Supreme Court, Albany County

Decided on May 12, 2026

Index No. 900514-25

David A. Weinstein, J.

[*1]

Plaintiff Frances Gully commenced this action by summons and complaint dated January 9, 2025, seeking damages for an alleged unlawful entry by her neighbors, defendants Anil Varghese and Rini Anil, onto plaintiff's property located at 5826 Newman Road in the Town of Guilderland. The complaint asserts that during this incursion, defendants destroyed "more than 47 feet of wire fence and 87 feet of immature trees, vines, bushes, underwood, and undergrowth" (Complaint ¶¶ 1-5). Based on these allegations, Gully has asserted causes of action for (1) violation of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law ("RPAPL") § 861 by the impermissible cutting, removing, injuring or destroying trees or timber, and damaging lands thereon^FN1; (2) [*2]reparations; (3) compensation; (4) treble damages; (5) trespass; and (6) conversion (id. ¶¶ 10-42).

Defendants filed an answer with counterclaims for declaratory judgment and quieting of title. After being granted leave by the Court, they filed a first amended answer adding an additional counterclaim for trespass.

During the course of discovery, defendants served a bill of particulars, and plaintiff moved to strike it. By letter dated January 6, 2026, I extended the return date of that motion to the return date for any future motion for summary judgment, and indicated defendants could address it in their papers opposing such motion. No party has addressed this issue further in their present motion papers.

Discovery is now complete. Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment on her complaint, with defendants cross-moving for summary judgment on their cause of action for trespass against plaintiff and dismissal of all six of plaintiff's causes of action as a matter of law.

Because of the particular issues that have arisen on plaintiff's motion, I will discuss these applications separately below.

Plaintiff's Motion

In support of her motion, plaintiff submits her own affidavit, along with her property deed and a land survey prepared by Bethlehem Land Surveying, PLLC (Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, sworn to on January 30, 2026 ["Gully Aff"] ¶ 4, Exs 2 and 3 respectively), as well as a Memorandum of Law (Memorandum of Law from Frances T. Gully, Plaintiff Pro Se, dated January 30, 2026 ["Pl MOL"]). In her affidavit, Gully asserts that on May 26, 2024, she caught the defendants ripping out her eight to ten foot high bushes along the property line between plaintiff's and defendants' houses (id. ¶ 5). According to plaintiff, the bushes, underwood, and small trees that defendants cut and removed were on Gully's property, on her side of a fence that was present when the defendants purchased their property (id. ¶ 6). She states that she did not give defendants permission to remove any of this vegetation from her property (id. ¶ 6). On this basis, she seeks summary judgment on defendants' liability under RPAPL § 861 and for trespass (id. ¶ 16).

In Gully's Memorandum of law, she claims that "[t]he Third Department has repeatedly held that proof of ownership, a survey, and unauthorized cutting establishes liability as a matter of law" (Pl MOL 3). In support of this contention, she cites to three purported judicial decisions: (1) Miller v Rau (174 AD3d 1131 [3d Dept 2019]); (2) Crammer v Spada (203 AD3d 1447 [3d Dept 2022]); and (3) Rockwell v Depart, 161 AD3d 1303 [3d Dept 2018]). These three "cases" are cited by plaintiff for the same proposition in her reply to defendants' motion for summary judgment (Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and in Further Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated [*3]March 25, 2026 ["Pl Reply MOL"] 4).

Defendants filed opposition papers along with their cross motion. These included the affidavits of both defendants, stating in pertinent part that there was a fence along the parties' boundary line, and that they had never "cut or removed any bushes which were allegedly woven through the wire fence," and "never reached over onto Plaintiff's property and cut or removed any bushes, shrubbery, vines, undergrowth, etc." (Affirmations of Anil Verghese and Rini Anil, dated March 4, 2026 ¶¶ 12, 14).

After plaintiff made her reply submission, defendants filed a reply affirmation of counsel, in which they point out that the case citations set forth in plaintiff's filings do not exist, and argues that plaintiff's use of such false citations renders her entire summary judgment motion frivolous^FN2 (Attorney Affirmation in Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Cross-Motion for SJ, dated April 8, 2026 [Def Reply Aff] ¶¶ 6-8). They also note that the Court may sanction plaintiff sua sponte under Part 130 of the Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge for using false case citations (id. ¶¶ 11-16).

In response, plaintiff sought permission to submit a sur-reply so that she could be heard on defendants' application for sanctions. I granted the motion, and in her sur-reply plaintiff acknowledged that the cases she purports to cite do not exist, but she asserts that she included them without knowing that they were inaccurate (Sur-Reply, dated April 13, 2026 ["Sur-Reply"] ¶¶ 1-3). Plaintiff further contends that her use of non-existent case citations was not completely without merit or otherwise frivolous under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, and defendants were not prejudiced thereby (id. ¶¶ 2-4). Thus, she argues that sanctions are not warranted.

Having considered the parties' submissions, I find that imposition of a sanction on plaintiff is appropriate here. Initially, the purportedly authoritative cases cited by plaintiff are, indeed, fabrications, and appear to be "hallucinations" created by an artificial intelligence tool. Although the case names appear to mimic those of actual parties to real rulings issued by the Appellate Division, Third Department, the cases bearing these names concern entirely different matters, and the citations themselves are fake.

The filing of legal paper with fabricated legal authorities is sanctionable as frivolous conduct (see Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v Le Tennier, — AD3d —, 250 NYS3d 260, 266 [3d Dept January 8, 2026] [the "submission of fabricated legal authorities is completely without merit in law and therefore constitutes frivolous conduct"]; see also Cassata, supra ["Citing nonexistent case law or misrepresenting holdings of a case is making a false statement to a court"]). That is because, in signing and submitting a legal paper to a court, a " 'party certifies that, to the best of that person's knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . the presentation of the paper or the contentions therein are not frivolous' " (Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 250 NYS3d at 267, quoting 22 NYCRR [*4]130-1.1a[b][1]).

Ms. Gully notes in her sur-reply that she is self-represented, and asserts that "any such errors were inadvertent, unintentional, and not made in bad faith" (Sur-Reply ¶ 3). But proceeding pro se does not excuse a party from the need to ensure that the legal authorities she cites are genuine (see Augustin v Formula 3 Brooklyn Inc., 88 Misc 3d 1236[A], *4 [Sup Ct Kings County 2025] ["It is of the utmost importance in preserving the integrity and functioning of the legal system that attorneys as well as pro se litigants not improperly use AI and comply by affirming the accuracy of the information provided to the Court"]^FN3; Dowlah v Professional Staff Congress, 227 AD3d 609 [1st Dept 2024] [stating in regard to plaintiff's use of hallucinated AI citations, "[w]e caution plaintiff that his pro se status does not excuse his failure to check the legal citations that he offers to a court]).

Indeed, while plaintiff says the citations were incorrect "unbeknownst to her" (see Sur-Reply ¶ 3), this is essentially an acknowledgment that she did not read or otherwise check the legal authorities she cited to the Court. While a pro se litigant may not have access to the same legal research tools as a represented party, I take judicial notice of the fact that a simple Google search for the cases named would have revealed that cases bearing the same names addressed entirely different issues. In any event, it is not proper for any party to rely upon and cite to the Court case citations for decisions they have not reviewed.

Many harms flow when a party presents a court with false or fraudulent material in a judicial proceeding, such as fake case citations. As one court has noted:

"The opposing party wastes time and money in exposing the deception. The Court's time is taken from other important endeavors, [and when an attorney is involved] the client may be deprived of arguments based on authentic judicial precedents. There is potential harm to the reputation of judges and courts whose names are falsely invoked as authors of the bogus opinions and to the reputation of the party attributed with fictional conduct. It promotes cynicism about the legal profession and the American judicial system"

(Grymes Development Co. v Fodera, 88 Misc 3d 767, 771 [Sup Ct Richmond County 2025] [denying summary judgment motion with prejudice for the use of false case citations]; see also Deutsche Bank Trust Co., supra ["Courts throughout the country which have been confronted with AI-generated authorities have concluded that filing papers containing hallucinated cases and fabricated legal authorities may be sanctionable, as there are many harms associated with the submission of fake cases that extend beyond merely wasting the time and money of the opposing party, but also in taking up the court's resources to evaluate and resolve the deception"] [citations omitted]).

A court has "inherent power to address actions which are meant to undermine the truth-seeking function of the judicial system and place in question the integrity of the courts and our system of justice" (Williams v Scafidi, 205 AD3d 1175, 1177 [3d Dept 2022] [internal quotation and citation omitted]). Here, the most appropriate consequence is to strike the papers in which plaintiff cited fraudulent caselaw. Indeed, the only cases on which plaintiff relies in [*5]both her affirmative motion and in her opposition papers are those imagined by AI. For that reason, I will deny her affirmative motion for summary judgment, and strike the submissions that contain the false citations.

I have considered whether additional or more significant sanctions are warranted, such as the imposition of a monetary fine. Given the weight of the sanction imposed, plaintiff's pro se status, and the caselaw on this issue, I find that the remedy imposed is sufficient. Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that she will be expected at trial to present legally competent evidence, and to the extent she cites legal authorities to the Court, they must be ones she has reviewed, and not those produced by artificial intelligence.^FN4

Defendants' Cross-Motion

In light of my determination above that I cannot consider those submissions of plaintiff's that include fraudulent citations, her opposition to defendants' cross motion is not before me, since it consists entirely of the legal memorandum infected with the false citations (see Cassata, supra; Grymes, supra). Nevertheless, in moving for summary judgment defendants must demonstrate that "the cause of action or defense shall be established sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in the moving party's favor" (CPLR 3212 [b]). In short, they must "make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact" (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; see also Jacobsen v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 NY3d 824, 833 [2014] [same]). Only if the moving party meets its burden, does the burden then shift to the non-moving party to "establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action" (Vega v Restani Constr. Corp., 18 NY3d 499, 503 [2012]). The fact that I have struck plaintiff's submissions does not relieve defendants of this burden (see Rivers v Butterhill Realty, 145 AD2d 709, 710 [3d Dept 1988] [although opposition papers were rejected as late, "plaintiff was still required on her own to demonstrate her right to summary judgment"]).

As set forth below, defendants have not met this burden.

On their cross motion, defendants seek the dismissal of each of plaintiff's causes of action (Attorney Affirmation in Opposition to Motion for SJ and in Support of Cross-Motion of Trevor J. Telisky, Esq., dated March 4, 2026 ["Telisky Aff"] ¶ 3). But a review of the attorney affirmation in support and memorandum of law shows that its challenge to plaintiff's complaint is premised on the alleged lack of admissible proof in Gully's motion papers regarding certain aspects of her case, including the type or value of the destroyed underwood, trees or timber, or the location of the property boundary lines (Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, dated March 6, 2026 ["Def MOL"] at 4-8). In particular, he notes the absence of any expert testimony in this regard (id. at 2-3).

However, plaintiff's failure to put forward sufficient proof to support her motion for summary judgment does not warrant a dismissal of the complaint in defendants' favor. Instead, it is defendants' burden on their cross motion to make a prima facie case showing that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, before the Court must address the sufficiency of the plaintiff's submissions (see Vega, supra; 2261 Realty, LLC v Wang, 242 AD3d 682, 685 [2d Dept 2025] [where plaintiff's submissions in support of summary judgment do not eliminate all questions of fact, such should be addressed at trial]; see also Caliber Home Loans, Inc. v Squaw, 190 AD3d 926 [2d Dept 2021] [denying unopposed motion for summary judgment where movant failed to present a prima facie case]).

In their motion papers, defendants submit affidavits from defendants Varghese and Anil averring that "the area along our property boundary line contains a wire fence which has been there since [defendants] purchased [their] home in February 2007," and defendants "never cut or removed any bushes which were allegedly woven through the wire fence," and never reached over onto Plaintiff's property and cut or removed any bushes, shrubbery, vines, undergrowth, etc." (Varghese Aff ¶¶ 12, 14; Anil Aff ¶¶ 12, 14). But defendants do not argue for summary judgment on this basis. To the contrary, they assert that plaintiff cannot prove the boundaries of her property without expert testimony (see Def MOL 5-7). By the same token, defendants cannot establish the absence of a trespass for purposes of this motion without such testimony.

As defendants do not submit proof showing that plaintiff's causes of action must fail — pointing instead to the shortcomings in plaintiff's motion — they have not shown that they are entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint.

Defendants also seek summary judgment on their counterclaim against Gully for trespass (Def MOL at 9). In support of this relief, defendants rely on the following excerpt from plaintiff's deposition transcript and argue that Gully's own testimony establishes her trespass:

Q: Even assuming — let me ask the question. Even assuming that the defendants were liable to pay for the invoice price of the bushes of approximately $26,000, how do you get to $100,000?

A: It is more than $100,000.

Q: How do you get to more than $100,000?

A: I'll tell you how I get it to. Trespassing, you can sue for actual damages, compensatory damages and punitive damages. Do you know the stress, the anxiety that they caused me for all this, this whole time? Two summers, two springs, the whole winter going without [*6]this. I can't even go in my back yard. These people harassed me to no end in my own back yard. Okay. Snapping pictures. What are they snapping pictures of me for? I can't even go in my own yard. They go out and they just stand there and stare. It is the most bizarre thing I have ever seen. And at your behest they went and they got pictures of me trespassing because I'm trying to keep my bushes so they won't do anything to them again.

Q: So you admit you were trespassing in those photos?

A: I admit that I went on that side on my strip. If I stepped over the line, it was an accident.

Q: So you admit you were trespassing in those photos?

A: I didn't state I was trespassing.

Mr. Telisky: Could you read that back, please. (Whereupon previous testimony was read back.)

A: I said if I was trespassing, if I trespassed, it was accidental. It wasn't intentional. I did not admit that I did. I said if I did. It wasn't on purpose. It wasn't — it wasn't deceptive. It wasn't like they intended to destroy something. I was at my fence line containing my property line so that they didn't butcher it.

(Telisky Aff, Ex A at 68 -70; Def MOL 9-10).

Defendants also append to their affirmations photographs and video depicting plaintiff walking on the property between defendants' and Ms. Gully's respective residences (Affirmations of Anil Verghese and Rini Anil, dated March 4, 2026, ¶¶ 33- 38, Ex D.).

As set forth in defendants' moving papers, "[t]he elements of a cause of action sounding in trespass are an intentional entry onto the land of another without justification or permission, or a refusal to leave after permission has been granted but thereafter withdrawn" (see Def MOL 9, citing Shrage v. Con Edison Co., 216 AD3d 1023, 1025 [2d Dept 2023] [internal quotation and citation omitted]). Here, notwithstanding defendants' contention that Ms. Gully admitted to trespassing onto their property, plaintiff's deposition transcript does not establish such. Even if her ambiguous testimony can be read to acknowledge that she crossed on to defendants' property, she insisted repeatedly that it would no have been intentional. Moreover, defendants failed to submit any competent evidence to establish the precise location of their property's boundary line which they claim was crossed by plaintiff.

As a result, defendants have not met their burden, and their motion must be denied as well.

Motion to Strike Bill of Particulars

As noted above, plaintiff also filed a motion to strike defendants' bill of particulars, the return date of which was made the same as that of the summary judgment motions. Except in plaintiff's initial filing — which is supported by an affirmation, there are no other submissions on [*7]this issue. Notwithstanding the absence of opposition papers, I deny the motion, as it is facially without merit.

The motion is based on two grounds. First, plaintiff argues that the defendants' bill of particulars was untimely. As set forth in plaintiff's supporting affirmation, service of the bill of particulars was due on May 19, 2025 according to the Preliminary Conference Order. Ms. Gully states that she agreed to extend the deadline several times until Friday, May 23, but defendants did not serve the pleading until Tuesday, May 27, the next working day, although this final extension was not authorized by plaintiff, and the others were not approved by the Court.

The second ground for this relief is that the document was only verified by defendant Varghese, and not by Rini Anil. Plaintiff filed a "Notice of Rejection" on both grounds on November 20, 2025, and then on December 10, 2025, defendants served a new Bill of Particulars verified by Ms. Anil as well (see NYSCEF No. 61, 66).

Before addressing these arguments. I note that plaintiff sought to bring a motion for sanctions on this basis by letter dated May 27. I responded by letter order on May 29, in which I found such a motion "would not be appropriate at this time," given the "limited nature of the delay" and the fact that the Bill of Particulars had now been served (NYSCEF No. 24). Plaintiff ultimately made the motion anyway.

Putting this earlier ruling aside, there remains no basis for the relief sought by plaintiff on the basis of the brief delay at issue. The remedy for a late bill of particulars is set forth in CPLR 3042(c), which states: " If a party fails to respond to a demand in a timely fashion or fails to comply fully with a demand, the party seeking the bill of particulars may move to compel compliance, or, if such failure is willful, for the imposition of penalties pursuant to subdivision (d) of this rule." Paragraph (d) addresses "willful" refusal to comply with such an order, and provides: "the court may make such final or conditional order with regard to the failure or refusal as is just, including such relief as is set forth in section thirty-one hundred twenty-six of this chapter."

In short, the Court has discretion as to whether to impose a sanction, and it may grant the kind of penalty sought by plaintiff, as is available under CPLR 3126, only in the event of willful refusal. Here, I am faced with a delay between May 19 and May 27, with the first five days agreed to by plaintiff, and the remainder encompassing Memorial Day weekend. Plaintiff has shown no prejudice, and the delay at issue does not remotely evince willful misconduct. While plaintiff points to various other delays by defendants, none of them support the kind of sanction sought here.^FN5

I am left, then, with the claim is that the Bill of Particulars is unsigned by one of the parties (Affirmation in Support of Motion to Strike ¶ 6). As noted, that issue has now been remedied. In any event, the verification by only one defendant provides no basis to strike the bill of particulars. Although plaintiff cites CPLR 3042 for her argument, that statute says nothing about a signing requirement. The only relevant statute is CPLR 3044, which says a bill of [*8]particulars must be verified if an earlier pleading was, or if the case involves personal injury. Defendants' answer here was not verified, and so such verification was not required here. In any event, I see no CPLR provision which states that all defendants must verify the document, and if there is such a requirement, this has now been done with no prejudice to plaintiff.

The motion to strike the bill of particulars is therefore denied.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that plaintiff's and defendants' motions for summary judgment are denied; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to strike defendants' bill of particulars is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the trial shall proceed as scheduled on June 24, 2026.

This constitutes the Decision & Order of the Court. The original Decision & Order is being filed electronically with the Court Clerk, with a copy e-mailed to defendants' counsel and plaintiff. The signing of this Decision and Order and e-filing on NYSCEF shall not constitute notice of entry under CPLR Rule 5513, and counsel is not relieved from the applicable provisions of the CPLR respecting to filing and service of Notice of Entry.

ENTER

Dated: May 12, 2026

Albany, New York

David A. Weinstein

Acting Supreme Court Justice

Papers Considered:

1. Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment and Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, sworn to on January 30, 2026, with Exhibits annexed thereto, along with Memorandum of Law, dated January 30, 2026 and Statement of Material Facts, dated January 30, 2026.

2. Notice of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Attorney Affirmation in Opposition to Motion for SJ and in Support of Cross-Motion of Trevor J. Telisky, Esq., dated March 4, 2026, with Exhibit annexed thereto, along with Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, dated March 6, 2026, and Affirmation of Anil Varghese, with Exhibits annexed thereto, and Affirmation Rini Anil, dated March 4, 202, along with Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts, dated March 4, 2026.

3. Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and in Further Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated March 25, 2026, with Exhibits annexed thereto, and Plaintiff Pro Se's Response to Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Material, dated March 25, 2026.

4. Attorney Affirmation in Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Cross-Motion for SJ of Trevor J. Telisky, Esq., dated April 8, 2026, with Exhibits annexed thereto.

5. Plaintiff's Sur-Reply, dated April 13, 20206.