People v Alamo

Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County

Decided on January 5, 2026

Docket No. CR-015716-25BX

David L. Goodwin, J.

The branch of the omnibus motion seeking dismissal on statutory speedy trial grounds, see C.P.L. § 30.30(1)(b), is DENIED.

The relevant branch is premised on an attack on the invalidity of the People's certificate of compliance. See Defense's Mot. ¶¶ 16—30. But the certificate was deemed valid by Judge Sorrentino on September 30, 2025, and the defense does not indicate why Judge Sorrentino's decision can or should be revisited.

Regardless, as the People observe in their response (albeit indirectly), see People's Resp. at 2—4, the defense has not shown that its motion is timely filed within the extension of time granted by Judge Krompinger on September 10, and the discussion of the parties' conferral in paragraph 9 of the defense motion otherwise falls short of what is required by C.P.L. § 245.50(4)(c). Accordingly, any attack on the validity of the certificate is procedurally barred.

This decision is without prejudice to the defense seeking discovery sanctions from the trial court, should such a request appear warranted.

To the extent that the defense's motion adequately raises a constitutional speedy trial claim, see Defense's Mot. ¶¶ 16, 29, that branch is also DENIED. The relevant tests for federal and state constitutional speedy trial violations do not favor the defense. Even assuming delay attributable to the appropriate parties sufficient to trigger constitutional guarantees, there is no issue of pretrial custody, the entire matter is only approximately six months old, and any prejudice suffered thus far is minor, among other considerations. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, (1972); People v. Wiggins, 31 NY3d 1, 10 (2018); see also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992) (observing that postaccusation delay generally becomes presumptively prejudicial "as it approaches one year"); People v. Walker, 21 Misc 3d 748, 756 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Kings Co. 2008) ("Finally, the defense contends that the defendant's ability to testify has been hampered by the fading of her memory caused by the multiple delays. The defendant, however, fails to explain to what extent such delays would impact her defense of the charges.").

The branch seeking dismissal on facial insufficiency grounds is DENIED. The allegations of the first-party accusatory instrument adequately make out operation of a vehicle on a public road in an intoxicated or impaired condition, see People v. Valera, 58 Misc 3d 369, 375 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2017) (Collins, J.)—although without inculpatory statements, chemical test results, or additional traffic violations beyond the alleged illegal u-turn, the case for intoxication is far closer than the case for impairment. See People v. Bryan, 2019 NY Slip Op. 50821(U), at *1 (App. Term, 2d, 11th, & 13th Jud. Dists. 2019); People v. Flores, 62 Misc 3d 46, 51 (App. Term, 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2018); People v. Williams, 55 Misc 3d 134(A), 2017 NY Slip Op. 50478(U), at *2 (App. Term, 2d, 11th, & 13th Jud. Dists. 2017).

The defense's reliance on People v. Vandover, 20 NY3d 235 (2012), and People v. Smith, 163 Misc 2d 353 (Just. Ct., Town of Perinton 1994), appears misplaced. Vandover involved the reviewability of a lower court's probable cause determination under the mixed question of law and fact standard, and the Court of Appeals specifically acknowledged that "different inferences may have been drawn from these facts." Vandover, 20 NY3d at 239. Smith has limited relevance because Smith involved sufficiency issues attached to simplified traffic informations, not regular criminal court informations. See Smith, 163 Misc 2d at 365. Regardless, Smith would not be binding.

Huntley/Mapp/Dunaway/Ingle/refusal hearings are ORDERED. Any Sandoval /Molineux/ Ventimiglia/ preclusion issues are referred to the trial court. Any request for relief not mentioned above is DENIED.

Dated: January 5, 2026

Bronx, NY

David L. Goodwin

Judge of the Criminal Court