People v Odeyale

Criminal Court of the City of New York, Richmond County

Decided on May 28, 2026

Docket No. CR-007230-25RI

Raja Rajeswari, J.

The defendant is charged by information with one count each of Forcible Touching (Penal Law § 130.52[1]), Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree (Penal Law § 130.55) and Harassment in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 240.26[1]). The incident arises from an incident alleged to have occurred on August 14, 2025, in the vicinity of 150 Richmond Terrace, Staten Island, New York where the defendant placed his hands in the bra of the complainant, C.M., multiple times, pinching her nipple with his fingers.

On April 22, 2026, the defendant made the Court aware that C.M. has occurred five prior arrests related to the offense of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree (Penal Law § 220.03), four of which are sealed because C.M. pled guilty to the charge of Disorderly Conduct (Penal Law § 240.20). The People opposed the defendant's application, and the Court instructed the defendant to make the application in writing.

In an affirmation and proposed order dated April 27, 2026, the defendant expressly [*2]moved to unseal docket numbers CR-001830-19RI, CR-002077-18RI, CR-001501-16RI and CRH-000558-12RI because the defendant anticipates that the files contain information that is necessary and relevant for the defendant to prepare a defense. In particular, the files contain evidence and information that may tend to exculpate the defendant and impeach C.M. at trial. On May 6, 2026, the People filed their opposition to the defendant's motion, arguing that the defendant has failed to allege or identify any specific allegations relevant to C.M.'s credibility. The People further aver that any allegations would confuse or mislead the jury or create a substantial risk of undue prejudice. Alternatively, the People propose that if justice requires unsealing, then the records should be unsealed only for an in camera inspection to determine whether any information or records should be made available to the defendant.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

To begin, contrary to the arguments of both parties, the cases at issue are sealed pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 160.55. Whereas the sealing provisions of CPL 160.50 control when a criminal action or proceeding terminates in favor of the accused, "the termination of a criminal action or proceeding against a person by the conviction of such person of a violation" is governed by CPL 160.55. Here, according to the representations from both sides, the sealed matters at issue concluded with a plea to Disorderly Conduct (Penal Law § 240.20), a violation and, thus, the provisions of 160.55 control.

As with CPL 160.50, with limited exceptions, the initial sealing requirement applies to photographs, palmprints and fingerprints, and requires the appropriate agency in its discretion to either destroy or return same to the accused. CPL 160.55 (1)(a), (b). CPL 160.55(1)(c) requires the sealing of "all official records and papers relating to the arrest or prosecution, including all duplicates and copies thereof, on file with the division of criminal justice services, police agency, or prosecutor's office shall be sealed," and further orders that these records shall not be made "available to any person or public or private agency." However, unlike, CPL 160.50(1)(c), "all official records and papers" does not include the records of a court. Cf. CPL 160.50(1)(c) ("all official records and papers, including judgments and orders of a court... , on file with... any court... shall be sealed and not made available to any person or public or private agency.") Thus, the record of the conviction for a violation remains on file with the court.

Access to sealed records, or the means of unsealing these records, pursuant to CPL 160.55(1)(d) mirror the same limited circumstances provided in CPL 160.50(1)(d), except that CPL 160.55(1)(d)(vi), which provides access to a sealed record of a Harassment in the Second Degree conviction committed against a member of the same family or household as the defendant, is not included in CPL 160.50, and CPL 160.50(1)(d)(vi), which proves access to a sealed record to a prospective employer of a police or peace officer, is not included in CPL 160.55(1)(d). See People v FB, 155 AD3d 1, 8 (1st Dept 2017) (holding that the interpretation by Matter of Katherine B v Cataldo, 5 NY3d 196, 202 [2005] of CPL 160.55[1][d][ii] should apply to the identical provision in CPL 160.55[1][d][ii]). Access to records sealed by CPL 160.55 may only be made available to:

i. a prosecutor in any proceeding in which the accused has moved for an order pursuant to section 170.56 or 210.46 of this chapter, or

ii. a law enforcement agency upon ex parte motion in any superior court, or in any [*3]district court, city court or the criminal court of the city of New York provided that such court sealed the record, if such agency demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court that justice requires that such records be made available to it, or

iii. any state or local officer or agency with responsibility for the issuance of licenses to possess guns, when the accused has made application for such a license, or

iv. the New York state department of corrections and community supervision when the accused is under parole supervision as a result of conditional release or parole release granted by the New York state board of parole and the arrest which is the subject of the inquiry is one which occurred while the accused was under such supervision, or

v. the probation department responsible for supervision of the accused when the arrest which is the subject of the inquiry is one which occurred while the accused was under such supervision, or

vi. a police agency, probation department, sheriff's office, district attorney's office, department of correction of any municipality and parole department, for law enforcement purposes, upon arrest in instances in which the individual stands convicted of harassment in the second degree, as defined in section 240.26 of the penal law, committed against a member of the same family or household as the defendant, as defined in subdivision one of section 530.11 of this chapter, and determined pursuant to subdivision eight-a of section 170.10 of this title.

CPL 160.55(1)(d)(i)-(vi). The Court of Appeals has held that the sealing statutes are to be strictly construed, including expressly stating the six statutory exceptions are "precisely drawn," and that sealed records may not be disclosed "except where the statute explicitly provides otherwise." Katherine B, 5 NY3d at 203; see also New York State Comm'n on Jud Conduct v Rubinstein, 23 NY3d 570, 581 (2014) (sealed criminal records may only be accessed by the individuals and agencies specifically enumerated and narrowly defined in CPL 160.50[1][d]) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, by the plain letter of the statute, access may only be granted to the express parties enumerated in the statute, such as accused or their designated agent, leaving the defendant without a statutory means of relief.

However, CPL 160.50 and 160.55 convey statutory and not substantive or constitutional rights. The Court of Appeals' decision in People v Patterson, 78 NY2d 711 (1991) is illustrative on the matter. There the police department failed to return the defendant's photograph taken in connection with an unrelated proceeding, which was later dismissed and sealed. The photograph was then used in an identification procedure in connection with the defendant's instant prosecution in an unrelated criminal matter. The defendant argued that suppression was required because the sealing states create "a 'substantial right' that 'relate[s] rather closely' to Fourth Amendment protections." Id. at 715. The Court of Appeals expressly rejected this argument, holding "there is nothing in the history of CPL 160.50 or related statutes indicating a legislative intent to confer a constitutionally derived 'substantial right', such that the violation of that statute, without more, would justify invocation of the exclusionary rule with respect to subsequent independent and unrelated criminal proceedings." Id. at 716.

In this way, the Court of Appeals has recognized that courts have an inherent power beyond the statutory provisions to grant access to sealed records "when the interests of justice so dictate." Matter of Hynes v Karassik, 47 NY2d 659, 664 (1979). The courts' inherent power and this power "grows out of that measure of discretionary authority courts enjoy with respect to their own records insofar as they pertain to the business of the court and when essential to the proper administration of justice." Id. (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals reasoned that "in the even rarer and more extraordinary circumstances in which sealed records must be unsealed in order to serve fairness and justice, courts are not impotent to do so " Id. However, even in Hynes, where the Court of Appeals held that "while cases might arise in which the exercise of a power to unseal would be appropriate[,]" the lower court there did not have the inherent power to unseal records to assist a bar grievance committee in determining whether to bring disciplinary action against an attorney. Id. at 664-665.

Rather, the courts' inherent authority to unseal records must only be granted in rare and extraordinary circumstances. See Matter of Dondi, 63 NY2d 331, 338 (1984). Indeed, "Such discretionary power may be invoked...only upon a compelling demonstration, by affirmation, that without an unsealing of criminal records, the ends of protecting the public through investigation and possible discipline...cannot be accomplished." Id. Furthermore, "Convenience alone will not justify an unsealing." Id. at 339 (holding that while the Grievance Committee may, upon an affirmation demonstrating necessity, gain an order to access records of a sealed criminal action, the letter put for insufficient facts warranting unsealing); see also Matter of Joseph M, 82 NY2d 128, 133 (1993) (holding that criminal proceeding records, sealed upon termination of proceedings in favor of accused, were not available to board of education for use in teacher disciplinary proceeding being brought against accused).

Consequently, appellate authority construes the sealing exceptions and the court's inherent authority to unseal records narrowly, frequently overturning efforts by lower courts to bypass the statutes' narrowly drawn exceptions. Instead, appellate authority makes clear that the courts' inherent authority to unseal records constitutes "dubious authority to override so clear a legislative policy direction." Matter of Alonzo M, 72 NY2d 662, 668 (1988). As stated expressly by the Court of Appeals, "[W]e have eschewed efforts to rewrite the statute to achieve what a court or advocate perceives to be a better outcome, because 'if there is to be an exception to the general rule proscribing the release of sealed records...it should be created by the [l]egislature, not by the courts.'" People v Anonymous, 34 NY3d 631, 643 (2020) (quoting Joseph M, 82 NY2d at 134). The Court of Appeals added that proposals to expand exceptions to the sealing statutes have been repeatedly rejected by the legislature, further demonstrating that the access to sealed records remain limited and should not be expanded by the courts. Anonymous, 34 NY3d at 643-644.

In contrast, the Court of Appeals has grounded the right to effective cross-examination under the Constitution, stating "that the right of cross-examination is 'implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure the accuracy of the truth-determining process.'" People v Smith, 27 NY3d 652, 659 (2016) (quoting Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284, 295 [1973]). Stated another way, "In the criminal justice context, cross-examination is universally recognized as a preeminent truth-seeking device, and it is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the veracity of the witness's testimony are tested." People v Rouse, 34 NY3d 269, 275 (2019) (internal citation, quotation marks and other marks omitted). In this regard, there are multiple theories and scenarios where records of misconduct [*4]are suitable for impeachment. See e.g. People v Green, 156 AD2d 465 (2d Dept 1989) (a witness's bias, interest or hostility is not collateral and may be shown, regardless of a witness's denial and is directly probative of credibility).

However, while the New York State Legislature made sweeping reforms to the discovery statutes in 2019, with subsequent amendments in 2020, 2022, and 2025, the Legislature neither required prosecutors to disclose materials from sealed criminal records as part of their discovery obligations under Article 245 of the Criminal Procedure Law, nor did they amend CPL 160.50 or 160.55 to authorize the prosecution to unseal records for the purposes of complying with their discovery obligations. As stated above, a defendant is also without statutory authority to unseal the records of a third party whose records have been sealed pursuant to CPL 160.55.

Lower courts have previously tried to reconcile Article 245's disclosure requirements, a defendant's right to confront a witness and the sealing provisions. In People v Taveras, 78 Misc 3d1221(A), 2023 NY Slip Op 50309(U) (Crim Ct, Bronx County 2023), the defendant moved to unseal records, arguing that the People were required to disclose sealed records to comply with their discovery obligations. However, the Court rejected the defendant's argument, finding that because the Legislature neither amended the sealing statues nor provided a means or direction for the People to seek unsealing within Article 245, there was no statutory or judicial authority for the People to seek unsealing orders to comply with their discovery obligations. Nonetheless, while the statutory scheme did not permit the People to seek unsealing, the Taveras court reasoned that a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense exceeds the statutory privilege of confidentiality and could trigger a court's inherent authority to unseal its own records where appropriate.

Similarly, in People v Davis, 67 Misc 3d 391 (Crim Ct, Bronc County 2020), the Court there held that the People were not under statutory obligation to obtain an unsealing order to comply with their discovery obligations. However, in light of the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense, the court ruled that an unsealing order for an in camera inspection was the proper balance between protecting an individual's statutory privilege of privacy and the defendant's constitutional right to confront a witness.

Here, based on the review of the parties' argument, this Court is likewise not convinced the Criminal Procedure Law authorizes unsealing records to comply with discovery obligations even where the underlying facts of the sealed records may contain evidence or information that may tend to impeach the credibility of a testifying witness. Additionally, the defendant's general assertion that the sealed records contain information necessary to establish a defense is not a compelling demonstration justifying this Court's extraordinary inherent authority to unseal records under its own authority. Dondi, 63 NY2d at 338. However, it would behoove this Court to acknowledge that the complainant's statutorily granted privilege of confidentiality must yield to the defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses. Davis v Alaska, 415 US 308, 320 (1974).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, in light of this court's inherent authority to unseal its own records and the defendant's constitutional right to confront a witness would be impaired by s statutory privilege of confidentiality, the this Court orders the People to unseal unseal the records related to docket numbers CR-001830-19RI, CR-002077-18RI, CR-001501-16RI and CRH-000558-12RI, and deliver the records to the Court so that the Court may conduct an in camera inspection of the [*5]unsealed records to determine whether the records contain information that may tend to exculpate the defendant or impeach the complainant at trial

This opinion constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: May 28, 2026

Staten Island, New York

RAJA RAJESWARI, A.J.S.C.