controlled the work being performed as part of the construction project. Specifically, the Plaintiff contends that KANTER and LINDSAY were not passive homeowners and instead acted as general contractors. Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY had actual [*11]and constructive notice of the dangerous staircase condition, as they were aware the original staircase had been removed and repositioned several times during the construction project and that the staircase lacked handrails at the time of the accident.

ANALYSIS

The Court considered all of the arguments presented by all parties in Motions # 1, 2, and 3 in their written submissions.

The Court's role on a motion for summary judgment is one of issue finding, rather than issue determination. See Sillman v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395 [1957]. Summary judgment is a drastic remedy that should not be granted when there is doubt as to the existence of a triable issue of fact. See Rotuba Extruders v. Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223 [1978]. The proponent of a summary judgment motion must establish his or her claim or defense sufficient to warrant a court directing judgment in its favor as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the lack of material issues of fact. See Giuffrida v. Citibank Corp., et al., 100 NY2d 72 [2003], citing Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]. The failure to do so requires a denial of the motion without regard to the sufficiency of the opposing papers. See Lacagnino v. Gonzalez, 306 AD2d 250 [2d Dept 2003]. However, once such a showing has been made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form demonstrating material questions of fact requiring trial. See Gonzalez v. 98 Mag Leasing Corp., 95 NY2d 124 (2000), citing Alvarez, supra, and Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Center, 64 NY2d 851 [1985]. Mere conclusions or unsubstantiated allegations unsupported by competent evidence are insufficient to raise a triable issue. See Gilbert Frank Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 70 NY2d 966 [1988]; See also Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]. Where material issues of fact exist that cannot be resolved on the papers filed in support of and in opposition to summary judgement, the motion must be denied. See Matter of Suffolk County Department of Social Services v. Jams M., 83 NY2d 178 [1993].

Labor Law § 200 and Common Law Negligence Claims

Plaintiff has alleged causes of action against all of the Defendants sounding in common law negligence and Labor Law § 200(1), which codifies landowners' and general contractors' common-law duty to maintain a safe workplace. See Singh v. 180 Varick, LLC, 203 AD3d 1194, 1995 [2d Dept 2022]; See also Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d 54 [2d Dept 2008]. "Cases involving Labor Law § 200 fall into two broad categories; namely, those where workers are injured as a result of dangerous or defective premises conditions at a worksite, and those involving the manner in which the work is performed." Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d, 54 61 [2d Dept 2008]; See also Reyes v Arco Wentworth Mgt. Corp., 83 AD3d 47, 51 [2d Dept 2011]. Property owners and/or general contractors may be liable for a violation of Labor Law § 200 "if [they] either created the dangerous condition that caused the accident or had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition that caused the accident." Id. In a circumstance where a claim arises from alleged defects or dangers arising from a subcontractor's work, then recovery against the owner or general contractor cannot occur unless it is demonstrated that the party to be charged exercised some supervisory control over the work. See Wilson v Bergon Constr. Corp., 219 AD3d 1380, 1382- 1383 [2d Dep 2023]; See also Chowdhury v. Rodriguez, 57 AD3d 121, 122-123 [2d Dept 2008]; Ortega v. Puccia, 57 AD3d 54, 60 [2d Dept 2008]; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec., CP., 81 NY2d 494, 505 [1993].

However, when the issue is the manner of work then liability will not attach to the property owner solely because they had notice of an unsafe way work was performed. See id. "[M]ere general supervisory authority at a work site for the purpose of overseeing the progress of the work and inspecting the work product is insufficient." Id. at 62. "Where a premises condition is at issue, a property owner is liable under Labor Law § 200 when the owner created the dangerous condition causing an injury or when the owner failed to remedy a dangerous or defective condition of which he or she had actual or constructive notice." Khan v Khan, 197 AD3d 1165, 1167 [2d Dept 2021] quoting Villada v 452 Fifth Owners, LLC, 188 AD3d 1292, [*12]1294 [2d Dept 2020]. Also, "[u]nlike Labor Law §§ 240 and 241, § 200 does not contain any single-and two-family homeowner's exemption." Ortega v Puccia 57 AD3d at 61.

Further, since Labor Law § 200 is simply a codification of the common law duty of a landowner and contractor to provide workers with a reasonably safe place to work -- all the defenses that can be pled and proven to avoid liability imposed under common-law principles of negligence apply equally to a Labor Law § 200 claim.

Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY seek summary judgment and bear the initial burden of establishing their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Giuffrida v Citibank, Corp., 100 NY2d 72, 81 [2003]. For KANTER and LINDSAY to satisfy their prima facie burden on the basis of the "homeowner's exception," the Defendants are required to demonstrate not only that their house was a single or two-family residence and that they did not "direct or control" the work being performed. See Aruma v Fruchter, 39 AD3d 678, 679 [2d Dept 2007]; See also Labor Law § 240(1).

There is no dispute the subject premises is a single-family residence. The statutory language, "direct or control," has been strictly construed by courts and refers to those situations where the owner supervises the method and manner of the work. See Baccio v. Bozik, 41 AD3d 754, 755 [2d Dept 2007]. Here, Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY did not meet their prima facie burden entitling them to the protection of the homeowner's exemption. As per the undisputed testimony, Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY hired and paid WMS, Plaintiff's plumbing company and employer, as an independent contractor for plumbing work during the demolition/renovation of their home. Further, Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY were both present in the premises at the time of Plaintiff's accident and had used the staircase to access the cellar prior to Plaintiff's accident. Consequently, Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY failed to establish that their role was merely that of an ordinary homeowner.

Turning to the two prongs of Labor Law § 200, here the Plaintiff's accident did not involve the manner in which he performed his work and instead involved an allegation of a dangerous or defective condition: the temporary staircase erected inside the premises owned by Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY during the demolition and construction. Therefore, the inquiry is whether Defendants had "control over the work site and either created the dangerous condition that caused the accident or had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition that caused the accident." Azad v 270 5th Realty Corp., 46 AD3d 728, 730 [2d Dept 2007].

A review of the contracts/agreements entered into by KANTER, LINDSAY and GHA, beginning in 2021 and continuing through the time of Plaintiff's accident in 2022, demonstrates that GHA was hired by KANTER and LINDSAY to oversee the demolition and construction at the property subsequent to GHA providing architecture services. Within the construction management agreement GHA's responsibilities included: (1) the hiring of all contractors; (2) the obtaining of all materials and supplies; (3) the supervision of all laborers either directly or indirectly; (4) inspection and approval of all work; and (5) "otherwise managing and controlling the progress" of the subject construction project. The intent of their Construction Management Agreement is clear: GHA was to supervise and control the work; and act as Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY's agent to managing the entire demolition project.

As per the Construction Management Agreement, the owner's responsibilities as defined in paragraphs four (4) and five (5) included -- maintaining the funds to be paid in a specific account and making periodic deposits into that account to ensure there were monies for GHA to pay the invoices. In addition, as set forth in paragraph six (6), the homeowners were required to contract directly with contractors and laborers, but as set forth in paragraph seven (7) those contracts were not negotiated by the homeowners. Rather, the contracts were required to be negotiated by GHA, and the homeowners were prohibited from entering into any contract without the written approval of GHA.

In essence, the parties were acting together as general contractors of the construction project. At a minimum, the contract required GHA to act as an agent of the homeowners, which then renders each of the Defendants subject to liability pursuant to Labor Law §§ 200 and [*13]common law negligence.

There is no specific delineation within the Construction Management Agreement as to who is to be titled the general contractor of the instant construction project -- the homeowners or GHA. This ambiguity requires an examination of the deposition testimony to determine how the roles of each party evolved after signing the Construction Management Agreement. The deposition testimony of the Defendants demonstrates the existence of a co-general contracting relationship. Each agreed that the homeowners, KANTER and LINDSAY signed the contracts that hired the subcontractors and that those contracts were agreements between those parties and did not include GHA. However, it is also abundantly clear from the EBT testimony that all the hiring, contract negotiations and overseeing of the contractors' work for safety and workmanship was conducted by GHA, and not the homeowners. Thus, there is a clear triable issue of fact as to the comparative negligence of the parties for a jury to determine.

As to constructive and actual notice of the alleged hazardous condition, the homeowners both testified that they were in the home on the date of the accident and were standing at the bottom of the staircase after descending to the lower level using the staircase. They observed the staircase's condition and had previously observed that the staircase was moved from one location to another in the home to provide access from the upper level to the lower level.

Also, both Hodosh and Lupachino testified that they were aware that the staircase was temporary and had been moved from one location to the other. Also, the testimony is clear that GHA, whether through Hodosh or Lupachino, was regularly at the premises to oversee the work and confirm compliance with the architecture plans.

Therefore, the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to the Labor Law § 200 and common law negligence claims as to all Defendants is granted (Motion Seq. No. 1). Also, Defendant GHA's motion for summary judgment (Motion Seq. No, 2) and Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY's motion for summary judgment (Motion Seq. No. 3) as to the Labor Law § 200 and common law negligence claims are denied.

Labor Law § 240(1) Claims

"Labor Law § 240(1) imposes a nondelegable duty [and absolute liability] upon owners and general contractors and their agents to provide safety devices necessary to protect workers from risks inherent in an elevated work site." Cagua v Bushwick Holdings, LLC, 238 AD3d 698, 699-700 [ 2d Dept 2025] quoting Verai v S.P. Irving Owner, LLC, 227 AD3d 932, 935 [2d Dept 2024]; See Von Hegel v Brixmor Sunshine, Sq., LLC, 180 AD3d 727, 728 [2d Dept 2020]; See also Caracciolo v SHS Ralph, LLC, 226 AD3d 861, 863 [2d Dept 2024]. In determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to recover, "'Labor Law § 240(1) requires a determination of whether the injury sustained is the type of elevation-related hazard to which the statute applies.'" Toalomgo v Almarua, Ctr., Inc., 202 AD3d 1128, 1130 [2d Dept 2022] quoting Wilinski v 334 E. 92nd Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 18 NYS3d 1, 7 [2011]. "[T]he decisive question is whether plaintiff's injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential." Runner v New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 13 NY3d 599, 603 [2009].

Labor Law § 240(1) provides that owners and their agents who are engaged in the demolition or alteration of a building or structure "shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropers and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed." Labor Law § 240(1); See Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d at 58; See also Crutch v 421 Kent Dev., LLC, 192 AD3d 977, 979 [2d Dept 2021]. The intent of the statute is to protect workers from gravity-related accidents that occur from the lack of or inadequate safety devices. See id. "The duties articulated in Labor Law § 240 are nondelegable, and liability is absolute as to the general contractor or owner when its breach of the statute proximately causes injuries." Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d at 59. Labor Law § 240(1) does contain an exemption for residential homeowners who contract but do not control the work and that intent of that exemption is to "protect residential homeowners lacking in sophistication [*14]or business acumen from their failure to recognize the necessity of insuring against the strict liability imposed by the statute." Id.

Here, the temporary staircase that fell while Plaintiff was descending to the cellar of the premises was not designed or erected as a safety device intended to protect workers, including Plaintiff, from an elevation risk. See Verdi v SP Irving Owners, LLC, 227 AD3d 932, 936 [2d Dept 2024]. The record makes clear that, at the time of the accident, the Plaintiff was attempting to use the temporary staircase as a passageway to his worksite in the cellar.

Thus, the staircase does not fall within the purview of Labor Law § 240(1). See Castro v Wythe Gardens, LLC, 217 AD3d 822, 825 [2d Dept 2023]; See Salcedo v Swiss Ranch Estates, Ltd., 79 AD3d 843, 844 [2d Dept 2010]. Specifically, the temporary staircase "was not being utilized as a ladder, scaffold, hoist, or other safety device for the benefit of the injured plaintiff in his work," since it was not created to assist any specific contractors to complete their work and was merely a passageway between the first floor and the cellar. See Donohue v CJ Am Assoc., LLC, 22 AD3d 710, 712 [2d Dept 2005]; see also Paul v Ryan Homes, Inc., 5 AD3d 58, 60-61 [2d Dept 2004].

The Court concludes that the temporary stairs were merely a passageway, not a safety device installed to benefit Plaintiff's work, and therefore Labor Law § 240(1) is inapplicable to Plaintiff's accident. As such, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Motion Seq. No. 1) as to the Labor Law § 240(1) claims are denied and Defendants KANTER, LINDSAY and GHA's motions for summary judgment (Motion Seq. Nos. 2 and 3) as to the Labor Law § 240(1) are granted.

Labor Law § 241(6) Claims

"Labor Law §241(6) requires that construction sites be conducted so as to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to persons employed therein." Mushkudiani v Racanelli Constr/ Group. Inc., 219 AD3d 613, 615 [2d Dept 2023]. Further, Labor Law §241(6) imposes a nondelegable duty upon owners and contractors due to another party's negligence for failing to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to workers engaged in construction, demolition or excavation operations. See Rizzuto v L.A. Wegner Contracting Co., Inc., 91 NY2d 343 [1998]; See also La Veglia v St. Frances Hosp., 78 AD3d 1123, 1125 [2d Dept 2010]. As recently reiterated by the Court of Appeals, "'Labor Law §241(6) is a 'hybrid' statute, as the first sentence 'reiterates the general common-law standard of care,' while the second sentence imposes a nondelegable duty with respect to compliance with riles of the Commissioner [of the Department of Labor] which contain' specific, positive command[s]'" Elizabeth Mann, & c., Appellant v Mezuyon, LLC, Respondent, et al, Defendant Mayrich Constr. Corp., Third Party Respondent, 2026 WL 1462931, *2 (May 26, 2026) quoting Bazdaric v Almah Partners LLC, 41 NY3d 310, 317 [2024] quoting Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d at 503-504. In addition, the Court of Appeals noted that, "[b]ecause the duty set forth in the second sentence is nondelegable, plaintiffs 'need not show the defendants exercised supervision or control over [the] worksite in order to establish [a] right of recovery.'" Id. quoting Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro- Elec., Co., 81 NY2d at 502. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals noted that the nondelegable duty imposed by Labor Law §241(6) is limited to Industrial Code provisions that mandate compliance with concrete specifications. See id.

"To establish liability under Labor Law §241(6), a plaintiff or a claimant must demonstrate that his injuries were proximately caused by a violation of an Industrial Code provision that is applicable under the circumstances of the case." Zaino v Rogers, 153 AD3d 763, 764 [2d Dept 2017]; See Moscati v Consolidated Edison Co. of NY, Inc., 168 AD3d 717, 718 [2d Dept 2019]. "[O]nce it has been alleged that a concrete specification of the Code has been violated, it is for the jury to determine whether the negligence of some party to, or participant in, the construction project caused plaintiff's injury." Rizzuto v L.A. Wegner Contracting Co., Inc., 91 NY2d at 350. Further, "[a]n owner or general contractor may raise any valid defense to the imposition of vicarious liability under section 241(6), including contributory and comparative negligence." Id.

In determining whether the applicable provision of the Industrial Code provides concrete specifications that impose vicarious liability pursuant to Labor Law §241(6), the Court of Appeals asserts that the following tools should be employed: (1) interpreting the Industrial Code sensibly and applying it to "effectuate its purpose of protecting construction laborers against hazards in the workplace" (Elizabeth Mann, & c., Appellant v Mezuyon, LLC, Respondent, et al, Defendant Mayrich Constr. Corp., Third Party Respondent, 2026 WL 1462931, *2 (May 26, 2026) quoting St. Louis v Town of N. Elba, 16 NY3d 411, 416 [2011]); (2) examining the text of the regulation for specificity without referring to the underlying facts (See id. citing Toussaint v Port Auth. of NY & N.J., 38 NY3d 89, 95 [2022]); (3) identifying that "general regulatory criteria" based upon words such as "adequate," "designated," "competent," "effective, " "good," "proper," "safe," "sufficient," and trained" "'are not sufficient to give rise to a triable claim for damages under Labor Law §241(6)'" Id quoting Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d at 502); and (4) administrative regulations should be interpreted based upon the interpretive rules and canons of construction for statutes. (See id citing Cruz v Banks, 2026 NY Slip Op 00821 [February 17,2026]).

At the outset, the Court is constrained to assess Plaintiff's Labor Law §241(6) claims based upon the Industrial Code sections cited by the Plaintiff in his moving papers and the Verified Complaint since he has failed to include a copy of his Bill of Particulars with his moving papers and abandoned all of the alleged Industrial Code sections raised in his Complaint except one: Industrial Code § 23-1.7(f). Moreover, Defendant GHA has specifically alleged that the Plaintiff has abandoned the proffered Industrial Code violations except for 23-1.7(f) and asks this Court to disregard Plaintiff's argument as to any violations of Industrial Code sections not previously identified by Plaintiff in his Bill of Particulars or Complaint. Like Plaintiff, the Defendant has also failed to include a copy of Plaintiff's Bill of Particulars or Complaint for the Court's review and consideration. Additionally, Plaintiff never uploaded his Bill of Particulars to NYSCEF and therefore the Court is unaware if the Plaintiff ever particularized additional Industrial Code sections not set forth in the Verified Complaint. As such, the Court is constrained to solely analyse the Plaintiff's and Defendant's arguments as to the Labor Law §241(6) claims based upon the Verified Complaint. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 1.

Plaintiff's Verified Complaint alleges a violation of Labor Law §241(6) predicated on Industrial Code §§23-1.5; 23-1.7; 23-1.1;23-1.16; 23-1.17; 23-1.21; 23-1.32; and 23-1.33. InPlaintiff's instant motion for summary judgment, he alleges violations of Labor Law §241(6) predicated on the Industrial Code §§23-1.7(f), 23-1.1, and 23-2.7(e). As noted supra, Defendant GHA contends that Plaintiff has improperly raised two (2) Industrial Code sections for the first time in the instant motion and any arguments in support of those two (2) sections should be disregarded by the Court.

First, Industrial Code § 23-1.7(f) provides "[s]tairways, ramps or runways shall be provided as the means of access to working levels above or below ground except where the nature or the progress of the work prevents their installation in which case ladders or other safe means of access shall be provided." The provision at issue, § 23-1.7(f), is sufficiently specific to support a Labor Law §241(6) cause of action. Specifically, § 23-1.7(f) does not constitute a "general standard of conduct" since it identifies a specific safety concern and commands a specific action required to address that concern. See Elizabeth Mann, & c., Appellant v Mezuyon, LLC, Respondent, et al, Defendant Mayrich Constr. Corp., Third Party Respondent, 2026 WL 1462931, *3 [May 26, 2026].

Here, the Plaintiff has established his prima facie burden as to a violation of Labor Law§241(6) predicated on Industrial Code § 23-1.7(f) through, to wit, (1) the deposition testimony of Plaintiff; (2) the deposition testimony of non-party Jessie Woodford; (3) the Construction Management Agreement between the Defendants; and (4) photographs of the staircase after the accident. Plaintiff has established that Defendants violated 12 NYCRR §23-1.7(f) by failing to provide a safe staircase from the first floor of the premises to Plaintiff's work site in the cellar of the home on the date of the accident and that this violation was the proximate [*15]cause of the accident and Plaintiff's subsequent injuries.

In opposition, Defendants KANTER, LINDSAY and GHA -- through the deposition testimony of LINDSAY and KANTER -- raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the Plaintiff could have accessed the cellar through the rear sliding glass doors. See Channer v ABAX Incorporated, 169 AD3d 758, 760 [2d Dept 2019]. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to the Labor Law § 241(6) claim predicated on a violation of Industrial Code §23- 1.7(f) is denied. Similarly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim is denied.

Next, the Court notes that Defendant has properly asserted that Plaintiff failed to allege in his Verified Complaint that his cause of action pursuant to Labor Law § 241(6) was predicated on a violation of Industrial Code §§ 23-1.11 or 23-2.7(e). However, in its discretion, the Court will consider the arguments proffered by Plaintiff for summary judgment given that the Defendants were aware, based upon the deposition testimony, of Plaintiff's arguments as to the language of Industrial Code §§ 23-1.11 and 23-2.7(e). Further, there is no prejudice to the Defendants for the Court to consider Plaintiff's proffered arguments as to the two (2) Industrial Code violations as Plaintiff moved first for summary judgment -- raising the arguments in his motion -- and both Defendants had the ability to oppose Plaintiff's arguments and also raise responsive arguments in their own motions for summary judgment.

First, Plaintiff has alleged that his Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action was predicated on a violation of § 23-1.11. The Court finds that regulation is not specific enough to support a Labor Law § 241(6) claim as it does not both identify a specific safety concern and command a specific action to address the concern. In contrast, Plaintiff's Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action predicated on a violation of Industrial Code § 23-2.7(e) is specific enough to support a Labor Law§241(6) claim as it identifies a specific safety concern -- the lack of an enclosure or guardrails on stairways -- and commands specific action to address the concern, i.e. the provision of a safety railing constructed and installed in compliance with safety standards set forth in the Industrial Code.

The Court notes that there is no dispute that, at the time of Plaintiff's accident, the temporary staircase lacked a handrail. However, despite the lack of a factual dispute that the temporary staircase lacked handrails, the Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the second prong of his prima facie burden as to the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action predicated on a violation of Industrial Code § 23-2.7(e), to wit, proximate cause. Specifically, neither the Plaintiff nor Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY indicated in their deposition testimony that Plaintiff's accident occurred due to the absence of the handrails. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the Defendants lack of compliance with Industrial Code § 23-2.7(e) was the proximate cause of his injuries. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to his Labor Law § 241(6) claims predicated on a violation of Industrial Code §§ 23-1.11 and 23-2.7(e) are denied, Defendant's motion as to those claims is granted and the cause of action sounding in those claims is dismissed.

Defendant GHA's Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY for indemnification and breach of contract

Defendant GHA argues it is entitled to summary judgment on its indemnification claim against Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY based upon language within paragraph six (6) of the Construction Management Agreement which provides that GHA would have no legal liability for any claims of contractors "in any circumstance."

"The right of contractual indemnification depends upon the specific language of the contract." George v Marshalls of MA, Inc., 61 AD3d 925, 930 [2d Dept 2009]. Specifically, "[t]he promise to indemnify should not be found unless it can be clearly implied from the language and purpose of the entire agreement and the surrounding circumstances." Id. "[A] party seeking contractual indemnification must prove itself free from negligence, because to the extent [*16]its negligence contributed to the accident, it cannot be indemnified therefore." Cava Constr. Co., Inc. v Gealtec Remodeling Corp., 58 AD3d 660 [2d Dept 2009]. If there is a question of fact regarding the indemnitee's negligence, a conditional order of summary judgment for contractual indemnification is premature. See State of New York v Traveler's Proper. Cas. Ins., Co., 280 AD2d 756, 757-758 [3d Dept 2001].

Here, there is a factual issue regarding whether the language in the agreement between Defendant KANTER and Defendant GHA requires indemnification by one party of the other. Paragraph six (6) of the agreement between KANTER and GHA is ambiguous and does not contain clear specific language providing the existence of indemnification between the parties in a circumstance of possible liability regarding an injury at the worksite. Rather, paragraph six (6) merely reiterates that Defendant GHA is not legally responsible for any circumstance regarding the contractors hired by Defendant KANTER. Since the parties' agreement does not clearly provide for the existence of indemnification or even address when and to whom indemnification would apply, GHA has failed to establish their prima facie burden for summary judgment as a matter of law as to their claims for indemnification against Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY. As such, Defendant GHA's motion for summary judgment as to their indemnification cross claim against Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY is denied.

Finally, Defendant GHA moves for summary judgment on its cross claim against Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY for failure to procure insurance -- as required by the parties' agreement. After consideration of the arguments proffered by Defendant GHA, a review of the Construction Management Agreement signed by the parties, the insurance denial letter from Defendant KANTER's insurance carrier, and the deposition testimony of Defendant KANTER and Hodosh, the Court finds that GHA has satisfied their prima facie burden establishing that Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY failed to comply with the term of the agreement requiring them to obtain liability insurance. The denial letter from Lloyd's demonstrates that KANTER obtained general commercial liability insurance coverage from September 28, 2022, to January 28, 2023, in the sum of $1,000,000.000 per occurrence and a $2,000,000.00 general aggregate limit but that policy included an endorsement excluding "CONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS."

There is no dispute that at the time Defendant KANTER's policy was obtained -- and in effect -- that the subject premises was undergoing demolition and renovation based upon the Construction Management Agreement signed by KANTER and Hodosh (on behalf of GHA). The Construction Management Agreement required KANTER to obtain liability insurance that included construction operations. Defendant KANTER has failed to oppose this argument. Defendant GHA's motion for summary judgment on their cross claim against JANTER for breach of contract is granted.

In arriving at this decision the Court has reviewed, evaluated, and considered all the issues framed by these motion papers and the failure of the Court to specifically mention any particular issue in this Decision and Order does not mean that it has not been considered by the Court in light of the appropriate legal authority.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion Seq. No. 1) is granted as to Plaintiff's causes of action pursuant to Labor Law § 200 as to both Defendants and denied as to Plaintiff's causes of action pursuant to Labor Law § 240 and 241(6) consistent with the foregoing; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant GHA's Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion Seq. No. 2) is denied as to Plaintiff's causes of action pursuant to Labor Law § 200, granted as to Plaintiff's causes of action pursuant to Labor Law § 240, and granted in part and denied in part as to Plaintiff's causes of action pursuant to Labor Law § 241(6) consistent with the foregoing; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant GHA's Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion Seq. No. 2) [*17]is granted is denied as to the cross claim for indemnification as to Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY and granted as to the cross claim for breach of contract as to Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendants KANTER and LINDSAY's Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion Seq. No. 3) is granted as to Plaintiff's causes of action pursuant to Labor Law § 240, is granted in part and denied in part as to Plaintiff's causes of action pursuant to Labor Law § 241(6) and is denied in all other respects consistent with the foregoing

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court on Motion Seq. Nos. 1, 2 and 3.

Dated: May 29, 2026

New City, New York

Hon. John P. Collins, Jr., J.S.C.