Supreme Court, Richmond County

Decided on May 8, 2026

Index No. REDACTED

Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.

[*1]

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion No. 002) numbered 68-77, 131-139; (Motion No. 003) numbered 78-81, 83, 140-142; (Motion No. 004) numbered 116-130; and (Motion No. 005) numbered 88-115. On April 23, 2026, Motion Sequence No. 002; Motion Sequence No. 003; Motion Sequence No. 004; and Motion Sequence No. 005 were all deemed by the Court on the record to be fully submitted and oral argument was heard on all motions.

The following papers, numbered on NYSCEF, were read and considered in connection with the following applications: (1) Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause, dated March 13, 2026, seeking leave to renew pursuant to CPLR § 2221 [e] and reargue the Decision and Order dated February 10, 2026 and for a recalculation of pendente lite support (Motion Sequence No. 002); (2) Defendant's Cross-Motion, dated April 9, 2026, opposing Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause, dated March 13, 2026 and seeking an award of counsel fees, costs, and disbursements in an amount not less than $200,000.00 payable to Berkman Bottger Newman & Schein LLP (Motion Sequence No. 005); (3) Plaintiff's second Order to Show Cause, dated March 19, 2026, seeking, inter alia, modification pendente lite obligations and a determination transferring jurisdiction concerning issues related to the parties' children to the State of Florida (Motion Sequence No. 003); and (4) Defendant's Cross-Motion, dated April 9, 2026, opposing Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause filed on March 18, 2026 and seeking counsel fees, costs, and disbursements in an amount not less than $26,356.60, payable to Berkman Bottger Newman & Schein LLP; (Motion Sequence No. 004).

The Court has considered: the Order to Show Cause (Motion Sequence No. 002), dated March 13, 2026, Plaintiff's Affirmation in Support, dated March 12, 2026, the Affirmation of Jeffrey S. Schecter, Esq., in Support, dated March 12, 2026, with annexed exhibits; the Defendant's Notice of Cross-Motion (Motion Sequence No. 005), dated April 9, 2026, the Defendant's Affirmation in [*2]Opposition to Order to Show Cause Motion No. 002 and in Support of Cross-Motion No. 005, dated April 9, 2026; the Affirmation of Evan Schein, Esq., in Opposition to Order to Show Cause Motion No. 002 and in Support of Cross-Motion No. 005, dated April 9, 2026, with annexed exhibits; the Order to Show Cause (Motion Sequence No. 003), dated March 19, 2026, Plaintiff's Affirmation in Support, dated March 17, 2026, the Affirmation of Jeffrey S. Schecter, Esq., in Support, dated March 17, 2026, with annexed exhibits; the Affirmation of Attorney for the Children Harry Chiu, Esq., in response to the Order to Show Cause, dated March 19, 2026; the Defendant's Notice of Cross-Motion (Motion Sequence No. 004), dated April 9, 2026, the Defendant's Affirmation in Opposition to Order to Show Cause Motion No. 003 and in Support of Cross-Motion No. 005, dated April 9, 2026; the Affirmation of Evan Schein, Esq., in Opposition to Order to Show Cause Motion No. 002 and in Support of Cross-Motion No. 005, dated April 9, 2026, with annexed exhibits.

The Court has further considered: Plaintiff's Affirmation, dated April 20, 2026, in Opposition to Defendant's Cross-Motion Sequence No. 005 and in further Support of Plaintiff's Motion Sequence No. 002, The Affirmation of Jeffrey S. Schecter, Esq., dated April 20, 2026, in Opposition to Defendant's Cross-Motion Sequence No. 005 and in further Support of Plaintiff's Motion Sequence No. 002 with annexed exhibits; Plaintiff's Affirmation, dated April 20, 2026, in Opposition to Defendant's Cross-Motion Sequence No. 004 and in further Support of Plaintiff's Motion Sequence No. 003, The Affirmation of Jeffrey S. Schecter, Esq., dated April 17, 2026, in Opposition to Defendant's Cross-Motion Sequence No. 004 and in further Support of Plaintiff's Motion Sequence No. 003; and all prior proceedings and submissions referenced therein.

II. Findings of Fact

This matrimonial action presents a series of intertwined financial and procedural disputes arising in the pendency of the litigation. By Decision and Order dated February 10, 2026, this Court awarded Defendant unallocated pendente lite support in the amount of $30,000 per month and directed Plaintiff to continue payment of numerous additional financial obligations, including, inter alia, carrying costs associated with multiple properties, vehicle-related expenses, and the full panoply of expenses attributable to the parties' children. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 92).

The instant applications, comprising four separate motions, arise from Plaintiff's contention that the prior determination was rendered upon an incomplete and, in certain respects, misapprehended financial record, as well as Defendant's applications for counsel fees and Plaintiff's additional request for jurisdictional relief.

As part of his Statement of Net Worth submitted on March 12, 2026, Plaintiff provided a copy of his 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return for 2024 in which he reported a total income of $3,667,144.00. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 75). Plaintiff's form 4868 for 2024 indicates a total tax liability to the United States government of $390,000.00. (see id). Plaintiff further provided a copy of his New York State 2024 Resident Income Tax Return, which reported on line 61 a total New York tax liability of $293,895.00.

Plaintiff has also provided a copy of a 4868 Application for Automatic Extension of Time to file U.S. Individual Income Tax Return for 2025 until October 15, 2026. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 133). This application indicates a total federal tax liability for the year 2025 in the amount of $354,000.00 and an outstanding balance due of $215,000.00. (see id).

Plaintiff's Total 2024 Gross Income	$3,667,144.00
2024 Federal Tax Liability	($390,000.00)
2024 New York State/City Tax Liability	($293,895.00)
Plaintiff 2024 Net Income	$2,983,249.00
Estimated Plaintiff 2024 Monthly Income	$248,604.00

The court notes that while the 2025 tax figures are based upon an extension application rather than a filed return, such estimates are appropriately considered in evaluating a party's current financial circumstances on a pendente lite application, as the court is not required to await finalized tax returns before rendering interim relief (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [b] [5] [iv], [v]; Nosratabdi v. Aroni, 198 AD3d 976 [2d Dept 2021]; Moffre v Moffre, 29 AD3d 1149 [3d Dept 2006]). The court has considered these figures for their probative value in establishing plaintiff's approximate current tax burden, while remaining mindful that actual 2025 liability may vary upon the filing of a completed return.

With respect to Motion Sequence No. 002, Plaintiff avers that his initial Statement of Net Worth, submitted in connection with the underlying pendente lite motion, contained a material omission. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 69 at ¶3). Specifically, while Plaintiff disclosed certain vehicle-related liabilities within the asset section of his financial statement, he failed to include the corresponding monthly loan obligations - totaling $56,528.15 per month, or $678,337.80 annually, within the expense section. (see id; NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 71).

The monthly vehicle payments to Ferrari Financial Services breakdown as follows:

Ferrari 1985 288 GTO VIN# Redacted	$19,777.54
Ferrari 2017 LaFerrari Aperta VIN# Redacted	$23,235.15
Ferrari 2024 Competizione Aperta VIN# Redacted	$13,516.84
Plaintiff's Total Monthly Payments to Ferrari Financial Services	$56,529.53
Plaintiff's Total Annual Payments to Ferrari Financial Services	$678,354.36

(NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 71).

Plaintiff has submitted the Parties' monthly TD Bank statements for account ending 2954 from September 26, 2024 through February 13, 2026, which document the ongoing and monthly nature of the payments to Ferrari Financial Servies in the monthly total of $56,529.53. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 72). Plaintiff asserts that these payments have been consistently made for a significant period of time preceding the commencement of this action and were omitted solely as a result of inadvertence. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 69 at ¶3; NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 72).

The court further notes that these vehicle obligations are not newly incurred luxury liabilities assumed in anticipation of litigation, nor are they merely personal indulgences of the plaintiff. The record reflects that plaintiff operates as a bona fide participant in the speculative market for collectible and high-value Ferrari automobiles, acquiring and holding these vehicles as appreciating assets with the intent to resell at a profit. The three vehicles at issue — a 1985 Ferrari 288 GTO, a 2017 Ferrari LaFerrari Aperta, and a 2024 Ferrari Competizione Aperta, represent distinct tiers of the collectible Ferrari market, each carrying documented financing obligations that predate the commencement of this action.

The court finds that the characterization of these obligations as purely personal luxury expenditures is an oversimplification that does not fully capture the economic reality of plaintiff's financial position. Whereas here, a party engages in the acquisition and speculative resale of high-value assets as a component of his overall financial activity, the carrying costs associated with those assets, including loan service obligations, are properly treated as business-related financial obligations, even if the underlying assets also possess characteristics of personal property (see generally Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6] [a]; Isaacs v Isaacs, 71 AD3d 951 [2d Dept 2010]; Qazi v Qazi, 220 AD3d 660 [2d Dept 2023]; Calabrese v Johnston, 274 AD2d 971 [4th Dept 2000]; Barber v Cahill, 240 AD2d 887 [3d 1997]).

The court is further satisfied that these obligations reflect the established financial lifestyle and business practices of the parties prior to separation, and that the banking records submitted confirm their consistent, recurring nature throughout a significant period preceding this litigation. Accordingly, the court concludes that these carrying costs are properly included within plaintiff's monthly expense obligations for purposes of this pendente lite determination, without prejudice to further examination of the business nature and profitability of this activity at trial.

Plaintiff further maintains that, when these expenses are properly accounted for, his monthly expenditures increase from $77,130.75 to $133,660.27, exclusive of tax liabilities. Plaintiff additionally contends that his annual tax obligations approximate $1,592,555, thereby substantially reducing his net disposable income. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 69 at ¶5; ¶7). Plaintiff argues that the combined effect of these expenses, together with the $30,000.00 monthly support obligation imposed by this Court, places him in a position where his financial outflows nearly equal or exceed his net income, leaving little or no margin for contingencies or non-recurring expenses. (see id).

The court is mindful that pendente lite determinations are necessarily made upon and incomplete record and that the figures presented represent the best available evidence at this stage of the litigation. The court makes no final determination as to the accuracy of plaintiff's financial disclosures and expressly reserves the right to revisit and recalibrate support obligations upon a more fully developed evidentiary record at trial (See Mahoney-Buntzman vBuntzman, 12 NY3d 415 [2009]).

Based his 2024 Tax Returns and the evidence provided Plaintiff's monthly financial status is as follows:

Plaintiff's estimated monthly gross income	$305,595.00
Plaintiff's estimated monthly federal tax liability	($32,500.00)
Plaintiff's estimated monthly state/city tax liability	($24,491.00)
Plaintiff's estimated total payments to Ferrari [*4]Financial Services	($56,529.00)
Plaintiff's expenses pertaining to Staten Island Property	($15,300.00)
Plaintiff's expenses pertaining to Plantation, Florida Property	($3,763.00)
Plaintiff's expenses pertaining to Sunny Isles, Florida Property	($10,661.00)
Estimated monthly utilities for all three properties	($7,677.00)
Estimated monthly educational expenses for the children	($20,000.00)
Plaintiff's estimated net income after expenses	$134,674.00

(NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 75).

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's underlying application for pendente lite support was devoid of substantiated evidence of her actual financial needs. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 69). According to Plaintiff, Defendant failed to provide personal bank statements, credit card records, or other documentation reflecting her historical expenditures, and instead relied largely upon financial records attributable to Plaintiff. (see id at ¶12). Plaintiff contends that this resulted in an inflated and unsubstantiated portrayal of Defendant's needs, which the Court may have inadvertently credited. (see id at ¶12-13).

The absence of independent financial documentation from defendant is a factor the court must weigh in assessing the appropriate level of pendente lite support. While the court is sensitive to the practical difficulties a non-monied spouse may face in documenting historical expenditures, particularly where the marital finances were predominantly controlled by the other party, the evidentiary burden nonetheless requires some substantiated showing of actual need (see Campanaro v Campanaro, 292 AD2d 330 [2d Dept 2002]). Defendant retains the opportunity to submit a comprehensive and fully documented financial statement upon any future application or at trial, at which time the court will be in a position to give greater weight to her claimed monthly expenses.

With respect to Motion Sequence No. 004, Plaintiff reiterates his financial arguments and further seeks a determination transferring jurisdiction concerning issues related to the parties' children to the State of Florida. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 79) While such relief is expressly requested, the submissions do not contain a detailed factual recitation concerning the residence history of the children, the duration of any alleged presence outside the State of New York, the existence of any prior custody determinations, or the pendency of any competing proceedings in another jurisdiction.

Defendant, in Motion Sequences 004 and 005, seeks awards of counsel fees, asserting that the disparity in the parties' financial circumstances and the nature of the litigation warrant such relief. Defendant's second application seeks a substantial award of no less than $200,000.

III. Conclusions of Law

The Court addresses each motion separately and in sequence.

A. Motion Sequence No. 002 - Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Renew and Reargue

Plaintiff moves pursuant to CPLR § 2221 [e] and [d] for leave to renew and reargue the Decision and Order dated February 10, 2026. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 92)

As to renewal, "CPLR § 2221 [e] provides, in relevant part, that '[a] motion for leave to renew . . . shall be based upon new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination . . . [and] shall contain reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion'" (see Shvyetsov v 1900 Newkirk Ave., LLC, 217 AD3d 704 [2d Dept 2023] quoting CPLR § 2221 [e] [2]-[3]).

The Appellate Division, Second Department, has repeatedly held that this requirement is not rigid and that a court may, in the exercise of its discretion, grant renewal even where the facts were known at the time of the original motion, provided a reasonable explanation is offered (see Rakha v Pinnacle Bus Servs., 98 AD3d 657 [2d Dept 2012]; DeMarquez v Gallo, 94 AD3d 1039 [2d Dept 2012]; Matter of Choy v Mai Ling Lai, 91 AD3d 772 [2d Dept 2012]; Caruso v Caruso, 155 AD2d 505 [2d Dept 1989]).

"[T]he requirement that a motion for leave to renew be based upon new or additional facts unknown to the movant at the time of the original motion is a flexible one and the court, in its discretion, may also grant renewal, in the interest of justice, upon facts which were known to the movant at the time the original motion was made" (see Shvyetsov v 1900 Newkirk Ave., LLC, 217 AD3d 704 [2d Dept 2023] quoting NP162, LLC v. Harding, 197 AD3d 479 [2d Dept 2021] quoting Citimortgage, Inc. v Espinal, 136 AD3d 857 [2d Dept 2016]).

"Pursuant to CPLR § 2221 [e], a motion for leave to renew shall be based upon new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination and shall contain reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion (see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Smart Choice Med., P.C., 2026 NY AppDiv LEXIS 2827 [2d Dept 2026] citing CPLR § 2221 [e] [2]).

"The new or additional facts either must have not been known to the party seeking renewal or may, in the Supreme Court's discretion, be based on facts known to the party seeking renewal at the time of the original motion" (see US Bank, N.A. v Kandra, 244 AD3d 902 [2d Dept 2025] quoting Ok Sun Chong v Scheelje, 218 AD3d 691[2d Dept 2023]; citing Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Moreno, 232 AD3d 673 [2d Dept 2024]).

In the matter of Caruso v Caruso, (155 AD2d 505 [2d Dept 1989]) the Second Department held that

The court properly granted the defendant's motion based upon his submission of a revised net worth statement and further affidavits explaining his financial situation. While the general rule has often been stated that an application for leave to renew should be based on newly discovered facts, the rule is not inflexible and the court may exercise its discretion to grant renewal even upon facts known to the moving party at the time of the original motion (see id citing Oremland v Miller Minutemen Constr. Corp., 133 AD2d 816 [2d Dept 1987]).

Similarly in the present matter, the Plaintiff's original submissions failed to provide the Court with an accurate picture of his finances. Had Plaintiff provided his financial information on the original motion in a more complete and clearer form, the Court would have in all likelihood altered the Court's original determination.

Plaintiff's present submissions demonstrate that a substantial category of recurring expenses, automobile loan payments exceeding $56,000 per month, was omitted from the expense portion of his Statement of Net Worth. The Court finds that this omission is neither trivial nor cumulative; rather, it represents a material component of Plaintiff's financial obligations, the inclusion of which [*5]significantly alters the financial landscape presented on the prior motion. Plaintiff has offered a reasonable explanation for the omission, namely, an inadvertent failure to properly categorize these payments despite their disclosure elsewhere in the financial documentation. (see B.B.Y. Diamonds Corp. v Five Star Designs, Inc., 6 AD3d 263 [1st Dept 2004]; Hackney v Monge, 103 AD3d 844 [2d Dept 2013]).

Given the magnitude of the omitted expenses and their direct bearing on Plaintiff's ability to satisfy the pendente lite award, the Court concludes that renewal is warranted in the interest of ensuring that its determination rests upon a complete and accurate financial record.

As to reargument, CPLR § 2221 [d] permits a motion based upon matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the Court. Such a motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court (see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Halls, 98 AD3d 718 [2d Dept 2012]; Ahmed v Pannone, 116 AD3d 802 [2d Dept 2014]; D'Amico Constr., Inc. v Cow Bay Sprinkler Corp., 233 AD3d 1024 [2d Dept 2024]; Am. Tr. Ins. Co. v Barakat PT PC, 2026 NY App Div LEXIS 1885 [2d Dept 2026]).

Plaintiff has raised substantial questions as to whether the Court's prior determination fully accounted for the totality of his financial obligations, including both recurring expenses and tax liabilities, and whether the evidentiary basis for Defendant's claimed needs was sufficiently substantiated. In particular, the asserted absence of Defendant's independent financial documentation and the reliance upon Plaintiff's records raise legitimate concerns regarding the factual underpinnings of the prior award.

Accordingly, leave to renew and reargue is GRANTED.

In so holding, the court emphasizes that this determination reflects no adverse credibility finding against the plaintiff with respect to the original omission. The court accepts plaintiff's representation that the failure to include the vehicle loan obligations in the expense section of his Statement of Net Worth was inadvertent, particularly given that the underlying liabilities were disclosed elsewhere in the financial documentation. The court's grant of renewal is based solely upon the need to ensure that its pendente lite determination rests upon a complete and accurate financial record (See Caruso v Caruso, 155 AD2d 505 [2d Dept 1989]).

Upon renewal and reargument, the Court must determine an appropriate pendente lite award based solely upon the record before it. The purpose of pendente lite relief is to maintain the status quo and ensure that reasonable needs are met pending final adjudication, without imposing an undue or unsustainable burden on the payor.

The Court has carefully considered the financial factors as well as the status quo situation. Guidelines maintenance and child support up to the cap would produce a monthly obligation to the Plaintiff of $4,000.00 for maintenance and $4,600.00 for child support for a total monthly payment of $8,600.00. To follow strictly the guidelines with the caps in place would yield an unjust result based on the Plaintiff's earnings and lifestyles of the parties. Removal of the financial caps entirely would create not only an outrageously unjust result, but an impossible result when considering the status quo situation and the ongoing financial obligations of the Plaintiff.

The court's determination to award support above the statutory guideline cap reflects the undisputed financial circumstances of the parties and established marital lifestyle. In exercising its discretion to exceed the cap, the court has considered the plaintiff's gross income, the parties' pre-separation standard of living including the maintenance of multiple properties across two states, the number and needs of the children, and the reasonable financial requirements of the defendant as the non-monied spouse (See Domestic Relations Law § 240[1-b]; Cassano v Cassano, 85 NY2d 649 [*6][1995]). The award of $20,000.00 per month represents the court's considered judgment that this amount adequately addresses defendant's reasonable interim needs while remaining within plaintiff's demonstrated financial capacity after satisfaction of his recurring obligations.

"A pendente lite award should be an accommodation between the reasonable needs of the moving spouse and the financial ability of the other spouse, determined with due regard for the preseparation standard of living" (see Jin C. v Juliana L., 137 AD3d 1063 [2d Dept 2016] citing Fieland v. Fieland, 229 AD2d 465 [2d Dept 1996]), see also Dowd v Dowd, 74 AD3d 1013 [2d Dept 2010]; Swickle v Swickle, 47 AD3d 704 [2d Dept 2008]).

In crafting its determination, the Court has considered the Plaintiff's financial submissions, as supplemented, which demonstrate that his after-tax income, when juxtaposed with his recurring expenses, leaves a relatively narrow margin of available funds. Furthermore, the Defendant's claimed expenses of $30,000.00 per month are not supported by sufficient independent documentation, which requires the Court to limit the weight the Court can assign them at this stage.

The Court has also considered the submission of the Attorney for the Children, Harry Chiu, Esq., dated March 19, 2026, filed in response to the Order to Show Cause. The Attorney for the Children has been appointed to independently represent the interests of the parties' children in this proceeding. To the extent the Attorney for the Children's submission addresses the financial provisions at issue, the court has weighed those observations in arriving at the modified support figure. The court is satisfied that the modified award, stated below, together with plaintiff's continued obligation to bear 100% of shelter costs, tuition, insurance, unreimbursed medical expenses, and statutory add-ons, adequately serves and protects the interests of the children during the pendency of this litigation.

Balancing these considerations, and without making any final determination as to the parties' ultimate financial rights and obligations, the Court finds, upon renewal and reargument, that the Decision and Order dated February 10, 2026 is ORDERED modified to the extent that Plaintiff shall pay Defendant unallocated pendente lite spousal maintenance and child support in the amount of $20,000.00 [TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS] per month, in a single lump sum on or before the first day of each month, commencing June 1, 2026, retroactive to the date of January 30, 2026, subject to reallocation upon further order of the Court; and it is further

ORDERED that the Court finds that retroactivity to January 30, 2026, the date of Plaintiff's original pendente lite motion, is appropriate. It is well settled that a court has broad discretion to make a pendente lite award retroactive to the date of the application (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6] [a]). To permit Plaintiff to benefit from the period of delay occasioned by the pendency of these motions would be inequitable. Accordingly, any overpayment made by Plaintiff above the modified award of $20,000.00 per month for the period from January 15, 2026, the date erroneously provided in the Decision and Order, dated February 10, 2026, retroactive through the date of entry of this Decision and Order shall be credited against future obligations, and any underpayment by Plaintiff below the modified award for that same period shall be paid as part of the lump sum arrears calculation directed herein; and it is further

ORDERED, that Plaintiff shall continue to pay 100% of all shelter/carrying charges, tuition, insurance, unreimbursed medical expenses, and statutory add-ons, pendente lite, and subject to reallocation at trial; and it is further

ORDERED, that commencing June 1, 2026, the Defendant shall pay 100% of all the monthly ordinary housekeeping expenses, pendente lite, and subject to reallocation at trial; and it [*7]is further

ORDERED, that any arears due to either party shall be calculated and paid in a lump sum within sixty days from the date of entry of this Decision and Order.

B. Motion Sequence No. 004 - Defendant's Cross-Motion for Counsel Fees

Defendant seeks an award of counsel fees. "In a matrimonial action, an award of an attorney's fee . . . is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court" (see Rigas v Rigas, 227 AD3d 1017 [2d Dept 2024] quoting Montoya v Montoya, 143 AD3d 865 [2d Dept 2016], see also Vitale v Vitale, 112 AD3d 614 [2d Dept 2013]; Cusumano v Cusumano, 96 AD3d 988 [2d Dept 2012]; Ivani v Ivani, 303 AD2d 639 [2d Dept 2003]).

While "[t]here is a statutory rebuttable presumption that counsel fees shall be awarded to the less monied spouse" (see id quoting Lieberman-Massoni v Massoni, 215 AD3d 656 [2d Dept 2023]), "court rules impose certain requirements upon attorneys who represent clients in domestic relations matters (see 22 NYCRR part 1400)" (see id quoting Montoya v Montoya, 143 AD3d 865 [2d Dept 2016]).

While the court acknowledges the statutory presumption in favor of counsel fee awards to the less monied spouse, such presumption does not operate automatically and does not relieve the applicant of the obligation to provide the court with the documentation necessary to assess the reasonableness of the fees sought (See Silverman v Silverman, 304 AD2d 41 [1 Dept 2003]). The presumption shifts the burden of justification to the more monied spouse only after a sufficient evidentiary foundation has been established by the applicant through itemized billing records demonstrating compliance with the matrimonial billing rules and the necessity of the services rendered.

Any application for counsel fees must be supported by itemized billing documentation that shows not only the time spent on each service, but also that the applying party has complied with the matrimonial billing rules set forth in 22 NYCRR 1400.2. (see Safir v Safir, 237 AD3d 868 [2d Dept 2025]; Rigas v Rigas, 227 AD3d 1017 [2d Dept 2024]; Spataro v Spataro, 211 AD3d 1069 [2d Dept 2022]; Greco v Greco, 161 AD3d 950 [2d Dept 2018]).

In addition to the relative financial circumstances of the parties, when crafting a counsel fee award, the Court must also consider the relative merits of their positions, and the tactics of a party in unnecessarily prolonging the litigation. (see Sevdinoglou v Sevdinoglou, 40 AD3d 959 [2d Dept 2007]; citing DRL § 237 [a]; De Cabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879 [1987]; Levy v Levy, 4 AD3d 398 [2d Dept 2004]; Krutyansky v Krutyansky, 289 AD2d 299 [2d Dept 2001]; Morrissey v Morrissey, 259 AD2d 472 [2d Dept 1999]).

The award of counsel fees in a matrimonial action is committed to the sound discretion of the Court, which must consider the financial circumstances of the parties, the merits of the positions taken, and the extent to which the requested fees are supported by appropriate documentation.

While the Court recognizes that there may be a disparity in income between the parties, such disparity alone does not mandate an award of counsel fees. The application must be supported by detailed billing records, evidence of the necessity of the services rendered, and a showing that the fees sought are reasonable.

On the present record, Defendant has not provided sufficient documentation to enable the Court to assess the reasonableness or necessity of the requested fees. This finding is not an ultimate determination on the ultimate issue of counsel fees, pendente lite, but only a determination on the [*8]sufficiency of the documentation provided in support of the present request. Accordingly, the application is DENIED without prejudice and counsel may renew the request for counsel fees, pendente lite, without seeking prior permission.

C. Motion Sequence No. 003 - Plaintiff's Second Order to Show Cause - Jurisdictional Transfer

Plaintiff's second Order to Show Cause (Motion Sequence No. 003) seeks, inter alia, modification of pendente lite support and a determination transferring jurisdiction concerning issues related to the parties' children to the State of Florida.

"A court of this state which has jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (see Domestic Relations Law art 5-A [hereinafter UCCJEA]), may decline to exercise it if it finds that New York is an inconvenient forum and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum" (see Matter of Hassan v Silva, 100 AD3d 753 [2d Dept 2012] citing DRL § 76-f [1]; Rey v Spinetta, 8 AD3d 393 [2d Dept 2004]).

The "court is required to consider the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 76-f [2] [a]-[h] and allow the parties to submit information regarding these factors before determining that New York is an inconvenient forum." (see id). The factors are the following:

(a) whether domestic violence or mistreatment or abuse of a child or sibling has occurred and is likely to continue in the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child;

(b) the length of time the child has resided outside this state;

(c) the distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction;

(d) the relative financial circumstances of the parties;

(e) any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction;

(f) the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the child;

(g) the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and

(h) the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending litigation. (see DRL § 76-f [2])

To the extent the motion seeks modification of pendente lite support, such relief has been addressed in connection with Motion Sequence 002 and is granted to the extent set forth herein. With respect to the jurisdictional branch of the motion, the Court notes that applications seeking to transfer jurisdiction over matters concerning children require a comprehensive factual record. Such determinations are inherently fact-driven and depend upon detailed information concerning the residence of the children, the duration of their presence in any jurisdiction, the existence of prior custody determinations, and the presence or absence of competing proceedings.

"[B]efore declining jurisdiction in favor of a court of another state, a New York court must consider the factors set forth in [DRL] § 76-f [2] and permit the parties to submit information with respect to all relevant factors" (see Salman v Salman, 32 Misc 3d 1242(A) [Sup Ct Kings County 2011] citing Matter of Greenidge v Greenidge, 16 AD3d 583 [2d Dept 2005]).

The Court is required to consider which state can best protect the child and must make a specific finding on this point, which must be supported by a record containing sufficient evidence that provides a sound basis for a finding that another state is the more appropriate forum. (see Jun [*9]Cao v Ping Zhao, 2 AD3d 1203 [3d Dept 2003] citing DRL § 76-f [2] [a]). The record presently before the Court is devoid of such information.

Plaintiff, as the movant, bears the burden under DRL § 76-f of proof in establishing a basis for the Court to determine that jurisdiction should be transferred to another state. (see Matter of Englese v Strauss, 83 AD3d 705 [2d Dept 2011]). Plaintiff has failed to meet that burden. The submissions provided fail to contain a sufficiently detailed factual presentation or the documentary evidence required to establish a basis upon which this Court may determine that jurisdiction should be transferred to another state.

In the absence of a developed evidentiary record, the Court is precluded from completing a meaningful analysis of the statutory factors. Accordingly, the Court is compelled to DENY this branch of the motion without prejudice to renewal upon proper papers.

D. Motion Sequence No. 005 - Defendant's Cross-Motion for Counsel Fees

Any application for counsel fees must be supported by itemized billing documentation that shows not only the time spent on each service, but also that the applying party has complied with the matrimonial billing rules set forth in 22 NYCRR 1400.2. (see Safir v Safir, 237 AD3d 868 [2d Dept 2025]; Rigas v Rigas, 227 AD3d 1017 [2d Dept 2024]; Spataro v Spataro, 211 AD3d 1069 [2d Dept 2022]; Greco v Greco, 161 AD3d 950 [2d Dept 2018]).

Defendant's second application seeks counsel fees in an amount no less than $200,000. As with Motion Sequence No.004, the Court must assess the application in light of the documentation provided and the circumstances of the case.

On the present record, Defendant has not provided sufficient documentation to enable the Court to assess the reasonableness or necessity of the requested fees. This finding is not an ultimate determination on the ultimate issue of counsel fees, pendente lite, but only a determination on the sufficiency of the documentation provided in support of the present request. Accordingly, the application is DENIED without prejudice and counsel may renew the request for counsel fees, pendente lite, without seeking prior permission.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's motion (Motion Sequence No. 002) for leave to renew is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's motion (Motion Sequence No. 002) for leave to reargue is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED, that upon renewal and reargument, the Decision and Order dated February 10, 2026 is modified to the extent that Plaintiff shall pay Defendant unallocated pendente lite spousal maintenance and child support in the amount of $20,000.00 [TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS] per month, in a single lump sum on or before the first day of each month, commencing June 1, 2026, retroactive to the date of January 30, 2026, subject to reallocation upon further order of the Court; and it is further

ORDERED that the Court finds that retroactivity to January 30, 2026, the date of Plaintiff's original pendente lite motion, is appropriate. It is well settled that a court has broad discretion to [*10]make a pendente lite award retroactive to the date of the application (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6] [a]). To permit Plaintiff to benefit from the period of delay occasioned by the pendency of these motions would be inequitable. Accordingly, any overpayment made by Plaintiff above the modified award of $20,000.00 per month for the period from January 15, 2026, the date erroneously provided in the Decision and Order, dated February 10, 2026, retroactive through the date of entry of this Decision and Order shall be credited against future obligations, and any underpayment by Plaintiff below the modified award for that same period shall be paid as part of the lump sum arrears calculation directed herein; and it is further

ORDERED, that Plaintiff shall continue to pay 100% of all shelter/carrying charges, tuition, insurance, unreimbursed medical expenses, and statutory add-ons, pendente lite, and subject to reallocation at trial; and it is further

ORDERED, that commencing June 1, 2026, the Defendant shall pay 100% of all the monthly ordinary housekeeping expenses, pendente lite, and subject to reallocation at trial; and it is further

ORDERED, that any arears due to either party shall be calculated and paid in a lump sum within sixty days from the date of entry of this Decision and Order; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant's cross-motion (Motion Sequence No. 004) for counsel fees is DENIED without prejudice and counsel may renew the request for counsel fees, pendente lite, without seeking prior written permission of the Court; and it is further

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's motion (Motion Sequence No. 003) is GRANTED solely to the extent of modifying pendente lite support as set forth herein, and is otherwise DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the branch of Motion Sequence No. 003 seeking to transfer jurisdiction concerning issues related to the parties' children to the State of Florida is DENIED without prejudice to renewal upon proper evidentiary submissions; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant's cross-motion (Motion Sequence No. 005) for counsel fees is DENIED without prejudice and counsel may renew the request for counsel fees, pendente lite, without seeking prior written permission of the Court; and it is further

ORDERED, that all other relief not specifically granted herein is DENIED.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: May 8, 2026

Staten Island, New York

HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR.

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT