Supreme Court, Kings County

Decided on May 29, 2026

Ind. No. 71706-2025

Heidi C. Cesare, J.

[*1]

Defendant, Joseph Edwards, moves to dismiss the indictment on statutory speedy trial grounds. He argues that the prosecution's statements of readiness for trial were illusory because the prosecution waited until two weeks before trial to seek DNA testing to compare his DNA to the DNA obtained from the pistol that he is charged with possessing. The prosecution contends that it was ready to proceed to trial without any DNA evidence and did not seek DNA testing earlier because of a mistaken belief that the DNA from the pistol was not suitable for DNA testing.

I. Factual Background

The felony charges against defendant arise from his alleged possession of a loaded and operable .22-caliber pistol on March 6, 2025. Police found the pistol during a traffic stop of an illegally parked automobile, which defendant occupied as the driver and that was occupied by a second person in the front passenger seat. As reflected in the testimony at the grand jury, police found the pistol inside a jacket that had been draped over the center console. "Defendant later admitted the jacket belonged to him" (NY St Cts Elec Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 17, affirmation at ¶ 3). Inside the jacket, police also found three documents, which included a school class schedule bearing defendant' s name.

According to police, defendant and his passenger "attempt[ed] to conceal" the jacket "toward the rear seat and center console area" (id.). Defendant told police that he was waiting for his cousin and that the jacket had been stuck between the seat. He also expressed his desire that police not search the automobile. Defendant told police that the automobile contained no weapons, and he repeatedly denied that he had turned his body toward the rear of the automobile (see id.). Police arrested defendant and his passenger at the scene.

On the day of the arrest, police swabbed the pistol in three areas for DNA evidence (see[*2]NYSCEF Doc No. 3, affirmation at ¶ 5). Four days later, the prosecution requested that the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) conduct DNA testing of the swabs taken from the pistol. In the meantime, the prosecution presented defendant's case to a grand jury. The prosecutor instructed the grand jury on actual and constructive possession, and the presumption of possession that applies when a firearm is present in an occupied automobile (see Penal Law § 265.15 [3]). The indictment was filed on April 3, 2025.

Approximately two months later, on June 5, 2025, before OCME had reported whether the pistol contained DNA evidence suitable for testing, the prosecution served upon defendant a certificate of compliance (CoC) and statement of readiness for trial. The CoC and statement of readiness were later submitted for filing on EDDS on June 27, 2025 (EDDS Doc ID: BRR7V3).

On June 18, 2025, the prosecution received the OCME report, which stated that one of the three evidence swabs from the pistol contained DNA suitable for comparison testing. The prosecution admittedly misread the report and mistakenly believed that none of the evidence swabs were suitable for comparison testing: "[T]he People acknowledge an inadvertent oversight as the People did not recognize at that time that this one sample was suitable for comparison and therefore did not pursue further comparison" (NYSCEF Doc No. 17, affirmation at ¶ 33). On June 23, 2025, the prosecution disclosed the OCME report to defendant and served and filed a supplemental CoC and statement of readiness for trial (EDDS Doc ID: OFOPUA). The prosecution prepared to proceed to trial without DNA evidence.

After completing the pretrial suppression hearing, this court adjourned the case to December 1, 2025, for a jury trial. On November 17, 2025, the prosecution filed a motion to compel defendant to provide a saliva sample to be used for DNA comparison testing with the DNA obtained from the firearm (NYSCEF Doc No. 3). One week later, on November 24, 2025, the prosecutor reported in an email to chambers and defense counsel that the People had filed a motion to compel and that "I anticipate we cannot announce ready due to this pending motion" (Harris, Joshua email dated November 24, 2025).

One day later, on November 25, 2025, the prosecution provided defendant with additional discovery and filed a supplemental CoC and statement of readiness for trial (NYSCEF Doc No. 4). On the same day, this court emailed the parties to set a due date for a defense response and to inform them that the case was administratively adjourned to December 17, 2025, for decision on the motion to compel.

On December 17, 2025, this court issued a decision that granted the motion to compel. At the calendar call, this court directed "the lawyers to communicate, and in good faith to schedule that swab, as soon as possible" (tr at 3). The court stated that this was a trial ready case and asked what date the prosecution was requesting. The calendar prosecutor replied, "January. One moment, for the calendar" (id. at 10). This court then proposed January 26, whereupon defense counsel sated, "That works for us too" (id.). The calendar prosecutor remained silent. This court adjourned for trial to January 26, 2026 (id.).

Meanwhile, on December 18, 2025, the prosecution requested assignment of a detective to take a swab sample of saliva from defendant, who was at liberty. On December 19, 2025, the prosecution texted defense counsel to state that the swab was scheduled for December 23, 2025, and that the detective would contact him with more information. Defense counsel did not respond to the text and defendant was not swabbed on December 23, 2025.

On January 4, 2026, a Sunday, defense counsel emailed the prosecution and offered to schedule the swab during the upcoming week. Defense counsel also stated that he was out of the [*3]office for the holidays when the December 19, 2025 text was sent.

On January 7, 2026, the prosecution texted defense counsel to schedule the swab appointment on Friday, January 9, 2026. However, because the detectives at the district attorney's office "do not swab on Fridays," the appointment was rescheduled by text with defense counsel, who agreed upon the date of January 13, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 17, affirmation at ¶ 49).

On January 13, 2026, neither defendant nor defense counsel appeared for the swab appointment. The prosecution emailed defense counsel and received an out-of-office reply. The prosecution spoke to a supervisor of defense counsel and scheduled the swab appointment for January 21, 2026, and a detective swabbed defendant on that date. The prosecution submitted those swabs to OCME the next day.

On January 26, 2026, the courthouse was closed due to a snowstorm, and the case was administratively adjourned to February 26, 2026.

On February 10, 2026, the prosecution disclosed to the defense the OCME paperwork related to the swabbing of the passenger and filed a supplemental CoC and statement of readiness for trial. The DNA testing of those swabs excluded the passenger as a contributor to the DNA sample from the pistol (see id., memorandum of law at 16).

On February 19, 2026, the prosecution served and filed an affirmation in support of a Molineux and Sandoval application and a memorandum of law (NYSCEF Doc No. 12).

On February 24, 2026, the court attorney for this court emailed the parties to ask if the prosecution was ready for trial on February 26, 2026. On the same day, this court received an out-of-office reply email from defense counsel stating that defense counsel was out of the office and would return on March 3, 2026. Later the same day, this court received an email from the assigned prosecutor, who wrote that "[t]he People will not be announcing ready for this case on tomorrow's court date. I will be there to stand on this case" (Harris, Joshua email dated February 25, 2026).

On February 26, 2026, the prosecutor appeared in court; defense counsel and defendant were absent. The case was adjourned to March 4, 2026, for a pretrial conference. The court stated that the prosecution was not required to be ready on that day.

On March 4, 2026, the assigned prosecutor reported that he was "not ready for trial" because the results of the DNA comparison analysis were still pending (tr at 3, 4). This court asked the prosecutor to "pick the date" (id. at 4). The prosecutor requested Wednesday, April 8, 2026. Defense counsel was not available on that date. This court adjourned to April 15, 2026, "for swab results" (id. at 5).

On April 10, 2026, the prosecution received the DNA report with results of the comparison testing of defendant's DNA and disclosed it to the defense, along with other related paperwork. The results were uninformative and did not support whether defendant was included or excluded as a contributor to the DNA sample from the pistol (see NYSCEF Doc No. 17, memorandum of law at 15).

On April 13, 2026, the prosecution filed a supplemental CoC and statement of readiness for trial (NYSCEF Doc Nos. 13 & 14).

On April 15, 2026, the calendar prosecutor reported that the DNA test results had been shared with the defense two days earlier. This court adjourned to June 1, 2026, for a jury trial.

On April 30, 2026, defendant filed his speedy trial motion (NYSCEF Doc No. 15) and an affirmation in support of a motion opposing the prosecution's admission at trial of evidence of [*4]prior bad acts and a memorandum of law (NYSCEF Doc No. 16).

On May 15, 2026, the prosecution filed an affirmation and memorandum of law in opposition to defendant's speedy trial motion (NYSCEF Doc No. 17).

Defendant did not file a reply.

II. Discussion

Under New York's speedy trial statute, the prosecution must be ready for trial within six months of when the felony complaint was filed on March 7, 2025 (see CPL 1.20 [8], [16], [17]; 30.30 [1] [a]; 100.05; People v Osgood, 52 NY2d 37, 50 [1980]). The applicable six-month period, as measured by the number of days in the six calendar months after the felony complaint was filed, is 184 days (see People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 207 n 3 [1992]; People v Bernier, 141 AD2d 750, 754 [2d Dept 1988]).

To determine whether the prosecution was ready for trial within the applicable six-month period, this court must compute the number of days that elapsed between the start of the criminal action and the statement of readiness, subtract any statutorily excludable periods of delay, and add "any postreadiness periods of delay that are actually attributable to the People and are ineligible for an exclusion" (People v Cortes, 80 NY2d at 208). If the prosecution was not ready within the applicable six-month period, the indictment must be dismissed upon motion of the defendant (see CPL 210.20 [1] [g]; 30.30 [1] [d]; People v Price, 14 NY3d 61, 63 [2010]).

When moving to dismiss the indictment based upon a statutory speedy trial violation, a defendant initially must allege that the prosecution was not ready within the applicable time period (see People v Goode, 87 NY2d 1045, 1047 [1996]; People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71, 77-78 [1995]; People v Felix, 246 AD3d 1372, 1372-1373 [4th Dept 2026], lv denied —NY3d— [2026]; People v Cotto, 240 AD3d 1311, 1312 [4th Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 1027 [2025]; People v Ryan, 237 AD3d 754, 755 [2d Dept 2025]). The burden then shifts to the prosecution to prove "that certain periods within that time should be excluded" (People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 349 [1980]; see People v Labate, 42 NY3d 184, 190 [2024]). The defendant must then "identify the specific legal and factual impediments to those exclusions" (People v Beasley, 16 NY3d 289, 292 [2011]). This court may decide the motion summarily if the motion papers do not raise a dispute about a material fact that must be resolved at a hearing (see People v Allard, 28 NY3d 41, 45-46 [2016]; People v Gruden, 42 NY2d 214, 215 [1977]).

To file a facially sufficient statement of trial readiness, the prosecution must satisfy two requirements. First, the prosecution must communicate readiness "on the trial court's record" (People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337 [1985]). The prosecutor can do so in "a written notice of readiness sent . . . to both defense counsel and the appropriate clerk, to be placed in the original record" (id.). Second, "the prosecutor must make [the] statement of readiness when the People are in fact ready to proceed" (id.).

The prosecutor's initial statement of trial readiness met each requirement. First, the prosecutor served defendant with the initial statement of readiness on June 5, 2025, and then submitted it for filing on EDDS on June 27, 2025. Although both parties have litigated this motion as if the statement of readiness was filed on June 5, 2025, the speedy trial clock continued to run after that date until the prosecution electronically submitted the statement of readiness for filing on EDDS on June 27, 2025 (see People v Licius, 45 NY3d 109, 112 [2025]). Thus, the delay from June 5 to June 27, 2025, counts as prereadiness delay (see People v Labate, 42 NY3d at 203; People v Anderson, 66 NY2d 529, 534, 536 [1985]; People v Cox, 161 AD3d 1100, 1100 [2d Dept 2018]).

Contrary to defendant's argument, the statement of trial readiness satisfied the second requirement. The prosecution filed the statement of readiness when it was actually ready for trial (see People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d at 337). The statement is presumed to be truthful and accurate (People v Brown, 28 NY3d 392, 405 [2016]). In an effort to rebut that presumption, defendant asserts in his memorandum of law that the prosecution "admitted" that the DNA evidence was "needed to be ready for trial" (NYSCEF Doc No. 15, memorandum of law at 3), but the attorney affirmation offered in support of the motion contains no factual allegations to support that assertion, such as the date and form of this alleged admission.

More importantly, the record supports the competing claim that the prosecution was, in fact, ready from the outset of the case to proceed to trial without DNA evidence. After all, the prosecution secured an indictment without presenting any DNA evidence to the grand jury, and the other evidence in this case was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of guilt (see NYSCEF Doc No. 17, memorandum of law at 21). The prosecution also served the initial statement of readiness on the defense without waiting for OCME to determine whether the pistol contained DNA evidence suitable for comparison testing. And the prosecution continued to be ready for trial after mistakenly believing that the pistol did not contain DNA evidence suitable for testing.^FN1 This court therefore finds that the prosecution was initially ready for trial without DNA evidence and thereafter maintained trial readiness as the case progressed toward trial.

Defendant alternatively challenges the statement of trial readiness on the ground that the prosecution did not file a valid CoC, which is a prerequisite to a valid statement of readiness (see CPL 30.30 [5] [a]; 245.50 [3]). He argues that the initial and first three supplemental CoCs are invalid because the prosecutor did not file the motion to compel defendant to provide a saliva sample before filing the CoC (see NYSCEF Doc No. 15, memorandum of law at 3). However, nothing in subdivision (1) of CPL 245.20, which defines the prosecution's initial automatic discovery obligation, or any other part of CPL article 245, requires that DNA testing be requested or conducted before a CoC is filed. The discovery statute requires only that the prosecution disclose any DNA test results expeditiously upon receiving them from OCME after the initial CoC was filed (see CPL 245.60), which the prosecution did in this case. The prosecution's delayed pursuit of potentially incriminating DNA evidence was not a discovery violation and does not provide a basis to invalidate the initial CoC and first three supplemental CoCs.

Next, this court must determine whether the prosecution withdrew trial readiness after filing the initial statement of readiness on June 27, 2025. The prosecution suggests that a withdrawal of trial readiness must be communicated on the record to be effective (see NYSCEF Doc No 17, memorandum of law at 15). But the prosecution cites no authority that supports this claim. Moreover, this court may consider any relevant fact to determine whether the prosecution [*5]withdrew trial readiness after validly declaring ready. For instance, a defendant trying to show that a statement of trial readiness was illusory may rely on any "relevant circumstances" that would support that showing (People v Brown, 28 NY3d at 400). This court may surely do the same in fulfilling its duty to inquire into the actual readiness of the prosecution, which can include determining whether the prosecution withdrew trial readiness (see CPL 30.30 [5] [a]).

In making that inquiry, this court finds that the prosecution withdrew trial readiness on November 24, 2025 and did not validly announce ready again until April 13, 2026. In determining whether the prosecution maintained actual trial readiness after June 27, 2025, this court cannot ignore the assigned prosecutor's November 24, 2025 email in which he stated that he anticipated answering not ready for trial on December 1, 2025. In addition, the prosecution did not answer ready for trial at the next calendar call on December 17, 2025, and the assigned prosecutor reported by email on February 25, 2025, that he would not be ready for trial on February 26, 2026. He also personally appeared at calendar call on March 4, 2026, and answered not ready, on the record, stating that he was not ready because he was still waiting for the results of the DNA comparison testing. These statements by the assigned prosecutor demonstrate that the prosecution was not actually ready for trial while awaiting those DNA testing results. Accordingly, the written statements of readiness that accompanied any supplemental CoCs filed between November 24, 2025, and April 13, 2026, were illusory and did not stop the speedy trial clock (see People v England, 84 NY2d 1, 4 [1994] ["A statement of readiness at a time when the People are not actually ready is illusory and insufficient to stop the running of the speedy trial clock"]; People v Bonilla, 94 AD3d 633, 633 [1st Dept 2012] ["When viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances, the People's October 24, 2008 and January 20, 2009 requests for adjournments, asserting a need for further investigation, effectively conceded that the prior statement of readiness was inaccurate"]).

The withdrawal of trial readiness on November 24, 2025, however, did not impact the validity of the prior statements of readiness. The speedy trial statute does not "preclude the People from declaring their present readiness, but still gathering additional evidence to strengthen their case" (People v Wright, 50 AD3d 429, 430 [1st Dept 2008]). The prosecution's decision to seek potentially incriminating DNA evidence does not render the prior statements of trial readiness illusory when, as in this case, "at the time they announced their readiness, the People would have been able to establish a prima facie case and proceed at trial" (People v Pratt, 186 AD3d 1055, 1057 [4th Dept 2020]). Nevertheless, following the withdrawal of trial readiness, the prosecution must be charged with any subsequent "delay that is directly attributable to their inaction" (id.), "except as subdivision 4 [of CPL 30.30] otherwise requires" (People v Anderson, 66 NY2d at 534]).

In this case, the prosecution argues that the delay for DNA testing is excludable under subdivision (4) (g) of CPL 30.30 as "delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances." To claim this exclusion, however, the prosecution "must exercise due diligence in obtaining the [DNA] evidence" (People v Clarke, 28 NY3d 48, 52 [2016]). To satisfy the due diligence requirement, the prosecution must diligently seek a court order to compel the defendant to supply a DNA sample for comparison testing (see id. at 53 [ruling that the exceptional circumstances exclusion did not apply because prosecution had "no reasonable excuse for . . . delay in seeking a court order for defendant's DNA exemplar"]). If the prosecution does not exercise due diligence to obtain a DNA sample from the defendant, the prosecution cannot claim the "exceptional circumstances" exclusion, no matter how diligently the prosecution acted afterward to submit the [*6]sample to OCME and check on the status of the DNA report (see People v Huger, 167 AD3d 1042, 1043 [2d Dept 2018]; People v Gonzalez, 136 AD3d 581, 582 [1st Dept 2016]).

In this case, the exceptional circumstances exclusion in subdivision (4) (g) of CPL 30.30 does not apply. The prosecution did not diligently move to obtain a DNA sample from defendant. The prosecution misread the DNA report and did not realize until four and one-half months later, apparently while preparing for trial, that the pistol contained DNA suitable for comparison testing. The prosecution has failed to provide a "reasonable excuse" for waiting nearly five months after receipt of the DNA report to file the motion to compel defendant to provide a DNA sample. For that reason, the delay needed to complete the DNA testing is not excludable under subdivision (4) (g) of CPL 30.30.

Still, the inapplicability of the "exceptional circumstances" exclusion does not mean that all delay related to the DNA testing is charged to the prosecution. The prosecution should not be charged with any delay that can be attributed solely to defendant. Here, some of the delay in scheduling a date for defendant to be swabbed was attributable to defendant, not to any inaction of the prosecution. After the motion to compel was granted on December 17, 2025, the prosecutor acted promptly to schedule a date for defendant to be swabbed, and the first agreed-upon date was January 13, 2026. However, defense counsel and defendant did not appear on that date, and the prosecutor had to reschedule the appointment to January 21, 2026. This 8-day period will be excluded from the speedy trial time computation.

This court also addresses whether to exclude the time during which the prosecution's so-called Molineux-Sandoval motions have been pending since they were filed on February 19, 2026. Both sides agree that this time is excludable as motion practice delay under subdivision (4) (a) of CPL 30.30. But that exclusion applies only when there is "a reasonable period of delay resulting from . . . pretrial motions" (id.) Here, the so-called Molineux-Sandoval motions have not delayed the progress of the case. Indeed, the motions are not ripe for consideration until the parties assemble for the purpose of conducting the trial. Until then, the motions are premature and have no bearing on the progress of the case toward trial. For that reason, the prosecution is not entitled to exclude, pursuant to subdivision (4) (a) of CPL 30.30, the time that has elapsed since those motions were filed.

Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, this court makes the following computation of chargeable speedy trial time. The parties agree that the 40 days between the arraignment on the felony complaint on March 7, 2025, and the arraignment on the indictment on April 16, 2025, are charged to the prosecution (see People v Cortes, 80 NY2d at 213 & n 5; People v Correa, 77 NY2d 930, 931 [1991]; People v Lisene, 201 AD3d 738, 740 [2d Dept 2022]; People v Owens, 209 AD2d 549, 550 [2d Dept 1994]). (40 days charged.)

At the arraignment on the indictment, defendant asked this court to inspect the grand jury minutes, and this court adjourned to May 28, 2025, for a decision on the defense request. Off calendar, on May 27, 2025, this court issued a decision on that request. The full adjournment period is excluded from the speedy trial time computation (see CPL 30.30 [4] [a]). (0 days charged. 40 total days charged.)

On May 28, 2025, the calendar prosecutor reported that the prosecution was close to completing automatic discovery and filing a CoC. This court adjourned to June 25, 2025, for the prosecution to file a CoC. As noted already, the prosecution neglected to file the CoC and statement of readiness during this adjournment period. This delay is charged to the prosecution. (28 days charged. 68 total days charged.)

On June 25, 2025, the calendar prosecutor stated that the CoC and statement of readiness for trial were filed on June 5, 2025. Defense counsel admitted receipt of those documents, but this court informed the prosecutor that those documents were not in the court's computer system. This court then adjourned to July 31, 2025, for a pretrial hearing on defendant's motion to suppress a firearm and statements allegedly made to police. An adjournment for the purpose of conducting the pretrial suppression hearing is excludable under CPL 30.30 (4) (a) regardless of whether the prosecution had filed the CoC and statement of trial readiness (see People v Pisano, 227 AD3d 419, 419 [1st Dept 2024] [excluding "reasonable periods following a decision on the motions to prepare for hearings"], lv denied 42 NY3d 929 [2024]; see also People v Taylor, 16 Misc 3d 339, 342-343 [Crim Ct, NY County 2007]). (0 days charged. 68 total days charged.)

The period from July 31, 2025, when the pretrial suppression hearing started, to October 8, 2025, when the motion was decided, is excludable (see CPL 30.30 [4] [a]). (0 days charged. 68 total days charged.)

The delay from October 8, 2025, to December 17, 2025, is also excluded from the speedy trial time computation. The adjournment for trial from October 8, 2025, to December 1, 2025, after this court had ruled on the pretrial motion to suppress, is excludable pursuant to People v Green (90 AD2d 705 [1st Dept 1982]). The period from November 17, 2025, to December 17, 2025, is also excludable as delay to resolve the prosecution's pretrial motion to compel defendant to provide a DNA sample (see CPL 30.30 [4] [a]; People v Solano, 206 AD3d 432, 433 [1st Dept 2022], lv denied 39 NY3d 1076 [2023]). (0 days charged. 68 total days charged.)

The portion of the postreadiness delay from December 17, 2025, to January 26, 2026, that is attributable to defendant is not charged to the prosecution. This includes the 8 days needed to reschedule the swab appointment after defendant and his attorney failed to appear for the first appointment. (32 days charged. 100 total days charged.)

The administrative adjournment from January 26, 2026, to February 26, 2026, necessitated by the closure of the courthouse because of a snowstorm, is not attributable to the prosecution and is, therefore, excluded from the speedy trial time computation (see People v Goss, 87 NY2d 792, 797 [1996]). (0 days charged.100 total days charged.)

On February 26, 2026, the case was adjourned for a pretrial conference to March 4, 2026, after defense counsel and defendant did not appear. This adjournment is excludable under CPL 30.30 (4) (f) (see People v Huger, 167 AD3d at 1043-1044; People v Mannino, 306 AD2d 157, 158 [1st Dept 2003]). (0 days charged. 100 total days charged.)

On March 4, 2026, the assigned prosecutor was not ready for trial. He requested a five-week adjournment to April 8, 2026. The court adjourned to April 15, 2026. The prosecution is charged only with the time requested, not the entire adjournment period (see People v Brown, 28 NY3d at 404). (35 days charged. 135 total days charged.)

On April 15, 2026, the calendar prosecutor reported that the prosecution had filed a supplemental CoC and statement of readiness for trial two days earlier. This court adjourned for trial to June 1, 2026. During this period, defendant filed the present speedy trial motion on April 30, 2026. This full adjournment is excludable because the prosecution was ready for trial, and the period after April 30, 2026, is excludable for the additional reason that defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss the indictment (see CPL 30.30 [4] [a]). (0 days charged. 135 total days charged.)

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this court finds 135 total days of chargeable speedy trial time, [*7]which is fewer than the number within the applicable six-month period. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30 is denied.

So ordered.

Dated: May 29, 2026

Amended: June 1, 2026

Brooklyn, NY

HEIDI C. CESARE, A.J.S.C.