Ataide v Ivey

Supreme Court, Queens County

Decided on May 29, 2026

Index No. 724294/2023

Karen Lin, J.

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29 were read on this motion to/for JUDGMENT - SUMMARY.

Upon the foregoing documents, plaintiff Ana Maria Ataide's motion for summary judgment is determined as follows:

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover for personal injuries allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident on August 7, 2023, at approximately 2:45 p.m., at the intersection of Merrick Boulevard and 228th Street, in Queens County. Plaintiff avers she was stopped in the left northbound lane of Merrick Boulevard, the first vehicle in line at a red light, when the vehicle operated by defendant Dona A. Ivey, and owned by defendant Catholic Charities Neighborhood Services, Inc., struck the rear of her vehicle. Plaintiff now moves for an order: i) granting partial summary judgment on the issue of liability in her favor; ii) dismissing defendants' second affirmative defense of failure to use a seatbelt and/or shoulder harness; iii) dismissing defendants' third affirmative defense of carelessness, negligence, assumption of risk, and culpable conduct; and iv) dismissing defendants' sixth affirmative defense of the emergency doctrine.

It is well established that the proponent of a summary judgment motion must establish a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, submitting sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320 [1986]). Upon this showing, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to produce evidence, in admissible form, sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). Where no genuine issue exists to be resolved at trial, the case should be summarily decided (see Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361, 364 [1974]).

A plaintiff is no longer required to demonstrate freedom from comparative negligence in order to establish a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment (see Rodriguez v City of New York, 31 NY3d 312 [2018]). However, while a plaintiff is not required to establish freedom from comparative negligence to be entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability, the issue of a plaintiff's comparative negligence may be decided in the context of a summary judgment motion where the plaintiff moves for summary judgment dismissing a defendant's affirmative defense alleging culpable conduct on the part of plaintiff (see Sapienza v Harrison, 191 AD3d 1028, 1029 [2d Dept 2021]).

"A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle" (Catanzaro v Edery, 172 AD3d 995, 996 [2d Dept 2019], quoting Wilansky v New York City Tr. Auth., 145 AD3d 938, 939 [2d Dept 2016]; see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129 [a]). "A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a non-negligent explanation for the collision" (Diamond v Comins, 194 AD3d 784, 784 [2d Dept 2021]; see Sroor v Marziano-Fontana, 229 AD3d 581, 583 [2d Dept 2024]; Catanzaro v Edery, 172 AD3d 995, 996 [2d Dept 2019]).

In support of her motion, plaintiff submits, among other things, an attorney affirmation, the pleadings, plaintiff's deposition transcript, and defendant Ivey's deposition transcript. Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she was stopped at a red light for approximately 30 to 45 seconds, and was the first vehicle in line followed by defendants' vehicle. Plaintiff further testified that "as soon as the light turned green," and as she was proceeding to go, but while her right foot was still on the brake pedal, she was struck from behind by defendants' vehicle. Defendant Ivey testified in her deposition that she observed plaintiff's vehicle stopped at the red [*2]light ahead of her, she stopped behind it approximately two to three feet away, and then waited for the light to change to green. Defendant Ivey further testified that when she observed the light turn green and plaintiff's vehicle in front of her had started to move, she moved her vehicle forward approximately five miles per hour, that plaintiff's vehicle then stopped moving and was "standing still" when her vehicle struck plaintiff's vehicle in the rear. Defendant Ivey did not recall whether there were brake lights or any vehicles ahead, and both vehicles had not progressed far past the traffic light. She further testified that when she observed the light turn from red to green, "in anticipation for the vehicle to move that was in front," she took her foot off the brake.

Upon these submissions, plaintiff has established a prima facie case of negligence. The burden then shifts to defendants to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a non-negligent explanation for the accident.

In opposition, defendants submit an attorney affirmation averring that Ivey's deposition testimony raises a triable issue of fact as to how the accident occurred, specifically that plaintiff's vehicle had moved when the light turned green before suddenly stopping, and that the emergency doctrine applies. However, a mere claim that the lead vehicle came to a sudden stop, without more, does not rebut the inference of negligence (see Perez v Persad, 183 AD3d 771 [2d Dept 2020]). "Stops by a lead vehicle which are foreseeable under the prevailing traffic conditions, even if sudden and frequent, must be anticipated by the driver who follows" (id. at 772). In Perez, as here, the defendant driver averred that after both his vehicle and plaintiff's vehicle had stopped for a red light, the plaintiff's vehicle began to move when the light turned green and then abruptly stopped, causing his vehicle, which had also begun to move, to strike the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle. The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the defendant driver's explanation "amounts to nothing more than a claim that the plaintiff's vehicle came to a sudden stop which, without more, failed to raise a triable issue of fact" (id. at 772). The cases relied upon by defendant are distinguishable from the instant action (Pollard v Ind. Beauty & Barber Supply Co., 94 AD3d 845 [2d Dept 2012] [plaintiff's vehicle stopped suddenly in the intersection despite a clear roadway]; Gonzalez v Ayala, 141 AD3d 687 [2d Dept 2016] [multiple conflicting witness accounts produced regarding how the accident occurred]; Etingof v Metro. Laundry Mach. Sales, Inc., 134 AD3d 667 [2d Dept 2015] [defendant's vehicle followed plaintiff's vehicle through a green light, past the intersection, and into the next block when plaintiff's vehicle suddenly stopped short with no traffic "for fifty yards in front of [the plaintiff's] vehicle"]). Accordingly, the branch of plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability is granted.

Turning to defendants' second affirmative defense of failure to use a seatbelt and/or shoulder harness, plaintiff attests in her affidavit and testifies at her deposition that she wore a seatbelt across her chest and lap at the time of the accident. Defendants' bare assertion of intent to retain an expert is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the branch of plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendants' second affirmative defense is granted.

Turning to defendants' third affirmative defense of carelessness, negligence, assumption of risk, and culpable conduct, plaintiff avers she was stopped at a red light as the first vehicle in line and was struck from the rear through no act or omission of her own. Defendants identify no negligent act or omission by plaintiff. Accordingly, the branch of plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendants' third affirmative defense is granted.

Turning to defendants' sixth affirmative defense of the emergency doctrine, the record lacks any factual support for its application in this case. The "emergency doctrine holds that those faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance, not of their own making, that leaves them with little or no time for reflection or reasonably causes them to be so disturbed that they are compelled to make a quick decision without weighing alternate courses of conduct, may not be negligent if their actions are reasonable and prudent in the context of the emergency" (Evan v Bosl, 75 AD3d 491, 491 [2d Dept 2010] [internal citations and quotation marks omitted]). Here, defendants fail to identify any sudden or unexpected circumstances that would constitute an emergency. Accordingly, the branch of plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendants' sixth affirmative defense is granted

For all the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that the branch of plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of plaintiff's motion dismissing defendants' second affirmative defense of failure to use a seatbelt and/or shoulder harness is granted, and said defense is dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of plaintiff's motion dismissing defendants' third affirmative defense of carelessness, negligence, assumption of risk, and culpable conduct is granted, and said defense is dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of plaintiff's motion dismissing defendants' sixth affirmative defense of the emergency doctrine is granted, and said defense is dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff shall serve a copy of this Order with Notice of Entry upon defendants within twenty (20) days from the date of entry.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: May 29, 2026

Jamaica, New York

Hon. Karen Lin

Justice of the Supreme Court