People v Castillo

Supreme Court, Bronx County

Decided on May 20, 2026

Ind. No. 70896-25/001

Verena C. Powell, J.

Defendant Stasy Castillo, charged with attempted murder in the second degree (Penal Law 110/125.25 [1]), and related offenses, moves to suppress both pre- and post-arrest statements attributed to her on the grounds that the police failed to issue Miranda warnings at the outset. Specifically, defendant contends that her initial statements were obtained without Miranda warnings and that any subsequent statements are inadmissible as fruits of the poisonous tree. In response, the People maintain that the initial police interaction was investigatory in nature, asserting that preliminary questioning was meant solely to clarify events rather than establish culpability, and that the officer's conduct was appropriate given the totality of the circumstances. The People further counter defendant's argument by emphasizing that the non-custodial context of the initial statements differentiates them from custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings, and that even if defendant's theory were accepted, any subsequent Mirandized statements remain admissible due to the proper administration of warnings and a valid waiver.

This court conducted a Huntley hearing that began on January 20, 2026, and concluded on January 23, 2026 (People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]). At the hearing, the People called one police officer as a witness. After the hearing, the parties made oral arguments in support of their respective positions for the remaining portions of this motion. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's motion to suppress statement evidence is DENIED.

Based on the evidence and after assessing the witness's credibility, this court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Findings of Fact

New York Police Officer Rufino Ortiz-Hernandez (PO or Officer Ortiz-Hernandez) and his partner, Keilly Hernandez (PO or Officer Hernandez), were working a 3 p.m. to 11:35 p.m. shift on January 20, 2025, when they received multiple 911 calls at approximately 4:47 p.m. for an accident in the vicinity of 837 Longfellow Avenue, Bronx, New York. PO Ortiz-Hernandez activated his body-worn camera before arriving at the scene. Arriving at the location within 2 � 3 minutes after receiving the calls, the officers exited their marked patrol car and walked towards a male observed on the ground and several people standing over him. That group consisted of two women and a man. The male on the ground was conscious and spoke to the officers in Spanish, complaining of pain. PO Ortiz-Hernandez tried to speak with the male, telling him that an ambulance was about two minutes away.

While at the location, at least two additional officers arrived. Officer Hernandez asked who was driving the car, to which Stacy Castillo responded by raising her hand and stating, "I was driving the car." Castillo then asked the officers if they spoke Spanish, and upon their affirmation, she explained that she and the man on the ground had been arguing. Castillo stated that during or after this disagreement, the male positioned himself on top of her car's hood and that, despite her requests for him to get off, he refused to do so. Castillo further stated that she then accelerated the vehicle, causing the male to go under the car. According to PO Ortiz-Hernandez's testimony, throughout this conversation, neither he, his partner nor the other officers present displayed their weapons, and at this stage, Castillo was not under arrest. Officer Ortiz-Hernandez also asked, in a rhetorical manner, whether she and the complainant had been arguing, to which Castillo confirmed by repeating her previous account. Clarifying that the male fell from the hood of the vehicle as she drove off. PO Ortiz-Hernandez described Castillo's demeanor during the exchange as calm; she spoke in an even tone and at a moderate pace. This assessment is corroborated by footage from the officers' body-worn cameras.

Seeking identification for the injured male, POs Ortiz-Hernandez and Hernandez escorted Castillo to her vehicle to retrieve his wallet and identification, as defendant identified him as Gamy Gabriel Garabito Jimenez (Garabito). Castillo demonstrated that Garabito was holding on to the windshield wiper blades before he fell from the car and was run over. Castillo could not locate Garabito's wallet or identification but again provided Garabito's personal identifying information to the officers. Officer Hernandez found keys in the gap between the engine hood and the left front quarter panel of the car, Castillo identified the keys as Garabito's. Asking Castillo to disregard a call she received on her cellular phone, the officers then placed her under arrest. Officer Hernandez frisked Castillo and recovered two cellular telephones, one belonging to the complainant, Garabito. The phones were secured by the officers.

Officers Ortiz-Hernandez and Hernandez transported Castillo by car to the 41st precinct for arrest processing. Neither officer questioned defendant after securing her in the rear of the vehicle for the two-minute drive to the precinct.

At the precinct, the officers processed Castillo's arrest by collecting her identifying information, asking if she needed medical attention, inquiring about the existence of any unattended children, and informing her that all strings and laces must be removed from her clothing and shoes or be cut to avoid self-harm. Castillo was then taken to the holding cell area for a more extensive search of her person and belongings. She identified both her and Garabito's cellular telephones. When PO Hernandez attempted to ask Castillo again what happened, PO Ortiz-Hernandez cut her off by uttering "Uh, Uh" and telling Officer Hernandez, "No." PO Ortiz-Hernandez spoke to Castillo twice more while she was held in a holding cell. Once to [*2]learn what she wanted him to do with the property recovered from the vehicle, as the car was being held as evidence, and to issue her a summons for the vehicular accident.

Later that evening, Officer Ortiz-Hernandez, along with another officer, transported Castillo to Central Booking located in the Bronx Criminal Court building on East 161st Street. The following evening, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Officer Ortiz-Hernandez, Castillo, and a Spanish language interpreter met with an assistant district attorney. The assistant sought to speak with Castillo concerning the circumstances of the accident. The line assistant administered Miranda warnings to defendant before the questioning. The verbal warnings, given in English, were translated into Spanish by the interpreter. Upon Castillo's response, given in Spanish, the interpreter translated the responses into English for the line assistant. The interrogation recording is approximately 16 minutes long. During the interview, defendant told the prosecutor that she and the complainant lived together. However, they were at her parents' home when an argument broke out. Not wanting her parents to overhear the argument, Castillo went to the car to leave. Garabito did not want her to leave and positioned himself on the car's hood. Castillo told him to get off the car. The first time she accelerated and stopped short, Garabito maintained his grip but refused to get off the hood. The second time she accelerated, traveling farther, Garabito lost his grip, and fell under the car. Castillo said she exited the car and saw Garabito under the vehicle and observed that he was injured. She said a neighbor advised another not to give him water, and a second neighbor called 911.

Conclusion of Law

Defendant seeks suppression of the statements attributed to her at the time of arrest and the later videotaped statement made during arrest processing in Bronx Central Booking.

Officer Ortiz-Hernandez and his partner responded to Longfellow Avenue after receiving multiple radio calls regarding a (vehicular) accident. Upon receiving such a call, New York law requires officers to respond to the scene (People v Benjamin, 51 NY2d 267, 270 [1990]; People v Wallace, 89 AD3d 559 [1st Dept 2011]). Upon arrival and observing a person lying in the street with bystanders standing over him, the officers initiated basic questioning to ascertain what had occurred (see Vehicle and Traffic Law � 603-a).^FN1 Under People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181, 191-192 [1992], brief inquiries at potential crime scenes are considered information-gathering, not custodial interrogation, and therefore do not require Miranda warnings. Further, cases such as People v Taylor, 57 AD3d 327, 327-328 (1st Dept 2008), confirm that threshold inquiries to clarify events at a scene are investigatory and need not be preceded by Miranda warnings" (see People v Johnson, 59 NY2d 1014 [1983]; see also Mayerhofer, 283 AD2d 672, 674 [3rd Dept 2001]; People v Coffey, 107 AD3d 1047, 1050 [3rd Dept 2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1041 [*3][2013]; People v DeBlase, 142 AD2d 926, 927 [4th Dept 1988]; People v La Joy, 109 AD2d 916, 918 [3rd Dept 1985]). Only after the officers asked what had happened did defendant identify herself as the driver of the vehicle that struck the complainant. Thus, these portions of the defendant's noticed statement are admissible.

Although the officers now knew that the individual in the street was struck by a vehicle driven by defendant, they lacked sufficient information to ascertain whether the incident was accidental or intentional. Accordingly, Officer Ortiz-Hernandez asked defendant how the accident occurred. At this juncture, the questioning remained within the scope of the common-law right to inquire, which is initiated upon a founded suspicion that criminal activity may be involved and permits officers to seek clarifying information without engaging in accusatory or custodial interrogation (People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976]; People v Hollman, ibid.). The transition from an investigatory to an accusatory stage occurred when, in response to these inquiries, defendant explained that she and the complainant had argued, and as she attempted to leave, the complainant straddled the hood of her car. Defendant stated that she pulled the car away and, after further requests that the complainant get off, accelerated, causing the complainant to lose his grip and fall under the wheels of the vehicle. It was this subsequent clarification, providing a more complete factual basis, that led Officer Ortiz-Hernandez to conclude that the incident was a deliberate act rather than an accident, thereby shifting the encounter from purely investigatory questioning to an accusatory context justifying arrest. The officer then requested identifying information regarding the man in the street. Officers Ortiz-Hernandez and Hernandez accompanied defendant to the car to look for his wallet.

After defendant recounted this story of how the accident took place, the street encounter was elevated from a common law right of inquiry to probable cause for arrest, bypassing reasonable suspicion. "[T]he level of police intrusion was an appropriate response to the observations and beliefs of the officers involved" (People v Leung, 68 NY2d 734, 736 [1986]; People v De Bour, supra at 223.)

In this case, the People offered body-worn camera footage of Officer Ortiz-Hernandez. The body-worn camera footage demonstrates that after this admission, defendant was handcuffed and placed in the rear of the police vehicle for transport to the local precinct. Neither officer administered her Miranda warnings or engaged in conversation with defendant. Additional footage from the precinct shows the officers processing defendant's arrest, asking pedigree questions, and several additional questions to determine to whom the contents of her vehicle should be given or released. When Officer Hernandez tried to engage defendant in conversation at the precinct, Officer Ortiz-Hernandez immediately ended the inquiry.

The video evidence demonstrates that the defendant was not interrogated at any point during this period, which is critical under the legal standard requiring Miranda warnings only when both custody and interrogation are present. Specifically, her statements regarding her property "were in no way the product of an 'interrogation environment,' the result of 'express questioning or its functional equivalent'" (People v Harris, 57 NY2d 335, 342 [1982] quoting People v Stoesser, 53 NY2d 648, 650 [1981]). In line with this standard, Officer Ortiz-Hernandez's inquiries about defendant's property did not rise to the level of custodial interrogation (People v. Davis, 155 AD3d 1311, 1315 [3d Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1114 [2018]). Thus, under the applicable legal precedent, these statements, although not previously noticed, are not subject to suppression because they are not obtained through a custodial interrogation.

A defendant who is in custody may not be interrogated by law enforcement without being advised of his constitutional rights (Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]). An individual is deemed to be in custody when he has been "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way" (People v Turkenich, 137 AD2d 363 [2d Dept 1988] citing Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436). "The term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response" (People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985], quoting Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 301 [1980]). "Both the elements of police custody and police interrogation must be present before law enforcement officials constitutionally are obligated to provide the procedural safeguards imposed upon them by Miranda" (People v Huffman, 41 NY2d 29, 33 [1976]).

The burden of proof lies with the prosecution, and the People must establish the voluntariness of defendant's statement beyond a reasonable doubt (People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]). In meeting its burden of proving the voluntariness of a defendant's statement, the People must establish that a defendant, in police custody, was advised of their constitutional rights before being subjected to interrogation (id.).

Here, Assistant District Attorney Tai (ADA Tai) administered Miranda warnings to defendant through a Spanish language interpreter. In response, defendant verbally confirmed her understanding and acceptance of the Miranda warnings. Under the applicable legal standard, a valid waiver must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent (Miranda at 444-445; People v Robinson, — NY3d —, —, 2025 NY Slip Op 05871, *2 [Oct. 23, 2025]), and defendant's explicit acknowledgement satisfies this requirement. Therefore, any subsequent statements made by defendant during the approximately sixteen minute videotaped questioning were obtained in accordance with constitutional safeguards and are admissible.

Defendant told ADA Tai that she and the complainant, who lived together, were arguing at her parents' home. Not wanting to involve them, defendant left the house. As she entered her car, the complainant continued arguing with her and climbed onto the car's hood. Defendant said that she told him to get off the car and moved the car forward to emphasize her point. When he did not get off the car's hood, defendant said she accelerated, causing him to fall off and be run over by the vehicle.

While defendant contends that her admission to running over the complainant should be suppressed as the fruit of a Miranda violation, the record establishes that appropriate warnings were administered prior to the videotaped statement, thereby satisfying constitutional requirements. Although it could be argued that prior unwarned statements tainted the admissibility of this statement, New York courts have held that post-Miranda confessions are not automatically inadmissible where sufficient attenuation exists, particularly when the warnings are provided and defendant voluntarily waives her rights (People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122, 130-131 [2005]; see Oregon v Elstad, 470 US 298 [1985]). This statement given 24 hours later, identifying defendant as the individual who ran over the complainant, is sufficiently attenuated and therefore properly admissible. Additionally, the People provided timely CPL 710.30 notice.

The record establishes that defendant was effectively advised of her Miranda rights and made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver (see Miranda at 444-445).

Conclusion

In summary, the court finds that the People have met their burden at this Huntley hearing, having demonstrated both the admissibility and voluntariness of defendant's statements. Accordingly, after careful consideration of the facts and relevant legal standards, defendant's application is denied in its entirety.

This shall constitute the decision and order of this court.

Dated: May 20, 2026

Bronx, New York

HON. VERENA C. POWELL, A.J.S.C.