Supreme Court, Queens County

Decided on June 1, 2026

Index No. 701131/2023

Leonard Livote, J.

[*1]

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 009) 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140 were read on this motion to/for RENEW/REARGUE/RESETTLE/RECONSIDER.

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 010) 135, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151 OTHER RELIEF.

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 011) 152, 160, 164, 165 OTHER RELIEF

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 012) 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163, 166, 167 were read on this motion to/for OTHER RELIEF

Upon the foregoing papers, the motions are determined as follows.

I. Relevant background:

The within action is for, inter alia, allegedly unpaid rent, use and occupancy breach of contract, and fraud. Plaintiff Sharei Torah ("Plaintiff") is a non-profit organization that owns the property at 92-15 69th Avenue, Forest Hills, NY 11475 ("Property").

Plaintiff purports to have leased the Property to two rabbis, defendants Mendel Hendel ("Mr. Hendel") and Menachem Mendel Shagalow ("Mr. Shagalow"), for the purposes of operating the defendant entity Congregation Ohr Menachem a/k/a Yeshiva Gedola Lubavitch ("Yeshiva").

Plaintiff alleges as follows: Messrs Hendel and Shagalow operate defendant entity Yeshiva Lubavitch, a New York 501 [c][3] organization, out of the Property. On or about August 2, 2011, the parties entered into a 12-month lease agreement ("2011 Lease") by which Plaintiff, owner of the Property, leased it to Messrs Hendel and Shagalow "in their personal capacit[ies] (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 6). Defendants allegedly failed to make certain rent and/or use and occupancy payments. At the conclusion of the 2011 Lease, Plaintiff agreed to allow Messrs. Hendel and Shagalow to "continue to occupy the Premises on a month-to-month basis, pay the back due rent and continue at a monthly rent of $10,500.00" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 7). For some time thereafter, Defendants continued to occupy the Property as a month-to-month tenant, although Defendants "occasionally, at times, paid rent, but have gone vast periods of time without paying any rent while continuing to occupy" the Property such that "in total, Defendants owe to [Plaintiff] approximately $600,000 in back rent and accumulated use and occupancy charges (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 8). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants "ignored the maintenance and other expenses of operating" the Property which the 2011 Lease purportedly required (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 9).

On or about June 2013, Plaintiff entered into a letter agreement to sell the Property to non-party Yeshiva Shar Yisochor Div ("Yeshiva Div"), but Messrs Hendel and Shagalow purportedly engaged in "tortious conduct" such that Yeshiva Div "felt threatened did not purchase the [Property] at that time" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 13). On or about March 2016, Plaintiff purportedly again attempted to sell the Property to Yeshiva Div but Defendants "filed a lis pendens and a plenary action in Queens County Supreme Court (Hon. Robert J. McDonald, Index No. 10193/2016) ("Plenary Action") claiming that Plaintiff had breached Defendants' right of first refusal. The court, in that Plenary Action, held: "[P]laintiffs [Messrs Hendel and Shagalow] did not renew or extend the lease in accordance with its terms. Rather they entered into oral agreement whereby they were month-to-month tenants. Thus, following the expiration of the lease, [Messrs Hendel and Shagalow] no longer maintained an enforceable right of first refusal" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 14).

Plaintiff alleges that since 2016, "in order to prevent [Plaintiff] from selling the [Property] to a third-party, Defendants have repeatedly claimed they were going to purchase the [Property], and worked out deals to do so by which [Plaintiff] agreed to forego or reduce the payment of back rent on the condition Defendants actually purchase the [Property]" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 15).

On or about 2018, Plaintiff initiated a holdover eviction proceeding in Queens County Civil Court (Index No. LT-077973/2018-QU) ("LL-T Action"), in which that court issued a judgment of eviction in or around February 2020. The parties ultimately agreed, pursuant to a stipulation of settlement so-ordered by Hon. Sally E. Unger ("Stipulated Settlement") to stay the eviction until July 2021, and again until April 2022. Said Stipulated Settlement purportedly provided that Defendants "would either peaceably surrender the [Property] or would agree to purchase [it]" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 16). Plaintiff claims Defendants "repeatedly" claimed to be interested in purchasing the Property but never did so and never vacated (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 16). In trying to consummate the transaction for Defendants to buy the Property, Plaintiff claims to have also dealt with three different Defendants' attorneys (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 17). On or about September 2022, in the LL-T Action, the court (Hon. John C. V. Katsanos) issued an order for the issuance of a new warrant of eviction with an earliest execution date of September 26, 2022, and further held that Defendants were "in violation of the so-ordered stipulation of settlement as modified" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 17).

On or about September 2023, Plaintiff then commenced the within action for claims sounding in "collection of unpaid rent in quantum meruit," "breach of stipulation of settlement," "tortious interference with contract," "fraudulent inducement," "damage to property" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 18-23). At the time of commencement, Plaintiff claimed it was "still waiting [for] the Queens County Clerk's office to upload a signed possessory judgment to hand over to the Sheriff's office for execution" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 17). Defendants interposed an answer on February 28, 2023 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 12) and later an amended answer on March 10, 2023 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 16), in which they, inter alia, pled denials and various affirmative defenses.

On March 22, 2023, this Court issued a Preliminary Conference Order ("PC Order") directing certain discovery.

By order dated July 25, 2023, this Court granted the motion (Mot. Seq. 001) of Zelenitz, Shapiro and D'Agostino, P.C. to withdraw as counsel for Defendants (NYSCEF Doc. No. 41). On August 15, 2023, Defendants retained Jacobs PC (NYSCEF Doc. No. 46).

On August 18, 2023, defendant entity Yeshiva Lubavitch filed for bankruptcy, as debtor, under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (EDNY Case No. 23-42923-jmm), but this case was ultimately dismissed on December 26, 2023 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 51).

By order dated March 11, 2025, this Court denied, on procedural grounds, Jacobs PC's motion (Mot. Seq. 004) to withdraw as counsel.

By order dated September 30, 2025, this Court granted the second branch of Plaintiff's motion (Mot. Seq. 005) seeking preclusion "to the extent that Defendants are precluded from offering any affirmative evidence in support of their claims and defenses at the time of trial on the issue of liability but may defend at trial on the issue of damages" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 89). In that same order, this Court found Defendants' conduct to be willful and contumacious. In that same order, this Court also granted Jacobs PC's motion (Mot. Seq. 006) seeking to withdraw as Defendants' counsel and directed parties to appear for a virtual conference on December 1, 2025 such that "any parties' failure to appear either by new counsel or pro se may result in striking pleadings, default, dismissal, and/or contempt" (id.)

On December 1, 2025, defendant Mr. Hendel filed to the NYSCEF record a "Notice of Removal" document addressed to "The Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York" apparently requesting to said clerk that, because an involuntary petition [*2]under Chapter 7 of Title 11 of the United States Code had been purportedly filed against Mr. Hendel in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ("SDNY"), the within action before this Court should be removed to the SDNY (NYSCEF Doc. No. 92). Mr. Hendel, in that submission, referenced a "Standing Order of Reference dated February 1, 2012 entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (12 Misc. 00032)" that purportedly serves as a basis for Mr. Hendel's claim that the within action was "automatically referred to the Bankruptcy Judges of this Court." No such "Standing Order" or order of any court was included in Mr. Hendel's NYSCEF Doc. No. 92 submission. Mr. Hendel also referenced that "On November 28, 2025, an involuntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 303, was filed against" him. No such petition document was included in Mr. Hendel's NYSCEF Doc. No. 92 submission.

On December 1, 2025, Mr. Hendel appeared at the court-ordered virtual conference in his personal capacity. Plaintiff appeared by counsel. Defendant Mr. Shagalow did not appear. The defendant entity Yeshiva Lubavitch did not appear with counsel.

On December, 4, 2025, this Court issued an order to show cause regarding Plaintiff's motion (Mot. Seq. 007) directing Defendants to show cause as to why an order should not be issued, inter alia, "entering default judgment against all defendants," "setting this matter down for an inquest on damages or directing written submission," "rejecting [Mr. Hendel's] purported 'Notice of Removal' (NYSCEF Doc. No. 92) and confirming that no stay is in effect and that this Court retains jurisdiction," (NYSCEF Doc. No. 102). This Court directed Plaintiff to serve said order to show cause on Defendants "via personal service" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 102).

On December 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed a notice of motion (Mot. Seq. 008) seeking an order pursuant to CPLR § 308 [5] for, inter alia, "authorizing alternate service of the Order to Show Cause and all supporting papers upon Defendant Mendel Hendel" regarding the order to show cause issued for Mot. Seq. 007 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 112).

By order dated April 2, 2026, this Court addressed Mot. Seqs. 007 and 008. This Court, having reviewed the NYSCEF record, held that "Plaintiff's motion (Motion Sequence 007) . . . was administratively marked 'closed' with leave to refile" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 126). This Court further held that "Plaintiff's motion (Motion Sequence 008) is denied as moot with leave to refile" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 126).

Thereafter, the parties filed the various motions discussed herein. Based on the Court's review of the record, it appears the conduct between Plaintiff's counsel and unrepresented Defendants has devolved into name-calling, disparagement, and personal attacks. In one communication from Plaintiff's counsel, Ms. Yifat Schnur ("Ms. Schnur") to Mr. Hendel on April 19, 2026, Ms. Schnur appears to write: "1. You [Mr. Hendel] are a vermin that is an embarrassment to the Jewish people; 2. You are a thief and a conartist [sic]; 3. You are a horrible human being That [sic] should not be allowed near children — and definitely not in a school Setting [sic]..." (NYSCEF Doc. No. 145). In another email to Mr. Hendel on April 17, 2026, Ms. Schnur writes: "I am embarrassed that you claim you are religious — it is because of people like you that October 7th happened..." (id.). In an April 19, 2026 email to Ms. Schnur from Mr. Hendel, Mr. Hendel threatened to bring Ms. Schnur's communications to the "subject of a grievance to be filed with the Attorney Grievance Committee of the Second Judicial Department . . . " (NYSCEF Doc. No. 145).

II. Plaintiff's motion for relief (Mot. Seq. 009):

Plaintiff now moves via order to show cause (Mot. Seq. 009) to, inter alia, reargue. The [*3]above-numbered papers were read on this motion by Plaintiff seeking:

"1. Granting leave to reargue pursuant to CPLR 2221(d) the Court's Decision and Order dated April 2, 2026 and entered April 3, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 126).

2. Upon reargument, vacating so much of the Order as denied Motion Sequence 008.

3. Determining that no stay or removal has been established on the present record.

4. Directing Defendant Mendel Hendel, within five (5) days of service of the Order deciding this motion, to file a sworn affidavit together with competent documentary proof of any alleged bankruptcy petition, including the court, case number, petition, and any order imposing a stay or effectuating removal.

5. Providing that failure to produce such proof shall result in a determination that no stay exists, that this action shall proceed without delay, and that Defendant shall be precluded from asserting any bankruptcy-related stay or removal.

6. Upon Defendant's failure to comply with the above directive, or upon a finding that no stay exists, granting Plaintiff's prior motion (Motion Sequence 007) for default judgment on liability, striking Defendant Hendel's pleadings, and setting the matter down for an inquest on damages.

7. Awarding sanctions against Defendant Mendel Hendel pursuant to 22 NYC RR § 130-1.1 (authorizing sanctions for frivolous conduct), including monetary sanctions and attorneys' fees.

8. Imposing protective conditions barring unsupported assertions of bankruptcy or removal and limiting adjournments.

9. Directing that all service in this matter be made upon [Defendant] Mendel Hendel via email to mmhendel@gmail.com; and

10. Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper." (NYSCEF Doc. No. 133)

a. Plaintiff's first and second branches of its motion:

The first two (2) branches of relief sought by Plaintiff relate to this Court's April 2, 2026 order (NYSCEF Doc. No. 126) ("April 2026 Order").

Under CPLR § 2221 [d]:

"A motion for leave to reargue: 1. shall be identified specifically as such; 2. shall be based upon matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the court in determining the prior motion, but shall not include any matters of fact not offered on the prior motion; and 3. shall be made within thirty days after service of a copy of the order determining the prior motion and written notice of its entry." (CPLR §2221 [d]).

A motion for leave to reargue "may be granted upon a showing that the court overlooked or misapprehended the facts or law or for some reason mistakenly arrived at its earlier decision" (Carrillo v PM Realty Group, 16 AD3d 611, 611 [2d Dept 2005]; see Coke-Holmes v Holsey Holdings, LLC, 189 AD3d 1162, 1164 [2d Dept 2020]).

In its April 2026 Order, this Court stated: "the Court is not able to adequately ascertain from the record whether any bankruptcy petition or court order either removed or stayed the within action" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 126). In the instant motion, Plaintiff argues that "[T]he proper course was not to deny relief because the Court lacked enough certainty. The proper course was to direct Hendel to produce competent proof immediately, and absent such proof, to decline to recognize any purported stay" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 129).

Plaintiff's argument in this regard is based on a misunderstanding of the law and court procedure. In issuing its April 2026 Order, the Court did not "overlook" or "misapprehend" a fact or law under Carrillo v PM Realty Group, 16 AD3d 611 [2d Dept 2005]. Plaintiff's motion (Mot. Seq. 007) seeking default against Defendants was erroneously marked administratively "closed" by a clerk within the court system and without this Court's directive to that clerk to do so. There is an indication on the NYSCEF record on December 1, 2025 at 9:28 am by a clerk as follows: "CASE CLOSED -- REMOVED TO EASTERN DISTRICT AS PER DOC #92," referring to Mr. Hendel's purported "Notice of Removal." There is another, later, comment by a different clerk on December 1, 2025 at 9:54 am as follows: "Closed on error."

As Plaintiff appears to be unaware, the Court cannot enter a decision on the merits of a motion that has been marked "closed." The Court also cannot direct a "closed" motion to be reopened for a decision. The action by the clerk to mark the within action and Plaintiff's Mot. Seq. 007 "closed" rendered this Court unable to enter any decision on Mot. Seq. 007. As such, this Court denied as moot Plaintiff's subsequent motion (Mot. Seq. 008) which sought alternative service of the order to show cause that was a part of Plaintiff's closed Mot. Seq. 007. Thus, the first and second branches of Plaintiff's instant motion (Mot. Seq. 009) seeking to reargue and vacate so much of the Court's April 2026 Order on the basis of the Court purportedly having overlooked or misapprehended the facts or the law are denied.

This Court, however, can enter a decision on a motion that is open and which seeks the same relief sought in a "closed" motion. Plaintiff's remaining branches of its instant motion (Mot. Seq. 009) are addressed below.

b. Plaintiff's third branch of its motion:

Plaintiff's third branch of its motion seeks a determination "that no stay or removal has been established on the present record" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 133).

Where a case has been removed, the court is "without jurisdiction to entertain" motions (Fin. Freedom Acquisition, LLC v Braunsberg, 201 AD3d 788, 792 [2d Dept 2022]).

At no point in the Court's April 2026 Order did this Court declare that the within action had been stayed or removed to a different court on account of Mr. Hendel's purported "Notice of Removal" filing (NYSCEF Doc. No. 92). If this Court had found as such, then the Court would have been "without jurisdiction to entertain" Plaintiff's then-pending motion (Fin. Freedom Acquisition, LLC, 201 AD3d at 792 [2d Dept 2022]. As apparent from the NYSCEF record, this Court did in fact render a decision on Plaintiff's motion (Mot. Seq. 008), which it could not have done had the case been removed.

For the avoidance of doubt, the Court states here, as it already established by the mere issuance of its April 2026 Order, that the within action is not stayed and has not been removed to any other court, and that Mr. Hendel's purported "Notice of Removal" filing (NYSCEF Doc. No. 92) did not remove the within action. Thus, the Plaintiff's third branch of its motion (Mot. Seq. 009) is granted.

c. Plaintiff's fourth and fifth branches of its motion:

The fourth and fifth branches of Plaintiff's instant motion seek to compel Mr. Hendel to produce certain documents or proof evidencing a purported removal of the within action, and to preclude him from asserting any bankruptcy-related stay or removal. Such branches of relief are denied as redundant on the grounds that this Court, as described above, did not find the within action in its April 2026 Order to have been stayed or removed.

d. Plaintiff's sixth and seventh branches of its motion:

Plaintiff's sixth branch of its motion seeks: "Upon Defendant's failure to comply with the above directive, or upon a finding that no stay exists, granting Plaintiff's prior motion (Motion Sequence 007) for default judgment on liability, striking Defendant Hendel's pleadings, and setting the matter down for an inquest on damages" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 133).

Plaintiff's seventh branch of its motion seeks an order "awarding sanctions against Defendant Hendel Mendel pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (authorizing sanctions for frivolous conduct), including monetary sanctions and attorneys' fees" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 133).

i. Relief sought as to defendants Mr. Shagalow and entity Yeshiva Lubavitch:

CPLR § 3215 [a] authorizes a party to make an application for a default judgment "[w]hen a defendant has failed to appear, plead or proceed to trial of an action reached and called for trial, or when the court orders a dismissal for any other neglect to proceed." A corporate defendant is in default when it appears in this action without representation by a licensed attorney and fails to give a reasonable excuse for its default (Lohmann v Castleton Gallery, Inc., 252 AD2d 482, 482-83 [2d Dept 1998]) (internal citations omitted).

Here, defendant entity Yeshiva Lubavitch did not appear at the December 1, 2025 conference with counsel. Individual defendant Mr. Shagalow also did not appear. As such, the Court finds these defendants in default under CPLR § 3215 [a] and Lohmann v Castleton Gallery, Inc., 252 AD2d 482 [2d Dept 1998].

ii. Relief sought as to defendant Mr. Hendel:

1. Whether Mr. Hendel engaged in fraudulent conduct:

The Court of Appeals has held that "a finding of fraud on the court may warrant termination of the proceedings in the nonoffending party's favor . . . for 'when a party lies to the court and [its] adversary intentionally, repeatedly, and about issues central to the truth-finding process, it can fairly be said that [the party] has forfeited [the] right to have [the] claim decided on the merits'" (CDR Creances S.A.S. v Cohen, 23 NY3d 307, 321 [2014]) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, once a court concludes that clear and convincing evidence establishes fraud on the court, it may strike a pleading and enter a default judgment (id.).

Plaintiff claims that at the December 1, 2025 conference, Mr. Hendel feigned an inability to understand English but, when his former counsel was brought on to the call at the direction of the clerk, Mr. Hendel conversed with him in fluent English (NYSCEF Doc. No. 98). Mr. Hendel does not address this claim in his opposition to the instant motion.

At the December 1, 2025 conference, Mr. Hendel represented to the Court that the within action had been removed as per his purported "Notice of Removal" filing (NYSCEF Doc. No. 92). As already discussed in this Court's April 2026 Order, Mr. Hendel's "Notice of Removal" filing referenced a "Standing Order of Reference dated February 1, 2012 entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (12 Misc. 00032)" that purportedly served as a basis for Mr. Hendel's claim that the within action was "automatically referred to the Bankruptcy Judges of this Court." No such "Standing Order" or order of any court was included with Mr. Hendel's filing.

Mr. Hendel also referenced in his purported "Notice of Removal" filing (NYSCEF Doc. No. 92) that "On November 28, 2025, an involuntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 303, was filed against" him. No such petition document was included in Mr. Hendel's purported "Notice of Removal" submission. Mr. Hendel's "Notice of Removal" filing did not indicate an index number of the relevant bankruptcy action underpinning his filing. Mr. Hendel also did not produce same in his opposition to the within [*4]action. Furthermore, Mr. Hendel's "Notice of Removal" filing stated that a petitioning creditor filed an involuntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, but Mr. Hendel does not identify in any papers before the Court the identity of the purported petitioning creditor.

Contrary to Mr. Hendel's claim, 11 USC § 362 provide for an automatic stay of all acts and proceedings against a debtor and its property only upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, not a purported "notice of removal" document filed to the state court. Mr. Hendel has not provided, either now in his opposition to the instant motion or earlier at the time of his purported "Notice of Removal" filing in December 1, 2025, proof of any such bankruptcy petition filed to the federal court to which he claims the within action was removed.

On December 1, 2025, after Mr. Hendel's purported "Notice of Removal" filing, Plaintiff's counsel a correspondence to the Court responding to Mr. Hendel's filing by arguing that, inter alia, Mr. Hendel's filing was improper. In this letter (NYSCEF Doc. No 93), Plaintiff's counsel, who had enumerated her arguments using numbered paragraphs, wrote as follows:

"5. Plaintiff Will Move to Remand if Necessary Should the federal court open a civil docket, Plaintiff will promptly file a motion to remand." (NYSCEF Doc. No. 93).

In response to this December 1, 2025 letter, Mr. Hendel submitted his own correspondence on January 15, 2026 to the Court in which he characterized the above statement in Plaintiff's letter as follows:

"Third, counsel admitted in her own letter that Plaintiff 'will promptly file a motion to remand' in federal court—thereby acknowledging that the proper forum to challenge removal is federal court, not this Court. Yet she [Plaintiff's counsel] simultaneously asked this Court to proceed anyway" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 117).

The Court finds Mr. Hendel's selective truncation of Plaintiff's original statement from "Should the federal court open a civil docket, Plaintiff will promptly file a motion to remand" to "Plaintiff 'will promptly file a motion to remand'" was deceptive on the grounds that the full quotation included a clear condition precedent—the federal court opening a civil docket—whereas Mr. Hendel's truncated quotation did not (NYSCEF Doc. No. 93). The original statement by Plaintiff did not admit that any federal court had already opened a civil docket, yet Mr. Hendel's correspondence to the Court made it seem as if Plaintiff had made such an admission.

In opposition to the instant motion, Mr. Hendel submitted an affirmation (NYSCEF Doc. No. 136). In it, he argues that he did not have adequate time to oppose the instant motion, which was returnable April 21, 2026, because of his observance of the Shabbat holiday between the evening of Friday, April 17, 2026 and the evening of Saturday, April 18, 2026. In furtherance of this contention, Mr. Hendel argues: "Due process requires that notice be given 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)." Mr. Hendel's quotation is nowhere to be found in the Mullane court's opinion. Thus, Mr. Hendel attributed a non-existent holding to a case in his submission to the Court.

Mr. Hendel further argues in his opposition that "Pro se litigants are entitled to greater latitude and their submissions are held to 'less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.' Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)." Mr. Hendel's quotation is nowhere to be found in the Traguth court's opinion. Thus, Mr. Hendel again attributed a non-existent holding to a case in his submission to the Court.

In fact, the Appellate Division has held the opposite of what Mr. Hendel posits, to wit: [*5]"Although courts will routinely afford pro se litigants...some latitude, a litigant's decision to proceed without counsel does not confer any greater rights than those afforded to other litigants, nor may a pro se appearance serve to deprive parties in opposition of their right to a fair trial" (Matter of Martinez v Gaddy, 223 AD3d 816, 819 [2d Dept 2024]). Thus, Mr. Hendel's argument that he should be entitled to greater latitude is not only based on a non-existent holding but also runs counter to an established holding by the Appellate Division.

Mr. Hendel further argues in his opposition that "Courts routinely grant pro se litigants additional time to prepare responsive papers, particularly where the opposing party is represented by counsel and the relief sought is significant. See Ennis v. Lessing, 84 AD3d 1508, 1509 (3d Dep't 2011)." There is no such case titled Ennis v Lessing having the citation provided by Mr. Hendel. The citation of "84 AD3d 1508" belongs to People v Parker, a Third Department Appellate Division opinion regarding the affirmation of a criminal conviction and discussing issues that are not relevant to those in the instant motion. The Court could not find any case having the caption "Ennis v Lessing." Thus, Mr. Hendel has cited to a non-existent case in his submission to the Court.

Mr. Hendel further argues in his opposition: "The United States Supreme Court has held that any proceedings conducted by a state court after removal are void, regardless of whether the removal was proper. Waco v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 293 U.S. 140, 143 (1934)." The actual holding at the pin cite he offered is: "We are of opinion that the petitioner was entitled to have the Circuit Court of Appeals determine whether the dismissal of its cross-action against the Fidelity Company was proper. If the District Court erred on this point, which we do not decide, its action should be reversed" (City of Waco, Tex. v U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 293 US 140 [1934]). The Waco court does not ever categorize state court proceedings as "void." Thus, Mr. Hendel offered a non-existent pin cite and overstated the Waco court's holding in its submission to the Court.

Mr. Hendel further argues in his opposition, regarding his purported "Notice of Removal" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 92), that: "Even if my removal is procedurally defective, only the federal court may make that determination. Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 128 (1995) [emphasis added by Mr. Hendel]." The pin cite offered by Mr. Hendel does not contain any holding by the Things Remembered court that, as Mr. Hendel suggests, "only the federal court may make" a determination of whether removal was procedurally defective. The holding at the offered pin cite is instead that 28 U.S.C. 1447 [d] "precludes appellate review of any order 'remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed.'" (Things Remembered, Inc. v Petrarca, 516 US 124, 128, 116 SCt 494, 497, 133 LEd 2d 461 [1995]). Thus, Mr. Hendel offered a non-existent pin cite and overstated the Things Remembered court's holding in its submission to the Court.

The aforementioned inconsistences appear to be exemplary of the result of using artificial intelligence-based tools to draft legal documents. To the extent Mr. Hendel's submissions to the Court were drafted or otherwise prepared with the assistance of artificial intelligence-based tools, which Mr. Hendel denies, this Court reminds all parties that submissions to this Court, even if made by an unrepresented litigant, must not be frivolous under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1.

Mr. Hendel's repeated false and misleading submissions to this Court, by way of his misleading and unsupported "Notice of Removal" filing, multiple submissions to the Court containing inaccurate citations to case law, overstated and misleading holdings, fictitious cases, non-existent pin cites, and selective quotation of Plaintiff's statements, amount to committing [*6]fraud before this Court under CDR Creances S.A.S. v Cohen, 23 NY3d 307 [2014]. As such, this Court strikes Mr. Hendel's amended answer dated March 10, 2023 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 16) and finds Mr. Hendel to be in default.

2. Whether Mr. Hendel engaged in frivolous conduct:

22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c] provides:

"[C]onduct is frivolous if:

(1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law;

(2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or

(3) it asserts material factual statements that are false.

Frivolous conduct shall include the making of a frivolous motion for costs or sanctions under this section. In determining whether the conduct undertaken was frivolous, the court shall consider, among other issues the (1) circumstances under which the conduct took place, including the time available for investigating the legal or factual basis of the conduct; and (2) whether or not the conduct was continued when its lack of legal or factual basis was apparent, should have been apparent, or was brought to the attention of counsel or the party" (22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c]).

Here, the record establishes Mr. Hendel submitted in his filings, as described above, inaccurate citations to case law, overstated and misleading holdings, fictitious cases, non-existent pin cites, and selective quotation of Plaintiff's statements. Such actions, in addition to Mr. Hendel's submission of a purported "Notice of Removal" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 92) without including the bankruptcy petition referenced by Mr. Hendel in said filing itself, amount to frivolous conduct.

Mr. Hendel's claim that he did not have enough time to adequately prepare his opposition papers due to the Shabbat holiday between the evening of Friday, April 17, 2026 to the evening of Saturday, April 18, 202, is unavailing. Even considering the "the time available for investigating the legal or factual basis of the conduct" under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c], this Court finds Mr. Hendel had ample time and opportunity between December 1, 2025 when he initially filed the purported "Notice of Removal" and the filing of the instant motion on April 16, 2026, to provide the petition of the purported petitioning creditor who he claims initiated the involuntary bankruptcy proceeding against him.

Mr. Hendel's attempt to stay or remove this case by way of filing a bare "Notice of Removal" without a petition, and to mislead this Court with inaccurate citations to case law, overstated and misleading holdings, fictitious cases, non-existent pin cites, and selective quotation of Plaintiff's statements are all "material" acts done "without merit" to "prolong the resolution" of the within action under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c].

Thus, the Court finds Mr. Hendel's conduct as frivolous and, therefore, sanctionable under Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts, 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 (see, e.g.: Will of Samuel, 82 Misc 3d 616 [Sur Ct 2024] (striking pleading that contained fictional and/or erroneous citations); see also Deutsche Bank Natl. Tr. Co. v LeTennier, 250 NYS3d 260 [3d Dept 2026] (defendant submitted 23 fabricated legal authorities across five filings and misrepresented the holdings of several real cases); and Ader v Ader, 87 Misc 3d 1213(A) [NY Sup 2025] (sanctions ordered to compensate adversary for reasonable costs and attorney's fees [*7]incurred in addressing nonexistent case citations)).

Under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [d], "an award of costs or the imposition of sanctions may be made either upon motion in compliance with CPLR § 2214 or § 2215 or upon the court's own initiative, after a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The form of the hearing shall depend upon the nature of the conduct and the circumstances of the case" (22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [d]). Having found Mr. Hendel's frivolous conduct sanctionable, Mr. Hendel shall reimburse Plaintiff for the legal fees incurred in preparing and filing Plaintiff's various letters and exhibits to the Court in response to Mr. Hendel's purported "Notice of Removal," specifically, NYSCEF Docs. No. 93, 94, 95 and 96. Plaintiff shall submit to NYSCEF an affirmation of services, attorney biographies, and invoices regarding the attorney fees incurred by Plaintiff in preparing and filing NYSCEF Docs. Nos. 93, 94, 95 and 96 within ten (10) days of the date of this decision, and Mr. Hendel may submit an opposition within seven (7) days of Plaintiff's submissions or otherwise waives opposition.

e. Plaintiff's eighth branch of its motion:

Plaintiff's eighth branch of its motion (Mot. Seq. 009) seeks an order "imposing protective conditions barring unsupported assertions of bankruptcy or removal and limiting adjournments." This branch is denied as it was presented without any support in Plaintiff's memo of law.

f. Plaintiff's ninth branch of its motion:

Plaintiff's ninth branch of its motion seeks an order "directing that all service in this matter be made upon Defendant Mendel Hendel via email to mmhendel@gmail.com." The Court notes Mr. Hendel has indicated his email to be "mmhendel@gmail.com" on various documents he has filed to NYSCEF, including NYSCEF Docs. Nos. 136, 158, and 166. The record thus establishes that Mr. Hendel utilizes this email address as a means of communication. Sister courts have found that "if any methods of communication can be reasonably calculated to provide a defendant with real notice, surely those communication channels utilized and preferred by the defendant himself must be included among them" (Hollow v Hollow, 193 Misc 2d 691, 696 [Sup Ct 2002]). Thus, Plaintiff's ninth branch of its motion is granted.

g. Plaintiff's purported reply papers:

Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.8-d "absent advance permission of the court, reply papers shall not be submitted on orders to show cause." Here, the Court's Order to Show Cause (NYSCEF Doc. No. 133) for the instant motion did not permit reply submissions. As such, the Court declines to consider Plaintiff's purported reply papers here (NYSCEF Docs. Nos. 137, 138, 139, and 140).

III. Defendant Mr. Hendel's motion (Mot. Seq. 010)

The above-numbered papers were read on this motion (Mot. Seq. 010) by defendant Mr. Mendel seeking an order:

"1. DISMISSING the Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice, as against Defendant Mendel Hendel individually, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), (a)(3), and (a)(7), on the ground that Plaintiff Sharei Torah is not a party to the August 2, 2011 lease annexed to the Complaint as Exhibit A (NYSCEF Doc. No. 2), the lease identifies Rabbi Avraham Yehuda Rosenberg as the sole landlord, expressly recites that Rosenberg is the legal owner of the premises, and does not identify Sharei Torah as a party, owner, principal, assignee, or beneficiary, and after three years of litigation Plaintiff has produced no deed, no assignment, no agency agreement, and no other documentary instrument establishing [*8]any enforceable interest of Sharei Torah in the lease;

2. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, DISMISSING the Complaint pursuant to CPRL 3211(a)(3) for lack of legal capacity to sue, on the ground that Plaintiff has not produced any documented action by the Board of Trustees of Sharei Torah authorizing the commencement or continuation of this action as required by Religious Corporations Law §§ 2-b and 5 and Not-for-Profit Corporation Law §§ 202, 701, and 708, and the self-authenticating Affirmation and Ratification Resolution of Isaac M. Neuberger (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 122, 123), each executed by Neuberger alone, and each deriving its purported authority from the other, do not satisfy those statutory requirements;

3. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, STAYING all proceedings in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), on the ground that Defendant Hendel filed a Notice of Renewal (NYSCEF Doc. No. 92), the statutory effect of which is to divest this Court of jurisdiction until a certified order of remand is entered by the United States District Court and filed with the clerk of this Court; and directing that Plaintiff, if it contends the action has been remanded, produce a certified copy of any remand order;

4. GRANTING leave to reargue pursuant to CPLR 2221(d) the Court's Decision and Order dated April 2, 2026 and entered April 3, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 126), on the ground that the Court overlooked or misapprehended

(a) the dispositive threshold defect that Plaintiff is not a party to the subject lease, squarely raised in Defendant's Reply Affirmation at Point III, paragraphs 23-31 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 125), which Plaintiff's counsel did not address in her responsive papers (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 121, 122, 123), and

(b) the legal effect of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), which effects removal by operation of statute upon filing regardless of whether any federal order is produced;

5. DIRECTING Plaintiff, within then (10) days of service of the Order deciding this motion, to produce and file on NYSCEF competent documentary proof of each of the following:

(a) any instrument by which Sharei Torah acquired rights under the August 2, 2011 lease, including but not limited to any deed, assignment, agency agreement, or successor-in-interest documentation;

(b) minutes of a duly noticed meeting of the Board of Trustees of Sharei Torah authorizing the commencement and continuation of this action, with evidence of notice to all trustees, presence of a quorum, and adoption of the authorizing resolution;

(c) the certificate of incorporation of Sharei Torah and its current bylaws;

(d) a certificate of the corporate secretary of Sharei Torah authenticating the foregoing documents and identifying the current trustees of the corporation; and (e) if Plaintiff contends this action has been remanded from federal court, a certified copy of the order of remand;

6. PROVIDING that failure to produce the documents specified in paragraph 5 within the time prescribed shall result in dismissal of this action with prejudice pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), (a)(3), and (a)(7);

7. STRIKING the Affirmation of Isaac M. Neuberger (NYSCEF Doc. No. 122) and the Ratification Resolution (NYSCEF Doc. No. 123) as procedurally deficient and insufficient as a matter of law to establish corporate authorization under the Religious Corporations Law and the Not-for-Profit Corporations law;

8. AWARDING sanctions against Plaintiff and its counsel pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 for

(a) prosecuting an action on behalf of an entity that is a stranger to the subject matter;

(b) failing to address a dispositive threshold defense when squarely raised, and

(c) affirmatively mischaracterizing a Notice of Removal as a "bankruptcy" matter in Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause dated April 14, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 128), including an award of Defendant's costs and expenses incurred in responding; and

9. GRANTING such other and further relief as to this Court may seem just and proper" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 146).

This Court's order to show cause dated April 22, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 146), upon which Mr. Hendel brings the instant motion (Mot. Seq. 010) did not issue a temporary restraining order ("TRO").

The above-numbered papers were read on this cross-motion (Mot. Seq. 010) filed by Plaintiff seeking "sanctions and entry of default judgment" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 142).

Upon the foregoing the papers, the motion and cross-motion are determined as follows.

a. Mr. Hendel's motion for relief:

A defendant seeking to vacate an order awarding a default must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a meritorious defense (Orwell Bldg. Corp. v Bessaha, 5 AD3d 573, 574 [2d Dept 2004]; see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]).

Here, Mr. Hendel has been precluded by this Court via its September 30, 2025 Order ("September 2025 Order") "from offering any affirmative evidence in support of their claims and defenses at the time of trial on the issue of liability" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 89). That order remains in effect as it has not been vacated or overturned.

Mr. Hendel alleges in the instant motion that, inter alia, the named Plaintiff "Sharei Torah" was never a party to the underlying 2011 Lease and that the Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed. Mr. Hendel also alleges here that the entity "Sharei Torah" was recently taken over by non-party Zalman Zvulonov ("Mr. Zvulonov"), who purportedly stated to Mr. Hendel that "We have no connection to this lawsuit" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 117). In response, Plaintiff, inter alia, references an affirmation submitted by Mr. Zvulonov in which he stated that he does "not object to the continuation of this action. Sharei Torah continues to authorize the prosecution of this Action." (NYSCEF Doc. No. 119).

Mr. Hendel argues that although he has been precluded from presenting affirmative defenses, his claim that Plaintiff "Sharei Torah" is not named in the 2011 Lease is not an affirmative defense because it references Plaintiff's own submission, to wit, the complaint and the 2011 Lease, at the outset of the within action (NYSCEF Docs. Nos. 1-2). Such a claim that Plaintiff "Sharei Torah" was never a party to the 2011 Lease underpinning the within action, if true, could serve as an affirmative defense in dismissing the case for lack of Plaintiff's standing, although it would present deeply troubling questions as to why such a claim was not presented by Mr. Hendel in the prior Plenary Action or the LL-T Action. Because the Court's September 2025 Order remains in effect, Mr. Hendel is precluded from offering such an argument or evidence herein.

On these grounds, Mr. Hendel's motion (Mot. Seq. 010) is denied in its entirety.

b. Plaintiff's cross-motion for relief:

Plaintiff's cross-motion (Mot. Seq. 010) seeking sanctions and default are denied as redundant based on this Court's holdings in Mot. Seq. 009 (see decretals below).

[*9]IV. Defendant Mr. Hendel's motion (Mot. Seq. 011):

The above-numbered papers were read on this motion (Mot. Seq. 011) by defendant Mr. Mendel seeking an order:

"1. STRIKING Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law (NYSCEF Doc. No. 141) and the Affirmation of Yifat V. Schnur (NYSCEF Doc. No. 149) in their entirety, on the ground that they contain material misrepresentations of fact, including the sworn characterization of Plaintiff's own Exhibit A (NYSCEF Doc. No. 2) as a "purported Hebrew version of the lease, which is not part of the record," when the NYSCEF Confirmation Notice identifies the Filing User of that document as counsel herself;

2. IMPOSING sanctions against Plaintiff's counsel pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c] [3] for asserting material factual statements that are false;

3. DENYING Plaintiff's cross-motion for sanctions and default judgment; and

4. GRANTING such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 160).

Upon the foregoing papers, the motion is determined as follows.

Mr. Hendel's motion (Mot. Seq. 011), brought via order to show cause, consists only of the statements presented in the Order to Show Cause (NYSCEF Doc. No. 160) and nothing else as support.

As such, Mr. Hendel's motion (Mot. Seq. 011) is denied in its entirety.

V. Plaintiff's Motion (Mot. Seq. 012):

The above-numbered papers were read on this motion (Mot. Seq. 012) by Plaintiff seeking an order:

"1. Issuing a protective order directing that all communications between Defendant Hendel and Plaintiff's counsel be limited to written correspondence confined strictly to matters directly relevant to this litigation;

2. Directing Defendant Hendel, as part of such protective order, to refrain from issuing extrajudicial demands, threats, or deadlines directed to counsel, including but not limited to demands for 'retractions' and threats of sanctions or disciplinary complaints outside proper motion practice;

3. Directing Defendant Hendel to cease efforts to obtain ruling from other tribunals or forums intended to interfere with or halt this action, and confirming that this action shall proceed exclusively before this Court; and

4. Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper." (NYSCEF Doc. No. 162).

Based on the foregoing papers, the motion is determined as follows.

Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that Mr. Hendel accuses Plaintiff's counsel of "lying to the Court" and "misconduct" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 154). Plaintiff alleges Mr. Hendel has threatened to file "a grievance with the Attorney Grievance Committee" and to prepare "a RICO complaint" (id.). Plaintiff argues, without legal support, that "New York courts possess inherent authority to regulate the conduct of parties appearing before them and to prevent abuse of the judicial process" (id.).

CPLR 3103 [a], regarding protective orders, provides as follows:

"Prevention of abuse. The court may at any time on its own initiative, or on motion of any party or of any person from whom or about whom discovery is sought, make a [*10]protective order denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating the use of any disclosure device. Such order shall be designed to prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice to any person or the courts" (CPLR 3103 [a]).

The language of the statute prescribes that protective orders regulate disclosure (see, e.g.: Balsamello v Structure Tone, Inc., 226 AD3d 580, 582 [1st Dept 2024] ("a court's power to limit otherwise proper use of a disclosure device should be exercised only for the purpose of avoiding 'unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage or other prejudice'"). Here, none of the Plaintiff's branches of its motion seek the issuance of a protective order as to discovery.

As such, the Plaintiff's motion (Mot. Seq. 012) is denied in its entirety.

VI. Decretals

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that NYSCEF Doc. No. 92, having been erroneously processed by the clerk, is deemed to be of no force and effect and shall be disregarded by the Court and deemed void by the County Clerk, and the County Clerk is directed to mark the record in NYSCEF as to that document with an indication to such effect and to see the within order. The County Clerk shall, in accordance with this order, mark NYSCEF Doc. No. 92 as "void" and should cite the within order thereat. The County Clerk shall mark the case to be restored to this Court's active Commercial Division Part A trial calendar;

ORDERED that the first and second branches of Plaintiff's motion (Mot. Seq. 009) are denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the third branch of Plaintiff's motion (Mot. Seq. 009) is granted to the extent that this Court holds that no stay or removal of the within action has been established on the present record; and it is further

ORDERED that the fourth and fifth branches of Plaintiff's motion (Mot. Seq. 009) are denied as moot; and it is further

ORDERED that the sixth branch of Plaintiff's motion (Mot. Seq. 009) is granted to the extent that all named defendants are deemed to be in default, that Mr. Hendel's amended answer dated March 10, 2023 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 16) is to be stricken, and that upon Plaintiff's filing note of issue the within action shall be placed on the Commercial Division Part A calendar for an inquest on damages (Teams link to be circulated upon Plaintiff's filing of note of issue); and it is further

ORDERED that the seventh branch of Plaintiff's motion (Mot. Seq. 009) is granted in so far that Mr. Hendel shall reimburse Plaintiff for the legal fees incurred in preparing and filing Plaintiff's filings on NYSCEF Docs. No. 93, 94, 95 and 96, for an amount to be determined by the Court upon the Plaintiff's submission to NYSCEF of an affirmation of services, attorney biographies, and invoices regarding the attorney fees incurred by Plaintiff in preparing and filing NYSCEF Docs. Nos. 93, 94, 95 and 96 within ten (10) days of the date of this decision (Mr. Hendel may submit an opposition within seven (7) days of Plaintiff's submissions or otherwise waives opposition); and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's eighth branch of its motion (Mot. Seq. 009) is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's ninth branch of its motion (Mot. Seq. 009) seeking an order [*11]"directing that all service in this matter be made upon Defendant Mendel Hendel via email to mmhendel@gmail.com" is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant Mr. Hendel's motion (Mot. Seq. 010) is denied in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's cross-motion (Mot. Seq. 010) is denied in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant Mr. Hendel's motion (Mot. Seq. 011) is denied in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion (Mot. Seq. 012) is denied in its entirety.

Any such other relief not described herein is denied. This constitutes the Order of the Court.

DATE 6/1/2026

LEONARD LIVOTE, J.S.C.