Williams Tire & Auto, Inc v Banks

City Court of Norwich, Chenango County

Decided on May 12, 2026

Docket No. CC0022-26/NO

Michael J. Genute, J.

Background

In its complaint, dated and filed on January 30, 2026, the plaintiff seeks $5,000 for "unpaid auto repair expenses", along with administrative and late fees for work performed on the defendant's recently purchased 2004 Ford F450 Super Duty Dump Truck.

The defendant's counterclaim for $5,000, alleges that the plaintiff "completed work on multiple vehicles", without providing an estimate and before obtaining consent from the defendant for completing the service. The counterclaim further asserts that even though the work was paid for, the work was deficient in at least one of the instances.

The trial took place on March 19, 2026. For the plaintiff, Sherri Williams, Jeff Williams, and diesel mechanic Donald Stringham, Jr. testified. Brian Banks, along with his wife, Kelly Banks, testified for the defendant.

Testimony and Evidence

Plaintiff's Complaint:

The facts concerning the plaintiff's case were straightforward. Sherri Williams testified that the plaintiff shop performed significant repairs on the used dump truck that the defendant had just purchased, charged the defendant a total of $10,287.25 for those repairs, which amounted to a total bill of $11,110.23, after the sales tax, and that the defendant failed to pay $4,842.93 of the total amount on the invoice (see, P-1). The plaintiff also sought late fees associated with the repair, resulting in a claim of the jurisdictional limit for this court of $5,000.

Ms. Williams testified concerning numerous texts and phone calls with the defendant, acknowledging the defendant's refusal to pay the remaining balance due to his not receiving any estimate for the entire repair. In this regard, Ms. Williams testified that the defendant never requested an estimate, citing D.M.V. Reg. 82.5(a), presented via a booklet — NYS DMV Motor Vehicle Repair Shop Regulation, that the defendant is only entitled to an estimate upon written request (see, P-5).

Ms. Williams also cited to text messages from the defendant arguing that the defendant essentially gave carte blanche for the plaintiff to do whatever needed to be done to the vehicle with text messages from February 6-8, 2025, reading, "I know u guys will do what's right. I trust [*2]u guys. I need a good dependable truck for a long time. I think this will be the one!" (see, P-2). Subsequently, the defendant asked about parts being ordered, some of which the defendant seemed involved in purchasing separately, where the plaintiff followed with a text message reading, "I'll get you a price in a bit; It's been crazy", before the defendant responded, "It's all good; It's gotta be done regardless" (Id.). At another point, the plaintiff texted that "(y)ou are in deep shit with this job," before noting that the plaintiff had ordered a brand new motor from Ford (Id.). Later, on March 6, 2025, following completion of the initial work on the dump truck, the defendant texted, "(l)et me know. I appreciate all u guys are doing for sure" (Id.). And on March 13, the defendant further messaged, "(w)e are seeing what our options are. We will get the parts $ to u before it's due" (Id.).

Mr. Williams subsequently testified for the plaintiff, mostly explaining his working relationship with the defendant since around 2023, commenting that the defendant never requested an estimate and that they had not had any prior issues with repairs or payment.

Donald Stringham, Jr., the plaintiff shop's diesel mechanic having 40 years of experience as a mechanic with plenty of certifications for Fords and diesels, testified about the problems and repairs needed on the dump truck. He explained that his goal was to get the truck to 100%, quoting the defendant as stating, "I know you guys will do what's right; I trust you guys." Mr. Stringham commented that he was carrying out the defendant's wishes and goals for the truck, denying that he did anything out of the ordinary to a proper repair of the vehicle.

As for any estimate, Mr. Stringham recalled a conversation with the defendant, where the defendant shared that he purchased the truck but noted that the seller of the truck warned of an issue with the truck overheating. Mr. Stringham responded that the defendant "better hope its not (the heads), because the heads are $6,000-$7,000," clarifying that he was not referring to the entire job, but just for the heads. He otherwise explained that he does not give estimates, as that is the job of Mr. Williams. Mr. Stringham otherwise denied ever giving an estimate to any customer.

Once he began working on the truck, Mr. Stringham discovered other issues that needed to be addressed for the truck to function optimally, including a radiator issue. In this regard, the plaintiff presented text messages where pictures were shared with the defendant of presumably bad parts of the truck, the defendant responded with exclamatory phrases suggestive of shock and surprise, but where the messages lacked specific content in terms of the work being done or the costs associated with the pictures of different parts of the truck (see, P-2).

The Defense:

The crux of the defense was that Mr. Stringham provided an oral estimate for the defendant's newly purchased dump truck as a worse-case scenario, if it required new heads in conjunction with the vehicle overheating. The defendant denied ever agreeing to a repair of approximately $5,000 more, when accounting for sales tax, and denied that the text exchanges between the defendant and Mr. Williams suggested otherwise. However, the defendant did not dispute that the plaintiff shop did good work on the dump truck, even commenting that he would not have had an issue if the invoice was a little over $7,000.

According to the defendant, he brought the truck to the plaintiff shop based upon the expertise of Mr. Stringham. The defendant testified that historically when dropping off vehicles to be serviced with the plaintiff, he would remark to Mr. Williams, "here are the keys; call me when you know what's going on." And if the repair or service involved a diesel engine, Mr. [*3]Williams would refer the defendant to Mr. Stringham for further information on the extent of the service or repair.

In this particular instance, the defendant claimed that he inquired of Mr. Stringham regarding his recent purchase of the used Ford F450 dump truck, and that Mr. Stringham informed him that the defendant was looking at $6,000-7,000, if the heads were bad. In response, the defendant stated, "I understand; I trust you guys," but noted that this understanding was always with the belief that the repair at most would be in that same price range. Ultimately, the final invoice from the plaintiff shop reflected that it also serviced, repaired, or replaced the radiator, turbo, o-rings, among other parts, which the defendant denied was ever brought to his attention, though there is a text thread documenting communications about the work being done, generally speaking, without any reference to costs (see, P-1; P-2).

In response to the text messages cited by the plaintiff, in arguing that the defendant gave carte blanche for whatever needed to be done to the truck, the defendant contradicted the meaning attributed to his texts by the plaintiff, citing that such phrases as "its all good" meant that "I understand you'll get back to me." He further argued that there was never any reference to any costs exceeding the $6,000-7,000, which he perceived to be a worse-case estimate for repair of the truck. And at no point in the received text threads were any costs or price points referenced.

The Defendant testified that he sent his worker to pick up the truck when it was completed on March 7, 2025, which is consistent with the invoice from the plaintiff (see, P-1). The defendant explained that he was shocked when his worker conveyed the amount of the invoice, initially believing it a joke. This prompted the defendant to call Mr. Williams. Noting that the call was on speaker phone so Ms. Banks could also listen to the conversation, the defendant testified that the conversation became heated, as he told Mr. Williams that "Donnie (Stringham) said $6,000-7,000" as an estimate for the repair work. According to the defendant and also corroborated by Ms. Banks during her testimony, Mr. Williams responded that he never heard Mr. Stringham give an estimate, that he was a man of his word, and if Mr. Stringham gave the defendant an estimate, Mr. Williams said to pay for the parts and then the defendant could take the truck.

Ms. Banks subsequently prepared and sent a letter with a check in the amount of $6,602. The first sentence of the letter reads, "(t)his bank check is to cover the balance accumulated prior to 3/7/25, plus the parts cost on the Ford dump truck, minus the $4,0000 already paid" ^FN1 (see, D-A [#4-5]). After documenting some of the issues the defendant had with the plaintiff over the cost of the invoice, the letter proceeded to document/confirm the phone conversation reading as follows:

. . . after the truck was picked up by one of our employees and we received the bill, (the defendant) explained he was very upset and shocked that the bill was that high, because nothing was approved or quoted. (Mr. Williams) stated he would accept [sic.] the "parts amount" of $6,267.30, listed on the bill as payment" (see, D-A [#4-5]).

The following paragraph of the letter read as follows:

On 3/15/25 (Ms. Banks) delivered a bank check in the amount of $4,000 to (Mr. Williams). For over a month now (Mr. Banks) has tried to have a conversation with (Mr. Williams) about going forward, explaining he didn't think he should owe this full amount as he didn't agree to it. On 4/30/25 (the defendant) and (Mr. Williams) finally spoke and nothing was agreed upon, as it seems he doesn't want to work with us fairly (see, D-A [#4-5]).

Mr. Williams did not dispute the defendant's reaction to the final invoice. Mr. Williams further confirmed his phone call with the defendant, but did not address whether he acquiesced to a resolution upon receipt of the $6606.02 payment for just the parts.

The Counterclaim:

For the counterclaim, Mr. Banks testified to a history involving repairs completed by the plaintiff shop, where estimates were not provided in advance of the repairs. The repairs specifically complained of included one to a 2008 Volkswagen Beetle and two for a 2019 GMC Sierra 2500 diesel pickup truck. There was no dispute as to the timeframe involving these prior repairs, which dated back to May of 2023. There was also no dispute that the repairs were completed and that the plaintiff shop failed to provide an estimate. However, Mr. Banks did not contest the quality of the work and continued to have subsequent vehicle repairs with the plaintiff shop, including the Ford dump truck. Mr. Banks even testified that he was not disputing that the plaintiff shop did good work on the vehicles, though he did question one of the repairs to the 2019 GMC Sierra.

When questioned on his continual use of the plaintiff shop, the defendant acknowledged that he was ultimately satisfied with the work product, further commenting that he kept going to the plaintiff shop "because he could get (his vehicles) right in." Nevertheless, he also complained about the cost of the 3 repairs, all similarly costing between $1669.76 to $1698.78, with one of the repairs being to the same vehicle, the 2019 GMC Sierra, which had just been picked up following a prior repair. Notably, however, the defendant at one point commented that while he never received an estimate, that he "was never wronged", commenting that hindsight is twenty-twenty and that he would "probably" not trust the repair shop again.

The defendant's testimony regarding the cost of the repairs was centered on his review of a website or "app", which provides time estimates for various types of auto repairs, called "Alldata." The defendant testified that the app provided estimates for each of the repairs to be in the area of three (3) to six (6) hours, whereas the plaintiff shop charged him in the area of 14-16 hours for each of the three (3) repairs of which he complained. However, the defendant failed to provide any documentation to back this up, though the plaintiff shop did not deny it, but merely explained through the testimony of Mr. Williams that more time is involved in total costs such as diagnostics and administrative costs.

The defendant most specifically complained about two repairs completed on his 2019 GMC Sierra, which was also a diesel, the first job involving transmission work. According to the defendant, after picking up the truck in September of 2024, he noticed the truck was not running properly and quickly brought it to another shop. According to the defendant, that other shop owner/mechanic denied that certain work the plaintiff shop charged for (specifically that the [*4]transmission had to be dropped out of the vehicle) had been done.

In response, Mr. Williams denied telling the defendant that the transmission was dropped out of the vehicle, noting that the work was on a "control module" which was separate from the transmission. The court notes that the invoice for this repair does not mention anything about the transmission being dropped or otherwise moved from the vehicle, noting only that a new "transmission control module" was a part needed, along with the diagnostic of tracing wires and programming the new module, amongst other details (see, D-A [#8]).

The defendant further complained about the additional repair needed on that same GMC Sierra 2500, which was a different repair altogether, being the exhaust manifold. Again, the complaint was the lack of receipt of any estimate and the fact that the cost was approximately the same as the one he just paid for, before having departed from the plaintiff shop. Other than the defendant's analysis from reviewing "Alldata", the lack of any estimate before the work was completed, and his frustration over having another repair immediately after picking up the vehicle, the defendant had no other documentation to claim anything was done improperly.

For these allegations, the defendant claimed damages in the amount of the repairs, due to the lack of an estimate from the plaintiff shop or approval for the repairs by the defendant. He additionally complained of lost revenue while the vehicles were with the plaintiff shop for much more time than the defendant claimed necessary.

Lastly, the defendant also complained that he paid an additional charge of just over $300 after he picked up the dump truck and almost immediately discovered an oil leak. The defendant testified that Mr. Stringham elected not to replace an old o-ring, which failed and caused the substantial oil leak. This allegation was not disputed by the plaintiff or more specifically by Mr. Stringham.

Analysis

In small claims cases, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving a claim by a preponderance of the evidence. The court has the obligation to apply the facts to the relevant law, keeping in mind the statutory mandate of substantial justice (UCCA §1804).

"An essential element of an accord and satisfaction is a clear manifestation of intent by one tendering less than full payment of an unliquidated claim that the payment has been sent in full satisfaction of the disputed claim" (Caldwell v Unger, 578 NYS2d 3, 4 [4th Dept 1991], citing Itoh & Co. [Amer.] v. Honerkamp Co., 99 AD2d 417, 418, 470 NYS.2d 593; Hudson v. Yonkers Fruit Co., 258 NY 168, 174, 179 N.E. 373).

"As a general rule, acceptance of a check in full settlement of a disputed unliquidated claim operates as an accord and satisfaction discharging the claim . . ." (Sorrye v Kennedy, 699 NYS2d 214, 215-16 [3d Dept 1999], citing Merrill Lynch Realty/Carll Burr v. Skinner, 63 NY2d 590, 596, 483 NYS2d 979, 473 NE2d 229). "In order for such an acceptance to constitute a binding release, however, the party to be charged must have been clearly informed that acceptance of payment would have that result" (Id. at 216, citations and internal quotations omitted). "Further, because an accord and satisfaction constitutes an executed contract founded upon new consideration, the written instrument must set forth all of the essential elements of a contract and there must be a meeting of the parties' minds (Id., citations omitted).

Also of relevance is that "(a) contractual agreement is simply a manifestation of mutual assent, by two or more legally competent persons, to one another" (Restatement Second, [*5]Contracts §3). "To establish the existence of a contract, there must be an offer, an acceptance of the offer, consideration, mutual assent, and an intent to be bound" (22 NYJur Contracts §9).

Further, pursuant to the NYS DMV Motor Vehicle Repair Shop Regulations, D.M.V. Reg. 82.5(b):

The repair shop shall not perform any services not authorized by the customer by a work order. If a repair shop prepares a written work order, a copy shall be given to the customer. If a written work order is prepared by the customer, such work order shall be attached to the invoice. If the customer gives an oral work order, the oral work order shall be noted on the invoice and shall include the date, time and manner of authorization and by whom such authorization was given.

Additional pertinent in this case is the equitable principle of laches, which ". . . is defined as an equitable bar, based on a lengthy neglect or omission to assert a right and the resulting prejudice to an adverse party" (Santander Consumer USA, Inc. v Steve Jayz Automotive Inc., 154 NYS3d 147, 150 [3d Dept 2021]; internal citations omitted). "To ultimately establish laches, a party must show (1) conduct by an offending party giving rise to the situation complained of, (2) delay by the complainant in asserting his or her claim for relief despite the opportunity to do so, (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the offending party that the complainant would assert his or her claim for relief, and (4) injury or prejudice to the offending party in the event that relief is accorded the complainant" (Matter of Falck for Riggs, 224 NYS3d 181, 188 [3d Dept 2024]; citations omitted).

And lastly, while "small claims matters are not bound by the rules of evidence, a determination may not be based solely on hearsay" (Rowe v. Silver & Gold Expressions, 968 NYS2d 202 [3 Dept. 2013] citation omitted). "Even at Small Claims, with its relaxed rules of procedure and evidence, the fundamental right to confront a witness by cross-examination must be preserved" (Falker v. Chrysler Corp., 119 Misc 2d 375, 378 [Civ. Ct. 1983]; citation omitted).

The case for the plaintiff, Williams Tire & Auto, Inc., is simply that Mr. Banks did not pay the balance on the submitted invoice for work performed on the defendant's Ford dump truck. The defendant offered multiple theories as defenses. The first argument made was that the plaintiff sued the wrong party and that Mr. Banks' business, Banks Property Maintenance LLC, should have been named as the party. There are a couple reasons why this argument fails at first glance. Firstly, all of the invoices introduced and received in evidence reflect that it was Mr. and Mrs. Banks who were being billed. Moreover, the bank check that was purportedly intended to act as an accord and satisfaction included Mrs. Banks as the remitter, as opposed to Mr. Banks' business. There is simply nothing in the documentation to suggest that Banks Property Maintenance LLC was the proper party, except for Mr. Banks' conclusory statements.

The defendant next contended that his payment and the plaintiff shop's acceptance of the $6,606.02, via the bank check made out by Mrs. Banks, along with his letter and telephonic communications, acted as an accord and satisfaction for the work performed on the subject vehicle. The court rejects this argument for a few reasons. For one, the check makes no mention and there are no other indicia on the check itself of the payment being an accord and satisfaction (see, 699 NYS2d at 216).

Second, the letter itself does not reflect a "clear manifestation of intent" by Mr. (or Mrs.) Banks "that the payment has been sent in full satisfaction of the disputed claim" (578 NYS2d at 4). In this regard, it could certainly be argued that the letter suggests that the $6,606.02 bank [*6]check is intended to be in satisfaction of the disputed claim, but the law requires that the communication be clear and unambiguous (see, § 3:313. Claims which are disputed—Accord and satisfaction—Clean and unambiguous notice, A NY Prac., Enforcing Judgments and Collecting Debts § 3:313).

In this case, the letter did not demonstrate that there was a "meeting of the parties' minds" (699 NYS2d at 216). The opening paragraph of the letter from the Banks indicates that the check was intended to cover a prior balance, "plus parts cost on the Ford dump truck, minus the $4,000 already paid" (D-A [#4-5]). It goes on to lay out the Banks' position and issues with the plaintiff shop. The court does observe that the letter includes reference to the phone call between the parties, which took place almost immediately upon the Banks' receipt of the invoice, noting that "Jeff stated he would except [sic] the 'parts amount' of $6,267.30, listed on the bill as payment" (Id.). But it subsequently points out that, "(f)or over a month now (Mr. Banks) has tried to have conversation with (Mr. Williams) about going forward, explaining he didn't think he should owe this full amount as he didn't agree to it" (Id.). And one of the last sentences of the letter states, "(o)n 4/30/25 (Mr. Banks) and (Mr. Williams) finally spoke and nothing was agreed upon, as it seems he doesn't want to work with us fairly" (Id.). Clearly, there is no clear manifestation of an accord and satisfaction or any other agreement in the Banks' letter dated May 1, 2025, to resolve the matter with the plaintiff shop's receipt and acceptance of the bank check.

Mr. Banks additionally and otherwise argued that Mr. Williams, as operator of the plaintiff shop, entered into a verbal agreement during their phone call on March 7, 2025, to accept payment of the parts as an accord and satisfaction or otherwise as a full and final resolution of the matter. This argument too must fail. For one, the April 30, 2025, letter from the Banks' makes it clear that a dispute still existed (see, 578 NYS2d at 4]). For two, while Mr. Williams never denied an agreement to accept the payment for just the parts portion of the service, he also failed to admit to any such agreement, which is only further confirmed by the Banks' acknowledgement in their letter that Mr. Williams was not in agreement with accepting the $6,606.02 as an accord and satisfaction of the matter (see, 699 NYS2d at 216).^FN2

Regarding the alleged verbal agreement made between the parties during that same March 7th phone call, the defendant also testified that Mr. Williams included the qualifier that "if" Mr. Stringham gave the defendant an estimate, which remains disputed, Mr. Williams had agreed to the said terms asserted by the defendant. Clearly, there was never a meeting of the minds as to whether or not Mr. Stringham actually gave the defendant an "estimate", which was, according to the defendant himself, a contingency to the terms advocated for by the defendant. While one could tenuously argue that this implies a verbal agreement, it is a far cry from being clear and unambiguous (City of Elmira v Larry Walter, Inc., 564 NE2d 655, 656 [Ct App 1990]; cf, Guggenheim Corp. Funding, LLC v Access.1 Communications Corp.-NY, 906 NYS2d 780 [Sup Ct 2009]).

Ultimately, the remarks attributed to Mr. Williams do not clearly state that the payment for the parts was an accord and satisfaction, that it would be accepted as a final resolution of the matter, or that Mr. Banks would not owe any further payments. In this last regard, it was clear [*7]from the testimony presented that the plaintiff shop would accept payments over time from Mr. Banks, most notably by the fact that they had a balance that they previously owed and recently paid as referenced in the Banks' April 30, 2025, letter. So even by the defendant's testimony, one cannot discern that the payment for the parts, while allowing the defendant to take the truck, was intended to be a final payment. The court simply does not find that there was any such agreement, especially when reviewing the Banks' April 30, 2025, letter and noting that the dispute over the cost of repair was a continuing issue and there was nothing beyond Mr. and Mrs. Banks testimony to suggest otherwise (see, Bouchoueva v Novoye Russkove Slovo Pub. Co., 798 NYS2d 343 [Civ Ct 2004]; see also, Guggenheim Corp. Funding, LLC v Access.1 Communications Corp.-NY, 906 NYS2d 780 [noting that "in determining whether the parties intended to be bound, the court may also consider correspondence and other preliminary or partially complete writings."]; citations and internal grammatical marks omitted).

However, the court does find merit to the defendant's argument that he should not be responsible for the cost of a repair he did not authorize (see, D.M.V. Reg. 82.5[b]). Certainly, the defendant is correct in having explained that he never received a written estimate. Likewise, there is absolutely no clear communication to indicate he received any further updates regarding any cost of the work to be done, though there arguably are text communications noting further problems that required repair. However, even these are not clear, especially in light of the defendant's obvious lack of auto repair inclination and understanding (see, D-A [#3A]). And while it continued to be disputed whether or not Mr. Stringham provided an estimate to the defendant for the cost of the repairs, which was clearly denied by the plaintiff shop, undisputed is that the defendant never agreed to a repair bill of several thousand more dollars than the $6,000-$7,000.00 cost he expected, even if the expectation was an erroneous one.

While the plaintiff shop cited text messages where the defendant arguably acquiesced to the plaintiff shop performing whatever work needs to be done with what was argued to have been a carte blanche authorization to do whatever needed to be done, there was never any reference to the cost of such work in any manner whatsoever. Further, Mr. Banks contradicted the meaning attributed to his texts by the plaintiff shop, positing that his texts reading "its all good" or similarly were intended to convey his patience with the plaintiff shop in getting back to him with a more detailed description and/or estimate as to what was required to repair the truck. Even if Mr. Stringham Jr.'s statement about heads costing around $6,000-$7,000.00 could be deemed an estimate, there was no reference to any costs beyond that number in any manner. Clearly, the degree and cost of the work on the defendant's dump truck was performed without the clear authorization by the defendant, reflecting "a complete failure by (the plaintiff shop) to follow the requirements of D.M.V. Reg. 82.5(b)" (Hammerstein v Potamkin Cadillac Corp., 412 NYS2d 337, 339 [Civ Ct 1979]).

Counterclaim:

Initially, any causes of action regarding the quality of the plaintiff shop's work or any arguments concerning the time it took for the shop to complete the work were based on hearsay in the form of statements from another shop owner/mechanic or the defendant's reliance on a website concerning expected repair times. The defendant's counterclaim sounded more in frustration, in retrospect, as a result of the latest interaction regarding the dump truck. Hence, this portion and aspect of the defendant's counterclaim must fail.

The court also rejects the defendant's counterclaim concerning the work completed without a prior estimate in the past. While it may have been a point of frustration for the [*8]defendant in the past, it clearly was not a litigious issue until the defendant was faced with the underlying complaint by the plaintiff shop. With that said, the court finds that the doctrine of laches applies in this case, where,

• the defendant asserted that he previously felt aggrieved by the lack of prior estimates, yet continued going to the plaintiff shop for further and continual service and repairs,

• the plaintiff shop clearly lacked any knowledge of a potential claim against it for the lack of any estimates through the course of these repairs, and

• the plaintiff shop would clearly be prejudiced to accumulated damages for alleged wrongs dating up to three years prior, where the defendant continually endured these alleged wrongs without complaint until this latest offense (see, 224 NYS3d at 188).

Regarding the defendant's complaint concerning the second repair to the dump truck, amounting to an invoice of $304.24 inclusive of tax, the court observes that "(t)o prevail upon a negligence claim, plaintiff must establish the existence of a legal duty, a breach of that duty, proximate causation and damages" (Ellis v. Mildred Elley Sch. Inc., 245 AD2d 994, 995 [3 Dept. 1997]; other citations omitted). In this regard, the court notes that the plaintiff shop charged defendant on the March 7, 2025, parts portion of the invoice for 8 o-ring kits, amounting to a total cost of $133.44, which was before the truck was returned for further repair of the oil leak. The subsequent invoice of April 7, 2025, for the oil leak repair makes no reference to new o-rings on the parts portion that invoice. In this respect, the court questions why there would be a charge for new o-rings on the March 7, 2025, invoice and then admittedly not replace an old o-ring which resulted in further repair costs. In either event, it appears clear that Mr. Stringham, on behalf of the plaintiff shop, acknowledged breaching a duty of care by trying to use an old o-ring that failed during a repair costing over $10,000.00, and that this omission caused the defendant's dump truck to require further service, which was paid for by the defendant.

While the court finds that the plaintiff shop was negligent in not replacing an old failing o-ring with a new one, especially in light of the menial cost of one when compared with the entirety of the repair, the court does not feel it would in the interest of justice to award any judgment against the plaintiff shop on this portion of the counterclaim for a couple of reasons. For one, the defendant believed that the matter was resolved with his payment of the parts costs to the plaintiff shop, arguing extensively that they had agreed to resolve the matter with the payment of the check with the letter dated April 30, 2025 (see, D-A [#4-5]). Additionally, the court is of the opinion that, in the interest of justice, the finding in favor of the defendant as to the plaintiff's complaint more than offsets any potential award for the defendant concerning any further repairs of the dump truck.

For all these reasons and keeping in mind the mandate of substantial justice, the court finds that that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has met their respective burdens of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and therefore dismisses both the complaint and the counterclaim.

Decision

Both the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's counterclaim are hereby dismissed. The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: May 12, 2026

Hon. Michael J. Genute

Norwich City Court Judge