Seventh Regiment Armory Conservancy, Inc. v Knickerbocker Greys

Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County

Decided on July 10, 2026

Index No. LT-300293-23/NY

Jeffrey S. Zellan, J.

Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of this motion:

Papers Numbered

Order to show Cause/ Notice of Motion and Affidavits /Affirmations annexed 1

Answering Affidavits/ Affirmations 2

Reply Affidavits/ Affirmations 3

Memoranda of Law

Other — Papers in Motion Seq. No. 009 4

Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision/ Order of the Court is as follows:

Following oral argument on the parties' respective motions calendared as Motion Seq. Nos. 008 and 009, the Court grants each of them to the extent of granting petitioner leave to renew and respondent leave to reargue the Court's decision and order dated August 20, 2025, and published as Seventh Regiment Armory Conservancy, Inc. v. Knickerbocker Greys, 88 Misc 3d 437 (the "August Decision"), adhering to the Court's holding in the August Decision, denying an appellate stay pursuant to CPLR 5519 without prejudice, and granting a discretionary stay pursuant to CPLR 2201 in the manner and for the reasons set forth below.

Background

That the parties' dispute has been heavily litigated throughout the halls of government is a severe understatement. While the Court noted much of this previously in the August Decision and generally assumes readers' familiarity with that decision, it bears repeating now.

This proceeding is the apparent end product of nearly two decades of discord involving two executive organs of the State, and a non-profit conservatory with both a common law mandate to act for public good and a contractual mandate to support "interpretive and/or [*2]educational programs related to the social aesthetic and military history of the building [at issue] and other topics to the extent practicable," unable or unwilling to resolve the use by another non-profit operating the nation's oldest afterschool educational program from that space for over 120 years of less than a thousand square feet in a building occupying an entire City block. (Master Lease, Ex. K., NYSCEF Doc. No. 59, at K-1).

The parties' dispute arises from petitioner's 2006 occupancy of the historic Seventh Regiment Armory, pursuant to a 99-year lease from the State. (Aff. in Supp., §§ 4-5). Although petitioner asserts that respondent Knickerbocker Greys "do not have (and never had) any occupancy rights to the subject premises, other than through an expired license that has nevertheless been revoked and terminated," petitioner also notes that the New York State Division of Military and Naval Affairs had "allowed" respondent use of space in the premises prior to petitioner's leasehold, and the parties do not dispute that respondents have occupied space in the premises since 1902. (Aff. in Supp. of Underlying Motion, ¶¶ 3 and 23; and Transcript, at 21-22). Petitioner argues that their lease granted them an unencumbered leasehold over all relevant portions of the Seventh Regiment Armory, and that petitioner granted respondent a series of licenses, which have expired. (Aff. in Supp. of Underlying Motion, ¶¶ 5-9). While respondent agrees that the purported licenses have expired, respondent disagrees that the licenses themselves govern. As respondent points out, petitioner's own "existing physical conditions assessment" of the Armory, based upon a July 1999 site inspection (itself made an exhibit to petitioner's master lease), notes several "military purposes and ancillary functions," which have "historically been housed and/or continue to operate" at the time, including "rooms reserved for the private use of the Knickerbocker Greys and other armory constituents." (Master Lease, Ex. N-1, NYSCEF Doc. No. 69, at 53-53 and 63). Amongst other documents respondent offers in support of their position is a 2022 letter from Senator Liz Kreuger to petitioner's president recounting a 2006 meeting between the Senator, her staff, and petitioner's president, stating:

Meeting notes taken by my Deputy Chief of Staff from our discussions in 2006 when the Armory was transitioning to becoming a leader in arts programming refer to the following assurance that you provided at that time:

"Finally, I was told the Conservancy views the organizations currently using the Armory, including the Knickerbocker Greys, as an 'integral part of the tradition and future of the Armory'."

My belief in the Armory serving as the Knickerbocker [Greys'] permanent home has not changed. I sincerely trust the commitment expressed and shared by the Conservancy has remained the same as well.

(Ltr. by Sen. Kreuger to Rebecca Robertson dated Apr. 4, 2022, NYSCEF Doc. No. 122, at 1).

Petitioner subsequently commenced this holdover proceeding to evict respondent.

By decision and order dated March 12, 2024, the Court (Johnson, J.) denied the parties' respective motion and cross-motion (Motion Seq. Nos. 002 and 003) on the issues presently before the Court, with leave to re-submit upon the conclusion of discovery. The parties subsequently completed discovery, and again both sought summary judgment resulting in the August Decision.

[*3]The Legislature's Action

During the pendency of this proceeding, the Legislature passed, and the Governor signed, 2024 NY Laws ch. 659, entitled "An act . . . authorizing the use of armories by legacy cadet corps programs." The stated purpose of the bill could not be clearer, stating that it is to "provide a legacy cadet corps program with meeting space and event space at a regimental armory which they have resided in." Sponsoring Mem. of Assemblymember Bores, 2024 NY Laws ch. 659. In finding that "[c]adet corps have a special historical value in the development and expression of New York City's culture and heritage," that "have existed for many decades," and that "[j]unior cadet corps for (children) have helped bring discipline, comradery, and education to countless generations of New York City's youth," while having "remained at the same location since their creation, adding a rich and important cultural institution to many New York City neighborhoods," Chapter 659's sponsor noted that "[s]ince the COVID pandemic, there have been attempts to evict these cadet corps from their long-standing locations," and "[c]ombating these evictions," had attracted the Legislature's attention. (Id.). In the face of those eviction efforts, the sponsor noted that "[p]reserving the ability of cadet corps programs to operate out of their long-standing locations is in the interest of keeping cultural and historical institutions within New York City intact and in their neighborhoods." (Id.). As defined, a legacy cadet corps program is "a cadet corps or organized militia program that has accessed or used a regimental armory located within a city that has a population of over one million people for over one hundred years during periods which are not periods of civil or military emergency," which the parties have never seriously disputed includes respondent. 2024 NY Laws ch. 659 § 1, codified as Military Law § 180-a(1)(l).

The Legislature crafted a two-stage process to assist such programs: a first stage stopgap solution and a long-term solution. "On application of . . . a legacy cadet corps program . . . the lessee or the manager pursuant to the terms of the management agreement shall provide a proper and convenient room or rooms or other appropriate space in the armory," for the organization to "hold regular and special meetings and organizational social events of a private nature, without the payment of any charge or expense therefor, provided that such use does not interfere with the use by the lessee or the manager pursuant to the terms of the management agreement." 2024 NY Laws ch. 659 § 3, codified as Military Law § 180-a(3)(c)(i) (emphasis added). Pursuant to Chapter 659, upon a finding by the New York State Urban Development Corporation (also known as Empire State Development) that a group is a legacy cadet corps program (based upon criteria set by statute), such group is entitled to a separate negotiated agreement governing their use of armory space, which "shall be sufficient and suitable space for the current and uninterrupted operation, provided that it is no less than twelve hundred square feet for their headquarters." 2024 NY Laws ch. 659 §§ 3 (codified as Military Law § 180-a(f)) and 4 (codified as New York State Urban Development Corporation Act § 39(b)).^FN1

[*4]The August Decision

In Motion Seq. Nos. 004 through 006, the parties each sought dispositions in their respective favors, which the Court granted in part and denied in part in the August Decision pursuant to CPLR 3212(g), finding that a trial on the narrow factual question of petitioner's interference claim was necessary to resolve this proceeding in light of legislative amendments chaptered as 2024 NY Laws ch. 659. August Decision, at *7-8.

The Federal Action

After the August Decision, petitioner commenced a collateral federal action in the Southern District of New York — Seventh Regiment Armory Conservancy, Inc. v. Knight, Dkt. No. 25-cv-7373 (the "Federal Action") — attacking the constitutionality of Chapter 659. That action remains pending, with discovery currently scheduled to conclude on June 26, 2026. Federal Action, Initial Case Management Order, ECF Doc. No. 44.

The Present Motions

While this proceeding has been marked by sharp and protracted disagreement amongst the parties, the parties have agreed to the extent of each side seeking the Court's reconsideration of the August Decision and that they should respectively win outright now rather than proceed to trial. At argument, the parties noted that petitioner and non-party ESD had been temporarily stayed by the Southern District of New York (Daniels, J.) from completing the lease agreement between ESD and respondent contemplated by Chapter 659. Federal Action, minute entry, at 1 (Oct. 22, 2025).^FN2

Respondent Knickerbocker Greys seeks reargument (Motion Seq. No, 008) on the aspect of the August Decision that found that a trial was necessary on the issue of interference and instead seeks an order granting respondent summary judgment in its favor in full.

Petitioner Seventh Regiment Armory Conservancy seeks renewal (Motion. Seq. No. 009) largely based upon developments from ESD and seeks summary judgment (and eviction) against respondent. Further, petitioner alternatively seeks a stay of this proceeding pending both its appeal of the August Decision, and petitioner's collateral attack in the Federal Action attacking the constitutionality of Chapter 659.

Discussion

Precedent in This Department Supports Granting Reconsideration

"[T]he court is not infallible, so there is always the potential that [a litigant's] theory has been underestimated and that a more expanded record and a more elaborate briefing process would provide [them] with some" ability to prevail despite having not prevailed earlier. Hungerford & Terry, Inc. v. City of Lawrenceburg, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9247, *14 (S.D. Ind. 2006). See also, Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (memorably noting that "[w]e are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible because we are final"). The Court is also "not unmindful of the need to eschew form over substance where [*5]circumstances warrant it, and will not deny relief in these circumstances" simply because of the rigid structures of CPLR 2221 in granting reconsideration, as the Court "[i]n any event . . . is also fully empowered to vacate or modify its own order, as the court always retains the inherent power to set aside, correct or modify its own orders" Barry v. Association des Senegalais d'Amerique ASA, 78 Misc 3d 1206(A), *1-2 (Civ. Ct., Bronx Co. 2023) (collecting cases and discussing reconsideration standard in the First Department). See also, Department Stores Natl. Bank v. Bailey, 85 Misc 3d 139(A), *1 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 2025) (reversing denial and finding that "courts have discretion to relax this requirement and grant such a motion in the interest of justice . . . and to achieve substantial fairness").

That said, the Court of Appeals has long held that even if "it is very possible that we err in many cases . . . the rule adopted in regard to rearguments is a proper one, considering the fact that there must be at some point an end of litigation, and after counsel has had his day in this court and has been unsuccessful in his case, it is but fair to the court and to other litigants who are pressing to be heard," and cases should proceed as decided without simply looking again for the sake of looking again. Fosdick v. Town of Hempstead, 126 NY 651, 652 (1891), quoting, Marine National Bank v. National City Bank, 59 NY 67, 73 (1874). At bottom, reconsideration is designed to be more than simply "a second bite at the apple," though, and more than a party's desire to try again is necessary to protect the orderly use of judicial resources. Maximum Income Partners, Inc. v. Webber, 58 Misc 3d 1218(A), *2 (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co. 2016). See also, U.S. Bank, N.A. v. 687 King LLC, 2024 NY Misc. LEXIS 26308, *6-7 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co. 2024) (same, citing Fosdick and others).

While the subjective import of one case or another does not itself lead to granting reconsideration, the Court is also mindful of "the importance of courts issuing written opinions on matters of interest," and to do so in a way that maintains "the integrity of the corpus of the common law so that the community understands it and so that it may be legitimately integrated into the tradition." Matter of H.Q., 2025 NY Slip Op 25256, *2 n. 1 (Civ. Ct., New York Co. 2025 (discussing the societal value of written opinions) (cleaned up), citing, Richardson v. United States, 477 F. Supp. 2d 392, 405 n. 18 (D. Mass. 2007), and, In re New York Mayor's Office of Special Enforcement, 2020 NY Misc. LEXIS 829, *1 (Sup. Ct., New York Co. 2020). On that basis, and within the discretion noted in Department Stores Natl. Bank, the Court will grant the parties leave to seek reconsideration and consider their arguments.

The Parties' Agreement as to Military Law § 180-a(3)(c) Cannot Override Legislative Enactments of Substantive Law

The parties make much of their apparent agreement that Military Law § 180-a(3)(c)'s interference provision does not apply to the Greys' occupancy of the basement room at issue. Though the Court encourages all parties in every case before it to agree on issues where they can, the parties' reliance upon this particular agreement is misplaced.

Parties are free to agree to resolve questions of procedural law, and the Court regularly encourages parties to do so where they can. However, they are not free to stipulate away areas of substantive law. Compare, e.g., Reeps v. BMV of North Am., 160 AD3d 603, 603 (1st Dept. 2018) (parties were permitted to chart "a procedural course that deviated from the path established by the CPLR" in allowing for a late round of summary judgment motions); with, Hanover Bank v. Cole, 7 AD2d 713, 713-714 (1st Dept. 1958) (dismissing proceeding on agreed statement of facts for lack of jurisdiction). As the Court noted in the August Decision, the [*6]Legislature's determination of the public interest, as expressed through substantive legislation, is given enormous weight that cannot be discarded in an action simply because two litigants wish to do so. See also, People v. Grasso, 42 AD3d 126, 142 (1st Dept. 2007) (noting that what the Executive "perceives to be the interest of the state cannot trump contrary determinations about the public interest made by the Legislature"); and Levine v. Long Island Railroad Co., 38 AD2d 936, 938 (2d Dept.), affd. without op., 30 NY2d 907 (NY), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972) (questioning whether the Legislature's power in this area was subject to waiver). Thus, while the parties may each wish to waive away certain parts of Chapter 659, there are limits.

The questions at issue in this action concern areas of government power and the use of publicly-owned resources by non-profit entities specially created to act (at least in part) in furtherance of the common good — a matter of far deeper import and infused with policy issues beyond the Court's remit — rather than procedurally when the parties might file a summary judgment motion as in Reeps. The controlling point is what the Legislature intended for the parties and empowered ESD and the parties to do, not what they might have wished from the Legislature. Thus, while the partes' agreement is certainly entitled to consideration for its persuasive value, it is not binding upon the Court.

The Legislature's Plain Language and Intent Establish that Chapter 659's Interference Question Applies to Respondent's Present Status

The Court must follow the bedrock "fundamental that a court, in interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature." Matter of New York State Land Tit. Assn. v. New York State Dept. of Fin. Servs., 169 AD3d 18, 28 (1st Dept. 2019). The issues here have been just as forcefully litigated in the "other bodies in our society that deal with these problems -- the Executive, the Congress and the public itself," as they have been litigated here, and the Court must exercise caution in substituting its judgment for the other branches "otherwise it would not be the common will which prevails, and to that extent the people would not govern." Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1247 n. 9 (3d Cir. 1981) (Adams, J., concurring in part), quoting, Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty (3d ed. 1960), at 109.

Both parties make much of the proposition that Chapter 659's interference provision on the so-called 'short-term solution,' codified in relevant part as Military Law § 180-a(3)(c)(i), does not apply to respondent's present occupancy of the space at issue, though they differ on the resulting consequences. Petitioner submits that the interference provision, indeed all of Military Law § 180-a(3)(c)(i), does not apply, and hence may proceed with an eviction. (Mem. of Law in Supp., at 2). Respondent submits that the interference provision of Military Law § 180-a(3)(c)(i) does not apply because they have been designated as a legacy cadet corps entitled to headquarters space. (Mem. of Law in Reply, at 5). Turning to the persuasive value of the parties' jointly-held view that Military Law § 180-a(3)(c)(i)'s interference provision does not apply to respondent's current occupancy of the basement room, both parties are wrong.

By its plain text, Military Law § 180-a(3)(c)(i) states (emphasis added):

On application of any of the associations of veterans or cadet corps programs, including a legacy cadet corps program, described in paragraphs a and b of subdivision one of such section one hundred eighty-three, the lessee or the manager pursuant to the terms of the management agreement shall provide a proper and convenient room or rooms or other appropriate space in the armory where such posts or chapters may hold regular and [*7]special meetings and organizational social events of a private nature, without the payment of any charge or expense therefor, provided that such use does not interfere with the use by the lessee or the manager pursuant to the terms of the management agreement, including any use by third parties contracted for under subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph.

It is this measure that the parties presently dispute in seeking reconsideration.

The Southern District of New York appears to have found as much as well in considering Chapter 659, finding that "[t]hrough these changes, the Amendments create two avenues by which a cadet corps program may secure space within the Armory: (1) section 180-a(3)(c)(i) and (2) section 180-a(3)(e)." Federal Action, at 476 (emphasis added). The second avenue — the end result of which is a separate agreement with ESD for no less than 1,200 square feet of space — is presently the subject of the Federal Action, and that court has held that "the [Greys'] current occupancy of an approximately 600 square foot space in the Armory's basement bears no relation to whether their future occupancy of an entirely different space would substantially impair the Lease." Federal Action, at 484. Instead, it is the first avenue — the Legislature's short-term solution — that impacts this proceeding, subject to different processes and considerations than the long-term solution being litigated in the Federal Action.

From both its plain text and the legislative history, Chapter 659 created a multi-step process of occupancy codifying respondent's use of space in the premises: one immediate and one longer-term in furtherance of the stated goal of "[p]reserving the ability of cadet corps programs to operate out of their long-standing locations," which are in "the interest of keeping cultural and historical institutions within New York City intact and in their neighborhoods." Sponsoring Mem. of Assemblymember Bores, 2024 NY Laws ch. 659. Upon enactment, Military Law § 180-a(3)(c)(i) codified respondent's right to "a proper and convenient room or rooms or other appropriate space in the armory where such posts or chapters may hold regular and special meetings and organizational social events of a private nature . . . provided that such use does not interfere with the use by the lessee or the manager pursuant to the terms of the management agreement," which is the much-discussed interference clause. That provision of Chapter 659 — the first step of the process crafted by the Legislature — was not dependent upon any action by ESD or any other entity: all that was required was that respondent satisfy the criteria to be a legacy cadet corps program and that it request space. The parties do not seriously dispute either of those points, and indeed they could not on the facts presented. That was the immediate portion of Chapter 659, in response to the Legislature's finding that "there have been attempts to evict these cadet corps from their long-standing locations by the owners of these locations," and that "[c]ombating these evictions has attracted the vocal and enthusiastic support of elected officials and local community groups." Sponsoring Mem. of Assemblymember Bores, 2024 NY Laws ch. 659.

Looking at the longer term, the Legislature crafted what it clearly intended to be a second, and permanent, solution as codified in Military Law § 180-a(3)(e) and New York State Urban Development Corporation Act § 39. In that process, ESD could officially recognize a legacy cadet corps program as such, designate at least 1,200 square feet in the premises as headquarters space for said program, and enter into a separate lease agreement with that program for the long-term use of that designated space. Respondent is correct that the long-term solution contemplated in Military Law § 180-a(3)(e) and New York State Urban Development [*8]Corporation Act § 39 does not contain an interference clause like Military Law § 180-a(3)(c)(i), and that Military Law § 180-a(3)(e) states that "[a] legacy cadet corps program use shall be governed by a separate agreement . . . such separate agreement shall be executed once a cadet corps program is determined to be a legacy cadet corps program." Both sides are also correct (and indeed, there can be no legitimate argument to the contrary) that ESD designated other space from the room currently used to be respondent's new headquarters space pursuant to Chapter 659. But, until that separate agreement for that new headquarters space is executed and the parties complete the second step of the process codified by Chapter 659, Military Law § 180-a(3)(c)(i) and its short-term solution governs the parties' relationship and respondent's access to space. To interpret the statute otherwise would run contrary to the bedrock principles of Matter of New York State Land Tit. Assn. which bind courts in this State. Although that means that respondent Greys need not wait for a signed agreement with ESD to occupy space in the premises (which, given the Federal Action, seems well out past the horizon at best) they are subject to the interference clause of Military Law § 180-a(3)(c)(i), rather than the unencumbered Military Law § 180-a(3)(e) and New York State Urban Development Corporation Act § 39.

Petitioner's argument stands in even starker contrast to Matter of New York State Land Title Association. While petitioner's desire for their proposed outcome is understandable from their perspective, the logical shortcomings of that argument quickly reveal themselves. Again, the Legislature's intent is not hidden here: that respondents stay somewhere within the very large building at issue. Sponsoring Mem. of Assemblymember Bores, supra. By petitioner's measure, respondent should be cast out of the premises completely because ESD has designated different larger space in the same premises for respondents that petitioner is actively challenging in the Southern District of New York. Thus, petitioner would have the Court find that the Legislature's mandate that ESD designate respondent as a legacy cadet corps program entitled to more space in the premises should result in respondent having no space in the premises. That argument should not trouble many for long. Indeed, petitioner's argument that "ESD's designation of space on the second and fifth floors of the Armory for the Greys 'headquarters' provides the Greys with 'continued use of the Armory' under the Legislation, which the Summary Judgment Order found to be the 'clear intent of the Legislature,'" might be more persuasive if petitioner had not already asked the Southern District of New York to declare that designation unconstitutional before making this argument to the Court in papers. (Mem. of Law in Supp., at 14). Petitioner's argument asks the Court to "decide legal issues . . . in an ivory tower removed from the clamor of reality," that petitioner itself has created, which the Court declines to do. New England Merchants Natl. Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 123 (S.D.NY 1980).

Rather, the question remains as it was following the August Decision. Military Law § 180-a(3)(c)(i)'s first step provision clearly and unambiguously states that petitioner "shall provide a proper and convenient room or rooms or other appropriate space in the armory where such posts or chapters may hold regular and special meetings and organizational social events of a private nature, without the payment of any charge or expense therefor, provided that such use does not interfere with the use by the lessee or the manager pursuant to the terms of the management agreement." The petitioner's obligation to provide proper and convenient space for respondent to hold meetings and social events, therefore, is mandatory, with the only caveat being that such obligation could be excused only if the use by respondent of any such space (whether the current 600 square foot space or any other space inside the armory) would interfere [*9]with petitioner's ability to use the armory as intended under the terms of the petitioner's management agreement with the State. That is the question left remaining through Chapter 659, and, as it is essentially an affirmative defense, it is petitioner that has the burden of proof.

Accordingly, petitioner is free to argue to a factfinder, with admissible evidence and testimony, that petitioner is not obligated to allow respondent to remain in the current space, or provide respondent with any other proper and convenient space anywhere in the armory, because any such use and occupancy would materially interfere with its ability to use the armory as intended under the management agreement. Conversely, respondent is free to argue, with admissible evidence and testimony of its own, that there is indeed "room at the inn," somewhere within this multi-story, City block-sized facility (including its current space), for an organization that has managed with less than 1% of that structure for over a century to continue to be able to do so without interfering with petitioner's ability to use the armory as intended. The Court does not express an opinion as to how any of this may turn at trial beyond noting that these are proper issues for a trial on the record presented.

Chapter 659, as Applied Here, is Constitutional for the Reasons Stated in the August Decision

The Court has already held that "Chapter 659 does not constitute a taking on the facts presented," in considering the first-step provision of Military Law § 180-a(3)(c)(i). August Decision, at *5. Petitioner disagrees with that conclusion, as it did before the August Decision. Petitioner's arguments were unavailing then, and remain so now.

As a threshold issue, petitioner's tactics, which seem to be little more than a thinly-veiled effort to avoid Pullman and res judicata issues in the Federal Action, also echo the (itself questionable) abstention doctrine to decline constitutional issues in administrative proceedings.^FN3 See, e.g., England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964) (discussing Pullman doctrine); Police Dept. v. Roman, Index No. 356/91, slip op., at 8-15 (N.Y.C. Off. of Admin. Trials & Hearings Apr. 26, 1991) (collecting authorities and discussing authority of administrative law judges to rule on constitutional challenges); and Application of Doe (Massapequa Union Free School Dist.), slip op., at 2 (N.Y.S. Commr. of Educ. Oct. 14, 2025) (same, in regard to the Commissioner of Education's authority to consider constitutional questions in issuing temporary stay in Education Law § 310 appeal), app. sustained, Dec. No. 18726 (N.Y.S. Commr. of Educ. Apr. 20, 2026). Yet, this is not an administrative proceeding, and the Court is capable of its role "to determine what our Constitution requires, even when the [*10]resulting analysis leads to a conclusion that appears, or is, unpopular."^FN4 Stefanik v. Hochul, 43 NY3d 49, 73 (2024). Petitioner's arguments fail for a number of reasons.

Also presenting as a threshold issue, there is a manifest difference in arguing a taking between the facts presented in the Federal Action and the situation at bar.^FN5 Respondent has occupied the space at issue in this proceeding for well over a century, predating even the State's ownership of the privately-built armory itself and even the existence of ESD and petitioner. See, Selwyn Raab, State Will Transfer Control of Armory on Park Avenue, New York Times, Mar. 1, 1999, at § B, p. 3 (discussing the history of the building).^FN6 The Court is not forced to labor within "an ivory tower, where my senses are not alive to the sounds and smells of the marketplace," and a simple review of the New York Times produces articles, going back decades and subject to notice now, specifically referencing respondent's occupancy of the building.^FN7[*11] Rocco Agostino Landscape & Gen. Contr. Corp. v. City of New York Dept. of Parks & Recreation, 2025 NY Misc. LEXIS 10141 (Sup. Ct., New York Co. 2025) (quotation and citation omitted), confirmed, 2026 NY Slip Op 31400(U) (Sup. Ct., New York Co. Apr. 7, 2026). That compels a different takings analysis than the newly-designated space under the long-term solution contemplated by Military Law § 180-a(3)(e) and being litigated in the Federal Action.

To be clear, this might have been a closer question had it involved natural persons or for-profit corporations as parties. Natural persons and for-profit entities are not required to act in the public interest. See, e.g., James Speta, Book Review: A Vision of Internet Openness by Government Fiat the Future of Ideas, 96 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1553, 1560 (2002) (noting "that private firms are supposed to earn money for their shareholders"); and Mackenzie Kern, Climate Litigation's Pathways to Corporate Accountability, 54 Case W. Res. J. Intl. L. 477, 489 (2022) (discussing the possibility of a "shift to focusing the modern corporation on a broader stakeholder-oriented model where corporations are required to act in the public interest and in a socially and environmentally responsible way" from the current corporate governance model framed in law). However, this proceeding is a dispute between two non-profit charitable organizations over the use of space operated by a combined public benefit corporation and state agency on behalf of the State of New York. Their obligations, particularly based upon the parties' self-selected status as non-profit organizations, are not simply to maximize their own profit margins and individual successes. Their respective charitable status, in keeping with longstanding precedent in New York and elsewhere, requires an element of harmony in furtherance of the public interest that is neither present (certainly in degree) nor expected in private business dealings.

Charitable organizations like the parties in this proceeding are specially created and required to act in the public interest; as the Court of Appeals has long noted that "[a] corporation organized in the public interest, with a view to the public welfare, and in the expectation of benefit to the community, which is the motive of the State's grant, may accept the franchise," but remains subject to scrutiny as to whether it works in the public interest. People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 NY 582, 620 (1890). See also, Abrams v. Richmond County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, 125 Misc 2d 530, 533 (Sup. Ct., Richmond Co. 1984) (status as a charitable organization "confers a public benefit and therefore the institution must demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public interest"). In creating and empowering nonprofit corporations like petitioner through tax exemptions and other benefits, "[t]he government is not trying to ensure that the production decision accounts for donors' good feelings, but rather that the nonprofit subsidy is meant to increase production of goods with particular public benefits." James Hines, Jr., et al., The Attack on Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 179, 1208 (2010). Other scholars have noted that "non-profit organizations . . . exist to serve public welfare purposes but do so at public expense." Heidi [*12]Grunwald, Non-Profit Organizations Should Prioritize Governance in Board Selection Decisions, 27 Fordham J. Corp. $ Fin. L. 433, 447 (2022). Petitioner accepted these strictures when it accepted nonprofit status from the State, and ratifies that choice when it continues to accept the benefits of that status rather than seek relief from them. Petitioner will be held to its choices.

That respondent is also a charitable organization subject to the same questions the Court of Appeals noted in North River Sugar Refining Co. only amplifies the public interest in the parties' agreements. If anything, the historical interest in ensuring nonprofits intended to benefit children's work in the public interest has older and deeper roots in New York. See, N.Y.S. Archives, State Bd. of Charities (n.d.) (discussing historical oversight of nonprofit activity in New York).^FN8 As such, the State's interest in the parties' activities, and limitations upon their ability to contract away from that public interest, are amplified. The State's interest in those purposes and products — the work of the nonprofits for which they were created — is compelling, and the public can rightly demand that nonprofits not unduly interfere with each other's work on behalf of the public. In that framework, there is no taking on the record here, certainly not one as a matter of law, in applying Military Law § 180-a(3)(c)(i).^FN9

[*13]While Petitioner Has Not Established Cause for an Appellate Stay Pursuant to CPLR 5519, the Court May and Does Grant a Discretionary Abeit Conditional Stay Pursuant to CPLR 2201

In the event that petitioner's summary judgment arguments fail (which, as discussed above, they do under every scenario presented), petitioner alternatively seeks a stay of this proceeding pending the determination of both the Federal Action and its appeal of this Court's decisions. Specifically, petitioner cites both the appellate stay provisions of CPLR 5519 and the general stay rule, CPLR 2201. While petitioner's CPLR 5519 arguments are not persuasive, the Court will exercise its discretion to grant a stay pursuant to CPLR 2201.

In considering an appellate stay under CPLR 5519, courts in the City have specifically considered the merits of any potential appeal in staying summary landlord-tenant proceedings for over a century. See, e.g., 627 Fox St. Corp. v. Salomon, 190 N.Y.S. 434, 435 (Bronx Co. Ct. 1921) (granting stay based on merits of appeal). Turning to that analysis then, practice commentaries note that courts "have regularly entertained such motions, albeit granting them rarely and only upon a showing of great merit to the appeal or that the appeal has been fully perfected, or both." Howard A. Kurland, Practice Commentaries: CPLR 2221 (Lexis 2025) (emphasis added). Mindful of the dichotomy in issuing a decision and then considering the likelihood that that decision was wrongly decided, the Court generally denies motions for appellate stays without prejudice to seeking the same or similar relief from the Appellate Term. See, e.g., Bank of America, N.A. v. Turner, 78 Misc 3d 1202(A), *3 (Civ. Ct., Bronx Co. 2022) (discussing prior denial of stay pending appeal without prejudice). Cf., David Ferstendig, Practice Commentaries: CPLR 2221 (Lexis 2025) (in the context of reconsideration, noting that "[a]s a practical matter, a party should critically evaluate whether to move to reargue and assess the chances that the same judge that just denied the party's motion is going to have an epiphany and find in the movant's favor"). Petitioner has not presented evidence of sufficient merit for the Court to diverge from its general practice. Accordingly, the branch of petitioner's motion seeking a stay pending appeal pursuant to CPLR 5519 is denied without prejudice to seeking such stay in the Appellate Court.

Turning to CPLR 2201, "the court in which an action is pending may grant a stay of proceedings in a proper case, upon such terms as may be just." "A motion for a stay, such as the present one, is, of course, primarily addressed to the court's discretion." Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co. v. Lloyd's Underwriters, 44 Misc 2d 872, 874 (Sup. Ct., New York Co. 1964). That is a decidedly broader and more flexible rule than the stay pending appeal contemplated by CPLR 5519.

Petitioner argues that the August Decision "expressly addresses the constitutionality of the Legislation, which is presently being litigated in the Federal Action commenced by the Conservancy," and that as such, "[a] stay of these proceedings pursuant to CPLR 2201 is therefore warranted pending a determination in the Federal Action regarding the constitutionality of the Legislation." (Petitioner's Mem. of Law in Supp., at 17). While the First Department has long held that "[t]he general rule is that proceedings in an action pending in a state court will not be stayed until the determination of an action pending in the federal courts, where it appears that the action sought to be stayed will have to be determined no matter which way the case in the federal jurisdiction is decided," that is not necessarily the case here. Grand Central Bldg., Inc v. New York & Harlem Railroad Co., 59 A.D. 207, 210 (1st Dept. 1977). Here, the conclusion of the Federal Action in ESD's favor could moot further litigation of this proceeding because the parties would presumably proceed through the second step of Chapter 659 and respondent would [*14]then move into different (and larger) accommodations within the Armory pursuant to Military Law § 180-a(3)(e) upon victory. On the other hand, it is certainly not clear that there is a likelihood of success in this regard, particularly as it would likely require nothing less than a full victory for ESD at the district court level.

That said, petitioners in landlord-tenant matters seeking possession of real property are typically the party most likely to be prejudiced by a stay as delaying the proceedings forestalls the petitioner's assumption of possession of the subject space in the event they win. The respondent-occupant of the subject space, on the other hand, is typically the party least effected by the stay as the respondent is seeking to maintain the status quo — i.e, to remain in the subject space. For that reason, the Court generally tends to look favorably upon stay or adjournment request by a petitioner who the Court presumes commenced the litigation with at least some expectation that their claims would be successful on the merits and would obtain possession if the action were to proceed. Here, the petitioner seeking eviction of respondent in this action is also the party seeking the stay. In support of this application, petitioner asserts that "if the Court does grant a stay of these proceedings, the Greys will suffer no prejudice because the organization continues to occupy the basement Premises that is the subject of this holdover proceeding at no expense." (Petitioner's Mem. of Law in Supp., at 21). Leaving aside the apparent paradox of a petitioner simultaneously alleging that the status quo is causing all manner of severe difficulties, but at the same time arguing that it can comfortably wait pending resolution by the Federal Court in lieu of a summary trial in State Court, the Court is inclined to grant such application to the extent the petitioner's assertion is true. Specifically, during oral argument, both sides seemed to suggest that respondent's access to the subject premises has not been entirely unabated, and in fact, respondent has asserted that they have not had access to the space to be used for meetings and events for a substantial period of time. However, given that petitioner has stated in its papers that the Court should grant the stay in part because there is no prejudice to respondent as they will be able to simply continue to be able to use the space for meetings and events pending the stay, the Court will grant the stay conditioned on the veracity of that assertion. In other words, any stay indicated here means a stay in which respondent's use, occupancy and access to the premises is and continues to be maintained. See, Bank of New York Trust Co., N.A. v. Courtney, 78 Misc 3d 27, 29 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 2023).

Conclusion

"The law, in its serene impartiality, requires that judicial scrutiny be guided by clarity of proof, coherence of pleading, and adherence to statutory and constitutional bounds," and "[a]bsent a debilitating constitutional flaw . . . this Court must effectuate the common will expressed in the purpose of the legislation." Eustache v. Bd. of Educ., 87 Misc 3d 1254(A), *9 (Sup. Ct., New York Co. 2025); and Isaly v. Garde, 2024 NY Slip Op 30490(U), *12 (Sup. Ct., New York Co. 2024), quoting, Swails v. State, 263 Ga. 276, 276, 431 S.E.2d 101 (1993). The complex and sadly fraught nature of the parties' relationship notwithstanding, the Legislature's expression of the common will is unmistakable, and Chapter 659 has answered many of the disputes between the parties. While the Court grants leave to reconsider its prior holdings, there is no basis upon which the Cout reverses or modifies the Court's prior determinations in the August Decision.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the parties' respective motions and cross-motions marked as Motion Seq. [*15]Nos. 008 and 009 are each granted in part and denied in part pursuant to CPLR 2221 in accordance with this opinion; and it is further

ORDERED that the Court grants reconsideration and upon reconsideration adheres to its prior holdings determining Motion Seq. Nos. 004 through 006 in the Court's decision and order August 20, 2025, and published as Seventh Regiment Armory Conservancy, Inc. v. Knickerbocker Greys, 88 Misc 3d 437; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of petitioner's motion seeking a stay of this proceeding pending appeal of the Court's August 20, 2025, decision noted above pursuant to CPLR 5519 is denied without prejudice to seeking the same or similar relief from the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court for the First Judicial Department; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of petitioner's motion seeking a stay of this proceeding pending the determination of the Federal Action, and any appeals thereof, pursuant to CPLR 2201, is granted to the extent of granting a conditional stay under the conditions stated in this decision and order; and it is further

ORDERED that pursuant to this conditional stay, respondent Knickerbocker Greys shall have use, occupancy and access to the premises at issue in this proceeding during the period of the stay ordered herein.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Date: July 10, 2026

Hon. Jeffrey S. Zellan, A.J.S.C.