MJ v MJ

Supreme Court, Nassau County

Decided on June 23, 2026

Index No. XXXXXX/2020

Edmund M. Dane, J.

The following papers have been read on these motions:

Plaintiff'S Order to Show Cause dated October 28, 2025 x

Defendant's Notice of Cross-Motion dated December 11, 2025 x

Plaintiff's Opposition & Reply dated February 2, 2026 x

Defendant's Reply dated April 17, 2026 x

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The Plaintiff moves by Order to Show Cause dated October 28, 2025 (Motion Sequence No.: 005) seeking an Order so that: (1) Expediting the signing of the Qualified Domestic Relations Order for the Council of School Supervisors & Administrators Compensation Accrual Fund (the "CSA QDRO"); (2) Compelling Defendant to comply to comply with the CSA QDRO within thirty (30) days of the signing of the CSA QDRO and turn over the $35,000 to the Council of School Supervisors & Administrators Compensation Accrual Fund for that the CSA QDRO can be distributed to Plaintiff immediately; (3) Directing Defendant to provide proof of his compliance with the August 23, 2023 court-signed QDRO for Defendant's pension (the "Pension QDRO"), including but not limited to providing Plaintiff with proof that Defendant has named Plaintiff beneficiary of the death benefit; (4) Directing Defendant not to alter the death benefit beneficiary form without Court approval; (5) Directing Defendant to notify this Court and Plaintiff simultaneously when he intends to retire so as to ensure Defendant's compliance with the Pension QDRO; (6) Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, imposing sanctions upon Defendant in the form of counsel fees and expert fees; (7) Pursuant to DRL § 238, directing that Defendant pay all of Plaintiff's counsel fees incurred in connection with the enforcement of the Judgment of [*2]Divorce and Plaintiff's rights under the court-signed QDROs; (8) Granting such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

The Defendant cross-moves by Notice of Cross-Motion dated December 11, 2025 (Motion Sequence No.: 006) seeking an Order: (A) Vacating the proposed Qualified Domestic Relations Order for the Council of School Supervisors & Administrators Compensation Accrual Fund (the "CSA QDRO"), for reasons which more fully appear hereinafter; (B) Amending the Qualified Domestic Relations Order for Defendant's pension (the "Pension QDRO") to conform to the terms of the parties' Stipulation of Settlement, dated August 26, 2022, and Judgment of Divorce, dated August 31, 2023, for reasons which more fully appear hereinafter; (C) Amending the Qualified Domestic Relations Order for Defendant's TDA Account (the "TDA QDRO") to conform to the terms of the parties Stipulation of Settlement, dated August 26, 2022, and Judgment of Divorce, dated August 31, 2023, for reasons which more fully appear hereinafter; (D) Awarding Defendant damages caused by the terms of the TDA QDRO not conforming with the parties' Stipulation of Settlement, dated August 26, 2022, and Judgment of Divorce, dated August 31, 2023; (E) Awarding Defendant's Attorney's Fees and or sanctions in the sum of no less than $10,000.00 to be paid to Defendant by Plaintiff, to enforce the terms of the parties' Stipulation of Settlement, dated August 26, 2022, and Judgment of Divorce, dated August 31, 2023, and for damages caused by the terms of the TDA QDRO, with leave to apply for additional and further counsel fees from Plaintiff; (F) Directing Plaintiff to produce any and all bills and proof of payment for the parties' daughter's, SJ's (D.O.B. XX/XX/XXXX), college expenses so that each party may pay their pro rata share and Defendant may receive a room and board credit against his direct basic child support obligation, in accordance with the parties' Stipulation of Settlement, dated August 26, 2022, and Judgment of Divorce, dated August 31, 2023; (G) Directing Plaintiff to cooperate in the reunification therapy process between Defendant and the parties' daughter, LJ (D.O.B. XX/XX/XXXX), in accordance with the terms of the parties' Stipulation of Settlement, dated August 26, 2022, and Judgment of Divorce, dated August 31, 2023; (H) Denying the relief request and dismissing Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause, dated October 28, 2025, in its entirety; and (I) Granting Defendant such other and further relief as this Court may deem fair, just and equitable together with the costs and disbursements of this action.

BRIEF BACKGROUND

These parties were married on XXXX XX, 2005. These parties have two children together, SJ, born XXXX XX, XXXX and LJ, born XXXX XX, XXXX. The parties' matrimonial action was commenced on August XX, 2020 by the filing of a Summons and Complaint with the Nassau County Clerk's Office. These parties executed a written Stipulation of Settlement dated August 26, 2022 (hereinafter referred to as the "Stipulation"). The parties were thereupon divorced by Judgment of Divorce dated August 31, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as the "Judgment") (Hon. Edmund M. Dane, J.S.C.). After the instant post-judgment litigation ensued, on December 12, 2025, this Court issued an Order Appointing Attorney for the Child whereby it appointed Ellen S. Pollack, Esq., as the attorney for the children.

THE PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

Plaintiff's Contentions:

The Plaintiff alleges that the Judgment provides that three QDRO's would be prepared for [*3]the distribution of the Defendant's retirement assets. She alleges that the three QDRO's were prepared by QDRO Advisors and that two of the proposed QDRO's, one for the Defendant's TDA and one for the Defendant's Pension, were submitted to the Court for signature and were subsequently signed by the Court. She alleges that the two signed QDRO's were served with Notice of Entry, and the time period to object to same has passed. She alleges that she received her portion of the TDA from the QDRO for the TDA, and that while the Pension QDRO was signed, the Defendant has not provided her proof, despite requests, that he named her as beneficiary. She alleges that the proposed QDRO for the CSA received approval, but on January 24, 2024, the Defendant had drafted a fourth proposed QDRO on the CSA. She alleges that the CSA QDRO was submitted to the Court for signature on April 12, 2024, but on April 22, 2024, the Defendant submitted a letter to the Court alleging errors in the draft proposed QDRO on the CSA plan and that the Court not execute same. She alleges that on April 16, 2025, her counsel sent a letter to the Court requesting that the proposed QDRO on the CSA plan be expedited. She alleges that the Defendant's delay in having the CSA QDRO executed has caused her prejudice and that the CSA QDRO should be signed retroactively to the submission date of April 12, 2024.

Defendant's Contentions:

The Defendant alleges that he acquired certain retirement assets as a result of his employment as a teacher: a pension plan and a tax deferred annuity. He alleges that unbeknownst to him, the Plaintiff retained QDRO Advisors to prepare QDRO's on the pension plan and the tax deferred annuity. He alleges that there are numerous errors in the pension QDRO and it contained terms not authorized by the Stipulation. He alleges, with respect to the pension QDRO, that the coverture fraction calculation is incorrect as it is calculated in years but the Stipulation defines the fraction in months, that the Stipulation is silent with respect to the supplemental retirement allowance but the QDRO provides for same, that the QDRO provides that the Plaintiff receives a full entitlement to pre-retirement survivorship benefits when under the Stipulation that Plaintiff is only entitled to a pro rata share, that the signed QDRO requires the Defendant to select a survivorship option which was not required by the Stipulation which reduced his monthly benefit, and that the Stipulation provides that the costs of survivorship option shall be shared equally but the QDRO provides that it be paid proportionally. He alleges, with respect to the TDA QDRO, that his TDA is basically divided into three funds: a fixed fund investment, a diversified fund investment and a balanced fund investment. He alleges that the TDA QDRO provides, in effect, that the Plaintiff receive one-half of the marital portion of the TDA plus or minus gains and losses. He alleges that the Stipulation does not provide that the funds shall be paid to the Plaintiff from any specific fund, yet the TDA QDRO provides that her share shall be taken from the fixed fund. He alleges that the fixed fund has a guaranteed interest rate of 8.25% not subject to market forces, whereas the diversified fund and the balanced fund are subject to market forces. He also alleges that, subsequent to the date of commencement of the matrimonial action, his contributions into the TDA were made into the fixed fund. He alleges, therefore, that the Plaintiff should have received the total aggregate sum of $290,023.64, but she actually received $298,359.75, which is $8,000 more than she was entitled to. He alleges, with respect to the CSA QDRO, that it provides that the Plaintiff was to receive an additional $35,000 (on top of it being divided equally) in satisfaction of certain pendente lite arrears, but that the Plaintiff received this sum of money already from the TDA. He alleges that pursuant to the Stipulation, he [*4]is required to contribute to the college expenses of SJ, and that he wants to pay his share, but he needs copies of the actual tuition statements and proof of payment. He alleges that pursuant to the Stipulation, he is to have therapeutic access with the children, but that the Plaintiff refused to cooperate with respect to same. He seeks reimbursement of counsel fees.

Plaintiff's Opposition & Reply:

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant has failed to pay his share of SJ's college expenses. She alleges that the QDRO's that the Defendant seeks to have altered have already been signed by the Court. She disputes, generally, that there are errors in the QDRO's. She denies the Defendant's allegations that he never saw the proposed QDRO's before signature. She alleges that she has provided the college bills through Our Family Wizard for SJ. She concedes that she "...will again provide Defendant with documentation of SJ's college bills..." She alleges that LJ is unwilling to participate in reunification therapy because the Defendant abandoned the children and she alleges that the Defendant never complied with so much of the Stipulation relative to therapy. She alleges that LJ is now seventeen years old and her preferences should be considered.

Defendant's Reply:

The Defendant alleges that there was no communication from QDRO Advisors with him regarding the QDRO's which were signed by the Court, and that he never reviewed, nor had any input, with respect to the TDA QDRO and/or the pension QDRO. He alleges that the Plaintiff does not justify in her papers receiving an additional $35,000. He alleges that he is the party trying to comply with the college provisions inasmuch as while the Plaintiff claims that he has failed to comply, she never filed an application in this respect. He alleges that the Plaintiff is refusing to comply with the therapeutic parenting time provisions of the Stipulation.

DISCUSSION + ANALYSIS

QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER(S)

A matrimonial settlement is a contract subject to principles of contract interpretation. Girardin v. Girardin, 281 AD2d 457 (2d Dept. 2001). The fundamental, neutral precept of contract interpretation is that agreements are construed in accord with the parties' intent. Slatt v. Slatt, 64 NY2d 966 rearg denied 65 NY2d 785 (1985). The best evidence of what parties to a written agreement intend is what they say in their writing. Slamow v. Del Col, 79 NY2d 1016 (1992). Thus, a written agreement that is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its term. See generally R/S Assoc. v. New York Job Dev. Auth., 98 NY2d 29, 32, rearg denied 98 NY2d 693 (2002); W.W.W. Assoc. v. Giancontieri, 77 NY2d 157, 162 (1990).

Extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent may be considered only if the agreement is ambiguous, which is an issue of law for the courts to decide. W.W.W. Assoc. v. Giancontieri, supra at 162. A contract is unambiguous if the language it uses has a definite and precise meaning, unattended by danger of misconception in the purport of the agreement itself, and concerning which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion. Breed v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 46 NY2d 351, 355 (1978), rearg denied 46 NY2d 940 (1979). Thus, if the agreement on its face is reasonably susceptible of only one meaning, a court is not free to alter the contract to reflect its personal notions of fairness and equity. See generally Teichman v. Community Hosp. of W. Suffolk, 87 NY2d 514, 520 (1996); First Natl. Stores v. Yellowstone Shopping Ctr., 21 [*5]NY2d 630, 638, rearg denied 22 NY2d 827 (1968). In addition, as this Court wrote in T.P. v. S.P.:

A court may not write into a contract conditions the parties did not insert by adding or excising terms under the guise of construction, and it may not construe the language in such a way as would distort the contract's apparent meaning. A court cannot reform an agreement to conform to what it thinks is proper, if the parties have not assented to such a reformation.

T.P. v. S.P., 78 Misc 3d 1239(A) (Supreme Court Nassau County 2023) (internal citations omitted).

As the Second Department wrote in Berardi v. Berardi:

When the distribution of pension benefits between former spouses is accomplished through a QDRO obtained pursuant to a stipulation, such QDRO can convey only those rights to which the parties stipulated as a basis for the judgment. Where a QDRO is inconsistent with the provisions of a stipulation or judgment of divorce, courts possess the authority to amend the QDRO to accurately reflect the provisions of the stipulation pertaining to the pension benefits. A court cannot issue a QDRO more expansive or encompassing rights not provided in the underlying stipulation.

Berardi v. Berardi, 54 AD3d 982 (2d Dept. 2008) (internal citations omitted). The Court also notes, in any event, that it retains the inherent authority to modify or vacate its own decrees. Matter of Alayon, 28 Misc 3d 311 (Supreme Court Kings County 2010). There are three (3) QDRO's at issue: (1) the proposed CSA QDRO; (2) the TDA QDRO; and (3) the Pension QDRO. They are addressed seriatim.

The Proposed CSA QDRO

The gravamen of the Defendant's objection to the Proposed CSA QDRO is that it contains a provision for the Plaintiff to receive an additional $35,000.00 that she has already received. The Court agrees. Article "XIX" of the parties' Stipulation, at pages 40-41, provide the following:

With regard to the Husband's TDA and CSA, the Wife shall be entitled to one half (½) of the marital portion from the date of marriage (December 29, 2005) through the date of commencement (August 27, 2020), plus or minus gains/losses until the date of distribution. With respect to the CSA, same will include deposits after the date of commencement if earned during the marriage...After the account(s) is divided, from the Husband's share, he will roll over the sum of $35,000.00 in satisfaction of arrears that are owe and due to the Wife...

The already executed TDA QDRO (see infra) provides at Paragraph "4" thereof that "...[f]urther, from the Participant's remaining account balance not allocated to the Alternate Payee, the Alternate Payee shall receive and [sic] additional sum of ($35,000.00)..." In opposition to the Defendant's cross-motion, the Plaintiff herself does not deny that she received the $35,000.00 as and for the arrears. Facts appearing in the movant's papers which the opposing party does not controvert, may be deemed to be admitted. Kuehne & Nagel, Inc. v. Baiden, 36 [*6]NY2d 539 (1975). Therefore, the $35,000.00 due and owing to the Plaintiff as and for certain arrears has been fully satisfied, and, if the Court executed the Proposed CSA QDRO, would result in a windfall to the Plaintiff. However, the proposed CSA QDRO, which the Plaintiff insists on having the Court execute on an expedited basis, provides, at Paragraph "5" thereof, that "...[f]rom the Participants's remaining account balance, the Alternate Payee shall receive an additional amount equal to ($35,000.00) with no earning, interest, gains and/or losses..." The Plaintiff fails to offer any cognizable justification as to why she should receive an additional $35,000.00 from the CSA QDRO when she has already received that sum from the TDA QDRO. Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Branches (1) and (2) of the Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause dated October 28, 2025 be and the same are hereby DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED, that Branch (A) of the Defendant's Notice of Cross-Motion dated December 11, 2025 be and the same is hereby GRANTED TO THE EXTENT that the Court declines to sign the Proposed CSA QDRO.

The TDA QDRO

The biggest gravamen of the Defendant's objection to the TDA QDRO is that it, in effect, takes money from specified funds in the TDA when the Stipulation is silent as to where the funds should be taken from. The Court agrees. Paragraph "5" of the TDA QDRO provides:

ORDERED, that the Alternate Payee's share of the Participant's account balance shall be withdrawn from the member's Fixed Fund balance until depleted, and then proportionally from any investments in the variable return Passport Funds pursuant to Plan rules and provisions...

Article "XIX" of the parties' Stipulation, at pages 40-41, provide the following:

With regard to the Husband's TDA and CSA, the Wife shall be entitled to one half (½) of the marital portion from the date of marriage (XXXX XX, 2005) through the date of commencement (August 27, 2020), plus or minus gains/losses until the date of distribution. With respect to the CSA, same will include deposits after the date of commencement if earned during the marriage. The Husband within 30 days of this agreement will provide written documentation to confirm what portion, if any, of his CSA account was accrued during the marriage. After the account(s) is divided, from the Husband's share, he will roll over the sum of $35,000.00 in satisfaction of arrears that are owe and due to the Wife (as more fully set forth below), as well as the equitable distribution of assets. The Husband represents that his TDA and CSA (Compensation Accrual Fund File number XXXXXX) and that all funds are solely contained in both of these accounts. The Husband represents that he has taken loans from either of these accounts and further represents that he has taken no distribution from either account. The Husband shall not liquidate any funds until the account is divided. Any loan shall encumber his portion only. The Husband shall additionally select a retirement option, that should he pre-decease her, the Wife shall receive her share of the Husband's TDA and CSA.

The parties' Stipulation is entirely silent as to what particular fund in the TDA that the Plaintiff's marital share shall come from, yet the TDA QDRO specifically authorizes, without authorization from the Stipulation, that the Plaintiff's marital share shall come from the TDA's fixed fund. Ostensibly, therefore, the TDA QDRO has re-written the terms of the Stipulation and has given rights to the Plaintiff that are not expressly provided for in the Stipulation. Therefore, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Branch (C) of the Defendant's Notice of Cross-Motion dated December 11, 2025 be and the same is hereby GRANTED TO THE EXTENT that the TDA QDRO is hereby VACATED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Defendant is entitled and shall be permitted to submit an Amended QDRO with respect to the TDA containing terms not inconsistent with the terms of the Stipulation (see generally A.F. v. D.F., 85 Misc 3d 1214(A) (Supreme Court Nassau County 2025)).

With respect to that portion of the Defendant's application seeking damages, the Court parts ways with the Defendant inasmuch as he fails to offer any expert proof as to what damages, if any, were caused by the TDA QDRO being signed. His self-created "spreadsheet", alone, is insufficient for the Court to award him damages. In light of the insufficiency of proof, the Court denies the application, but grants the Defendant leave to renew upon the submission of proper papers. The Court takes no position on the merits of this portion of the Defendant's application. Therefore, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Branch (D) of the Defendant's Notice of Cross-Motion dated December 11, 2025 be and the same is hereby DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and with leave to renew upon the submission of proper papers.

The Pension QDRO

The Defendant interposes five (5) stated objections to the Pension QDRO: (a) the coverture fraction; (b) supplemental retirement allowance or early retirement subsidies; (c) pre-retirement survivorship benefits; (d) survivorship option; and (e) cost of the survivorship option. Those are, as well, taken herein seriatim.

A. Coverture Fraction

Paragraph "1" at page "41" of the parties' Stipulation provides, in part, that "...[t]he numerator shall be the total number of months of credited service...in the Retirement System...[t]he denominator shall be the total number of months of credited service in the Retirement System..." However, Paragraph "3" of the Pension QDRO provides, in part, that "...[t]he numerator of said fraction shall be the total number of years...of credited service...and the denominator shall be equal to the total number of years..." The Court therefore finds Paragraph "3" of the Pension QDRO to be inconsistent with the terms of the Stipulation.

B. Supplemental Retirement Allowance/Early Retirement Subsidies

Paragraph "3" of the Pension QDRO provides, in part, that "...[t]he term retirement allowance as used herein, shall be deemed to include any supplemental retirement allowance or early retirement subsidies which may be paid by the TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK to the Participant..." A careful review of Paragraphs "1" through "8" of the Stipulation, located on pages "41" through "44" reflects that the Stipulation does not provide that the Plaintiff shall be entitled, in any way, to any portion of a supplemental retirement [*7]allowance or early retirement subsidies. The Court declines to re-write the Stipulation to read in such a provision (see T.P. v. S.P., supra) and the Pension QDRO therefore conveys to the Plaintiff rights which were not stipulated to (see Berardi, supra).

C. Pre-Retirement Survivorship Benefits

Paragraph "6" at page "43" of the Stipulation provides, in part, that "...[t]he Participant is directed to designate the Alternate Payee as beneficiary of Plaintiff, so that in the event the Participant dies prior to retirement, the Alternate Payee shall receive a pro rata share of any available pre-retirement death benefit calculated to the coverture fraction..." However, Paragraph "8" of the Pension QDRO provides, in part, that "...the Participant is hereby directed to designate the Alternate Payee as beneficiary of any and all pre-retirement survivorship benefits available in their TRS pension plan, so that in the event the Participant predeceased the Alternate Payee prior to retirement, the Alternate Payee shall receive the Alternate Payee's full entitlement calculated pursuant to the Third (3rd) decretal paragraph above in this Order..." The Stipulation only bestowed upon the Plaintiff the right to receive her pro rata share of any available pre-retirement death benefit, while the Pension QDRO bestows upon her a right not conferred in the Stipulation, namely, "full entitlement". The Court finds these provisions contrary to one another.

D. Survivorship Option

Paragraph "6" at page "43" to "44" of the Stipulation provides, in part, that "...[t]he Husband shall additionally select a retirement option, that should he pre-decease her, the Wife's benefit shall continue through her lifetime, the cost of which shall be shared..." However, Paragraph "9" of the Pension QDRO provides, "...upon the Participants retirement from the TRS, the Participant shall designate the Alternate Payee, assuming the Alternate Payee is then living, to receive an Option 2 - 50% for purposes of providing the Alternate Payee, upon the Participants death, with a monthly retirement allowance..." Here, the Pension QDRO is incongruous with the Stipulation, as the Stipulation only requires the Defendant to select a survivor option that provides the Plaintiff her benefit through her lifetime, while the Pension QDRO permits the Plaintiff to receive 50% of the entire allowance. That provision of the Pension QDRO runs afoul from the Stipulation.

E. Cost of Survivorship Option

Paragraph "6" at page "44" of the Stipulation provides, with respect to the survivor option, that "...the cost of which shall be shared..." The Pension QDRO provides, at Paragraph "9", in part, "...[t]he parties shall each share proportionally in the cost reduction of any option pursuant to this Order..." The Court parts ways with the Defendant here. While he claims that the Stipulation provides that the cost of any survivorship option shall be split equally, the Stipulation simply provides that the cost "...shall be shared..." But "shared" and "shared equally" are two different concepts, and the Court does not find that it was the intent of the parties' that the cost of the survivorship option was to be split equally. Had they intended it, they would have said it.

F. Miscellaneous

The Court rejects the Plaintiff's arguments regarding service of the TDA QDRO and the Pension QDRO with Notice of Entry as unavailing. In any event, the Court notes that it is a court of equity (see generally F.J.O. v. M.I.O., 76 Misc 3d 1207(A)) (Supreme Court Nassau County 2022)) and that the Court may vacate its own order for sufficient reasons and in the interests of substantial justice (see generally Fannie Mae v. Mullings, 2025 NY Slip Op 30917(U) (Supreme [*8]Court Nassau County 2025)). The substantial windfall, plainly inconsistent with the terms of the Stipulation, which would be provided to the Plaintiff if the TDA QDRO and the Pension QDRO were not vacated, are sufficient enough to vacate those QDRO's.

G. Conclusion

Accordingly, and for all of the aforesaid reasons, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Branch (B) of the Defendant's Notice of Cross-Motion dated December 11, 2025 be and the same is hereby GRANTED TO THE EXTENT that the Pension QDRO is hereby VACATED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Defendant is and shall be entitled to submit an Amended QDRO with respect to the Pension containing terms not inconsistent with the terms of the Stipulation (see generally A.F. v. D.F., 85 Misc 3d 1214(A) (Supreme Court Nassau County 2025)).

In light of the Court vacating the Pension QDRO, see supra, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Branches (3) and (5) of the Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause dated October 28, 2025 be and the same are hereby deemed MOOT; and it is further

ORDERED, that Branch (4) of the Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause dated October 28, 2025 be and the same is hereby DENIED at this time as premature and with leave to renew at a later date.

COLLEGE BILLS/INVOICES

Paragraph 1 of Article XVII of the parties' Stipulation provides, in part, with respect to the payment of college expenses, that, "...[t]he Husband shall remit his share of college and educational expenses as defined herein no later than seven (7) days after the issuance of an invoice..." Given the intent necessary to interpret the Stipulation, it is evident that the parties' intended that the Defendant would receive copies of invoices prior to him having to make payment.^FN1 Indeed, in opposition to the Defendant's Notice of Cross-Motion, the Court notes the absence of any proof that the Plaintiff actually sent and invoice and proof of payment to the Defendant. The Defendant readily admits that "...I want to pay my required share of our daughter's college expenses..." Therefore, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Branch (F) of the Defendant's Notice of Cross-Motion dated December 11, 2025 be and the same is hereby GRANTED TO THE EXTENT that, within seven (7) days of the date of this Decision and Order, the Plaintiff shall provide directly to the Defendant any and all bills and proof of payment for SJ's college expenses incurred through the date hereof.

ENFORCEMENT OF PARENTAL ACCESS

As the Second Department wrote, in part, in Stolzenberg v. Stolzenberg:

In considering questions of child custody or parental access, a court must make every effort to determine what is for the best interest of the child, and what will best promote its welfare and happiness. Such determinations should [g]enerally be made only after a full and plenary hearing and inquiry...[w]here...facts material to a determination of what parental access is in the best interests of the child remain in dispute, a hearing is required.

Stolzenberg v. Stolzenberg, 209 AD3d 688 (2d Dept. 2022) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Stipulation, at Article XII provides, in part:

"The Father shall engage in therapeutic visitation with the children with the goal of repairing his relationship with the [sic] and having regular visitation...[t]he parties further agree that they will cooperate with one another, in conjunction with the therapists as set forth above, to arrange for a schedule of parenting time and holidays as recommenced by the therapists..."

Here, the parties' Stipulation is clear and unambiguous that the Defendant shall engage in therapeutic parenting time with the children in an effort to repair his relationship with the children. The Court parts ways with the Plaintiff which she, in effect, asks this Court to outright deny the Defendant's application. Notably, she has not interposed an application seeking to modify the Defendant's parental access or to suspend same. However, the Court finds a disputed issue of fact as to whether or not enforcement of this provision remains in LJ's best interests.^FN2 The Court also finds an issue of fact as to which parent, if any, or the child, or a combination of any two of them, or all three of them, is the root cause of whether or not the Defendant has not had time with the child. While LJ's wishes are certainly entitled to significant weight given her age of seventeen, the Court nonetheless will not deprive the Defendant of a hearing on this matter simply because LJ does not wish to go. That decision, while critical, is simply not one for the child to make, and, certainly, LJ's voice, while loud, is not dispositive on the Court. Given LJ's age, and expedited hearing is in order. Therefore, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Branch (G) of the Defendant's Notice of Cross-Motion dated December 11, 2025 be and the same is hereby REFERRED TO AN EXPEDITED HEARING; and it is further

ORDERED, that all parties, counsel for the parties, and the attorney for the child shall appear before the undersigned Justice at the Nassau County Supreme Court Family and Matrimonial Court Complex, 101 County Seat Drive, Courtroom 3D, Mineola, New York 11501 on September 1, 2026 at 10:00 a.m. and September 2, 2026 at 10:00 a.m. for a HEARING.

COUNSEL FEES

Domestic Relations Law § 238 provides, in relevant part, that:

"...[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce or modify any provision of a judgment or order entered in an action for divorce...the court may in its discretion require either party to pay counsel fees and fees and expenses of experts directly to the attorney of the other party to enable the other party to carry on or defend the action or proceeding as, in the court's discretion, justice requires having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties..."

In Mollah v. Mollah, the Second Department held that where a party was compelled to bring a motion to enforce the terms of an order, the court therein providently exercised its discretion in awarding attorney's fees, considering, inter alia, the relative merits of the parties' [*9]positions at the time and the documented time, effort, and skill of counsel. See generally Mollah v. Mollah, 136 AD3d 992 (2d Dept. 2016). An award of counsel fees may be based in part on the relative merit of the parties' positions, but should not be predicated solely on who won and who lost. Matter of Steven S. v. Yelena M., 129 AD3d 408 (1st Dept. 2015).

Plaintiff's Application

The Plaintiff's application for counsel fees is denied. Her application was entirely unsuccessful and/or portions of it were rendered moot. In addition, the Court notes that her application for sanctions (see infra), in and of itself, was entirely unmeritorious, and that she sought, in part, to recoup $35,000.00 in the Proposed CSA QDRO which she already obtained by way of the TDA QDRO. Given the total lack of merit of her positions, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Branch (7) of the Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause dated October 28, 2025 be and the same is hereby DENIED.

Defendant's Application

The Court partially grants the Defendant's application for reimbursement of counsel fees. In this respect, the Court notes that the Defendant was successful in the filing of his application seeking to vacate and/or amend the subject QDRO's at issue. The Court notes that the Defendant was correct, in effect, that the terms of the QDRO's were inconsistent with the language of the Stipulation. Therefore, the Court finds, at this time, that a partial award of counsel fees is proper. The Court has reviewed the retainer agreement of the Defendant's counsel ^FN3 and the invoices and statements for services rendered. The Court finds that the hourly rates charges are reasonable and customary. In addition, the Court has carefully reviewed the time charges incurred and elects to award the Defendant counsel fees in the sum of $3,190.00 at this time for the work partially necessary to file this application and oppose the Plaintiff's application. The Court declines to award, at this time, fees relative to the Defendant's application to enforce the provisions of the Stipulation relative to parental access. Therefore, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Branch (E) of the Defendant's Notice of Cross-Motion dated December 11, 2025 be and the same is hereby GRANTED TO THE EXTENT that the Plaintiff shall pay directly to the Defendant's counsel, STEMPEL CATTERSON LoFRUMENTO CARLSON & BIONDO, LLP, attorneys for the Defendant, the sum of $3,190.00 as and for reimbursement of his reasonable counsel fees, within thirty (30) days of the date of service of the within Decision and Order with Notice of Entry; and it is further

ORDERED, that upon the failure of Plaintiff pay the Defendant's counsel as set forth herein above, the Defendant's attorneys may file an Affidavit of Non-Compliance with the Clerk of the County, who shall enter a judgment, with statutory interest thereon as of the date of this Decision and Order, in favor of the firm of STEMPEL CATTERSON LoFRUMENTO CARLSON & BIONDO, LLP, attorneys for the Defendant, and against the Plaintiff. MJ, without further proceedings.

SANCTIONS

22 NYCRR 130-1.1 provides:

(a) The court, in its discretion, may award to any party or attorney in any civil action or [*10]proceeding before the court, except where prohibited by law, costs in the form of reimbursement for actual expenses reasonably incurred and reasonable attorney's fees, resulting from frivolous conduct as defined in this Part. In addition to or in lieu of awarding costs, the court, in its discretion may impose financial sanctions upon any party or attorney in a civil action or proceeding who engages in frivolous conduct as defined in this Part, which shall be payable as provided in section 130-1.3 of this Part. This Part shall not apply to town or village courts, to proceedings in a small claims part of any court, or to proceedings in the Family Court commenced under article 3, 7 or 8 of the Family Court Act.

* * *

(c) For purposes of this Part, conduct is frivolous if:

(1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law;

(2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or

(3) it asserts material factual statements that are false.

The Court declines to impose sanctions upon the Defendant. The Defendant did not undertake conduct completely without merit in law which could not be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law, he did not undertake conduct primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation or to harass or maliciously injure another, nor did he undertake conduct which asserts material factual statements that are false. Quite the contrary, he simply sought to correct and amend QDRO's which were inconsistent with the terms of the Stipulation, he simply sought to obtain invoices in order to satisfy his obligation(s) for college, and he simply sought to enforce his rights to parental access to his minor child. Stated plainly, seeking relief consistent with the terms of a Stipulation is far from frivolous. Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Branch (6) of the Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause dated October 28, 2025 be and the same is hereby DENIED.

Any other relief requested not specifically addressed herewith is hereby DENIED.^FN4

This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.

Dated: June 23, 2026

Mineola, New York

E N T E R :

Hon. Edmund M. Dane, J.S.C.