Parkway Hgts. LLC v Carrington

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County

Decided on June 5, 2026

Index No. L&T 318842-25/KI

Javier E. Ortiz, J.

Parkway Heights LLC (hereinafter "Petitioner") commenced this holdover proceeding against Yolande H. Carrington (hereinafter "Respondent"), Shaka Ray Mentor (hereinafter "Mr. Mentor"), Sylvester Leemow and "John & Jane Doe," seeking possession of 410 Eastern [*2]Parkway (the "subject building"), Apartment 5-K, Brooklyn, New York (the "subject premises"). The petition is predicated on the service of a ten-day notice to cure which alleges that Respondent is violating a substantial obligation of her tenancy and Rent Stabilization Code ("RSC") § 2525.6(f) by impermissibly subletting the subject premises without permission of the Petitioner. (NYSCEF Doc. 1 at pg. 11). The notice to cure specifically alleges that the individuals occupying [Respondent's] apartment are unknown to the landlord and were only "recently discovered . . . .Shaka Ray Mentor and Sylvester Leemow are believed to be currently occupying the apartment without the permission of the landlord and were not listed on the lease of the tenant of record." (Id.). The notice to cure provided Respondent ten days to "move back into the apartment as your primary residence or remove the occupants." (Id. at pg. 12). A notice of termination followed, informing Respondent that she failed to cure the allegation of an illegal sublet and that Petitioner was therefore terminating her tenancy pursuant to RSC § 2524.3 (breach of lease) and § 2525.6(f) (illegal sublet). (NYSCEF Doc. 1 at pg. 6). Respondent and Mr. Mentor retained counsel and submitted an answer alleging that Mr. Mentor is not a sub-lessee but instead resides at the subject premises with Respondent as her son, and that Sylvester Leemow is not in possession of the subject premises and vacated years ago, inter alia. (NYSCEF Doc. 9).^FN1 The court conducted a trial of this proceeding on February 24, 2026, and March 27, 2026.

FINDING OF FACTS

Evidence Presented at Trial

Petitioner's Case

Tina Georgi (hereinafter "Ms. Georgi") was Petitioner's only witness on its case. Ms. Georgi testified that she is employed by Petitioner; that she is familiar with the subject premises through her employment; that Petitioner is the deed holder of the subject building; that the subject building is a multi-family property with 72 residential units; that it is registered with the Department of Housing Preservation and Development; that Respondent is the tenant of the subject premises; that Respondent entered into possession of the subject premises through a lease agreement; that the subject premises is rent stabilized; and that the Petitioner has offered Respondent renewal leases.

At this point Ms. Georgi was shown Petitioner's Exhibit 4, the current renewal lease for the subject premises, and she testified that there were two signatures on the tenant section of the lease; that one of the those signatures belongs to Respondent, while the other was unrecognizable and possibly attributed to an occupant; that the Petitioner never offered a lease to anyone other than Respondent; that the Petitioner crossed off the non-tenant signature as it did not offer the lease to that signatory; and that Respondent has breached the lease agreement by not living in the subject premises, while letting other occupants reside there.

Ms. Georgi was then provided with Petitioner's Exhibit 3, the initial lease agreement, and referenced paragraph 12. Ms. Georgi testified that the provision contained in that paragraph prohibits the assignment or sublet of the subject premises and that Petitioner believes that Respondent has breached this provision; that Petitioner never gave permission to the Respondent to sublet the apartment; that the Petitioner came to the conclusion that Respondent was [*4]subletting after hiring an investigator; and that Petitioner's investigation revealed that the Respondent purchased a home in Florida and has been living there for several years.

Ms. Georgi was then shown Petitioner's Exhibit 5, a deed to a property located in Miami, Florida (hereinafter "Florida property"). She testified that the grantee on the deed was the Respondent, Yolande Carrington; that through Petitioner's investigation, Respondent not only owns the Florida property but is residing there; and that this belief is based on Respondent claiming a homestead tax exemption on the Florida property.

Ms. Georgi was next shown Petitioner's Exhibit 6, property tax documents regarding Respondent's Florida property. Ms. Georgi testified that she recognized the exhibit as being tax documents from Florida; that Petitioner obtained these documents from an official government website of the State of Florida; that the tax documents show that Respondent is claiming a homestead exemption since at least 2019; that Petitioner engaged an attorney to commence the instant case; that Respondent was served with a notice to cure prior to commencement of the proceeding; that Respondent failed to cure by June 4, 2025, the deadline set forth in the notice; that a notice of termination was then prepared and served on Respondent; that Respondent failed to vacate the subject premises by June 26, 2025, which was the deadline set forth in the termination notice; that the names of the other Respondents-undertenants were obtained through Petitioner's investigator; that after sending both notices, Petitioner then commenced this summary holdover proceeding.

At this point the court took judicial notice of the pleadings, affidavit of service and the contents therein. Ms. Georgi continued to testify that rent is due from the Respondent, as seen in their rent ledger; that the ledger alleges arrears in the amount of $7,593.72; and that Petitioner is seeking a judgment of both possession and money.

On cross examination, Ms. Georgi testified that the Florida tax documents show a financial breakdown of what was billed; that she did not see a calculation representing a deduction from the tax levied attributable to a homestead exemption; that she is not an attorney in the State of Florida; that she does not know for certain what is required to qualify for a homestead exemption in Florida; that her understanding is that to qualify for a homestead exemption, you must first surrender your license or residence in another state and prove that your primary residence is in Florida; and that she otherwise has no knowledge of the laws in Florida.

On redirect Ms. Georgi was shown Petitioner's Exhibit 8, building and property tax records for Respondent's Florida property. She testified that the exhibit shows a $25,000 exemption marked as homestead; that the exhibit also shows an exemption marked as second homestead; and that she does not know what a second homestead exemption means.

On re-cross examination, Ms. Georgi testified that she is not surprised that citizens of New York may have second homes; and that she is not surprised that the Florida tax code may permit a homestead exemption for second homes.

With that Petitioner rested its case.

Respondent's Case

Respondent was the first witness on her case. She testified that she has lived at the subject premises for fifty-one years; that she has never sublet to anyone; and that Mr. Mentor is her son. Respondent was then shown Respondent's Exhibit 1, the birth certificate for Shaka Ray Mentor. She testified that her name on the birth certificate is listed as Yolande Phillips; that her name is Yolande Carrington from marriage; that she was born Yolande Phillip; that she was [*5]married in 1971; that when Mr. Mentor was born and brought home from the hospital, he was brought to the subject premises; that it is fair to say that Mr. Mentor has lived at the subject premises his whole life; that she has filed tax returns in New York State every year; that she worked at the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles for over thirty-three years; that she retired in June 2013; and that she files her tax returns in New York even in retirement.

Respondent further testified that she does own a property in Florida; that she has owned the Florida property since 1989; that her primary residence is in New York; that she travels to her Florida property between December to February every year; that she stayed longer in Florida this year because she was sick; that she has never filed a tax return in Florida; that to her knowledge, she has never filed for a homestead exemption; that she is the sole owner of the Florida property; that all of her bank accounts and pension are connected to the address of the subject premises; that she is registered to vote in Kings County; that she has never been registered to vote in Florida; and that she has never registered to vote using another address in New York.

On cross examination Ms. Carrington testified that she has never claimed a homestead exemption in Florida; that she has heard of a homestead exemption, but that she does not have it; that looking at the divorce decree, it permits her to resume her maiden last name as "Phillip"; that the actual last name is "Phillip", not "Phillips"; that the birth certificate for Mr. Mentor shows her last name as "Phillips"; and that she never bothered to correct the mistake.

Respondent further testified that she is not renting out her Florida property, nor is she receiving any form of income stream related to rent; that the Florida property is a house; that in 2025, she slept at the subject premises approximately 200 nights; that in 2024, she slept in the subject premises approximately 180 nights; that even though Petitioner's Exhibit 8 shows a homestead tax exemption for the Florida property, she has no knowledge of applying for one; that she is not aware of the requirements involved with claiming a homestead exemption in Florida; that when she travels to Florida, Mr. Mentor often accompanies her; that when Mr. Mentor travels with her to Florida, there is no one else living at the subject premises; and that herself and Mr. Mentor are the only occupants of the subject premises.

On redirect, Respondent testified that the last name of "Phillips" on the birth certificate may be a mistake from the hospital; that she was born in Trinidad; that she first came to New York in October of 1971; and that she does not have any explanation as to the confusion regarding her maiden name.

Mr. Mentor was called as the second witness. Mr. Mentor testified that he has lived at the subject premises since October of 1978; that he has never resided anywhere else other that at the subject premises; that he works at the New York City Department of Education; that he is a teaching assistant who works with children receiving special education; that the notice of termination lists a John Doe and Jane Doe as undertenants, along with his name and Sylvester Leemow; that Sylvester Leemow was his mother's ex-boyfriend; that they were dating for a "long time" but the relationship ended approximately nine or ten years ago; that Mr. Leemow used to spend some nights at the subject premises but did not permanently reside there; that Mr. Mentor at no point gave up his residence at the subject premises; that he never told Petitioner vacated; and that he has never sublet the subject premises.

On cross examination Mr. Mentor testified that he has a driver's license; that he had a driver's license before 2022; that both his prior and current licenses lists the subject premises as his address; that no one else lives in the subject premises other than himself and his mother; that [*6]he helps his mother pay the rent; that the amount he has given her varies; that for the past two years he has been paying the rent for Respondent; that there were discrepancies with management when they started sending the invoices directly to him; that Respondent used to walk into the management office personally to pay the rent, but was told not to do so; that he writes the checks directly to Petitioner; that he did attempt to add his signature to the renewal lease in question; that his name does not appear on the lease so he understands it was not being offered to him; that there was paperwork that lists him as an occupant in the subject premises; that he is registered to vote; that he filed his federal and state taxes for 2025 and the address he used is that of the subject premises; and that it is the same for his 2024 and 2023 tax returns.

With that, Petitioner concluded its cross examination and Respondents rested their case.

DISCUSSION

The court begins its discussion with what this case is not about. Much was offered during trial, both in the testimony elicited by the witnesses and the exhibits introduced by Petitioner, about whether Respondent is a full-time resident of Florida. This proceeding is not a non-primary residence holdover. Petitioner's cause of action is limited to the grounds specified in its notice of termination. (9 NYCRR § 2524.2[b]). Thus, Petitioner's cause of action is only one that alleges a breach of lease by way of the allegation that Respondent is subletting the subject premises without permission of the Petitioner. (NYSCEF Doc. 1 at pg. 11; 9 NYCRR §§ 2524.3, § 2525.6[f]).

That said, the RSC prohibits rent stabilized tenants from assignment or subleasing absent permission from the landlord, and doing so is grounds for termination of the tenancy. (9 NYCRR § 2525.6[f]). However, a rent-stabilized tenant who has allowed a close family member to reside in her apartment for an extended a period of time, without profiteering from the arrangement, "has not engaged in an unauthorized sublet, even where the tenant of record resides elsewhere." (Royal Assoc. LLC v Gomez, 80 Misc 3d 422, 425 [Civ Ct, Queens County 2023], citing to 235 W. 71st St. LLC v. Chechak, 4 Misc 3d 114, 115 [App Term, 1st Dept 2004]). It is also unlawful for a landlord to restrict or prohibit occupancy to a residential premises where such restriction seeks to exclude a tenant's immediate family. (RPL § 235-f [2],[3]).

Further, the Second Department, wherein this court sits, employs a heightened level of scrutiny to predicate notices based on the allegation of an unlawful sublet where the landlord knows, or should have known, that the alleged sublessee is a close family member of the tenant of record. (Gomez, 80 Misc 3d 422 at 426; 888 E. 96th St. LLC v Hargrove, 61 Misc 3d 137[A] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]). This heightened standard requires that where:

a landlord has information that the occupant of the apartment is a close family member of the tenant and seeks to evict that occupant on the basis of an illegal sublet . . . it must do more, in its predicate notices and petition, than make conclusory allegations of an illegal sublet or assignment; instead the landlord must allege facts tending to establish that the occupancy rose to the level of an illegal sublet.

(901 Brooklyn Realty, LLC v Woods-Najac, 65 Misc 3d 158[A], *4 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]).

This enhanced factual pleading requirement is particularly salient considering that "a claim of succession rights is not a cognizable defense to an illegal sublet proceeding." (Id. at *2). [*7]Given that a respondent/occupant, who is an immediate family member of a tenant of record, may have a colorable claim to succession in a licensee or non-primary residence holdover, specific factual pleadings in a notice of termination alleging an unauthorized sublet to a family member are essential so as to not extinguish rights to succession. (Gomez, 80 Misc 3d 422 at 427-428).

Applying this framework to the case at bar, Petitioner's predicate notices fail to meet the standard required in the Second Department. Petitioner's notice of termination contains no factual allegations whatsoever beyond the conclusory statement that "[Respondent has] neither moved back into the apartment as your primary residence nor have you removed the occupants including but not limited to Shaka Ray Mentor and Sylvester Leemow." (NYSCEF Doc. 1 at pg. 6). Petitioner's notice to cure is similarly devoid of facts establishing that the occupancy of the premises constitutes an illegal sublet. The notice to cure states that Respondent has "sublet [her] apartment without the permission of the landlord and without first obtaining the prior written consent of the landlord." (Id. at pg. 11). It further alleges that the person occupying the subject premises is unknown to the landlord and that Respondent never informed Petitioner that any additional family members moved in. (Id.). Notably, "Shaka Ray Mentor and Sylvester Leemow are believed to be currently occupying the apartment without permission of the landlord and were not listed on the lease of the tenant of record." (Id.). These notices do not establish any facts as to how or why the Petitioner determined an unauthorized sublet is occurring, nor do they acknowledge the familial relationship between Respondent and Mr. Mentor. These are not factual allegations plead with specificity, rather they are bare and unsupported conclusions, the type of which have already been rejected by the Second Department and fail the requirement of the RSC. (9 NYCRR § 2524.2(b); 69 E.M. LLC v Mejia, 49 Misc 3d 152[A] [App Term 1st Dept 2015]; Hargrove, 61 Misc 3d 137[A]; Woods-Najac, 65 Misc 3d 158[A]).

Petitioner's claim in its predicate notice that Mr. Mentor was previously "unknown to the landlord" and "only recently discovered" strains credulity. Both Respondent and Mr. Mentor credibly testified that Mr. Mentor has resided at the subject premises for essentially his entire life and that Sylvester Leemow has not been to the subject premises in years. Mr. Mentor even testified that he has appeared in the management office along with his mother on several occasions, that he has previously been listed as an occupant, and that he has received rent invoices and paid rent to the Petitioner directly for at least two years prior to the termination of the tenancy; not to mention, he attempted sign a renewal lease in his own name. Certainly, Petitioner should have known of the familial relationship between Respondent and Mr. Mentor, given these facts and, particularly, based on his decades-long occupancy of the subject premises since childhood.

The court does note that it is undisputed that Respondent has a property in Miami, spends significant time there, and may be claiming a homestead tax exemption in Florida. Generally, "[w]hen a person other than the lessee is shown to be in the leasehold premises, the law will presume the existence of an assignment or sublet agreement and proof of such agreement is not required." (Carol Mgt. Corp. v Britton, 1992 NY App. Div. LEXIS 15209 [App Div 2d Dept 1992]. It is this presumption that Petitioner argued during closing. The presumption, however, "does not apply where the person in occupancy is a close family member of the tenant, as the permissible occupancy of family members does not provide a basis for a claim of illegal sublet." (Woods-Najac, 65 Misc 3d 158[A] at *3 -*4). To be clear, the court makes no finding as to where Respondent's primary residence is located, as this was not the issue before it. If the [*8]dispositive issue is the primary residence of the Respondent, the appropriate remedy for the Petitioner is a nonprimary residence holdover commenced after the requisite notice. (Chechak, 4 Misc 3d 114 at 115; Golub v Frank, 65 NY2d 900 [1985]).

Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, it is:

ORDERED that the proceeding is dismissed; it is further

ORDERED that parties are directed to pick up their exhibits within thirty days or they will either be sent to the parties or destroyed at the Court's discretion in compliance with DRP-185.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

DATE June 5, 2026

JAVIER E. ORTIZ, J.H.C.