People v Berrios

Supreme Court, Bronx County

Decided on June 5, 2026

Ind. No. 75677-24

Verena C. Powell, J.

This case comes before the court on a single indictment charging both defendant Miguel Cano Garcia and codefendant Emilio Berrios with offenses arising from the same incident. Under this indictment, Miguel Cano Garcia is charged with leaving the scene of an accident without reporting (Vehicle and Traffic Law � 600 [2A]), among other related charges, stemming from a fatal motor vehicle incident that occurred on April 5, 2023. Emilio Berrios, as codefendant, faces charges of manslaughter in the second degree (Penal Law � 125.15 [1]) and other related offenses arising from that same incident.

Originally granted a Wade hearing (United States v Wade, 388 US 218 [1967]) by the reviewing court, counsel for Berrios informed the hearing court that as Berrios surrendered to the police, they did not conduct an identification procedure, nor did the People serve CPL � 710.30 (1) (b) identification notice. As there was no identification procedure to challenge, the previously ordered Wade hearing was not conducted.

As to defendant Miguel Cano Garcia, this court conducted a combined Mapp/Huntley/Dunaway hearing on March 26, 2026, and April 2, 2026 (Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 [1961]; People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]; Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200 [1979]). Defense withdrew their demand for the previously ordered Darden hearing upon the prosecution's representation that the person who provided information regarding the location of the vehicle involved in the accident was erroneously identified as a registered confidential informant rather than as an anonymous tipster. The People called two New York City Police Department (NYPD) detectives, Detective Solomon and Detective Rosario, to testify. The defense did not call any witnesses. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court heard oral arguments from counsel and received applicable case law.

Based on the credible testimony, the applicable law, and oral arguments, the court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I

On April 5, 2023, at approximately 11:22 p.m., at the northwest corner of Pierce Avenue and Williamsbridge Road in the Bronx, a bicyclist was fatally struck by a white pickup truck. Prior to the collision, law enforcement officers had begun pursuing the same white pickup truck due to its speeding and operation without a license plate. During this police pursuit, the pickup truck proceeded through a red light, collided with the cyclist, and immediately left the scene.

Almost half an hour after the incident, at 11:55 p.m., the pickup truck arrived at a certain address in Yonkers, New York, Westchester County, and was parked there. Four individuals exited the pickup truck, entered a white SUV that arrived at the location, and departed in that SUV.

On April 6, both Detective Solomon and Detective Rosario were assigned to investigate this case as part of the NYPD Collision Investigation Squad (CIS). Both detectives canvassed the area for video surveillance and potential witnesses. They spoke with an eyewitness who was nearly struck by the pickup truck at the time of the incident. The eyewitness identified the vehicle as a large white pickup truck that did not have a license plate on it.

Video surveillance from NYPD Argus cameras and New York City Department of Transportation (DOT) speed cameras was used to track the pickup truck's route after it left the scene. From the still images captured by the speed cameras, Detective Solomon identified the make and model of the pickup truck as a GMC Sierra. By tracking the pickup truck via video surveillance, Detective Solomon learned that it traveled up Pelham Parkway toward the New England Thruway, then went north on I-95. Ultimately, however, visual tracking through video surveillance was lost.

Physical evidence recovered at the scene included broken parts of what appeared to be the headlight of a vehicle, which was found on the west side of the street where the incident occurred.

Later that day at approximately 4:00 p.m., Detective Rosario received a call at the CIS office from Officer Rodriguez of the 45th Precinct. Officer Rodriguez relayed a tip that the vehicle under investigation was parked at a specific address in Yonkers and that individuals connected to it planned to move it to Pennsylvania later that night.

Detective Rosario proceeded to the Yonkers address that Officer Rodriguez relayed. When Detective Rosario arrived, he said he saw the vehicle he observed on the DOT speed camera parked at that location. The pickup truck at that location had a Pennsylvania license plate. Detective Rosario described the location as a parking area with several garages for private homes on the left and a public park on the right. No fence or gate obstructed the view of the pickup truck from the street. The pickup truck was not located inside a garage or any other enclosed structure. It was parked perpendicular to the street with its front bumper facing a playground fence and its rear bumper facing the street.

After entering the parking area, Detective Rosario observed damage to the driver's side front bumper and a broken headlight lens, which he described as consistent with a collision. Detective Rosario arranged for the pickup truck to be towed to the precinct, out of concern that it could be moved and thereby destroyed.

After the pickup truck was recovered, Detective Solomon requested and obtained video [*2]surveillance from the Yonkers Police Department for the location where the pickup truck was parked. That video footage showed the pickup truck arriving at the Yonkers location where it was parked and later recovered.

The next day, on April 7, 2023, the attorney for codefendant Emilio Berrios contacted Detective Solomon. Berrios's attorney said that Berrios sought to surrender himself to the police for his involvement in the incident.

Less than a week later, on April 13, 2023, Berrios surrendered himself to the police. On that date, Detective Solomon interviewed Berrios while his attorney was present in an interview room at the 49th Precinct.

Nearly seven and a half months after the date of the incident, on November 29, 2023, defendant Miguel Cano Garcia voluntarily surrendered himself to the police, following an extended period during which he had not come forward to authorities. On that date, Detective Solomon, joined by Detective Rosario, interviewed defendant Cano Garcia in an interview room at the 49th Precinct. Defendant's attorney was present throughout the interview. (Counsel of record has since changed.)

Detective Solomon administered the warnings in sequence. First, he advised defendant of the right to remain silent. Second, he advised defendant that anything he said could be used against him in a court of law. Third, he advised defendant of the right to consult with an attorney before answering any questions and to have an attorney present during questioning. Fourth, he advised defendant that if he could not afford an attorney, one would be appointed for him at no cost. Fifth, he advised defendant that, if no attorney was available, defendant had the right to remain silent until he had an opportunity to consult with one. After each warning, Detective Solomon asked whether defendant understood, and defendant answered affirmatively. Detective Solomon then asked defendant whether he was willing to answer questions after defendant was advised of his rights. Defendant answered affirmatively. Defendant was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained during the interview.

Defendant admitted that the pickup truck, a white 2020 GMC Sierra, belonged to him, but was registered in Pennsylvania under his stepmother's name. He said that he was sitting in the front passenger seat of the vehicle when the incident occurred. Defendant stated that Emilio Berrios was driving the pickup truck at the time because he felt ill. At some point after the incident, the pickup truck stopped, and defendant switched seats with Berrios. Defendant drove the truck to Yonkers, about 20 to 30 minutes away and parked it there. Almost halfway through the interview, Detective Solomon told defendant, in sum and substance, that he was there as a witness, not to be placed under arrest. The interview continued afterwards with defendant clarifying earlier statements he had made.

After the interview, defendant left the precinct in the company of his attorney.

Nearly eight months later, on July 26, 2024, defendant was arrested.

II

A. Mapp

On a motion to suppress physical evidence, the People bear the initial burden of establishing the legality of the police conduct, and defendant bears the ultimate burden of proving illegality by a preponderance of the evidence (People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367 [1971]).

Defendant has standing to challenge the seizure of his pickup truck. A defendant seeking [*3]suppression must establish some personal interest in the place or item at issue (People v Wesley, 73 NY2d 351, 357 [1989]). A seizure of property occurs upon "some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property" (United States v Jacobsen, 466 US 109, 113 [1984]). Since defendant owns the pickup truck, defendant has standing to challenge its seizure.

However, defendant lacks standing to challenge the detective's entry into the Yonkers parking area where his pickup truck was found because searches and seizures are governed by distinct legal standards. Specifically, the right to object to a search is predicated on whether the defendant had "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises or object searched" (People v Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99, 108 [1996]), requiring both a subjective expectation and an expectation that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. In contrast, the right to challenge a seizure turns on a possessory or ownership interest in the item seized. In this case, although defendant may have a possessory interest in the truck itself, there is no evidence that he owned, resided at, or possessed any reasonable expectation of privacy in the Yonkers parking area. Thus, defendant cannot contest the detective's entry or observations in the parking area on search grounds, although he may challenge the seizure of his vehicle due to his possessory interest..

Detectives relied on information relayed by a call from a fellow police officer who passed along an anonymous tip. The relayed information, which asserted that the pickup truck was in Yonkers, furnished an investigative lead. Because it was hearsay, any probable cause resting on it is governed by the Aguilar-Spinelli standard (People v Griminger, 71 NY2d 635, 639 [1988] [retaining Aguilar-Spinelli standard as a matter of state constitutional law, having declined to follow the federal totality approach]). Under Aguilar-Spinelli, hearsay can establish probable cause only when both the reliability, or veracity, of the source and the basis of the source's knowledge are shown (People v Johnson, 66 NY2d 398, 402-403 [1985]). The record does not establish the original source of the Yonkers information. The hearsay in that relayed information furnished an investigative lead by directing the detectives to the Yonkers location. The probable cause determination rests on the hearing evidence apart from the relayed information.

Once at the Yonkers location, Detective Rosario observed a white pickup truck matching the make and model of the pickup truck from this investigation. Detective Rosario then entered the parking area to observe the pickup truck more closely. Defendant established no legitimate expectation of privacy in that area. Nothing in the record indicates that he resided at the location or used it as a private space. It was an open and unenclosed parking area that appeared to serve several private homes, was adjacent to a public park, and was visible from the street. Detective Rosario's presence in that area therefore violated no privacy interest personal to defendant (People v Sweezey, 215 AD2d 910, 914 [3d Dept 1995] [finding no privacy intrusion from an officer's presence on a publicly accessible lot]). Further, the parking area was not the curtilage of any residence in which defendant held a protected interest. Whether an area constitutes curtilage turns on its proximity to the home, whether it lies within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of its use, and the steps taken to shield it from observation (United States v Dunn, 480 US 294, 301 [1987]). Defendant did not establish that the parking area was his curtilage or a place where he had any legitimate expectation of privacy.

Because Detective Rosario's presence in the parking area did not invade any privacy interest of defendant's, the detective could lawfully observe the pickup truck's exterior and rely on its damaged condition as the basis for probable cause (People v Diaz, 81 NY2d 106, 110-111 [*4][1993] [holding that the observation of an item out in the open and in plain view is not a search]). Although a possible counterargument might assert that the open view doctrine should not apply if the parking area is functionally equivalent to a private space, supporters of this argument may rely on precedent establishing Fourth Amendment protection for areas intimately connected to the home, such as curtilage, or for certain private spaces where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. For example, if the parking area had been fenced, posted with signs prohibiting trespass, or otherwise enclosed in a manner indicating an intention to exclude the public, then application of the open view doctrine might be more contentious. However, the present facts do not support such an inference. The parking area was open, unenclosed, and visible from the street, lacking barriers or features suggesting exclusivity or privacy, and it was not established to be curtilage or a residence to which defendant had any protected interest. Thus, the area falls squarely within the precedents supporting lawful observation from a nonintrusive vantage, and the observation of the headlight damage was therefore not suppressible.

The detective's lawful observation, in combination with the preexisting investigation, satisfied the probable cause standard by establishing a reasonable basis to believe the truck at the Yonkers location was the instrumentality of the fatal collision. Under the probable cause standard, courts look to whether the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, viewed as a whole, would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed and that the vehicle in question is connected to that offense. Here, prior to receiving information by phone, detectives had already identified the vehicle involved as a white pickup truck, specifically a GMC Sierra, through an eyewitness account corroborated by surveillance footage. The discovery of damaged headlight fragments at the collision scene provided physical evidence of a front-end impact. Upon arrival at the Yonkers location, the detective observed a white GMC Sierra displaying driver-side front-end damage and a broken headlight lens consistent with the recent collision. Considering these specific and corroborating facts together, the detectives had a practical, not merely speculative, probability that the vehicle at the Yonkers location was involved in the incident, thereby meeting the probable cause requirement (People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423 [1985]; People v Taylor, 104 AD3d 431, 431 [1st Dept 2013].

The seizure of the pickup truck was justified by the combination of probable cause and the exigency attending a readily movable vehicle. A warrantless seizure of a vehicle is permissible "[i]f the police possess probable cause to believe the vehicle is the instrumentality of a crime and exigent circumstances exist" (People v Buggenhagen, 57 AD2d 466, 468-469 [4th Dept 1977]; People v Doll, 98 AD3d 356, 369 [4th Dept 2012] [upholding a warrantless vehicle seizure supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances]). Exigent circumstances exist where the vehicle remains accessible and could be moved (People v Sweezey, 215 AD2d 910, 914 [3d Dept 1995] [finding exigency where the vehicle "could be sold or moved by a third party"]). The pickup truck had already been moved once, from the collision scene to Yonkers. It remained in an open and unsecured area, was not in police custody, and could readily be driven or towed away. These circumstances created an objectively reasonable risk that the pickup truck would be moved or altered before a warrant could be obtained. Defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence is therefore denied.

B. Huntley

Before a defendant's statement may be admitted at trial, the prosecution bears the burden [*5]of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was made voluntarily (People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72, 78 [1965]).

As a threshold matter, the interview at the precinct was not custodial. The test for custody is objective and asks whether "a reasonable [person], innocent of any crime," would have believed that they were in custody (People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969]). A noncustodial finding is supported where a defendant appears voluntarily, is not handcuffed or restrained, is advised that he is not under arrest, and is permitted to leave (see People v Andrango, 106 AD3d 461, 461-462 [1st Dept 2013] [holding that a police officer's unarticulated intent to arrest an individual is irrelevant to the custody determination]). Defendant voluntarily appeared at the precinct, accompanied by counsel. He was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained. He left the precinct at the end of the interview, and he was not arrested until approximately eight months later. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would not have believed himself to be in custody, and Miranda warnings were not required. Detective Solomon's precautionary administration of Miranda warnings does not change that conclusion (Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444 [1966]; see Oregon v Mathiason, 429 US 492, 495 [1977] [holding that Miranda warnings are not necessarily required where questioning takes place in a station house or because the questioned person is a suspect]).

If the interview were deemed custodial, the warnings that Detective Solomon administered before questioning sufficiently conveyed defendant's rights under Miranda (Miranda, 384 US at 444; see Florida v Powell, 559 US 50, 60 [2010] [requiring only those warnings reasonably convey a suspect's rights]). Any waiver of rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances (People v Anderson, 42 NY2d 35, 38 [1977]). Defendant affirmed his understanding after each warning and agreed to answer questions with his attorney present throughout the questioning.

The statements were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. Deception does not render a statement involuntary unless it is "so fundamentally unfair as to deny due process" or is accompanied by "a promise or threat . . . that could induce a false confession" (People v Tarsia, 50 NY2d 1, 11 [1980]). Advising defendant that he was present as a witness and was not being placed under arrest created no substantial risk of false incrimination and was not accompanied by any promise or threat (see id.).

Defendant's right to counsel was not violated. The indelible right to counsel is honored where any interrogation is conducted in counsel's presence, which is "a more effective safeguard against an involuntary waiver of counsel than a mere written or oral warning in the absence of counsel" (People v Hobson, 39 NY2d 479, 481 [1976]). All questioning took place with counsel present, and no uncounseled waiver or uncounseled interrogation occurred.

Accordingly, because the statements were made voluntarily, with a valid waiver of rights, and with counsel present throughout the interview, defendant's motion to suppress statements is denied.

C. Dunaway

A statement obtained through an unlawful seizure of the person must be suppressed unless the causal connection between the illegality and the statement has become attenuated (see Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200, 216-219 [1979]). The threshold question is whether defendant was seized before or during the interview, that is, "whether a reasonable person would have believed, under the circumstances, that the officer's conduct was a significant limitation on [*6]his or her freedom" (People v Bora, 83 NY2d 531, 535 [1994]).

Defendant was not seized before or during the interview. He voluntarily appeared at the precinct with counsel, was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained, was told that he was present as a witness and was not under arrest and was permitted to leave at the end of the interview. Those circumstances do not amount to an unlawful detention or arrest (Andrango, 106 AD3d at 461 [finding no custody where defendant was not restrained]). Furthermore, the record establishes that appropriate warnings were administered prior to the videotaped statement, thereby satisfying constitutional requirements. New York courts have held that post-Miranda confessions are not automatically inadmissible where sufficient attenuation exists, particularly when the warnings are provided and defendant voluntarily waives her rights (People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122, 130-131 [2005]; see Oregon v Elstad, 470 US 298 [1985]). This statement given 7 � months later, is sufficiently attenuated and therefore properly admissible. Finally, another eight months passed before defendant was arrested after he provided his statements.

The motion to suppress statements or other evidence on this ground is thus denied.

III

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the branch of defendant's motion seeking suppression of physical evidence is denied (see Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 [1961]); it is further

ORDERED that the branch of defendant's motion seeking suppression of statements as involuntary is denied (see People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]); and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of defendant's motion seeking suppression of statements or other evidence as the product of an unlawful seizure of his person is denied (see Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200 [1979]).

Dated: June 5, 2026

Bronx, New York

HON. VERENA C. POWELL, A.J.S.C.