Matter of Pedro C (Jordy G)

Family Court, Kings County

Decided on June 16, 2026

File No. 321661

Laura M. Paley, J.

This decision is to memorialize the basis for the order for genetic marker testing (GMT) entered today to determine whether Mr. Pedro C ("Petitioner" or "Mr. C") is the biological father of the Child, Maria G ("Child" or "Maria").

The Child, Maria, was born out of wedlock on [redacted date], 2023 to Ms. Katherine P ("Mother" or "Respondent" or "Ms. P"). On October 24, 2023, Mr. Jordy G ("Legal Father" or "Mr. G") signed an Acknowledgment of Paternity despite the fact that the Child's mother, Ms. P knew that Mr. G was not the Child's biological father. Ms. P and Mr. G were not married.

The Petitioner, Mr. C, filed the instant Paternity Petition pursuant to Family Court Act § 524 on December 13, 2023, when the Child was only 51 days old. Although Mr. C filed his [*2]petition in December 2023, due to the high volume of paternity and support cases in Kings County Family Court, the matter was not scheduled for first appearance until July 17, 2024. On that date, the Petitioner Father and the Respondent Mother appeared in front of the Support Magistrate, but the Mother's attorney did not. The matter was adjourned another four months out to December 11, 2024. A few days before that court date, the Respondent Mother's attorney emailed the Support Magistrate and informed them that she was not available on the December 11th date. On the December 11th date, the Respondent Mother requested an adjournment since her attorney again did not appear. The Magistrate joined issue and noted that no birth certificate nor acknowledge of paternity was filed and the Court subpoenaed such. The matter was adjourned another five months to May 28, 2025.

On May 28, 2025, the Petitioner and Respondent Mother appeared, and the Mother's attorney stated that the Mother was "not disputing paternity" and that she was only appearing for that date. The matter was then adjourned out another four months for the mother to be assigned counsel and to address service on the Mr. G.

This case was not referred to this judge for potential estoppel issues until September 15, 2025, and the first appearance was scheduled in front of this judge's court attorney on November 3, 2025. The parties were scheduled for their first appearance in front of this judge on February 2, 2026, on which date the Petitioner, Mr. C, was assigned counsel, and the legal father, Mr. G, appeared and was assigned counsel. At this point, all parties and the Child were represented. The matter was scheduled for the next date mutually available to the Court and all four attorneys, May 27, 2026.

On May 27, 2026, all parties and attorneys appeared in front of this Court. The Attorney for the Child argued that estoppel does not apply in this case and requests that the Court order a DNA test on this case given the Child's young age and the fact that the Petitioner filed when the Child was only two months old. However, this Court began an estoppel hearing on May 27, 2026 and heard the entire direct testimony of the Petitioner Mother. The Court then adjourned to the next available date which was in October 2026.

After the May 27, 2026 appearance, this Court reviewed the applicable statutes, case law, and the case file, and agrees with the AFC and finds that it erred in beginning an estoppel hearing and that estoppel does not apply in this case. Instead, this Court should have — and now does — order a DNA test.

"A prior acknowledgment of paternity made in accordance with Family Court Act § 516—a does not serve as an insuperable bar to a claim of paternity by one who is a stranger to the acknowledgment." Matter of Jose M. v Shaniqua F., 124 AD3d 892, 893 [2d Dept 2015]; see also Matter of Thomas T. v Luba R., 121 AD3d 800, 800 [2d Dept 2014] (reinstating paternity petition and finding error where the Family Court dismissed paternity petition and instead treated it as one to vacate the acknowledgment of paternity where the petitioner sought to declare himself the father of the child).

Family Court Act § 532(a) provides that upon "the motion of any party, [the court] shall order the mother, her child and the alleged father to submit to one or more genetic marker or DNA tests . . . No such test shall be ordered, however, upon a written finding by the court that it is not in the best interests of the child on the basis of res judicata, equitable estoppel, or the presumption of legitimacy." Family Court Act § 532(a) (emphasis added). In other words, the Court need not find that a test is in the Child's best interests but rather shall order such genetic testing unless the Court finds it is not in the best interests of the child. See Ryan M.E. v Shelby [*3]S., 191 AD3d 1315, 1316-17 [4th Dept 2021]. Indeed, "[t]he Legislature has plainly indicated its belief that the best interests of the child will, in fact, be advanced by establishing the alleged father's paternity, irrespective of the mother's wishes." Matter of Leromain v Venduro, 95 AD2d 80, 83 [3d Dept 1983].

"The purpose of equitable estoppel is to preclude a person from asserting a right after having led another to form the reasonable belief that the right would not be asserted, and loss or prejudice to the other would result if the right were asserted. The law imposes the doctrine as a matter of fairness. Its purpose is to prevent someone from enforcing rights that would work injustice on the person against whom enforcement is sought and who, while justifiably relying on the opposing party's actions, has been misled into a detrimental change of position." Shondel J. v Mark D., 7 NY3d 320, 326 [2006]. "Estoppel may . . . preclude a man who claims to be a child's biological father from asserting his paternity when he acquiesced in the establishment of a strong parent-child bond between the child and another man." Matter of Shondel J., 7 NY3d at 327. Mr. Ck filed this proceeding less than two months after Maria's birth and thus "equitable estoppel is clearly inapplicable in this case." Ryan M.E. v Shelby S., 191 AD3d 1315, 1317 [4th Dept 2021].

It simply cannot be argued here that the Petitioner acquiesced in the establishment of a parent-child bond between the Child and Mr. G given that he filed the instant paternity petition less than two months after the Child was born. Mr. C filed his Paternity Petition shortly after the Child's birth and thus he did not delay in seeking such adjudication nor acquiesce in the formation of a parent-child bond between the Child and Mr. G. Compare Matter of Greg S. v Keri C., 38 AD3d 905, 906 [2d Dept 2007] (Putative father did not file until child was two years old); Ettore I. v Angela D., 127 AD2d 6, 16 [2d Dept 1987] (three-year delay in filing for paternity "insufficient to defeat the defense of estoppel"). It was court delay, not Petitioner's, that resulted in application for the DNA test to come before this judge at this later stage.

Mr. C has not neglected to assume the role of Maria's Father; rather, he has been fighting to be named her father for almost two-and-a-half years. An overburdened court cannot be the reason DNA is not ordered when Mr. C took all the proper steps to be named the Child's father and had a right to a DNA test.

Finally, the Attorney for the Child, who is substituting judgment for this young child, has advocated for this Court to order a DNA test.

Given that Mr. C filed the instant petition when the child was less than two months old and the Child's Mother was never married, the Court finds he is entitled to a DNA test. The Court finds that estoppel is not applicable in this case. To the extent that this Court consider the Child's best interests, it has heard the Mother's entire direct testimony and finds that is not contrary to this two-and-half-year-old Child's best interests to order such a test.

Thus, the Court orders a genetic marker test of the subject child and the Petitioner, Mr. Pedro C. The order for the test will be sent out separately.

Dated: June 16, 2026

Hon. Laura M. Paley