People v Chandler

Justice Court of the Town of Webster, Monroe County

Decided on July 6, 2026

Case No. 26020198

Thomas J. DiSalvo, J.

Synopsis. The defendant was charged with common law driving while intoxicated, VTL § 1192 (3) and driving while intoxicated, per se, VTL 1192 (2) on November 19, 2025. Filed with the court were uniform traffic informations, a two page fill-in-the-blanks/check box supporting deposition entitled "Supporting Deposition/Bill of Particulars" and a breath test supporting deposition. Those charges were dismissed by this court as being insufficient on their face pursuant to CPL §§ 170.3 (1) (a), 100.40 (1) and 100.15. See People v. Gregory W. Chandler, 253 N.Y.S. 3d 521, 529 [Webster Just Ct 2026]^FN1 It was determined in that decision that the accusatory instruments before the court failed to establish reasonable cause to believe "... that the defendant operated a motor vehicle; that the defendant was intoxicated and that the operation and intoxication were simultaneous".^FN2 It was further determined that the People could not rely on an alleged statement of the defendant in the 710.30 Notice which was attached to the said supporting deposition and which was referred to therein in an effort to establish the sufficiency of the accusatory instruments.^FN3Subsequent to said dismissal the same charges against the defendant were re-filed with this court on February 23, 2026.The defendant was then arraigned thereon on March 18, 2026. Defense counsel filed omnibus motions with the court. Relevant to this decision is the motion to dismiss the current accusatory instruments as being insufficient on their face pursuant to CPL §§ 170.35 (1) (a), 100.40 and 100.15. In support of said motion, the defense also provided a Memorandum of Law. The People have filed a [*2]responding affirmation in opposition to the said defense motion. The court will deny the motion dismiss the accusatory charging the defendant with common law driving while intoxicated as defective. However the court will grant the motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument charging the defendant with per se driving while intoxicates as being defective.

Facts of the Case.

The accusatory instruments herein included two simplified traffic informations, a fill- in-the- blanks/check box supporting deposition, entitled "Supporting Deposition/Bill of Particulars". All three documents were labeled "Amended" The "Amended Supporting Deposition/Bill of Particulars, although signed by the arresting officer, was not dated.In addition, a fourth document, which is in narrative form, entitled "Supporting Deposition - General, was filed with the court at the same time. Presumably, the later supporting deposition was prepared and submitted to the court in an effort to correct the deficiencies in the first set of accusatory instruments. All of said accusatory instruments were executed by the same Webster Police Officer, who made the arrest of the defendant. The issue in this case is whether the new accusatory instruments, which now include an additional supporting deposition, are sufficient on their face, pursuant to CPL §§ 170.35 (1) (a), 100.40 and 100.15. However, as to the charge of per se driving while intoxicated, VTL 1192 (2) , no chemical test analysis certificate which was both verified by the individual who administered the test in compliance with CPL § 100.30 (1) (d) and which indicated defendant's blood alcohol level was provided to the court at arraignment on the new charges or at any time thereafter. Thus the defendant's driver license was not suspended pending prosecution at the arraignment pursuant to VTL § 1192 (2) (e) (7).

Legal Analysis.

Reasonable Cause Standard. The People maintain in their Responding Affirmation that because the case was commenced by the issuance of a simplified informations accompanied by a supporting deposition, they need only "provide reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed the offense". The prosecution further argues that "The standard of reasonable cause does away with the requirement that the People provide evidence on each element of the offense charged.... [and that] There is no provision in either CPL § 100.25 or CPL §100.40 (2) which prohibits reasonable cause in a simplified information from being established with hearsay evidence." If that was the case, then two defendants arrested by the same police agency at different times on the same day could have faced different standards relative to the establishment of the sufficiency of accusatory instruments in their respective cases. For example, defendant number one, arrested for common law and per se driving while intoxicated, is taken to the police department. After being processed he or she was provided with an appearance ticket and copies of a misdemeanor information consisting of a misdemeanor complaint and a supporting deposition. Defendant number two, arrested for common law driving while intoxicated and per se driving while intoxicated, is taken to the same police department. However, after being processed was provided with an appearance ticket, two simplified traffic informations and a supporting deposition. Based on the People's argument the prosecution would in the former case [*3]have to comply with all the requirements of CPL § 100.40 (1) such as the establishment of reasonable cause in subsection(b) and that the "Non-hearsay allegations of the factual part of the information and/or of any supporting depositions establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof" as set out in subsection ( c). However, defendant number two could be prosecuted with accusatory instruments of a lesser standard of sufficiency, i.e. that of reasonable cause only. Not cited by the People, but somewhat relevant herein, is the case of People v. Hohmeyer, 70 NY2d 41, 517 N.Y.S.2d 448 [1987], which in effect only stands for the proposition that use of a fill- in-the- blanks/check box supporting deposition in a driving while intoxicated case is proper but did not address the said difference in treatment by the lesser standard.

The court in People v. Goris, 78 Misc 3d 1031 186 N.Y.S.3d 585 [2023 Levin, J.] addressed this issue directly stating as follows:

"The Court finds the reasoning in People v. Smith, 163 Misc 2d 353, 621 N.Y.S.2d 449 [Perinton Just Ct. 1994]) very persuasive. Judge Rood's decision provides an excellent explanation of the proper interpretation of the Criminal Procedure Law as it relates to Simplified Traffic Informations:

'It defies logic, as well as the concepts of fairness and equal protection, for the Court of Appeals to have intended, as the People contend, that its decisions in Hohmeyer and Alejandro [70 NY2d 133, 517 N.Y.S.2d 927, 511 N.E.2d 71 (1987)] decided just two days later, should create two classes of criminal defendants charged with misdemeanors; those charged with traffic related misdemeanors and those charged with Penal Law misdemeanors. The People's position is all the more tenuous when one considers that a defendant charged with a traffic related misdemeanor could be charged by either an information or a misdemeanor complaint and, thereby, undisputedly be entitled to all of the same pleading protection given to a defendant charged with an offense under the Penal Law. To sustain the People's position would require this court to hold that there are two classes of defendants charged with traffic related misdemeanors: those charged by simplified traffic information and those charged by information or misdemeanor complaint. Such a holding cannot be supported by logic or reason. Further, this court does not read Hohmeyer to preclude the application of the principles of Alejandro to a case where the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor by a simplified traffic information. Smith, supra at p. 362, 621 N.Y.S.2d 449.'"^FN4

The appeal of the defendant in People v. Goris was denied on other grounds.^FN5 Nevertheless the Appellate Term disagreed with the trial court's reasoning relative to the issue of what establishes sufficiency of a simplified information. However, it did not discuss the dichotomy of treatment [*4]discussed herein. It has been held that

""The simplified information is a statutory creation designed to provide an uncomplicated form for handling the large volume of traffic infractions and petty offenses for which it is principally used. It need not provide on its face reasonable cause to believe defendant has committed the offense.' Nuccio, 78 NY2d at 104, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 694. See also People v. Key, 45 NY2d 111, 115—16, 408 N.Y.S.2d 16, 19, 379 N.E.2d 1147 (1978).'"^FN6

A person charged with any violation of VTL § 1192 is not accused of a mere traffic infraction nor a petty offense. In particular, a misdemeanor conviction can have severe direct consequences, such a criminal record, loss of a driver license, a fine and surcharge, a term of probation and/or incarceration. An indirect consequence can even be the loss of one's employment.^FN7 It has been held that "the filing of a supporting deposition does not 'convert' a simplified traffic information to a misdemeanor information" (People v. Murray, 63 Misc 3d 130(A), 2019 NY Slip Op. 50407[U] [2019] *1) However the concepts of fundamental fairness, due process and equal protection would seem to require that a simplified information accompanied by a supporting deposition in a criminal prosecution be given the same consideration as a misdemeanor information.

Common Law Driving While Intoxicated. In any event, the "Amended" Supporting Deposition/Bill of Particulars appears to be exactly the same document previously provided to the court.^FN8 Thus for the reasons set forth in the court's prior decision, the said simplified informations and the Amended Supporting Deposition/Bill of Particulars would not, in and of themselves, allow the amended accusatory instruments to survive a motion to dismiss for insufficiency. See People v. Chandler, 253 N.Y.S. 3d 521, 2026 NY Slip Op. 26032 [2026]) The essence of that decision was that an alleged statement set out in the 710.30 Notice could not be used to establish the sufficiency of the accusatory instrument, since that document was not an accusatory instrument and it would be outside of the four corners of the supporting deposition.^FN9

As a result of that decision, when the People refiled the charges herein, the accusatory instruments included an additional supporting deposition in narrative form entitled "Supporting Deposition -General". Said deposition was affirmed on February 19, 2026 by the arresting officer, to wit: Webster Police Officer Jarod R. Barnard.The deposition alleges in pertinent part as follows:

"That on November 9, 2025 at approximately 0020 hours, I was dispatched to single vehicle motor vehicle accident on South Avenue in the Town of Webster. Upon arrival, I observed a grey sedan with significant passenger-side damage in the middle of the northbound lane. I also saw a green SUV with driver's side damage parked in a parking spot on the east side of the road. I located the above defendant standing by the vehicles. While speaking with the defendant, I could smell a strong odor of alcoholic beverage emitting from the defendant's breath. The defendant's eyes were dilated, watery, and bloodshot. The defendant spoke at a slow rate, and his speech was very slurred. The defendant was having trouble giving full answer to my questions and spoke off- topic. During my conversation with the defendant, he stated that he was driving home from the bar 'Mulconry's' location in Fairport, NY. The defendant stated that he was drinking and that he had 'a lot more than he should have had.'

The defendant stated that he was driving the 2014, Gray Volkwagon [sic] I documented this vehicle as the striking vehicle given that the defendant was the only person operating a vehicle at the time of the accident. The other vehicle that was involved was parked and unoccupied. Based on my initial observations and conversation with the defendant, I placed the defendant through a series of Standardized Field Sobriety Tests. The defendant displayed poor coordination throughout the tests and had to be reminded of the instructions that he stated he understood. Overall, the defendant displayed significant signs of intoxication and was subsequently taken into custody for driving while intoxicated."

The standard for sufficiency of an information is set out in CPL 100.40 (1) as follows:

"An information, or a count thereof, is sufficient on its face when:

(a) It substantially conforms to the requirements prescribed in section 100.15; and

(b) The allegations of the factual part of the information, together with those of any supporting depositions which may accompany it, provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged in the accusatory part of the information; and

(c) Non-hearsay allegations of the factual part of the information and/or of any supporting depositions establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's " commission thereof."

There is no allegation that the accusatory instruments fail to conform with CPL § [*5]100.15."

This court has previously held that "An accusatory instrument charging a defendant with common law driving while intoxicated must provide reasonable cause to believe three specific elements. Namely, the accusatory instruments must allege that the defendant operated a motor vehicle; that the defendant was intoxicated and that the operation and intoxication were simultaneous." People v. Chandler, 253 N.Y.S.3d 521,525 2026 NY Slip Op. 26032 [2026]).

In terms of establishing reasonable cause in accordance with CPL § 100.40 (1) (b), the case of People v. Fumara, 116 AD3d 421, 982 N.Y.S.2d 482 [2nd Dept. 2014] is instructive. In that case the court in upholding the sufficiency of the accusatory instrument stated:

"The accusatory instrument was not jurisdictionally defective. Giving the misdemeanor information 'a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading' (People v. Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360, 717 N.Y.S.2d 88, 740 N.E.2d 233 [2000] ), we find 'as a matter of common sense and reasonable pleading' (People v. Davis, 13 NY3d 17, 31, 884 N.Y.S.2d 665, 912 N.E.2d 1044 [2009] ) that it was legally sufficient to charge defendant with violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(3). The arresting officer alleged that defendant operated a motor vehicle, that he had bloodshot, watery eyes, slurred speech, and a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, that he was unsteady on his feet, and that he admitted to the officer that he had been drinking, but refused to submit to a breath test (see e.g. People v. Spencer, 289 AD2d 877, 879, 736 N.Y.S.2d 428 [3rd Dept. 2001], lv. denied 98 NY2d 655, 745 N.Y.S.2d 514, 772 N.E.2d 617 [2002] ). There was no requirement that the information also contain an allegation of erratic driving."^FN10

It has been held that in a situation where the arresting officer did not see the defendant operating a vehicle, the supporting deposition must set forth any facts from which it could reasonably be inferred that the defendant was operating the vehicle, which is a prerequisite to a conviction of violating section 1192 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. ( See People v. Key, 87 Misc 2d 262,266, 391 N.Y.S.2d 781,785 (App Div 1976]) In this case the Supporting Deposition-General does set forth facts from which it can be reasonably inferred that the defendant had been operating his vehicle when his vehicle collided with the parked vehicle; that he had consumed a significant amount of alcohol before said operation; that he was exhibiting the various indicia of intoxication during the time he was speaking to the officer and that he had simultaneously driven his motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition.

As to the requirement as set out in CPL § 100.40 (1) ( c) that the information and/or any supporting deposition set out non-hearsay allegations as to every element of the offense charged, it has been held that "Moreover, a non-hearsay requirement is met so long as the allegation would be admissible under some hearsay rule exception." People v. Casey, 95 NY2d 354,361, 717 N.Y.S. 88,91 [2000]. In this case the defendant made a statement to the police admitting [*6]that he "was driving home from the bar "'Mulconry's'" location in Fairport, NY." That the defendant also stated that he was drinking and that he had "a lot more than he should have had." Although those statements are hearsay, they would be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule as a statement against his penal interest.^FN11

Per Se Driving While Intoxicated. It is noted that neither the Amended fill- in- the-blanks/check box supporting deposition nor the Supporting Deposition General supplied any specific information regarding the results of a chemical breath test

"In People v. Lopez, 170 Misc 2d 278, 280, 648 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (NY City Crim. Ct. 1996), the Court held that:

[A]n accusatory instrument charging V.T.L. § 1192.2 (operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol with .10% [now .08%]or more blood alcohol level) must be supported by a chemical test analysis certificate which is both verified by the individual who administered the test in compliance with C.P.L. § 100.30 and which indicates defendant's blood alcohol level. The absence of either of these factors renders the instrument jurisdictionally defective.

In so holding, the court reasoned that:

Corroboration or non-hearsay allegations which support a charge of V.T.L. § 1192.2, must take the form of a blood alcohol test result verified by the individual who administered the test. An individual's blood alcohol level is an element of the offense and its omission from the instant chemical test analysis renders that portion of the accusatory instrument charging a violation of V.T.L. § 1192.2 jurisdictionally defective.

People v. Lopez, 170 Misc 2d 278, 280, 648 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233—34 (NY City Crim. Ct. 1996). See also People v. Richberg, 125 Misc 2d 975, 979, 481 N.Y.S.2d 237, 240 (NY City Crim. Ct. 1984). See generally People v. Mertz, 68 NY2d 136, 139, 506 N.Y.S.2d 290, 291, 497 N.E.2d 657 (1986) ("A violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2) is not established unless the trier of fact finds that while operating a motor vehicle defendant had a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .10 [now.08%] of 1% or more.") (emphasis added)."^FN12

The accusatory instruments herein charging the defendant with per se driving while intoxicated suffer from the same deficiency, in that no chemical analysis certificate was provided in support of the charge of per se driving while intoxicated.

Conclusion.

A fair reading of the "Supporting Deposition-General", while completely disregarding the fill-in-the-blanks/check box "Amended Supporting Deposition/Bill of Particulars" and while applying the higher standard of sufficiency required by CPL § 100.40 (1), one must reasonably determine that the accusatory instruments charging the defendant with common law driving while intoxicated pursuant to VTL § 1192 (3) are sufficient on their face.^FN13 Specifically, the accusatory instruments herein, to wit: the simplified traffic information and the Supporting Deposition - General satisfy the higher standard relative to the sufficiency of informations imposed by CPL § 140.40 (1) as to both reasonable cause and as to setting out the elements of the charge of common law driving while intoxicated and of the defendant's commission thereof. Therefore, the defense motion to dismiss said accusatory instrument charging the defendant with common law driving while intoxicated s as being insufficient pursuant to CPL §§ 170.35 (1) (a) ; 100.40; and 100.15 is hereby denied. However the motion to dismiss the accusatory instruments charging the defendant with per se driving while intoxicated pursuant to CPL §§ 170.35 (1) (a) ; 100.40; and 100.15 is hereby granted. As to the remaining defense motions this court holds as follows: That the motion to preclude identification testimony is granted; The motion to preclude statements set out in the body worn camera video and not specifically set out in the CPL §710.30 Notice is hereby granted pursuant to this court's prior ruling in People v. Bowman, 81 Misc 3d 1223[A], 2024 NY Slip Op. 5000 [U] *4 [2024]; The motions to suppress the stop, the detention, the arrest, the search of the person and property of the defendant and to deny the use of any chemical/breath test by the People is denied, but the defendant is granted a probable cause hearing pursuant to CPL § 710.60 (4). The court reserves on the remaining defense motions. This constitutes the decision and order of this court.

Dated: July 6, 2026

Webster, New York

Hon. Thomas J. DiSalvo

Webster Town Justice